

Jesse Andrews.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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PREFACE.

THE title indicates the specific aim of this volume. It is not an encyclopædia; nor is it intended as an introduction to any particular philosophical system, or to the history of the various systems, but to the study of philosophy itself. The book was not written for philosophers, but for students and others who desire to prepare themselves for philosophic pursuits. While especially adapted to beginners in philosophy, maturer students will find it helpful as a review. It may serve to concentrate and crystallize the thoughts which have been confused and bewildered by the perplexing problems of philosophy, and by the antagonistic views in the different systems, and thus may prepare the thinker for a new and more vigorous start in philosophic research. The urgent need of such a work is the apology for its existence,—a need evident to all who understand the inherent difficulties of philosophy, the conflicting notions respecting its nature, aim, divisions, and method, and the numerous mistakes of students, and their failure to secure the best results from philosophic inquiries.

The specific aim has not merely determined the general character of the volume, but also its particular parts, so as to limit the contents strictly to the scope of an introductory work. No labor has been spared to present, in the clearest manner, such thoughts as are regarded most essential for the beginner. The reader who knows the difference between floundering in a subject, and thinking through it, is in no danger of mistaking obscurity as synonymous with philosophical profundity. But even an elementary work in philosophy is obliged to discuss subjects which require profound study, and furnish food for the deepest thought. Particularly is this the case with those great problems which have enlisted the best energies of thinkers ever since the birth of philosophy. The student who has the acumen and thoroughness which adapt him to philosophical investigations will appreciate the importance of grappling early with themes which most severely test his intellectual powers. While intent on securing all possible help to put him into the right attitude to philosophy, he will value all aids only as means for becoming independent of foreign help. Philosophy is not taught, but thought; and even an introductory work presupposes that the student will do more for himself than others can do for him. Particularly in philosophy is it true, that what one gets depends on what he brings.

The best introduction to philosophy is not so much an accumulation of materials of thought, as the develop-

ment and proper direction of the energy of thought. While the following chapters aim to give a clear statement of problems, and hints for their solution, it is evident that their full discussion must be left to philosophy itself. Where mere statements are all that the philosopher requires, the beginner may need the processes themselves which lead to the results attained by mature thinkers; and here such processes are frequently given, so that, by means of the genetic method, the student may learn that only by thinking through a thought can it be appropriated. At the end of each chapter, hints are found under the head of *Reflections*, intended partly as a review, but mainly as suggestions for independent inquiry and for mental discipline.

Aside from the nature of the subject, the character of the volume has been determined by the author's own experience of the difficulties of philosophical studies, and by extensive observations, in America and Germany, of the perplexities and mistakes of students of philosophy. Particularly have these observations been valuable in Berlin, where students congregate from all parts of the world. A careful consideration of the need of beginners has led to the treatment of certain subjects with greater fulness than required in ordinary philosophical works; while other topics have been only mentioned or briefly discussed, their full consideration being left to a period of greater maturity. A clear view of philosophy itself and its divisions, a definite statement of the problems involved, and specific directions for

thorough and successful study, have been the constant aim. While the views of philosophers in past ages may be learned from their books, or from the history of philosophy, the student generally finds it exceedingly difficult to form a comprehensive view of present tendencies in philosophic thought, — tendencies which are the more important because he is continually, though perhaps unconsciously, subject to their influence. Frequent reference is made to the present status of philosophy, in order that the student may learn what special demands the age makes on the philosophic thinker, and against what dangers he must guard. Wisdom does not lose itself in random thinking, but it selects timely and useful subjects, which the historic development justifies and the age makes urgent, and which are capable of richest development and most fruitful application.

Much valuable help has been derived from the numerous volumes consulted; but as none of them has exactly the same aim as this volume, they could not determine the general plan and particular method of the book. It is hoped that the student will find in the work that independence respecting prevalent systems which the book itself is intended to promote. So far as justice required, special mention has been made of the authors used. The student will be grateful for the views of eminent philosophers on the most important problems; and he who makes reading subordinate to thinking will not regret the opportunities for reflection furnished by the interruptions occasioned by footnotes. The longer

notes are thrown into the Appendix, and to these the numbers in the text refer.

In discussing the relation of philosophy to science, it would have been easy to treat the subject wholly from the philosophical standpoint. But this relation has become so important, that both sides should be heard; and for this reason the views of scientists, as well as those of philosophers, are presented: hence numerous references are made, both in the text and in the Appendix, to leaders in science.

In addition to the works referred to in the text, a list of books is given at the end of the first chapters, on the subjects therein discussed. This list may be valuable as an introduction to the literature on philosophy, particularly to the philosophical journals. Besides a knowledge of current philosophical tendencies, these journals furnish valuable aid to the student for the selection of works on the general subject, and on the various departments of philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION.

IF philosophy is the object of our search, the question respecting the means for its attainment is fundamental. But not less important is an inquiry into the state of the person who is to engage in this search, and to use these means. The apprehension of the subject, and the application of the means, depend on the student's intellectual grasp and energy, his previous training and mental possessions. Since these vary so greatly, their peculiarities in each individual case cannot be taken into account here: only what must be required of all can be indicated. Although we are obliged to leave the matter mainly to himself, the greatest emphasis must be placed on the state of the beginner in the study of philosophy. Thrown upon his own resources more than in any other pursuit, a fault in himself or in his attitude toward philosophy may prove fatal to success.

Not only must philosophy in the abstract, and what the student is in himself, be considered. The development attained by philosophy and the general condition of thought, particularly in his immediate surroundings, are also important factors in determining his course. Even mature philosophers cannot ignore the current tendencies of their age; still less can this be done by beginners. The earnest student of philosophy, an inquirer into deepest thought, is supposed to be exempt

from ordinary errors and prejudices respecting the nature and value of his pursuit. The severe labor required of the philosophic thinker is evidence that the best truth may lie farthest below the surface, and cannot be received as a direct impression through the senses, or as an inspiration. Other views calculated to embarrass him may, however, be worthy of serious attention, — views infecting the air we breathe, and unconsciously becoming a part of our very being and intellectual life.

In every age opposite tendencies prevail, animated by different spirits, pursuing methods which are in conflict, and terminating in results which cannot be harmonized. Frequently these antagonistic movements are extremes which beget and develop one another. When the error in an extreme is discovered, the mind is apt to reject even the truth with which it is associated, and to adopt one-sidedly the truth which was ignored or denied; but truth out of right relations, or developed in undue proportion to other truths, is itself an error. It requires rare breadth, depth, and impartiality, to discern, appropriate, and properly relate all that is true in a system, while rejecting all that is erroneous.

Amid the numerous currents of our agitated age, there are two fundamental tendencies which are radically antagonistic. On the one hand, we discover the maxim which confines thought to external objects, as the only source of valid and valuable knowledge. Observation and experiment are pronounced the only means of communicating with the real, and the mind is solely esteemed as the agent which unites the materials thus gathered, and which draws from them such laws as give the intellect a comprehensive view of the facts, and enable it in some measure to foretell coming natural events. Nature being regarded as the chief object of investigation,

empiricism, aided by mathematics, domineers thought. The mind is treated as the passive tool of the sense, subject to its laws, run in its grooves, and limited by its authority. The human interests receiving supreme attention are those most closely connected with nature, and with the animal creation at large. As the facts of the natural world are made the germs of science, so the facts of human history become the seeds of ethics, sociology, and politics. A deep distrust of mind is frequently revealed by minds controlled by this tendency, and vigorous efforts are made to suppress aspiration beyond the limits of natural law. Much formerly regarded as real, or at least as a mental representation of reality, is now mercilessly assigned to poetry and fiction, while the sense is endowed with an intuitive knowledge of things as they are. To thought preferring the limits of its own law to those of empirical realism, the region of mythology is generously donated. Cherished ideals are treated as pleasant and perhaps harmless illusions; faith is regarded as effete; and theology and metaphysics are interpreted as aberrations of mind on its way to positivism, the Ultima Thule of reliable thought.

This tendency is not, however, confined to positivists. Sacrificing depth to breadth, it is a widely diffused spirit with various manifestations, agreeing in its negations rather than in its positions. Thus experience may be lauded as the sole guide, and yet the results obtained may differ greatly. The theoretic rejection of faith does not prevent assumptions which reveal astounding credulity. Theology can be rejected as worthless, and then, to meet the cravings of the mind, something termed natural religion can be invented, or a cultus of reason, genius, or humanity can be instituted. If a practical rest can be found in a theoretical void, agnosticism may be

pronounced final. Facts may be regarded as most valuable in their naked, unconnected reality, while a system of them is viewed as suspicious because too mental. Above all else, that is esteemed as having worth which can be weighed and measured, and expressed in mathematical formulas.

Numerous evidences of this spirit are found in life and literature. Socialism boldly proclaims that science has abolished the spiritual world and the ideals, and that consequently the most illiterate, by placing himself on the conclusions of science, will be consistent with it if he limits his desires and pursuits to the immediate interests of this life. Selfishness and passion have much to do with determining these interests. Unless some altruistic notions can be communicated to him, he is freed from the dominion of all authority outside of himself, that of blind force or the penal laws of society alone excepted. With the dominion of empiricism, new methods of education are also to be introduced. Mental science is treated as vague and unreliable, because it does not submit to tape-lines and scales. Even history is depreciated, because it does not square itself to the rules of mathematics. Humanity has so meandering a course, that it can be studied to best advantage in the severer scientific regularity of brutes. The classics are objectionable, because by promoting ideals they disturb the mind's possession of the reals.

Not indeed all who cherish this spirit go to these extremes; but one need only be familiar with the press of the day, to learn that potent factors in society tend to destroy the ethical and spiritual basis, to interpret what is termed mental by the mechanical, to deprive the soul of confidence in its peculiarities and deepest interests, and to involve it in that pessimism which has

become so marked a feature of the most sensitive and most cultured among those controlled by this spirit.

So general and so dominant is this spirit, that all who eagerly enter the domain of science, to become masters of its principles, are likely to come under its influence. In proportion to the zeal with which an object is pursued, does it abstract the attention from other objects. Not in enthusiasm for a specialty is there danger for the mind, but in affirmations respecting the reality or character of the territory lying outside of that specialty, and not even entered by the intellect. It is a common human failing to make the knowledge obtained in one sphere of thought the light to illumine the darkness of every other sphere. Not unfrequently has nature been interpreted by the knowledge obtained of mind; and, in our day, the reverse is common.

The correctness of the claims made by this spirit will be considered later; here we want only to contrast it with another tendency. In science itself there are numerous illustrations that the best scientists are not exclusive. Not a few of them admit that science is neither the measure of reality nor the limit of the intellect. Tyndall, Huxley, Haeckel, Helmholtz, Du Bois-Reymond, and many others, prove by their works that science is but the basis for thought in its progress to broader generalizations and higher flights. There are even scientists who compensate for the absence of fancy in their themes, by liberally supplying it themselves.

But it is outside of the domain of science that a spirit, the opposite of that described, is most manifest. All religion proves that the mind is unwilling to be confined to the dogmatism of empiricism. But also in other departments thought rebels against the prescribed limits, strives to free itself from the trammels of gross objects,

revels in poetry and fiction, and thus proves that it wants to supplement the known realities of nature with creations of its own, in order that it may obtain satisfaction. The age which seeks to curb thought has not a few who hail even Emerson's poetry as philosophy, failing to discriminate between the rational and imaginative elements in his works. Plato has been subject to the same treatment in all ages. And it looks as if in realistic America an era of Hegelistic idealism were about to be inaugurated,—an idealism farthest removed from the dominion of facts, and blending the subtlest fiction with the profoundest reason. Look where we will in the most practical and most scientific lands, thought proves by a fact, by its own energy, that it cannot be buried under a mass of sensations.

It is not necessary to prove to the student of philosophy, that there are aspirations which a cramped knowledge cannot satisfy. Nor is it worth while further to pursue this spirit in its efforts to move in a sphere which transcends the phenomena of nature. One need but understand himself, in order to know that the real of the senses is not the limit of the real of reason. Never has the intellect been limited to the former, except by a theory not fully understood by its advocates.

Looking at these opposite tendencies, both equally marked in our day, what is their lesson? What position respecting them shall we take? Empiricism is liable to err in limiting thought to sensations, while speculation is in danger of ignoring the data of the senses. The one treats as final what is but a beginning; the other treats as the beginning what still requires a solid basis. The mind cannot be content with the facts of nature bound together in a rigid system of laws, while all reality beyond the visible and the tactual is

denied. Nor can we build solid structures on creations of the fancy. The mind conscious of itself demands *a certainty that is absolute, and at the same time the pursuit of thought to its utmost limits*. This means the union of what is good and reliable in both tendencies, without the adoption of their extremes. It means actualism and realism, whether found in the highest or lowest domains of thought. The intellect can only be true to itself while moving in a freedom whose sole law is the necessity of reason.

The above result justifies the demand for philosophy. Numerous other reflections lead to philosophy and illustrate its scope.

1. The concrete is endless. The mind cannot remember all individual objects; if it did, they would only prove a useless burden. But every step it takes from the concrete toward the abstract, from percepts to concepts, and from concepts to principles, decreases the number but increases the comprehensiveness of the objects before the mind. There is a strong innate tendency to unite under as few heads as possible all the objects of knowledge. However far separated at the start, as they increase in depth, the thoughts converge and tend to union in the ultimate principles.

2. Besides this tendency to seek the fundamental thought which lies in many or all other thoughts, the mind also wants to find the various relations of concepts. It seeks so to unite fragmentary thoughts as to form a system. Not content with the spontaneous association of thoughts, it aims to discover their hidden relations, so that it may construct an intellectual cosmos in which nothing is isolated.

3. Numerous objects appear before consciousness, and then vanish to return no more. In this way a fleeting

world is presented, and because continually vanishing it fails to satisfy. Does the mind exist merely for the sake of these ever-changing impressions, or has it a value of its own? It is hard to believe that the universe has no other meaning than to furnish passing phenomena. As the same underlying consciousness abides amid the changes of its objects, so the mind seeks the eternal substance behind the vanishing forms. It inquires into the ultimate real; asks whether its nature changes, or whether in what we term phenomena there is seen only the effect of changing the relations of the real. Can we conceive of the substance as unchangeable, and yet as the source of all changes?

4. Our opinions vary. We make mistakes, and correct them. Much once held as established beyond all question is now pronounced false. Its experiences may lead the mind to question its ability to discover the truth. The differences of opinion, the conflicts between systems, and the numerous disputes on the most significant and most trivial subjects, shake its confidence in the ordinary thinking. As the intellect becomes critical, it distinguishes between subjective views (opinions) of truth, and the truth itself. Are there criteria which furnish an absolute test of systems and an invariable standard of truth?

5. The greatest interests are attacked. The existence of spirit is questioned; the freedom and immortality of the soul are denied; reason is eliminated from the universe, and blind force is thought to banish design; God being dethroned, atoms are made omnipotent. Is there still a reliable basis for religion? Or is faith an empty vision, and hope a dream? What are the objects of supreme worth?

6. Much that appears I condemn, and much that I

think desirable does not exist. How to destroy the one and promote the other, thus becomes an important problem. In one domain of values, taste rules; in another, conscience. What is their authority? How can they be satisfied?

7. As soon as the intellect penetrates beyond the surface of ordinary thought, numerous perplexing problems appear. The effort to solve them leads deeper and deeper, and reveals a world formerly hid. Far away from the phenomenal, the mind is thrown wholly on its own resources, and depends on the penetrative energy of its thoughts. How can it discover the laws of reason and move safely in the realm of pure thinking?

These hints give an idea of some of the ways which lead to philosophic thought, and also indicate the sphere in which the discussions of this book move. The logical arrangement of the chapters is seen at a glance. First the Nature of philosophy is considered; then its Relation to adjacent subjects; its general Divisions are then given, and these are followed by an explanation of each division; and last of all the Spirit and Method in the study of philosophy are discussed.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

INTELLECT is energy, great equally in discovering as in solving problems. The leading systems of thought have revealed difficulties before unseen, and exposed fallacies in reasoning before supposed to be perfect. The works of Plato and Aristotle, of Hume, Kant, and Hegel, teem with problems; and some supposed solutions given by them are found to contain greater problems than they themselves knew. Difficulties multiply as we go deeper; and whoever discovers a new unsolved question proves that he has thought more correctly or more profoundly than his predecessors. The discovery of such problems, where the ordinary thinking sees none, is the first step toward philosophical thought; and the determination of their exact nature is a condition for all successful attempts at solution. The difficulty which arrests thought tests the mind's quality, and tends to develop its capacity. Resistance makes the intellect conscious of itself, and arouses its greatest energy. The supposed limits of the understanding, for instance, provoke to almost superhuman efforts to transcend them. Unless the tension is too great, it will

develop the utmost strength. The spontaneous flow of thought which we do not master, and are scarcely conscious of, may become so habitual as to unfit the mind for riveted attention to profound themes, and for the control of its own processes; while problems requiring penetrative thought, and long, absorbing investigation, are of inestimable value for intellectual discipline, even if their study ends in no solutions. Only with severe labor can we rise from a life lost amid sensations, to a steady contemplation of concepts. These are at first taken for what they seem to be, just like the impressions through the senses; only after severe training to the task can the mind fathom their meaning, discover their problems, discern their relations, and learn what they imply, but do not explicitly state. This life in the concepts, if deep and consistent, moves among the problems which have enlisted the best energies of the first thinkers for thousands of years, and have given birth to philosophy.

All who use this term intelligently recognize it as designating a sphere which lies far beyond the range of ordinary thinking, though numerous avenues lead from the one to the other. The profoundest efforts to solve the mysteries of thought and being have usually been regarded as characteristic of philosophers. The first and final causes, and the great concepts lying between them, are the realm of philosophy; but such statements are too general to convey any tangible meaning.

It is a popular conviction, that the object of philosophical contemplation lies beyond ordinary scholarship, as well as beyond the search of the masses; and hence but few in any age, even when scholarship was not unusual, have been honored with the illustrious name

of philosophers. But the reverence accorded to them has been based on vague notions of the excellence of their pursuit, rather than on a clear conception of its exact nature. The recognition that depth characterizes philosophy has not served to dispel the mysteries connected with the term. The popular mind associates with it wisdom and reason, — peculiar endowments and a peculiar sphere of inquiry; but however eminent and solitary the position thus assigned to philosophy, its real character has been but little understood by the popular mind. All this becomes self-evident so soon as we appreciate the truth, that we understand only what we intellectually elaborate or work out for ourselves.

The use of the term on the part of scholars is scarcely less vague than in the popular mind. The proof is found in works of scientists and philosophers, and in general literature. The thoughtful reader is consequently constrained to ask, What constitutes philosophy? An inquiry into the mysteries of being? The objects which philosophers contemplate? The method of inquiry? The results attained by the investigation? Whoever seriously reflects on the word will apprehend the difficulty of determining its exact sense. With the prevailing vagueness in its use, what wonder if those beginning the study of philosophy are puzzled by the nature, aim, relations, and limits of the subject?

In many problems an exhaustive study is the condition of clear conception; still it is evident that at the very outset the exact place of a discipline in the whole system of knowledge should be determined in order to insure its successful investigation. Perhaps even this can be done only after long inquiry; in that case no effort should be spared in the beginning to determine

the subject proximately and as clearly as possible. The limitation given a subject by the definition is essential to concentration and perspicuity of thought. We must find a subject, must separate it from its attachments, and possess it intellectually, before we can apply to it predicates or use it effectively. The rational and successful pursuit of a study, therefore, necessarily depends largely on a clear conception of its nature. Only when an object is in some measure known, can the way to it be found; only then can it be recognized when discovered; only then can its importance be appreciated, and directions for its pursuit be valuable. With no definite end in view, the most diligent study is in danger of losing itself in distractions, in fruitless searchings, and idle wanderings.

Definitions are a mental necessity. In every definition, two things are to be distinguished; namely, an object defined, and the mind giving the definition. When two persons define the same word differently, the reason is found in the knowledge, the needs, the preferences, the prejudices, and perhaps the whims, of the persons. An object may be viewed in two lights. We can ask what it is in itself, or we can content ourselves with the impression it makes on our minds or what it is to us. In the latter case we consider only what the object *seems* to be, or how it strikes us. We do not go beyond this to inquire whether our impression is correct, but we take it as final. Superficial as this is, it is the common way of viewing objects. An inquisitive energy is required to lead the mind from the naïve to the critical standpoint, which demands an investigation of the impression itself in order to determine its truth or falsity. So long as uncriticised impressions or mere opinions are taken for real knowledge, we

must expect definitions to be personal and arbitrary, with a flavor of the defining subject rather than the characteristics of the object defined.

A sharp distinction between the mind as subject and the object before it, and a discernment of the difference between what *seems* to be and what *is*, are the best evidences that the mind has passed from its spontaneous to the critical and philosophical stage. By abstracting (separating) the object from the subject, and by concentrating the attention on it, the mind seeks *the* (not a) definition. It is an epoch in the history of intellect, when it begins to make objective truth the standard of subjective value.

We must not imagine that definitions alone change while the objects remain the same. A word may be variously defined; but then the same word stands for as many different objects as there are definitions. Both Hegel and J. S. Mill wrote on logic, but they did not discuss the same subject. We speak of the philosophy of Plato and of Comte, but the latter rejected from philosophical inquiry what in Plato's system is the essence. And, as the same word may stand for different things, so different words may stand for the same object. There is thus much that is accidental and arbitrary in the use of words; and where clearness and exactness are sought, it is of the first importance to come to an agreement on the sense in which words are to be taken.

Aside from these general considerations, there is special need of determining the meaning of philosophy. It would be difficult to find another word of the same prominence which has been subject to as many changes and to such a variety of definitions. At different times it has been made to include all that is possible and real on earth, in heaven, and in imagination. It is no wonder,

therefore, that teachers of philosophy and authors of philosophical works find it extremely difficult to define the term, and be consistent in its use. This is especially true of the historians of philosophy, who are perplexed to know what to admit and what to exclude of the materials regarded in the various ages as philosophical. While some standards limit these to rational speculation, others embrace science and a large part of general literature. When we consider the heterogeneity of objects designated by the term at present, we must first define "system of philosophy," when used, if it is to convey any definite meaning. Indeed, in the same university, philosophical systems may be taught which really exclude each other.

It is evident that this indefiniteness must interfere both with the study and the progress of philosophy. The stream flowing through history for thousands of years has at last separated into so many rivulets that it is in danger of losing itself in the sand. Philosophers, therefore, recognize the necessity of coming to an understanding on the use of the term, so that they may concentrate their efforts, and also understand one another. Consequently, in philosophical journals and books, the definition of philosophy is one of the subjects most frequently discussed. So long as those regarded as philosophers cannot agree as to the object which engrosses their attention, it is not surprising that philosophy itself is regarded with suspicion, and treated by many as unworthy of serious inquiry. Not a few earnest thinkers are inquiring whether philosophy stands for any thing definite and valuable; whether it is possible as a distinct department of thought. If it is an independent subject worthy of profound consideration, why do not philosophers limit the word and their inves-

tigations to that subject? Some have become suspicious that under cover of that attractive name men have sought for something which is unattainable. May it not be that the progress of knowledge shows that philosophers have been dreaming, and that, being awake now, they are searching in vain for the reality in their dreams? Some are ready to put philosophy on a level with astrology and alchemy; they accordingly assign its place to the past wanderings of the human mind in its progress toward knowledge.

This confusion discourages the beginner, and makes the study difficult. The vague use of the term also encourages looseness in thinking, and deceives the student into the belief that he has attained something real and precious, when he has nothing but a word that is almost meaningless, and includes the most heterogeneous materials. Of the many who study what is called philosophy, not a few at the end of their collegiate course cannot define the word. It may even happen that those who have studied the elements of psychology or logic imagine that they have mastered philosophy!

We might yield to the temptation either to drop the term altogether, or to leave it in its present indefiniteness, with no particular object and no peculiar sphere, were it not for the treasures of the past which it holds, and for the conviction that it stands for something too precious to lose. Subjects are often difficult in proportion to their intrinsic value, and the terms used vaguely to designate them may only indicate the eagerness of the mind to grasp the subjects themselves. There is no other word to take the place of "philosophy;" but the concept for which it stands is so difficult, because it lies beyond the usual objects of contemplation, and this naturally contributes to the present confusion.

But no one who forms and appreciates the concept will begrudge the labor it costs. The student with patient thoroughness in the beginning may discover a light which shall illumine his course till the end.

PRINCIPLES WHICH DETERMINE THE DEFINITION.

In a definition we aim at a full and clear apprehension of an object. This is only possible by so limiting that object as to be readily distinguishable from others, especially from those most closely related. Brevity being essential to clearness in definitions, we cannot give a full description of an object by defining it; the characteristic marks by which it can at once be recognized will meet all requirements. In order that an object may be known, its own peculiarities, as well as its relation to other objects, must be indicated. The most essential elements are the determination of the class or genus to which the object belongs, and its peculiarities in that genus (the *genus proximum* and the *differentia specifica*).

Where a subject is complicated, it is more easy to determine what the general requirements of a definition are than to fix the principles according to which it is to be found. With all the learned and laborious efforts to define philosophy, these principles have not been sufficiently considered. We cannot expect agreement respecting the definition, unless it is understood with what conditions it must comply. Our first inquiry must therefore be: What rules should be followed in defining philosophy?

Owing to the variety of objects at one time or another included under this name, there may be a strong temptation to let preference or prejudice or a mere whim decide to which the term shall be applied.

Every arbitrary, merely subjective definition, must, however, be rejected. Whatever its authority to the mind giving it, objective value it cannot claim. We are not seeking any one's opinion, but philosophy itself, — an aim according to which the reader is expected to accept or reject all presented in this chapter.

For the same reason we cannot let any existing system determine the sense of the word, unless the system itself has been proved the true philosophy. It is common to adopt a system taught at a university, and then make it the test of other systems. Those pursuing this method should remember that there is a difference between philosophy and philosophical systems. Every system is apt to have some peculiar views respecting philosophy; and it is to be regretted if the beginner accepts these, and lets them determine the whole course of his inquiries, instead of waiting until the mind can compare and critically test the various systems, and can either form its own or adopt one rationally. The philosophic mind can wait.

Not a few define the term according to what they think philosophy can and ought to accomplish, thus limiting it to what they regard as most important or within the reach of the mind. This, however, makes the subjective state the principle of the definition, while the historic use of the term is ignored. If this rule is adopted, there may be as many definitions as definers. Besides, it has by no means been determined what the limits of the knowable are; this, in fact, is one of the most important problems of philosophy, and it would be unreasonable to close the investigation by making any one's opinion on the subject the last appeal.

Useful as the etymology may be in determining the original sense of a word, it does not necessarily indicate

its meaning afterwards. Words are but symbols of thought, and their meaning is liable to change with the concepts for which they stand. It sometimes happens that in the course of time the sense of a word changes to the very opposite of the original. The development of a subject is also a development of the corresponding term, which grows with it in definiteness and richness. Yet the etymology may be useful, the original meaning of a word being in many cases like the seed which determines the future growth. As all development is according to law, each stage of progress depending on the preceding growth, the etymology is important in giving the root of the meaning, the concept of those who first used the term, and the nature of the subject then designated by it. While, therefore, we do not expect the etymology to give the use of the term "philosophy" in the different ages and the various systems, it will, nevertheless, be valuable in determining important elements in the historic use of the word.

The history of the term is far more important than its etymology. It gives the notions attached to the word by the leading philosophers and in the prominent systems. Even if the historical use has varied greatly, there is in all probability something common, some leading thought which underlies the various senses, at least in the principal systems. If this common element can be found, it will give the central thought of philosophy in all ages, or that which makes an historical system philosophical. Those who ignore this historical use of the term must regard the standard histories of philosophy misnomers, and must sever the word arbitrarily from its past associations. The history of philosophy is a summary of the thinking of all philosophers, even the greatest of whom constitutes only a small part of the

whole course of philosophical development. If, then, we prefer the whole to its parts, we must place the historic use of the term higher than the conception of any philosopher, unless that conception is either a legitimate product of the historical development, or else proves that development to be fundamentally wrong.

Useful as the historical development is in determining the sense of the term, it has unfortunately terminated in no generally accepted definition. We cannot therefore appeal to the present use of the word to determine its sense, nor is any system so prominent as to make any particular meaning generally prevalent. Still the consciousness of the age, especially of its best thinkers, must be taken into account.

A careful study of the subject will show that the confusion is largely verbal. Philosophy really has a sphere of its own, clearly defined, and very important; and no other subject can either take its place or make it unnecessary. Its separate existence and continued study are thereby justified. It will be found that there is a sense which gives the essence of the etymology, as well as of the historic use of the term; which contains what is common to the great systems; which marks an important and distinct department of thought; and which also gives the idea on which the present intelligent use of the word is based.

We shall now, under the guidance of these principles, proceed to determine the meaning of the term.

ETYMOLOGY AND HISTORY OF THE WORD.

The etymology * primarily indicates a certain spirit and tendency, namely the love of wisdom, and the striving to become wise. So long as wisdom was a pursuit

* *φίλος* and *σοφία*.

and not an attainment, its exact nature could not be determined. The sphere of inquiry and the goal reached were to each seeker the measure for his apprehension of the desired object. Thus wisdom as the chief excellence of man might be differently apprehended according to the views, preferences, and results of the inquirers. It might be viewed as the summit of speculation in any particular department, or as the culmination of all theoretical inquiry; or it could be taken as the practical guide of life or as skill for attaining particular ends, — a skill in which the highest theory and best practice are united. It was not unusual to ascribe wisdom to persons who excelled in an art or learning. Pythagoras is said to have been the first who employed “philosophy” to designate a particular subject; and it is claimed, that he called himself a philosopher rather than wise,* because he thought God alone wise, while man is merely a friend of wisdom, and strives to attain it.† This sentiment, however, corresponds most fully with the spirit of Socrates, and many think it should be attributed to him rather than to Pythagoras. Plato also repeatedly states that wisdom belongs only to God, but that it becomes man to be a friend or lover of wisdom.

In the historical use of the word, we behold a reflection of the various views of philosophy itself in the course of its development. We must, however, distinguish between the popular and the technical use of the term. In the former, some phase of philosophy is usually

* φιλόσοφος rather than σοφός.

† On the use of the term among the Greeks, I have found of special value “Philosophie,” by R. Hayn, in *Ersch und Gruber's Encyklopaedie*; Paulsen, “Ueber das Verhältniss der Philosophie zur Wissenschaft,” in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1877, first number; and Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Einleitung.

seized, or a general characteristic designated ; but it is of little service in determining the technical sense.

While originally the word indicated merely a mental attitude toward wisdom, and the striving to which that led, it was soon used also to designate the result of this striving.* For a long time, however, the word was used vaguely. Thus Herodotus employs it to designate the desire for learning, while Thucydides uses it in the sense of striving after intellectual culture. Among others, sophists and rhetoricians were called philosophers, and the contents of their instruction were designated philosophy. Isocrates, for instance, uses the term for rhetoric. Even in the Socratic school the sense of the word was by no means fixed. Plato employs it for study, for learning, for love of learning ; but the knowledge to which he especially applies it is that sought for its own sake and not for practical application. Thus he speaks of himself as a philosopher, in distinction from the sophist, who makes a trade of imparting instruction, and from the politician, who seeks knowledge for practical ends. Like Plato, his pupil Aristotle also uses the word in various senses.

Besides this general use of the term, we, however, find that Plato and Aristotle also employ it in a technical sense. Thus Plato, as already intimated, uses it to designate the purely theoretical activity of the mind, aside from any practical application of the results attained. While the artist seeks skill, and the rhetorician and politician eloquence, in order to influence popular assemblies, the philosopher seeks truth, simply

* The word *ιστορία* has been subject to a similar development as *φιλοσοφία*. Both originally designated merely a subjective state or attitude, and afterwards the results attained, namely histories and philosophies. The same is true of many other terms.

because it is the truth. The philosopher also differs from the historian, who merely describes events. Plato wants to get behind phenomena, and seeks to attain an intellectual apprehension of existence; and he holds that "a philosopher is one who sees the essence of things, the true things, the ideas."* Not satisfied with the transient and the particular, Plato sought the eternal and the universal; instead of what seems to be, he aimed to get at reality itself. From the world of sense he withdrew to the world of ideas, the archetypes of all existence, the contemplation of which he regarded as the true philosophy. The term, however, is not confined to this contemplation or to any mental attitude, but is also applied to the knowledge or system which is the result. But as a system philosophy was not distinguished from mathematics and physics; and in one instance Plato speaks of geometry as included in philosophy.

The verb "to philosophize" is used by Aristotle in the sense of inquiring or searching after knowledge or truth, and he pronounces philosophy the science of truth. It is thus a general term for learning, especially for deeper knowledge. Like his teacher, Aristotle did not separate science from philosophy.† He, however, makes a distinction in favor of what he calls the "first philosophy," afterwards designated metaphysics. But in philosophy he also includes physics, mathematics, ethics, and politics. In its widest sense Aristotle, in

* Paulsen.

† *φιλοσοφία* is at times used by him as synonymous with *σοφία*, and also with *ἐπιστήμη*. Paulsen says of Aristotle's use of the term, "No knowledge whatever is excluded. Aristotle thinks he philosophizes when he investigates the natural history of animals or household economy, as well as when he contemplates the nature of things in general, or the essence of knowledge. He, however, manifests a tendency to limit the term to a narrower sphere: he wants philosophy to consider being in general, not any particular part of it."

fact, embraces within it all the knowledge which he himself systematized. But in a more specific sense it is the science of the first principles, and of the causes of reality. Haym says that according to the Aristotelian conception, "the science of the philosopher is the science of being, so far as it is being, — being in general, not in particular." It thus comprehends all that pertains to being, such as its matter, its form, its efficient and its final cause. Philosophy is thus found to consist in the ultimate explanation of all existence. He also employs the term to designate particular systems, for instance that of Thales.

The character of the Greek mind, the state of learning, and the wanderings necessary in the search for what above all other things entitles one to be designated wise, explain the variety of senses in which the word was used. The various meanings were so many hypotheses respecting its real nature, which were destined to be confirmed or rejected by later investigations. The term "philosophy" more than any other expressed the deepest desire and highest aspiration of the Greek mind. Wisdom was prized more than aught besides, and philosophy was intended to embody the eagerness and the striving of the mind for its attainment. All the varied results thus attained were also designated philosophy, a fact which accounts for the comprehension under this term of all that was supposed to make men wise. But distinctions were made in these attainments, some being regarded more excellent than others. What philosophers of one age established, those of the next generation tried to surpass; thus age after age they strove to get nearer the goal of all thinking. The highest attainments in any period were naturally regarded as wisdom in the truest sense, and their pos-

essor was emphatically *the* philosopher. It is evident that a real desire for wisdom could not rest content with inferior knowledge; it was a restless impulse to attain the most exalted. This enables us to understand why, with all its varied applications, the term "philosophy," in its most specific sense, should designate the ultimate object of all search, namely the first principles. The only explanations with which eager inquiry could stop are those which need none themselves, or for which none can be found. While all that lay between the beginning and these final explanations might be viewed as part of philosophy, it was nevertheless but means to an end, its value consisting in that it aided the mind in the discovery of the last thought. As wisdom culminated in the first principles, they were called philosophy *par excellence*. Thus both Plato's ideas or archetypes, and Aristotle's "first philosophy," regard as the essence of philosophy those principles which are explanatory of all things, but which themselves require no explanation.

What the Greeks meant by philosophy, in its technical sense, may be inferred from the systems usually designated by that name. In their methods and results they vary greatly; they, however, have this in common: they aim to get beyond phenomena to their source and final interpretation. The first Greek philosophers were intent on finding the primitive substance, or the elements from which the universe was compounded, or out of which the present order is developed. The inquiries of the Ionian philosophers were cosmological. Thales regards water as the source of all existence. Anaximander postulates an eternal, self-moving, indefinite something,* as lying at the basis of the universe. Anax-

* ἀπειλον.

imenes makes air the primitive substance, while Heraclitus holds that fire is the original element. They all viewed matter as the source and the sufficient explanation of the cosmos, and hence they merely sought its primitive form.

Pythagoras and his disciples made a specialty of mathematics, and viewed number as the principle of all existence. In the Eleatic school* the notion of being was the absorbing theme,—being as one and eternal (God and the universe are one), and its distinction from that which merely appears and is not real (the distinction between the real and the phenomenal world). The inquiries of this school were therefore metaphysical, and its principal subjects were: being and nothing; the real and the apparent; the one and the many; that which is, and what seems to become and then vanishes again, or the eternal and the transient; the stationary and motion.

Some of the later Greek philosophers who inquired into the origin of nature recognized the existence of gods, while others ignored them. Empedocles believed in their existence: nevertheless he explained nature by making earth, water, air, and fire the first things, with love and hatred as their ruling principles. Anaxagoras held that originally there was a mixture of the primitive elements, a chaos, from which the divine spirit constructed the universe. Leucippus and Democritus established the atomic theory, and were pure materialists.

In all these cases, philosophy meant an inquiry into the real nature and the cause of things; but it also included the result of this inquiry, or the explanation found. Philosophers were those who sought to understand the essence, the principles, the cause of existence,

* Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus.

or the first substance from which every thing else sprang. Wisdom thus meant for them the ultimate thoughts obtained by inquiring into the nature and origin of the universe.

However interesting and absorbing these problems, they could not permanently limit the inquiries of the mind. The failure or despair of a solution, as well as the importance of other questions, served to direct attention to a different class of objects. Problems themselves are evolved in the process of intellectual development; and an age may be better characterized by the questions which occupy the attention of its best thinkers, than by the solutions given. Philosophy began with nature, but it could not be confined to nature. As if exhausted by its fruitless attempts to unravel the mysteries of what was outside of itself, the mind now directed its attention to itself. The sophists gave prominence to the hitherto neglected subjective element. In spite of their later degeneracy, which justly subjected them to severe criticism, they had an important share in the development of Greek philosophy, and mediated the way from the naturalistic to the Socratic school. Instead of permitting nature to absorb the attention, they concentrated their thoughts on man, and made him the measure of all things. This doctrine, which is certainly true, so far as it makes the laws of our being the condition and measure of all our conceptions, was perverted to mean that truth itself is merely a matter of opinion; and even if something more than this, it was held that the truth cannot be discovered. Hence, instead of eternal principles, subjective preferences were made the rule of life. Knowledge and skill were esteemed simply because useful in discussion, or for the attainment of personal ends; and dialectic was

valued as an instrument for selfish interests, without regard to truth and right. So far as the later sophists had any claim to philosophy, it was permeated with sceptical, eclectic, and utilitarian elements.

The appearance of Socrates makes an epoch in philosophy. He opposed the conceit, together with the superficial and sceptical tendencies, of the sophists, and directed attention from mere observation and opinion to careful definitions and correct thinking. He esteemed a knowledge of self as the essence of wisdom; self-knowledge was consequently the aim of his instruction. While the sophists claimed to possess wisdom, he modestly professed to be still a seeker. In the whole history of philosophy, Socrates is the best embodiment of the etymological sense of the term. He thought, if any thing could entitle him to claim wisdom, it was the knowledge of his ignorance. Regarding virtue as the highest good, he made truth its basis and correct knowledge its source. Virtue had, indeed, been discussed by Pythagoras, Democritus, the sophists, and others; but Socrates made the moral element the essence of philosophy, and is properly regarded as the founder of philosophical ethics.

If, now, in connection with this hasty glance at the early systems of philosophy, we inquire into the technical use of the term among the Greeks, what do we find respecting its meaning? Although the inquiries of the early philosophers were confined to nature, they were not those pursued by the physicists of our day. They were allied to what the Germans call *Naturphilosophie*, being purely speculative and really a part of metaphysics. The speculations of the Eleatics, as we have seen, were also metaphysical. The essence of Plato's philosophy and the "first philosophy" of

Aristotle belong to the same category. There can, therefore, be no question that among the Greeks metaphysics has peculiar claims to the title philosophy. In it, as a rule, philosophical inquiry culminated. We should, however, have to ignore not only the sophists, but also Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, if we did not include in philosophy dialectics (logic) and ethics. In a still more general sense, as already intimated, mathematics and other subjects were also included, especially by Aristotle.

In Aristotle the development of Greek philosophy and of the term itself culminated. However vaguely the word was used at times, in its technical sense it designated the aim to discover the final explanation of things. It indeed included many reflections which do not bear directly on this aim; but they were generally such as were supposed to aid in understanding the real nature of things.

Among the successors of Aristotle, namely the Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, philosophy lost the high standard it had attained; and the term was again used indefinitely, frequently designating a certain mental tendency rather than a special study. Its use for particular systems, however, continued. But it was also applied to any study regarded as specially important and as leading to wisdom.* Strabo puts Homer among philosophers, and regards geography as a part of philosophy. Josephus speaks of three philosophies of the Jews, meaning Pharisaism, Sadduceeism, and Essenism. The Church fathers applied the term to Christian doctrine, and in the early Christian Church theologians were called philosophers. In the

* Cicero, *De Or.*, says, "*Omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in iis exercitatio philosophia nominata est.*"

Middle Ages the term was employed very much as among the Greeks, except that, in distinction from theology as the science of God and divine things, it was used to designate worldly wisdom.*

In modern times the word has not only been taken in previous senses, but new ones have also been added. From the time of Bacon and Descartes it has frequently been employed to designate inquiries into the causes of things, as well as for systematized knowledge in general. Until recently a clear distinction between philosophy and the experimental sciences was not made. Indeed, the Middle Ages handed the term down to modern times in that general sense in which Aristotle sometimes uses it.†

In England, philosophy and science have been used interchangeably, and to a considerable extent this traditional use still prevails. Bacon regards the results of the experimental method as philosophy. Newton called his great work, *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, and his scientific investigations are usually spoken of as his philosophy. With Locke, philosophy and science are synonymous. At the close of his work on Human Understanding, he calls physics, which is "the knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings, their constitutions, properties, and operations," natural philosophy. It is, in his sense, much more metaphysical than like modern physics; still he regards it as the first part of science, of which the second is ethics, the third logic. In the "Epistle to

* *Sapientia secularis* or *mundana*.

† In Descartes' *Principia Philosophiæ* are found, among other things, mechanics, astronomy, physics, and chemistry. In 1729 Bourgnnet published his *Lettres Philosophiques sur la Formation de Sels et Cristeaux*. In the middle of the same century appeared the celebrated work of Linnæus, entitled *Philosophia Botanica*.

the Reader," he pronounces philosophy "nothing but the true knowledge of things." The philosophical societies of England, the *Philosophical Transactions*, and the *Philosophical Magazine*, are chiefly devoted to scientific investigations.

In England and America, philosophy is often taken in a more comprehensive sense than science, but frequently they are also made synonymous. Thus natural philosophy is either the same as natural science, or one of its branches. English writers in particular are in the habit of using "philosophy" and "philosophical" very loosely. Nor can an improvement be expected, so long as the terms "philosophy" and "science" are not more carefully distinguished.¹*

In England there is now, however, a tendency to make a clearer distinction in the application of the terms. Scientists attack philosophy, and speak disparagingly of its study, thus proving that, even if they do not know exactly what it means, it is not science. Present discussions excite the hope that the two will eventually be recognized as occupying entirely distinct spheres. But among English writers who recognize the peculiarity of philosophy, there is no agreement as to its proper sphere. Not unfrequently what has from the first been regarded as its peculiar province is excluded. From the time of Bacon, English thought has been predominantly practical, and this has determined the character of its significant conquests. Instead of inquiring into first principles, it has cherished an aversion to speculation, and a horror of metaphysics. There is not in all England a journal devoted exclusively to (speculative) philosophy. When, in 1876, "*Mind*, A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy," was begun, the

* See Appendix.

editor said, "That no such journal should hitherto have existed, is hardly surprising. Long as English inquiry has been turned on the things of mind, it has, till quite lately, been distinguished from the philosophical thought of other countries by what may be called its unprofessional character. Except in Scotland (and even there Hume was not a professor), few British thinkers have been public teachers with philosophy for the business of their lives. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, did their philosophical work at the beginning or at the end or in the pauses of lives otherwise active, and addressed for the most part the common intelligence of their time. It may not have been ill for their fame; but their work itself is not what it otherwise might have been, and their manner of thinking has affected the whole character and standing of philosophical inquiry in England. If their work had been academic, it would probably have been much more sustained,—better carried out when it did not lack comprehension, more comprehensive when it was well and carefully begun. The informality of their thought has undoubtedly prevented philosophy from obtaining the scientific consideration which it holds elsewhere." Paulsen, in the article already quoted, referring to English philosophy, says, "Philosophy or science aims at a knowledge of the laws of the real. Beyond this there are no objects for scientific knowledge. There may be objects for faith, but that is the concern of the Church. Metaphysical or critical investigations like Hume's are received coldly, and viewed with suspicion."

The practical character of the English mind, with its tendency to observation and experiment, has given particular prominence to psychology; and it has been

common to regard "mental science" as the whole of philosophy. In the few sentences devoted to the article "Philosophy," in the eighth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1859), this occurs: "Philosophy may be defined as *the science of first principles*; and the term is now limited almost exclusively to the mental sciences." An effort is, however, now made in England to exclude psychology from philosophy, and to introduce more speculative elements into the latter. German philosophers, especially Kant and Hegel, have gained considerable influence; but this, instead of fixing the sense of the term "philosophy," has added new meanings to the word, and increased its indefiniteness. One who studies its present use in English literature almost despairs of attaching to the term any definite meaning; it is applied to subjects so heterogeneous, that it indicates nothing in particular. Sometimes philosophy is spoken of as a mere habit of mind. Thus one writer* limits the term to a mental tendency, and regards philosophy useful as a kind of literary training, "concerned with moods of mind rather than with objective truth," and declares "that it is as much beside the mark to wrangle over the truth of a philosophy, as over the truth of *Paradise Lost*." This view would consign the deepest thinking of the ages to the realm of fiction. Philosophy, indeed, implies a certain habit of mind: it is not, however, that habit, but its product, — the result of the sincerest love and profoundest search for truth. Others make it synonymous with metaphysics, or regard it as a theory of knowledge. The editor of "*Mind*" † pronounces metaphysics the same as "general philosophy." In another place ‡ he says that philosophy "is theory of *knowledge*" (as that which is known), but declares

* *Mind*, vol. iii. 240.

† i. 5.

‡ viii. 16.

metaphysics "the most widely accepted synonyme for any thing that can be called philosophy." In replying to the writer quoted above, he, however, regards philosophy as a "rational interpretation of the universe in relation to man," and says, "In philosophy we are going to consider what may be said more or less determinately concerning the whole frame of things and man's relation thereto." In the same journal * we read "that the term 'philosophy' may fairly be applied to what is primarily a doctrine of the criteria of knowledge, without reference to any ontological conclusions which such a doctrine may be held to establish." This variety in the definition is a fair index of the prevalent confusion of thought on the subject.

Not only does one look in vain for unanimity in the use of the term in England; but other interests so engross the attention, that, with the exception of a few eminent thinkers, there seems to be no serious effort to come to an agreement. The influence of English thought in America has promoted a similar state of things in this land. Instead of agreement as to its application, the narrowest as well as broadest use of the term prevails, the definition, of course, depending largely on the system adopted. Much more attention is paid to philosophy in Scotland than in England; but there, too, the term lacks definiteness. Indeed, among the multitude of current definitions, it might be difficult to find one which in each of these three countries has not some advocates.

For more than a century Germany has taken the lead in philosophy. At the very beginning of its pre-eminence, the foundation was laid for distinguishing it from empirical inquiries. Kant held that philosophy

* vii. 533.

starts with reason, natural science with experience. The domain of philosophy is therefore the rational, that of natural science the empirical.* His immediate followers completed the work of separation begun by him. They aimed to construct a purely speculative system of *a priori* knowledge, and this they termed philosophy. Since Kant it has, therefore, become common to distinguish sharply between speculative or philosophical, and empirical systems. In the division of the faculties in German universities, the traditional use of "philosophical" is, however, still retained. The "Philosophical Faculty" includes all learned branches outside of theology, law, and medicine.

Since Hegel's philosophy lost its supremacy (about 1840), no other system has gained such general influence as to determine the meaning of the term. Much attention has been devoted to the history of philosophy, as well as to psychology, logic, æsthetics, and ethics; but metaphysic has been viewed with suspicion. It is a general conviction, that philosophy needs reconstruction, and that the first requirement is a new and immovable basis. But the tendencies indicate that the age is critical, sceptical, and destructive, rather than favorable to the construction of new systems.

We have inherited the ruins of the philosophical systems of former ages. Among them are fragments of inestimable value; but they cannot be used as they are for the construction of new systems. Those who stumble over these ruins, in search of a satisfactory definition of philosophy, are apt to be bewildered and lost in the confusion; and yet, until that definition is found, they have no criterion to judge which of the fragments are

* It seems that Kant was also the first on the Continent who separated mathematics, as well as psychology and physics, from philosophy.

genuine and fit for use in the new structure. This philosophical chaos is a characteristic of the age and of all lands. It is generally supposed, at least in Germany, that if the last dominant schools fairly represent its true character, philosophy is not worthy of the best efforts of serious minds. But while those who strive to reconstruct philosophy may have learned much from these schools, they are not so unphilosophical as to identify any existing system with the ideal or with philosophy itself.

In the various lands in which considerable attention is paid to philosophy (besides Germany, Great Britain, and America, the principal ones are France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Holland, and Scandinavia), the question is seriously asked, whether it designates a peculiar object, or sphere of thought. Some regard its sphere the same as that of the natural sciences, but hold that its method is peculiar, doing speculatively what they do empirically. But if science does its work successfully, what demand is there for performing the same by another method? Others assign to it the mind as its special sphere, making it mental science (*"Geisteswissenschaft"*), so that, as nature is the sphere of natural science, philosophy is essentially psychology. This, however, is too narrow, excluding much that has always been regarded as belonging to it. Quite recently there has been a disposition to make it synonymous with the theory of knowledge; but there already existed systems of philosophy before this theory became a special object of study, and it cannot be made to absorb the whole subject. Not a few regard philosophy as the synonyme of metaphysics, while others view it as giving the laws of the sciences, or as drawing the conclusions from them so as to constitute the unity of all knowledge.

While the popular use of the term is altogether too loose and general, some of the definitions given are too partial, taking a particular element of philosophy and regarding it as the whole, instead of seizing the essence and making it the nucleus around which all that belongs to the subject may be gathered. If any historic element of philosophy is to be excluded, a sufficient reason for doing so must be given. There may be much in the historical development which was merely temporal or accidental, and which can without serious loss be now ignored. The sand carried along by the current is not the stream. But if now we must abandon the elements which from the very beginning constituted what was called philosophy, then with its sense let us also abandon the word.

THE MEANING OF THE TERM.

It has become evident that neither the etymology nor the history of the term, nor the development of philosophy itself, nor its present status, can give us the true sense of the word. Yet they must all be taken into account. If the essence of all can be found, it will make philosophy, with all its variety, a unit, so that its past, present, and future must constitute an organism which always changes and yet is ever the same. It is the same tree, whose bark, leaves, and fruit differ with the seasons. Sometimes it grows vigorously; at others it produces only wild wood, which must be lopped off in order to insure health and future growth. It may be subject to many vicissitudes without losing its essential character. Those, however, who take from it a twig, and plant that so as to secure a new growth, may have something valuable; but they have not the tree itself. Those who, on the other hand, root out the

tree in order to plant another in its place, sever their connection with the past, have not the same tree, and only mislead by calling the new organism by the old name. Trimming may be necessary; but if the future is to grow from the past, the tree itself must be spared. Its fruit may have become unpalatable, so that it is time to change its products; every limb may have to be cut off in order to graft on new scions; but they must be ingrafted on the tree itself, if the fruit is still to be its product.

The development of philosophy in the individual mind is similar to the process in history; and whoever interprets aright his own philosophizing will obtain the clearest knowledge of philosophy itself. In the genetic method of defining a term, we *do* what we want to know. Philosophy thus becomes a matter of experience.

Consciousness precedes self-consciousness; percepts precede concepts; individual concepts precede systems; and for systems we seek the final thought which is the bond of union for all systems, concepts, and percepts, — a thought that is the seed from which all our thoughts are developed. In its earliest processes the mind simply lets itself go, its operations being determined mainly by objects of sense and by spontaneous reflection. This naïve stage may be called historical or psychological, but no one thinks of calling it philosophical. The mere observation of phenomena cannot produce philosophy, even in its shallowest sense. Those remaining on this standpoint never give an account to themselves of their own operations and of the contents of their minds, but accept the opinions of others as thoughtlessly as the impressions through their senses. When, however, the mind is checked in this course, and

aroused to reflect on itself, it is impelled to seek an explanation of what is given spontaneously. The mind become conscious of itself is not merely receptive, but also penetrative. It wants to know, but it soon learns that it only truly knows what it interprets. The very energy of the mind, when once aroused, leads to inquiries into the causes of phenomena. Much that transpires is calculated to excite its curiosity; it begins to wonder, which Plato pronounces the beginning of philosophy. In its efforts to explain mysteries, the mind finds former views, which were naïvely adopted, incorrect; and with increasing efforts at explanation it also finds the problems deepening and the difficulties growing. Wonder increases, and doubt becomes its constant companion. Doubt is developed by the discovery that opinions have been held without sufficient reason, and even contrary to reason; and repeated failures may lead to questioning the possibility of solving the riddles of mind and nature. But wonder and doubt, unless the scepticism becomes absolute and induces despair, are mighty impulses to seek an explanation of what is obscure. They create and intensify an eagerness for deeper knowledge, and the love of wisdom becomes the inspiration of the most searching inquiries. This is the spirit which is characteristic of all philosophy, and is the essential element in the etymology of the word.

There is in this impulse a peculiarity which was particularly emphasized by Plato and Aristotle. It has its birth directly in the energy and necessity of the mind itself; the impulse is wholly innate, a purely mental or intellectual affection. The reason for philosophizing is different from the impulse leading to studies undertaken for a livelihood or ambitious ends. In a peculiar sense, therefore, philosophy is free and human; in it the

intellect most fully expresses its own nature, and follows its own laws. Because so free, not a servant to attain other ends, it has been called the "divinest and worthiest" of all studies. The fact that the impulse of the mind itself is its creative energy, of course does not imply that philosophy is not in the highest and best sense useful; but its use, aside from meeting the intellectual needs, is secondary, and wholly conditioned by what it does for the mind and makes that mind.

Impelled by wonder and doubt, the mind in its search for the solution of problems is a law unto itself. Behind the psychologic process and the transitory character of phenomena, it wants to discover the reason, the underlying thought, the eternal principles. When doubt has brought thought to the stage of the sophists, where all is uncertain, the mind, with Socrates, inquires for the permanent, and, with Plato, seeks the archetypes and ideas. The laws of reason being the standard of judgment, mere external authority loses its binding character. Opinions, traditions, mythologies, and all dogmas are subjected to the rational test. These, no mind conscious of itself can adopt uncritically; its aim is purely and solely the truth, and it cannot rest short of the highest truth, which is the most complete embodiment of wisdom. It is therefore evident, that, whilst it may use the descriptive and historical, the reason cannot view them as final; they may give what transpires, but cannot furnish its ultimate explanation. They do not constitute philosophy, though they may furnish materials for philosophizing. Poetry and the arts are also excluded from philosophy; they do not explain what is, but are themselves subjects for explanation; they increase, instead of satisfying, intellectual wonder and doubt. Nor is philomathy philosophy: it

may be mere breadth, while the latter always demands depth; it may be mere learning, while the latter is always the explanation of learning itself; it may be the product of a mind predominantly receptive, while in philosophy the energy of the mind is the essential thing.

It is not strange that in history the philosophical impulse first attempted an explanation of nature. The same is true in the genesis of knowledge in the individual mind. The natural phenomena are most striking, and first arrested attention. But the mental facts could not be permanently ignored, and in the course of time both nature and the mind were subjected to philosophical inquiry. The ultimate principle or principles of natural and mental phenomena and being, therefore, early formed the object of philosophy.

In history, as well as in the genesis of philosophic thought in the individual mind, the usual objects of attention and interest are the ones which demand an explanation. Thought need not go out of its usual path to discover mysteries; it cannot go anywhere without finding them. The early philosophers, besides nature and the mind, found religious faith existing — a belief in gods. This faith had to be explained. And by the time Greek thought reached its climax, there were three objects of supreme importance, namely nature (cosmology), man (psychology), and God (theology). The investigation of these was an inquiry into being itself, — the effort to discover its essence and interpretation. We have already seen how to these objects of inquiry the dialectical and ethical elements were added.

In its efforts to explain what is, the mind always depends on existing knowledge, at least for its starting

point. The way to the explanation may be but little prepared. The first work in that case is of an elementary character, largely a groping in the dark, method and means still obscure, and imagination, as well as reason, active in the process of discovery. Originally the progress toward the wisdom sought required an examination of many things which the philosopher now finds explained, just as the geologist or ethnologist may at first be obliged to perform the work afterwards done for him by the miner and the traveller. In seeking the final explanation, philosophy took up one department of knowledge after another as it needed them, but each belonging to it only as means to an end. When sufficiently developed to become independent, they no longer needed the fostering care received in the past; and it was against the interest of the mother, as well as of the son, to keep the man in childish subjection. This explains the fact that at one time philosophical investigations may include more subjects than at another. A subject may also at one time be thought to lie within the domain of philosophy, and afterwards be found to belong to another department, when it is dropped.

We can thus be true to the Greek notion of philosophy without including the same disciplines as Aristotle. Although philosophical inquiry began with nature, we do not include physics. Mathematics has long been independent.

But after eliminating the natural sciences, what sphere remains for philosophy? The fundamental and ultimate problems. These have in all ages been assigned to it, though their nature has at various times been differently apprehended. Whether it started with the interests uppermost at the time, or with concepts which engrossed the attention of preceding thinkers, the final

aim has always been the solution of the problems regarded as ultimate. Many other themes have been discussed in the name of philosophy; but that was merely incidental, or because they were supposed to lie on the way to the last solution. They can, however, be consigned to other departments, or dropped without serious loss. But those problems which pertain to the last things cannot be dropped without the destruction of philosophy itself; they, as every one who reflects on what is known as philosophical literature must admit, constitute its very essence. These problems are the centre from which the whole circumference of philosophical speculation is drawn. Their solution has always been regarded as the highest intellectual wisdom; hence that solution is the most eager and the last aim of the love of wisdom. That this is a correct view of the distinctive characteristic of philosophy, is proved by its entire history, and by the fundamental thoughts of its great systems. The elements of the universe, sought by Thales and his successors; the principles of being, discussed by the Eleatics; the atoms of Democritus; the efforts of the sophists to solve the final problems in mental phenomena; the search of Socrates for the eternal reason underlying thought and morals; the ideas of Plato; the "first philosophy" of Aristotle; the nominalistic and realistic controversies of the Middle Ages, and the speculations of the school-men respecting God and the universe; the innate ideas of Descartes; the theory of knowledge given by Locke; the monads of Leibnitz, and his pre-established harmony; the substance of Spinoza; the absolute scepticism of Hume respecting the final problems; the *Kritik of Pure Reasons*, by Kant; the Ego of Fichte, the subject-object of Schelling, and the

panlogism of Hegel; common-sense or intuitionism, as the ultimate appeal, of the Scotch school; the rejection of theology and metaphysics by Comte, and the claim that the results of the positive sciences are the ultimate of the intellect; Schopenhauer's will as force, Spencer's unknowable, and Hartmann's unconscious; the conflicts between idealism and realism in Germany; and the various efforts in different lands to determine the limits of thought, and to get a safe method to reach these limits; the prevalent doubts respecting the solvability of the ultimate problems, and the consequent suspicion of philosophical solutions, — all furnish indubitable proof that the final problems have been the peculiar domain of philosophy from its origin till the present.

Having now found the sphere of philosophy, it remains to be seen how it deals with its problems. Mythology and theology largely move in the same sphere; and frequently mythological and religious views are mixed with philosophical elements. But mythology is the work of a creative fancy, and religion is the outgrowth of faith; while philosophy is purely the product of reason. Hence the test applied to a philosophical system is always rational, history and external authority having no weight in its final decisions. While the history of thought shows what has been held as truth, philosophy seeks to discover the truth itself. Reason as the instrument and creator is also the sole test of philosophy.

In summing up all that has been said, we find that from the first the most general characteristic of philosophy is, that it is a rational inquiry into ultimate principles.*

* As the student is an inquirer, and cannot be prepared to give the content of the final system, it is of especial advantage to apprehend distinctly the *aim* of all his inquiries. Only when he has found the ultimate principles (in idealism, materialism, or something else), will philosophy cease to be for him an inquiry.

This *inquiry* must not, however, be viewed as merely a mental act, but as the product of the inquiring mind. In this sense the word is frequently used in literature, as in Hume's "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding." Every product of such rational investigation is philosophical. All the philosophies of the past may be brought under this definition. Not one of them can be pronounced *the* philosophy: they are but attempts to construct it. Hence we treat them as tentative, as essays and inquiries. This is no disparagement of those systems: they are simply on a level with all other systems produced by the human mind.

While the definition just given applies to all real systems of philosophy, it does not give the ideal; and yet this is what we want when a subject is defined. We must, therefore, go beyond this definition, in order to learn what that idea is which philosophy, as an inquiry, seeks to realize. Looking solely at the *idea* of philosophy, not at the actual attainments, we define it as follows:—

Philosophy is the rational system of fundamental principles.

By *Principles* we here understand more than is usually designated grounds, or reasons, or causes; they include all required to explain a subject. They involve the nature, the grounds, and the design of objects. As the word "principle" is frequently used for other than the last explanation, it is qualified in the definition by *fundamental*, to indicate that it is the last or ultimate principles that are sought. When we speak of the principles of science, we mean those first truths which interpret science itself, constitute it what it is, and thus give its essence. He who knows these principles has the characteristic marks of all that is scientific, that which

is peculiar to all the details of science, and yet is not these details. The ultimate principles are those which lie behind all others, and yet are involved in all of them; they are the solutions from which all other solutions spring, as plants from seeds. Philosophy wants to discover the last thought respecting what is, whence it is, why it is; or it seeks to learn the essence, the origin, and the purpose of (real and ideal) being. It aims to find the idea of that which is. Instead of merely inquiring into the immediate causes of phenomena, it wants to penetrate to the reason which manifests itself in the universe. It therefore seeks that principiant truth which is the solution of all problems. The words theism, atheism, pantheism, materialism, idealism, realism, and numerous other terms which give the characteristic marks of systems, all contain the idea of a principle which is viewed as the ultimate of thought. Philosophy is, accordingly, the highest possible demand of the human mind, and marks the utmost limit of intellectual aspiration; it is reason objectified.

In philosophy we want *System*, not merely isolated thoughts. If one principle, ultimate and all-embracing, can be found, then the system may be deduced from that; but if this is not possible, the different principles found must be put into proper relations, and the inferences drawn from them must also be systematized. With our imperfections and limitations, we may be unable to form one system of fundamental principles, a system containing the ultimate of all thought; in that case we must be content with a number of systems, each controlled by a principle to us ultimate.

The system must be *Rational*; that is, it must be the product of reason, and in all its parts meet the requirements of reason.² As an impulse to truth, reason is also

the norm for its search, and the standard of its attainment. The word "rational," therefore, indicates the sphere and character of all philosophical investigation. The inquiry may start with experience or history; but if limited to these, it cannot produce philosophy. There may be other systems with principles professedly ultimate; but their basis is not the sole authority of reason. Irrational elements may also be attached to philosophical systems; but they are to philosophy itself what dross is to the gold to which it adheres.

As already intimated, our definition gives the ideal of philosophy, indicating its *aim*, not an actual attainment. In this there is nothing peculiar, but a characteristic of all definitions. They want to give the idea of the subject itself, without regard to the degree of realization attained, unless they profess to be merely descriptive. This is not only true of theology, philology, history, and the like, but also of every one of the natural sciences. Physics, chemistry, geology, biology, are ideals, compared with which the real works, individually and collectively, are very defective. The ideal science of nature has not yet found its way into books. There are many attempts at science, but they are only attempts. The same is true of philosophy. It represents the end sought, and the actual systems are but efforts to attain that end. If, instead of the true idea of philosophy itself, we want simply to indicate what has been already attained, we shall have to go back to the previous definition, and say that every system is a rational *inquiry* into ultimate principles.

As a rational system of ultimate principles, philosophy has a clearly defined sphere which distinguishes it from all other departments of thought. It is neither descriptive, nor historical, nor experimental; its province is

not the imaginative, nor the emotional, nor the artistic. It does not come under the special sciences, each of which is limited to a class of objects with whose explanation it is satisfied; nor is it a science of the sciences, since it aims to explain more than can ever be made a direct object of science as now technically used.

Looked at in every light, the definition meets all the requirements of the case. The principles sought are the highest wisdom; hence the definition harmonizes with the etymology. It is also justified by the history of the specific use of the term, and by the history of philosophy itself. Every great system aims at these principles. Trendelenburg, in fact, divides all the systems according to their first principles; namely, those which start with matter, with mind, or with a union of both. This gives materialism, idealism, and pantheism. It would be difficult to get all the systems under this classification; nevertheless, it is true that the character of a system is determined by its ultimate principles. In many instances these were thought to have been found, as in the case of the early Greek philosophers and Plato, and also Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann; while other systems were rather an inquiry into the possibility of discovering these principles, as those of Locke, Hume, and Kant, which are essentially a theory of knowledge. But in all systems the ultimate principles were the object of inquiry.

While the definition gives the *aim* (namely, the fundamental principles) within the *sphere* (the rational) of philosophical inquiry, it is not intended to intimate that the principles sought are the only contents of philosophical systems. These may also include whatever is connected with the discovery of the principles, and

likewise the rational inferences drawn from them. A developed system of these principles embraces at least the general ideas of all objects they comprehend. As the search for the ultimate concepts implies a journey over the road leading to them, so when discovered and systematized they may be applied to the explanation of whatever they include. Philosophy is thus both inductive and deductive; and both in its search and application, its sphere is limited solely by reason. Philosophies are consequently not mere skeletons of these principles. Indeed, philosophy is the most comprehensive of disciplines, including principally all that is real and ideal. Its principles are the apex of a great pyramid; but in passing toward the base, there is a constant increase of space and content.

In spite of the present confusion in the definition of philosophy, it will be found that the one given harmonizes with the intelligent specific use of the word now, containing the essence of what is sought but, perhaps, not clearly expressed. By common consent, philosophy aims at the highest and most universal truth, which can be nothing short of the ultimate principles. This is implied by those even who pronounce philosophy itself impossible, for they regard these principles unattainable.

That our definition largely agrees with the common consciousness as to the specific sense of the word, is evident from the application of the term to various other subjects. Thus we speak of the philosophy of law, of language, of religion, of history, and the like. What is meant by philosophy when thus applied? Simply the principles involved in these subjects, and explanatory of them. Thus the philosophy of religion contains the principles which underlie religion, and

explain its existence and character. If now, when applied to other subjects, philosophy is an inquiry into the principles involved in them, then taken by itself, or absolutely, it must be an investigation of principles, not indeed of any particular subject, but of all subjects, — it must be an investigation into the absolute or final principles; and at its completion, it must be a system of those principles.

Although the definition meets all the requirements, the beginner will probably have difficulty in clearly apprehending the subject. This arises partly from unfamiliarity with it, partly from its inherent difficulties. It will, however, become clearer, the more he reflects on the aim to attain the final explanation, and the farther he progresses towards this goal. Such is the depth of philosophy, that those who never attempt to follow thought to its limits can form no conception of its real character. But whoever rationally inquires into the essence, the origin, and the purpose of all things, philosophizes; and, as intimated, in the processes of his own mind he will find the best interpretation of the aim and the sphere of philosophy.

Every subject, unless purely rational, may be viewed empirically, or historically, or rationally. We may learn what a language is; we can trace its history; we can investigate its principles. Instead of limiting our researches to facts, we can also inquire into what must or ought to be; we can investigate particular phenomena, and search for their laws; but we can also seek what is universal. In all such cases it is easy to recognize the function of philosophy. In contrast with the phenomenal, it seeks the substance; instead of the empirical, it seeks the rational; in contrast with the accidental, it seeks the necessary; in distinction from the

particular, it seeks the universal; instead of the descriptive, the historical, and mere classifications, it seeks the principiant; instead of the world of sense, it seeks the idea, or the last thought; and, in distinction from the derivative, it seeks what is primitive, or the first principles.

Many of the current definitions agree essentially with that given; while there are others which are included under it, as designating some part but not the whole of philosophy. Ulrici says, "To philosophize is to seek principles." Ueberweg (*History of Philosophy*, Introduction) states that in the various systems, philosophy is viewed as a science, and that, as a rule, it is distinguished from the other sciences in that its sphere is not limited like theirs. It does not, however, include, to their full extent, the sum of all the spheres of knowledge; but it seeks the essence, the laws, and the connection of all that is real. He gives this definition: "Philosophy is the science of principles." This might be adopted without hesitation, were it not that "science" is used almost as vaguely as the term it is intended to define. "Principle" is also used in various senses. In order to avoid ambiguity, I have used "system" and "fundamental" or "ultimate" principles. In his *Logik* (Introduction), Ueberweg defines philosophy "as the science of the universe, not according to its details, but according to the principles which condition all particulars; or, as the science of the principles of what is knowable by means of the special sciences." In another place* he states that the various philosophical systems are indeed not science, but that the aim of

* In Fichte's *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 1863. "*Ueber den Begriff der Philosophie.*" A valuable discussion of the subject.

philosophy has all along been to become "science in the strictest and highest sense." As science it is distinguished from art and practice. It is theoretical; even what is called practical philosophy is only a theory of practice.

Whatever the differences in the definitions given, they, as a rule, make the universal and the ultimate the aim of philosophy. Trendelenburg regarded it as aiming at the idea of the total and universal, which lies at the basis of the parts and of all that is particular, in distinction from the empirical sciences, which contemplate the individual as separated from the totality. Lotze held that it is the aim of philosophy to bring into unity and connection the scattered thoughts, to follow them to their first presuppositions, and also to their last consequences, and thus to secure a consistent idea of the universe. It aims especially to subject to new investigation those thoughts which, in life and in the sciences, are the principles by which other thoughts are judged, in order to determine their validity and limits. He therefore viewed philosophy as fundamental, examining the principles on which all the sciences rest, and as going backward and forward to the utmost limits of thought.* Harms (*Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie*) also regards it as fundamental, being that general science which investigates and explains the nature and the connection of the sciences. "Since philosophy is the science of the fundamental principles of knowledge, which include logical, ontological, ethical, and physical conceptions, it has a large sphere; and, by means of the fundamental principles of knowledge, it is connected with all the sciences." Wirth defines philosophy as "a striving after the principiant knowl-

* *Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopaedie der Philosophie.* 85.

edge of all being, which knowledge must not, however, be based on assumptions." He held that there is a law of thought which impels the mind to seek the unity in the variety of knowledge.* Joseph Beck † says: "Philosophy is the rational knowledge of the truth of the facts of human consciousness; or the science of the nature, the last principles, and the highest ends (design) of things." Its aim is truth; its objects are man, the world, and God. Its mission is to follow phenomena to their ultimate grounds, in order to comprehend their nature and connection, so that their relation as parts to the whole may be understood. Stöckl (*Lehrbuch der Philosophie*), an author whose works are used in Catholic schools, defines philosophy as "the general, speculative, rational science; or, as the science of the last and highest grounds of being, so far as they can be known and proved by mere reason." Frohschammer, professor of philosophy at Munich, regards truth, not as found in history or experience, but ideal, perfect truth, as the aim of philosophy. It seeks the ultimate reason of being and of thought, and of the ideal; it wants to explain the essence, and give the reason, of all real and ideal being. Schmid ‡ says, "Philosophy is a rational science of reality: namely, of the nature, reason, and design of things, as well as of the means for the accomplishment of the design." According to Paulsen, "He is a philosopher whose inquiries are

* Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, of which he was one of the editors, 1863. 186. The original is:—

"Es gibt also ein im Wesen des Denkens, seiner nothwendigen Form gegründetes, mithin apriorisches und allgemeingültiges Denkgesetz der Totalität oder des Ganzen, welches also lautet: strebe alle deine Erkenntnisse zur Einheit der Totalität zu verknüpfen."

† *Encyclopaedie der theoretischen Philosophie*, a book for gymnasia.

‡ *Philosophische Monatshefte*, iii. 388.

guided by the aim to attain the ultimate unity of all knowledge; while he who stops with isolated facts as the final truth is an empiric."

LITERATURE.

The references made in the chapter will serve as a general guide to the literature on the subject. For the views of philosophy in the different systems, the various histories can be consulted, particularly that of Ueberweg, translated by Professor G. S. Morris. The most scholarly discussion of Greek philosophy is by Professor E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*. Some of the best discussions of the definition of philosophy are to be found in philosophical journals, which must also be consulted if the student desires a survey of present tendencies in philosophy. In the following list of journals the number of volumes in 1886 is indicated. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. 20. Williams T. Harris: New York. — *Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy*, vol. 11. George Croom Robertson: London. — *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*, vol. 11. Th. Ribot: Paris. — *La Critique Philosophique*. Nouvelle serie, vol. 2. M. Renouvier: Paris. — *Revista de Filosofia Scientifica*, vol. 5. Enrico Morselli: Milan. — *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, vol. 33. T. Mamiani: Rome. — *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. 23. C. Schaarschmidt: Heidelberg. — *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*. Neue Folge, vol. 87. Founded by J. H. Fichte and H. Ulrici. A. Krohn and R. Falckenberg: Halle. — *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, vol. 10. R. Avenarius: Leipzig. — *Philosophische Studien*, vol. 4. W. Wundt: Leipzig. — *Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie*, im Sinne des neuern philosophischen Realismus, vol. 14.

T. Allihn and O. Flügel: Langensalza. — In the first volumes of *Mind*, a series of valuable articles on philosophy in England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Italy, Sweden, America, and Germany, appeared, written by prominent philosophical thinkers in these countries. In a book entitled *Einleitung in die Philosophie vom Standpunkte der Geschichte der Philosophie*, by Professor L. Struempell, 1886, the definition and leading problems of philosophy are discussed. The volume aims to introduce the student into the historical systems of philosophy.

REFLECTIONS.

The significance of Definitions. Difference between Definition and Description. Vague use of "Philosophy." Reasons for this vagueness. Popular and technical sense. Principles determining the Definition. Etymology, history, and present use of the term. How used in leading systems. Distinction between Philosophy and Systems of Philosophy. Is the gulf between the ideal and real Philosophy peculiar to it? Difficulties in the Definition. Define Philosophy. Its Aim. Its Objects. Its Sphere. Relation to Empiricism, to the Practical, to History, to Art. Philosophy as a mental habit, and as a product of this habit. Indicate the agreement of the Definition with the Etymology, the History, and present Use of the term.

CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.

THE nature and sphere of philosophy will be better apprehended by determining its relation to subjects with which its connection is most intimate. Its distinction from history, poetry, and art, is too marked to require discussion; but its relation to religion, natural science, and psychology, is worthy of special consideration. While a subject is outlined by the definition, it is brought into bold relief by comparison with adjacent parts. Distinctness means distinction from what is most similar.

When only their striking peculiarities are viewed, philosophy and religion are as distinct as two peaks; but by going deeper, numerous points of contact are discovered. They are, in fact, two circles which intersect. Different in spirit and method, their objects are largely the same. Both consider the origin, nature, relation, and tendency of objects; but they view them in different lights, and each has a peculiar aim in their contemplation. Their intimate relation accounts for their mutual influence, and the frequent efforts to control or absorb each other. Their harmony respecting the cause and design of the universe has always been signalized by vigorous co-operation; but in disagreement their very intimacy makes the conflict between them one of life and death.

The objects held in common by philosophy and religion are viewed from the standpoints of faith and reason. Co-operation is consequently possible only in the union of these two: namely, in a believing reason, or its synonyme, a rational faith. This implies that both coalesce so far as their objects are the same. If reason and faith ignore each other, it must be at the sacrifice of their perfection. But even in their union the peculiarities of each must also be distinguished. Whatever the beginning of the religious impulse, it reaches its climax in faith, while philosophy always culminates in pure reason. Psychologically religion is much broader than philosophy, enlisting the whole spirit and affecting intellect, heart, and will; philosophy, on the other hand, whatever object it contemplates, is always purely intellectual, subjecting even the heart and will to theoretical treatment. While religion, therefore, so apprehends its objects with the spirit as fully to possess them and to be possessed by them, philosophy speculates, it beholds them intellectually; if it loses itself in them, as the mystics did, it ceases to be philosophy. Philosophy is always conscious of itself, keeps subject and object apart, and is cold; religion is feeling as well as intellect, hence is capable of great enthusiasm. The statement which dates from the Middle Ages, that philosophy seeks the truth, theology finds it, and religion possesses it, at least indicates the relation to the truth claimed by each. In their origin they differ widely; religion, being more naïve and more intuitive, is much earlier than philosophy, which requires more maturity of intellect for its origin. The objects of religion are usually given historically, in sacred books or tradition, while philosophy is required to search for its objects by a long and laborious process of thought.

But they differ somewhat respecting their objects, as well as respecting their standpoints and methods. So much of belief lies outside of its sphere, that religion is far from including the whole domain of faith. But even the range of religious faith may be much larger than that of demonstration, and thus include many objects which philosophy still seeks. The historical element being a potent factor, religion may receive from it objects which reason alone could never have discovered. The impulse of the heart may also present to religious faith objects beyond the sphere of demonstration. On the other hand, philosophy also deals with subjects foreign to religion. Being thrown wholly on itself for its method of research, philosophy must establish its authority; reason must justify itself to itself, and thought must prove thought. Consequently philosophy deals largely with the processes of thought, testing them so as to discover their validity, their laws, and their limits. Why we think as we think; why we reach certain conclusions, and form certain systems; why we accept certain inferences as true, and reject others as false; these are problems of primary significance for philosophy, while religion only considers them so far as it becomes philosophic. Like all other subjects, religion looks to philosophy to settle for it problems purely rational. While religion is a relation of submission and obedience to a will, person, or power, recognized as supreme, philosophy is a purely theoretical (contemplative, rational) relation to the same, and to all that pertains to principles and being.

When the relation of the two is here considered, it is of course intended to discuss them only so far as the circles intersect. Their agreement and conflict concern us most, and these pertain entirely to objects and inter-

ests held in common. Religion is here taken in its most general sense. Neither a particular system of theology, nor the faith of a particular church, is taken into account. Theologies are a product of development, and change with their growth. Even when they are subject to great changes, religion itself, at least its essence, may not be affected thereby. If, however, the dogmas lying at the basis of religion are overthrown, then the superstructure must also fall. Usually theology is a union of religious and philosophical elements, faith striving to become rational, and reason seeking to become faith. It is consequently in the domain of theology that the fiercest conflicts between faith and reason occur. The battle ranges around the dogmas of theology, they being the border-land where philosophy and religion meet and claim equal right to possession.

Lying wholly within reason, philosophy cannot transcend this limit and still remain true to itself. Its agreement and conflict with religion and theology therefore pertain to these so far only as they lie within the domain of reason. Religion and theology are, consequently, directly related to philosophy only in their natural or rational elements. Speculative or rational theology is, in fact, a part of philosophy.

Recognizing the rational element in religion as its sole point of contact with philosophy, Kant entitled his book on theology, "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason."³ He did not, however, mean to indicate that there are no objects beyond these limits, and that faith in them is not valid. Kant repeatedly affirms that there may be many things of which our limited reason has no knowledge. This every profound philosopher admits; and this admission is the basis of hope that, with all their differences, and even conflicts, philosophy

and religion can exist together. It is the narrow, shallow, and exclusive tendencies, on both sides, which destroy the hope of final agreement. The usual limitations of our thoughts, together with the tendency of the mind to take one object, hold it before consciousness to the exclusion of others, and to develop it by itself, and therefore one-sidedly, is not only a great barrier to final harmony, but prevents the very recognition of the differences, and the appreciation of the need of agreement. All discussion is simply beating the air, so long as there is a lack of depth and comprehensiveness, and of that modesty which is a requirement equally of religion and philosophy. The two need each other as complements. A religion that ignores philosophy is in constant danger of superstition and fanaticism; while an exclusive philosophy attempts to compress the whole of life into logical formulas, at which the heart rebels. For the healthy development of both, it is essential that their spheres be exactly defined, that each be kept strictly in its sphere, and that each recognize the just claims of the other.

While there is much in the emotions and the life of religion which transcends the power of exact philosophical expression, they are not wholly beyond the influence of reason. If, for instance, it could be demonstrated that the objects of faith are products of the fancy, mere creations of the brain, as Feuerbach held, all worship would necessarily cease. The very points which philosophy and religion have in common are the ones on which the latter depends; namely, the questions respecting ultimate principles.

The origin of religion cannot be determined by speculation. Recent ethnographical studies have led to various theories, and it may also be impossible to determine

the matter historically, the given data being insufficient. Whether the first religious impressions were the result of a direct revelation, or came from dreams, the sight of a corpse, or, as Max Müller says, "from an incipient perception of the infinite pressing upon us through the great phenomena of nature, and not from sentiments of surprise or fear called forth by such finite things as shells or bones;" whether fetichism, polytheism, or monotheism came first; whether there were not in reality different occasions for religion in different places, and different emotions as its basis in different persons, may never be absolutely settled by history. The phenomena bearing on this subject are so various, often so uncertain and contradictory, that there is abundant room for different theories. But, whatever its origin may have been, the philosophical value of religion cannot be determined thereby. If the lowest fetichism was its source, that is no more against it, than the fact that all knowledge began in the crudest way is an argument against science and philosophy.

There is dispute even as to whether there are or have been peoples wholly devoid of religion. In some cases the question was answered affirmatively, when afterwards it was discovered to be a mistake, founded on ignorance of the language and customs of the peoples.* For philosophy this question is not essential. If a people were found with no notion of general principles, it would argue nothing against their validity. What prevails in a higher stage of development, not in a lower one, may only prove the superiority of the former.

* Thus far there is no satisfactory evidence that any people exists, or has existed, wholly devoid of religion. It is often extremely difficult for travellers to learn the religious views of savage peoples, and many of their statements have to be taken with caution.

Religion is established as a fact, and is so deeply rooted in human nature, and so much a need of man, that we may be sure it is here to remain. It is incredible that from the earliest records till the present time religion existed, and yet is nothing but the "baseless fabric of a vision." While errors may be attached to it, religion itself must have a true basis in the human heart. It may need purification; it cannot be exterminated. So far as philosophy can draw religion within its circle, it must consider the subject as one of the deepest and worthiest problems of humanity, demanding explanation. If originally a revelation, then the origin of religion is of course removed beyond the domain of philosophy. But whatever supernatural elements it may possess, it must also be natural, and subject to evolution, and therefore an object of philosophical inquiry.

Religion, indicating the personal relation of man to God, implies that the spirit is both receptive and active, so that it both receives and gives. Instead of putting its seat in the intellectual, emotional, or volitional element, religion lies behind the various faculties of the mind, and gives coloring and direction to all of them. Its seat is in the person or spirit, and indicates the character of the heart in the scriptural sense, namely as the centre of human nature and the source of all human manifestations. Religion is a spiritual energy in thought and feeling and volition, so that it has concepts, inspirations, and acts. The intellectual elements, and the conduct springing therefrom, are naturally more completely within the comprehension of philosophy than the emotions. Yet these emotions are too essential an element of religion to be ignored in the philosophy of religion.

Nothing is more absurd than to claim that all views

based on religious feeling are reliable. In this way the most contradictory opinions and wildest fanaticism might be established. Philosophy boasts that its logic is heartless, and therefore not subject to influence by feeling. But this does not mean that reason can neither give light to the emotions nor learn lessons from them. The religious feelings are as truly facts as those we become aware of by means of the external senses, and they reveal the human heart and our real nature with at least as much perfection as external phenomena reveal the nature of the substances which produce them. We are undoubtedly more fully conscious of self than we can be of any thing external. That our emotions are a real, and apparently the most immediate, revelation of self, is a fact of deepest significance, whose importance is not decreased because it is so generally ignored in our day. The philosopher Jacobi may have gone too far in identifying reason so largely with the higher emotions, and thus making it a kind of intuitive faculty for the objects of religion; but he was evidently right in emphasizing the value of the emotions beside the reflections of philosophy. To say with a sneer, "It is nothing but feeling," and thus dismiss summarily what concerns humanity most, is an insult to human nature. There may be in emotion a depth of reality which philosophy can neither fathom nor formulate. The religious feeling demands explanation; and reason confronted by it cannot but ask, What is its meaning? What its source? What does it reveal respecting man? What elements of truth does it embody? How is it to be intellectually apprehended? To what inferences does it lead? If religion is a sentiment, so is irreligion; and the question still remains, Which sentiment rests on the truth? It is no wonder

that the deep mysticism of the middle ages — of Master Eckhart, Tauler, Nicholas of Basle, Suso, and others — arrested the attention of philosophers, and led to the inquiry, "What must that nature be which is capable of such things?" The theosophy of Jacob Boehme may be false, nevertheless its very possibility demands explanation. Only when things are exalted, and personality is depreciated, can this be questioned. All the great teachers of religion and their doctrines, Jesus and his gospel included, present problems to the philosopher: if philosophy cannot explain them, it must give the reasons for its inability; if it could explain them as natural phenomena, this very explanation would give new revelations of nature, and wholly change our views of its character.

We must recognize as proper the effort of philosophy, particularly the Hegelian, to resolve emotion into thought. The intellect is only true to itself when its energy seeks to think what the heart feels. Yet not strength but weakness of intellect ignores the limits of thought, and frivolously rejects as frivolous what the logical scales cannot balance. A healthy reason transforms the emotional into the rational when possible, and expresses feelings in concepts; but whatever does not submit to this transformation, it seeks to explain as emotion. Philosophy may not be able to put the substance of impulse and aspiration and longing into rational equivalents, and yet may find in them an important revelation of the nature of the seed from which they grow and of the soil on which they flourish. A system of human nature which destroys its mental life, the emotions included, for the sake of gaining pure abstractions, is as valuable as a botany and an anatomy which exist for the destruction instead of the interpre-

tation of organisms. Life, spirit, freedom, God, may contain more than can be limited philosophically, the concrete necessarily being richer than our abstract formulas. Our highest intellectual generalization is poorer than reality, and we may put an abstraction or an unrelated absolute for what is the real source of the universe. We know that there is personality, but we may not be able to find a single principle deep and broad enough to comprehend personality. Perhaps in feeling, a reality, a personality supplements the manifestation of itself in thought. Even reason cannot free itself wholly from the impulse of the emotions, and feeling may become a mental guide when thought is bewildered.

No one questions the perfect harmony of truth with itself: we are convinced of the existence of that harmony, even if we fail to discover it. This is a postulate on which all reasoning is based. But if there is harmony in truth, then the establishment of one truth means in some measure the establishment and support of all other truth; and the advocacy of error means hostility to all truth. Truths in science, philosophy, religion, and history, are not destructive, but promotive of each other; and if there is antagonism, it is either imaginary, or else between truth and error. Therefore truth in one department always welcomes as an ally truth in another, so soon as it is recognized. And truth alone can recognize truth.

The harmony claimed for the truth, we also claim for reason. All logic, all the processes of thinking, rest on this as a fact. It is a primary law of reasoning, that two conflicting concepts cannot both be true. I may hold as rational, views which are in reality destructive of each other; but this is only possible by mistaking as rational what is not rational. Progress from error to

truth is simply the elimination of the irrational (which was held as rational), and the apprehension of the rational. There may be much error in what we regard as rational: there can be none in what is rational. As we distinguish between what is subjectively held as truth, and objective truth, so we must distinguish between what is subjectively regarded as rational, and what is really or objectively rational. All true thought tends to make the subjective the same as the objective: to have the truth, not merely to think we have it.

These are axioms of thought to him who has not merely moved in the forms, but has also grasped the principles, of logic. Strange that those who accept these axioms do not take the next step which they really involve. If I can trust my intellectual nature or reason when properly understood, why not the rest of my nature properly interpreted? The emotions, so far as a correct expression of the true self, cannot be in conflict with each other or with the truth. If the true self is reliable when it expresses itself intellectually, why not when it expresses itself emotionally? There are false emotions, just as there is false reasoning; but this is no more an argument for rejecting all emotions than for rejecting all reasoning. We want to eliminate the false ones in order to get those which really express our true being. We may not always interpret correctly the truth deposited in our feelings, but there can be no doubt that there is much there which cannot be revealed in any other way. And religious faith, as an expression of the true self, as a real and legitimate demand of our nature, has as reliable a basis as that reason which is an expression of the same nature. True reason and true faith can no more conflict than a true thought and a true emotion.

We might go still farther, and show that there can be no conflict between the real interests of our nature. The conflicts which occur are only between supposed interests. What my nature truly demands, it has a right to demand; indeed, it is a necessity, and my nature must demand it. Unless there is that which my very constitution must demand, all ethics is overthrown, and all reasoning based on the final harmony of thought and being rests on a false postulate.

These thoughts are fundamental for the investigation of the rational basis of religion. It is an unjustifiable one-sidedness to regard our nature as the ultimate appeal intellectually, and then to reject the same appeal when made with respect to the emotions. It is indeed very difficult to get at the intellectual factor in our emotional nature, and to draw the correct inferences, particularly at a time when it is fashionable to regard the mind as valuable in proportion as it studies things and not itself. The time may, however, not be distant when the truth revealed in and through ourselves shall be prized as highly, at least, as that which comes to us from a foreign source.

The thoughtful mind will not mistake the fool's sneer at the most serious subjects, for an expression of wisdom. The student who is tainted with that frivolous tendency which regards the moral and religious problems as not worthy of his best efforts, lacks the spirit which produced the greatest systems, and animated men like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Lotze.⁴

Were philosophy and religion perfect, they of course could not conflict. But both err, hence the strife; both are liable to claim infallibility, hence the dogmatism. Each is apt to throw the entire blame on the other,

instead of revising its own status to discover whether it may not itself be at fault. Sometimes the hostility leads to a war intent on extermination; at others, the grounds of the conflict are only apparent. The first thing required, therefore, is that they understand each other perfectly, so as to learn whether really antagonistic. Thus certain forms of philosophical scepticism are not unfavorable to religion; the proof that a sphere lies beyond the region of demonstration does not imply that it is beyond the domain of valid faith. There may be good reasons for believing in the existence of God, though we know that no argument can leap from the finite to the infinite.⁵ In his *Kritik of Pure Reason*, Kant examines thoroughly all supposed proofs of the Divine existence, and claims to have overthrown them; yet he was too great a philosopher to think he had proved that there is no God, or to imagine such a proof possible even. True to his convictions of the limit of human knowledge, he declared, "It is indeed necessary to be *convinced* of the existence of God, but it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." In fact, he went so far as to declare that he was obliged to destroy knowledge in order that he might find room for faith. He held that God, freedom, and immortality are undemonstrable, and yet established beyond question, by what he termed the practical, in distinction from the speculative, reason. In the ultimate regions of thought, Kant was obliged to resort to postulates; but he chose such as the necessities of the case seemed to require. When, in dealing with the final problems in religion, philosophy passes from demonstration to postulates, it naturally resorts to such as have potency to account for what is and transpires, — feelings, ethics, and religion included. Surely reason is not reprehend-

sible if it makes the First Cause rich enough to account for all things, instead of an abstraction which has no reality itself, and cannot be the source of any other reality. And is the reason to be blamed if, in the First Cause, it seeks something rational, in order that reason may at least account for its own existence?

Forms of agnosticism are possible which are not hostile to religion. All depends on the sense and significance attributed to knowledge and faith. All Christians are agnostics if knowledge is limited to objects of sense and to mathematical demonstrations. Agnosticism is only destructive of religion when it claims that nothing but absolute knowledge, in the scientific sense, is worthy of assent, or when it denies the possibility of a valid basis for faith. Not the proofs but the implications of agnosticism endanger religion.

In grappling with the momentous problems of religion, the serious thinker may become involved in perplexities which ordinary minds cannot appreciate; and his faith may be affected just because his love of truth is so deep as to induce him to attempt its pursuit to the ultimate sources and final consequences. If such plodders appreciate their ignorance, and hold in abeyance their decision on the problems of the ages, nothing can be gained for religion if, in its name, they are subjected to flippant attacks by such as answer the profoundest questions without even an effort at thought.

With the ages the problems have deepened, and the attempts to solve them have only made the difficulties of the solution the more apparent. Hume's despair of knowledge is shared by many who are not his disciples. One need but appreciate the difficulties of every theory of knowledge, and the agnosticism, scepticism, together with the despair of the age and its consequent pessi-

mism, in order to learn that it is most irrational and irreligious to attack men on account of the results of honest and deep thought, whatever those results may be. The convincing power of the fury of passion has vanished. It must be frankly admitted by the religious that the philosopher and scientist may be perfectly honest in their researches, and because of that very honesty, and freedom from bias, may find their early faith beset with difficulties. Under such circumstances, if their view conflicts with the prevalent religious dogmas, they cannot but be repelled by theological abuse, while they respect every honest defence of religion. Philosophy, as well as religion, has its martyrs.

The philosopher must be free from all bias respecting religious dogmas. So far as he is purely philosophical, he must treat them as unfeelingly as he would a question in logic. He can do this with the full consciousness that there is much in religion which he cannot grasp in this way, just as he is convinced that there are many things which the chain of his logic cannot measure. He begins his philosophical investigations solely as an inquirer after truth so far as this is an object of rational inquiry. If any thing else than philosophy determines the truth for him, he can dispense with the aid of philosophy, and should not profess to conduct his researches under its guidance. Slow and cautious in accepting statements, the philosopher is equally slow and cautious in rejecting them. The names and catch-words of parties have no significance for him, except so far as they embody truth. For the beginner in philosophy, this attitude of perfect freedom from prejudice is extremely difficult, but of the utmost importance. He must learn to estimate aright both the unthinking faith, and the idiotic sneer at religion, fashionable in some quarters.

yes, in
deed.

Nor must he be frightened by the terms "pantheism" and "materialism." They are to him, like religion, subjects for deep study. The most devout mystics had pantheistic elements, and the Apostle Paul uses expressions which border on pantheism: as when he says of God, "For in him we live, and move, and have our being;" "For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things." Who will draw the exact line between theism and pantheism? Indeed, it may be that much in a philosophical pantheism only expresses intellectually what is implied in the devout religious feeling, when the soul *loses* itself in God. Even materialism has become largely a bugbear. Although frequently claiming to be scientific, it is not, and, from the nature of the case, cannot be. Science never deals with the ultimate problems, unless it becomes philosophy. To the scientist, materialism can never be any thing but a postulate or a working hypothesis. Atoms and matter are symbols to him, as those of algebra and chemistry; and as such they are useful, without leading to atomism or materialism as an interpretation of the universe. In its sphere, science is absolute; out of its sphere, it ceases to be science. Thus science as science cannot recognize God, unless it abandons the sphere of observation and its laws. The terms "theism" and "atheism" have no relevancy for science, simply because it limits itself to objects which are affected neither by the one nor the other, just as it is not affected by poetry, history, or æsthetics. The questions which the scientist asks of nature have nothing to do directly with his religion, and this should not have the slightest effect on his search for the answers. The only atheistic influences which science can exert spring from the habit induced by the constant study of subjects in which God is not

considered, and in the use of methods which can never lead to Him, — a habit which may deaden the religious sensibilities. Jacobi once said, "It is to the interest of science, that there should be no God." He uses "science" in a wider sense than the strictly technical one; but, if we put "empirical" before the term, we must say that neither in its aims, nor in its methods, nor in its results, is pure science concerned with the existence or non-existence of God. The fact is, that the supposed influence of science on religion is, as a rule, simply the influence of philosophical speculations, for which the definiteness and exactness of science are claimed, though without the least title to that claim. Although usually termed scientific, materialism, dealing with the ultimate problems, belongs to the domain of philosophy. It is a word whose sense is apt to vanish in proportion as the effort to fathom its meaning is deep. Whoever is haunted by materialism can get no better advice than to make clear to his mind what he means by it, and by the term "matter," whose atoms are imagined to be the seed of the universe. The vulgar materialism of the day cannot bear the light of intellect. Expressions which seem to involve the crassest materialism may be harmless. Professor Huxley, in "Lay Sermons," has an address on "The Physical Basis of Life," in which he uses expressions, which, taken by themselves, might lead to the conclusion that their author must be a materialist. Yet he holds that we are totally ignorant of what matter is, and consequently he is not a materialist in the ordinary sense. The same is true of Herbert Spencer; he claims to be neither a spiritualist nor a materialist, because he thinks we can attach no intelligent meaning to these terms. The suspicion with which metaphysic is generally regarded has made

scholars cautious in drawing inferences respecting the nature of things, and especially of the substance which lies behind all phenomena and is the ultimate source of all.

In one aim philosophy and religion perfectly agree: both want the truth respecting the origin and tendency of things, and respecting our relation to this truth. Philosophy, however, seeks this truth theoretically, while religion also wants it for the heart and life. If now the one can help the other in this aim, its aid should be welcomed exactly in proportion as it overthrows prejudice and false notions, and leads to pure truth. This is omnipotent, and nothing will be able to check its conquering march. Nothing else is eternal; and only he who resolutely attaches himself to the truth can hope to do work which will abide. In this conviction the philosopher and believer can unite in their labors, each in his sphere doing his utmost to discover and promote the truth, and cheerfully co-operating with the other to attain this end. The best friend of the honest thinker is the man who destroys his dearest errors, and substitutes for them despised truth.

Since religion involves the deepest interests of man, the defence of its fundamental dogmas, with intense feeling, can easily be understood. This very fact is of significance to the philosopher. Why is the spirit so deeply attached to religion? If not a demand of man's nature, how can we explain the fact that religion is adhered to so persistently, and defended so passionately? The inquiry into its psychological basis reveals in religion elements so thoroughly human, that he who would banish it from the world must first rob humanity of its heart. Not only is religion older than philosophy, but it has also at all times exerted a deeper and wider

influence.* Those who appreciate it as a necessity of human nature, do not fear that its right to existence will ever be successfully questioned, and are the last to shield it from the severest tests. They cannot share the fears of those who imagine that the development of science and philosophy may weaken the religious sentiment. Such fears are apt to prevail most in times when the agony of doubt is experienced, and in minds where faith and criticism are in antagonism, and whose confidence in religion has been shaken. They therefore have a subjective rather than an objective basis. Jacobi, who declared that with his head he was a heathen, but with his heart a Christian, feared that philosophy tended to Spinozism, and that with its progress its deleterious influence on religion would increase. But such fears can only be justified if philosophy perverts the truth, or else if religion is not true and does not meet the real needs of man. With a true philosophy, genuine religion must also advance. "Every fresh advance of certain knowledge apparently sweeps off a portion of (so-called) religious belief, but only to leave the true religious element more and more pure; and in proportion to its purity will be its influence for good, and for good only." †

Whatever is really valuable must retain or even increase its value after the most thorough investigation. If, after such investigation, its value vanishes, it is conclusive proof that it is a delusion which ought to be

* Herbart, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 2d ed. 213, says that religion "is much older than philosophy, and strikes its roots much deeper in the human soul." He doubts whether religion loses from the fact that it is a matter of faith instead of demonstration. This faith he regards as a complement of our knowledge, a complement which theoretically is a necessity.

† W. B. Carpenter: *Contemporary Review*, vol. xxvii.

banished as soon as possible. A faith that fears scrutiny is a very weak faith as far as its contents, or else as far as its confidence in the power of truth, is concerned.

To reject the claims of philosophy, respecting its right to investigate religion, may spring from three motives: either because religion is not thought worthy of philosophical attention; or because it does not need attention from philosophy; or because it is supposed that philosophy can determine nothing respecting religion. The first has already been disposed of as totally ignoring the significance of religion, and the important part it has played in human history. The second is based on a false view of philosophy, and of the rights of reason, and also ignores the fact that, whether religion wants it or not, philosophy will examine its claims. The third assumes what can be determined only by philosophy itself; and, while philosophy may not solve the deepest problems of religion, it will at least reveal their true character, and expose the fallacies of false solutions, thus performing an important work for religion. Philosophy does not solve the problems involved in moral and physical evil; but while it cannot construct a satisfactory theodicy, it may do much to show that atheism meets with just as many difficulties as the religious view, or with still more. And if some philosophical systems have been used against the very existence of religion, the latest which is of special significance, that of Lotze, has much which is in harmony with religion in general, and with Christianity in particular. He declares that faith in a personal God is not in conflict with any of the metaphysical convictions he is obliged to maintain, and rejects the supposition that the spiritual may have had its origin in the material, or that anthropomorphism

necessarily vitiates the religious notions.* If for nothing else, religion should hail with joy a true philosophy as a corrective of the false prevalent systems.

Among the cardinal points in determining the relation of philosophy to religion are the following: Is one supreme and the other subordinate? Or are they co-ordinate? Or are they partly co-ordinate, partly different in rank? A complete answer would settle their relation, and avoid many difficulties common in their disputes. Conflicts often arise because religion and philosophy attempt to encroach on each other.

If religion arrogantly claims dominion over thought, its tendency is to make philosophy in the true sense impossible. Degraded to a tool of theology, it ceases to be philosophy. Nor can it be expected to develop freely, so long as it is limited to a sphere in which there is no possibility of a conflict with theology. This was its position in the Middle Ages. Philosophy was viewed as the servant of religion, whose dogmas were regarded as absolute, and therefore a norm for the philosopher. Plato and Aristotle, especially the latter, were used to form and prove the systems of theology. As soon as philosophy came in conflict with the dogmas of the Church, as in the case of Abelard and others, the demand was made unconditionally that it should be abandoned or modified. Those to whom the works had to be submitted were usually not the persons best able to appreciate their contents. To save themselves from the anathema of the Pope, some of the philosophers, or rather philosophic theologians, invented the doctrine

* *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*, 99. He pronounces foolish the notion that the highest principle of the world is an unconscious, blind substance, whose conception is for us perfectly dark and impenetrable. Thus his views antagonize the pantheistic systems, which strike their roots in Spinoza, as well as the systems of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and *vice versa*. It is self-evident that a philosophy which starts with the presuppositions of a Church, and moves along the line marked out for it by that Church, can have authority only for him who occupies the same ecclesiastical standpoint; and it has authority for him merely because it has no authority of its own, but only that of the Church. A system that fetters the reason cannot be rational.

In the Roman-Catholic Church this servile position is still assigned to philosophy. Where the Church or a council or the Pope is pronounced infallible, the final appeal will always be to this infallibility; and the supremacy of reason, as well as the freedom of philosophy, is out of the question. A prominent teacher in that Church says that there are truths which belong both to theology and philosophy, but that the former always treats them as truths of revelation, while the latter regards them as truths of reason. He adds, "*In rank philosophy is not co-ordinate with theology, but subordinate. For theology has, on the one hand, a much higher source of knowledge than philosophy, namely revelation; and on the other, it has a higher and more extensive sphere of truth than philosophy, because it has the Christian mysteries, which philosophy of itself cannot attain.*" * This view is evidently the only one which can consistently be held in that Church. The author claims that philosophy is actually exalted, instead of being degraded, by this position. "Philosophy stands to theology in a certain relation of *servitude*, and that in a twofold way. First, it gives to theology a scientific basis, because it contains logic and methodology;

* *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, by Dr. A. Stöckl, professor in Eichstädt, 4th ed., 1876, vol. i. 14. The Italics are in the original.

and, second, it furnishes those speculative results on whose basis theology, so far as it is possible for the human mind, attains a speculative knowledge of the Christian mysteries. This is the sense and significance of the well-known device: *Philosophia est ancilla theologiæ*. From this it is seen, that, in accepting such a position of servitude in its relation to theology, the dignity of philosophy is not lessened; for it surely is no degradation of philosophy if, in the way indicated, it can be and is used for the purposes of a *higher science*." On such soil a pure philosophy cannot flourish; and it is not surprising, that of recent philosophers not one of eminence has come from the Catholic Church. It goes back to Thomas Aquinas, not forward.

If such views are still possible in Germany, we cannot be surprised if in the countries of Southern Europe philosophy is held in bondage. Barzellotti,* in speaking of Gioberti and Rosmini, says of the latter, "He never allows the freedom of his thought to go the length of admitting that any thing can be true to a philosopher which is incompatible with religious faith. That is to say, Rosmini regards the agreement of the latter with the results of philosophical investigation as a postulate. Gioberti, in his earlier works, goes even farther than this. Not only does he identify philosophy and religion, but he recognizes in the spirit a faculty *sui generis*, superior to reason, and having the supernatural for its object. Viewing the doctrine of Rosmini and Gioberti mainly from this point of view, Cousin, therefore, had ground for asserting that Italian thought was still in the 'bonds of theology.'"

Only a Church which regards its dogmas as absolute and final can degrade philosophy to a mere tool, and

* Philosophy in Italy, *Mind*, 1878.

rob reason and conscience of their rights. That philosophy in any worthy sense is thus destroyed, must be evident to all who understand its character. If dogmas are absolutely true, all possible antagonism cannot affect them, and all thorough inquiry can only serve to make their truth more evident. That mind must be strangely constituted which holds that a force is so great as to overcome all resistance, and yet claims that no one is permitted to test that force or attempt resistance. When both the dogmas and the infallibility of the authority establishing them are questioned, as in our day, such claims create the suspicion that the Church lacks confidence in its own teachings.

But even in the Protestant Church philosophy has not always enjoyed that freedom which enabled it fully to express and develop its principles. Wolff, Kant, Fichte, and others had their liberties restrained, or were subjected to persecution.* Heusde, a recent Dutch professor, said of his countrymen, "In philosophizing we ask for simplicity, good sound sense, and especially good principles, that should in no wise disagree with those of our religious faith." Let any one in America or Great Britain attempt to develop a philosophical system in conflict with the prevailing faith, and he will soon discover that there is a marked difference between nominal and real freedom of thought. In these lands the law may not interfere with freedom of expression; but there are other than legal restraints. There is a constant growth of toleration; but there are many who still have to learn that the wounds made by philosophy

* Wolff was banished from Halle, but was restored by Frederick II. ; Kant received a reprimand from the *Cultusminister* for publishing a certain article on religion; and Fichte, being charged with atheism in Jena, lost his professorship, and fled to Berlin.

and science can only be healed by the same, while abuse and passion only turn them into festering sores.* Sometimes the question of toleration becomes in the highest degree difficult. Can a state permit teachers in its institutions, appointed and supported by itself, to advocate views which tend to undermine the very principles on which it is founded? Its first law is self-protection. Communism will probably teach the states which have not already learned the lesson, that a sharp line must be drawn between liberty and licentiousness. In an institution established by a religious denomination, for religious purposes, it cannot be expected that instruction subversive of this end should be tolerated. No honest philosopher would accept or retain a position in which the perfect freedom necessary for a full development and free expression of his views cannot be maintained. This does not imply that a teacher must express all he imagines or believes, no matter with what consequences it may be fraught. The wise man is reserved in the utterance of mere opinions on weighty subjects, — opinions which may be false and injurious, and which he himself may have occasion to change afterwards. Freedom is not temerity; and philosophy is not contempt of authority, though it recognizes no authority as not subject to its tests.

If religion has repeatedly attempted to make philosophy subordinate, the latter has frequently tried to overthrow religion, or, at least, to transform it into harmony with itself. The Kantian rationalism, the use made of Hegel's dialectics, and Hartmann's pessimism, are examples. Theologians have repeatedly tried to harmonize

* Julius Muller says in one of his sermons, "Wounds which have been inflicted on humanity by knowledge, can be healed only by knowledge."

their doctrines with the prevalent school of philosophy, often with indifferent results. Sometimes, when the harmony was supposed to be complete, the philosophical system itself changed, and then no one cared for the reconciliation. Theologians may be obliged to pass through many transformations in order to keep in harmony with the rapidly changing philosophies.* There can hardly be a more absurd proposition than to claim that religion must adapt itself to the current philosophy. Even the disciples themselves are not always agreed as to the religion most in harmony with their philosophical system. In the school of Kant, and still more in that of Hegel, the followers have disputed fiercely about the religious attitude of their philosophy; and even on the doctrines of God and immortality conflicting views were held. Some philosophers modified their own systems (as Reinhold and Schelling), so that at different periods of their lives different religious doctrines would have found most favor. And what a time theologians would have in our age to determine which philosophical system shall fix their dogmas! Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Comte, Spencer, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, and perhaps a score besides, would have to be taken into account. Religion has been subject to many changes, but it has been stability itself compared with the evolutions and transformations of philosophical systems.

The failure to harmonize the two has repeatedly led

* Karl Daub, formerly theological professor at Heidelberg, is an interesting illustration. He began his career as a Kantian, and his first works are written from that standpoint. Then, after being under Fichte's influence for a while, he adopted Schelling's system, and wrote a number of dogmatic works in the spirit of that philosophy. Finally he became a disciple of Hegel, and his latest works bear the impress of that philosopher. His change of views cannot be attributed to lack of character. He was thoroughly sincere, as well as scholarly and speculative.

to efforts to separate religion from philosophy.* That this is impracticable, is frequently proved by its very advocates. One might as well attempt to keep the two elements apart in his own mind. A philosophical system may influence the mind very deeply, yet unconsciously.

Conflicts are inevitable. When they do arise, which is the final appeal? The fact that a religion claims to be absolute has no significance for the philosopher. The Catholic, the Protestant, the Jew, the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, all claim to possess the truth; but who shall decide between them? In order to be the criterion, a faith must first legitimate itself; it must prove its authority before its claims can be recognized by philosophy. The appeal to revelation or inspiration may be made by any religion: the very thing to be established is the genuineness of the claimed authority. A faith, in order to gain the approval of reason, must be rational. This implies that reason is the ultimate appeal in case of conflict. Properly understood, there can be no objection to this on the part of faith. As the appeal to reason as the final authority, even in religious faith, is often perverted, it is worth while to determine exactly what is meant by such an appeal.

The claim that faith must be rational does not mean that all the objects of belief can be comprehended by reason. If this were the sense, faith might as well be abandoned at once. Reason neither comprehends itself absolutely, nor the soul, nor the world, nor God. So far as it understands its limits, it has the best grounds

* Schleiermacher attempted this at the beginning of the century. Ritschl of Göttingen advocates the total exclusion of metaphysics from theology. He already has numerous followers, and his school is growing.

for modesty. The deeper thought of the age tends to despair rather than to arrogance. Much may be true whose full meaning we cannot fathom.

Nor does it mean that faith is only to accept what reason or the understanding demonstrates. If this were done, faith would be superseded by knowledge. This is the tendency of positivism and allied systems, though they themselves, in the name of knowledge, usually start with some supposition which itself needs proof, so that their positive knowledge itself rests on faith. Such tendencies, narrow, unconscious of their real character, often conceited as well as exclusive, are opposed by a philosophy which is broad as well as deep. A rational faith means the continuance of faith as faith, and not the foolish attempt to transform its emotional elements into mathematical formulas. Faith may contain much which reason cannot discover or demonstrate and comprehend, and yet be perfectly rational. It must not, however, contain any thing in itself contradictory; and one of the most important functions of philosophy in relation to theology is the test of the consistency of theological dogmas and systems. Not only does the reason claim that doctrines must be consistent with themselves, but also that they must not be in conflict with the established laws of mind. When evidence is produced in favor of facts or doctrines, it must be in accordance with the laws of evidence. So far as its objects are subject to demonstration, faith has only that logic whose application is universal. The logic of faith, unless the expression is figurative, is exactly the same as that which proves the revolution of the earth around the sun. The data, indeed, differ greatly, but not the reasoning founded on them.

So far as the doctrines of faith are comprehensible by

reason, they must be rational. But we go a step farther, and claim that faith, whether its doctrines are comprehensible or not, must itself be rational; that is, there must be sufficient ground for the faith. The fact that a doctrine is not self-contradictory is no evidence of its truth. The ontological proof has lost its force, because it is seen that a consistent idea of the Divine Being is no proof that God really exists. Whether it is held that faith is based on revelation, or on history, or on the study of nature, or on the impulses, demands, and experiences of man, or on all these combined, it can only substantiate its claims by showing that its grounds are rational. The objects of the claimed revelation may transcend the limits of our minds; but if I am to believe in them, I must have reasonable grounds for the belief, otherwise I might as well accept mythology, or make some other arbitrary choice. For historic facts we justly demand historic evidence. Philosophy, in spite of the attempt of Hegelians, cannot determine *a priori*, or according to any valid process, what the historical development must have been, and what may have occurred at a particular time. But reason has criteria according to which historical events, whether sacred or profane, must be tested. Faith in events which stand this test is rational, while unbelief would be irrational. It is certainly not rational to determine by philosophy what belongs exclusively to history. A philosophy which decides *a priori* that providence, prophecy, and miracle are impossible, disposes of these subjects summarily, wholly regardless of the testimony of history. All in history which comes under these heads is interpreted as mythology, or fiction, or deception, or mistake. There is much construction of history where there should be simply interpretation. We must judge

experience by experience, not by any supposed philosophy of experience which ignores experience itself; so history must be judged by history, according to the laws of historic criticism.⁶

In affirming that reason is the last appeal, we mean that reason is fundamental; it determines the laws of probability and certainty. It must not, however, be expected that reason can reconcile all principles, or explain all mysteries. If the accomplishment of this is to be the rule, then the religion that is rational must be barren, and will hardly rise above the level of rigid morality. Philosophy cannot fully explain even its own principles, or completely harmonize them; and it is too much to expect of it an explanation of all that pertains to religion. Principles which are true may form a union at a point which lies beyond the reach of our intellects. Even Hume, with his empirical basis, his clearness and acumen and scepticism, could not limit his mind to what he could explain and demonstrate. At the close of his *Treatise* he says, "There are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz., *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.*" If these problems baffle the power of the mind, is it any wonder that the deepest may have much for faith and little for intellectual sight?

The specific rules of reason as applicable to faith may be thus summarized:—

1. The fact that a notion is perfectly consistent with itself is no evidence that there is a corresponding reality.
2. No reality can correspond with a notion that is self-contradictory. A cannot at the same time be B and not-B.

3. No doubt many objects exist of which reason has no conception, and which it cannot comprehend. The power of reason is not the measure of existence.

4. Faith in such objects must be based on sufficient evidence; that is, it must be rational.

To reject rules as evident as these, is simply to determine that faith shall be unreasonable; that it shall rest on grounds which the mind itself finds inadequate. One need but understand what this means, in order to see that it is in reality faith against faith; that it is an effort to force the mind to assent to what it cannot accept. Rejecting this negation of its own laws as impossible, nothing remains but genuine rationalism, as indicated in the rules given. But it is not what has commonly been called rationalism. Heretofore this name has usually been applied to the efforts to bring all the objects of faith within the comprehension of reason, or to admit as valid only those which reason itself could discover and demonstrate. This rationalism was itself most irrational, because it ignored both the reasonable claims of the heart and the limits of reason. It viewed as rational only what was within the grasp of reason, which reason was often used in a low and narrow, not in an ideal, sense; but it forgot that there may be rational grounds in history and experience for a faith which is not limited by the powers of the reason to comprehend. The rationalism which the above rules establish simply claims that there should be a reason for the faith in us, and that we should prove all things, and hold fast that which is good. It is a rationalism which religion demands as much as philosophy; which, in fact, faith demands if it is to be faith. It admits that objects of faith may be *above* reason, but insists that they cannot be *against* reason; it admits

that reason may no more be able to discover them than it can historic events, but claims that faith in them must be reasonable. Whatever the ground of faith may be, whether in history, Scripture, nature, the heart, or the will, it must have a rational basis.

If faith has at times sinned against reason by ignoring the rational claims, philosophy has also sinned against faith by ignoring its character and rights. But the sins of faith against reason are against faith itself; and when philosophy sins against faith, it also does violence to its own nature. A philosophy which eagerly interprets the phenomena of the external world, but ignores those which are inner, which reveal man himself and concern him most, may ignore religion, but it is not worthy of the name "philosophy."⁷

It may be claimed that sin has so weakened reason, that it cannot test the truth; but this objection cuts off the very limb on which the objector himself must stand. If it is valid, how can we know whether we have the truth? How can we determine what to believe? The power of faith must also have been perverted by sin. The argument which robs man of the ability to test the truth, also robs him of the possibility of attaining a reliable faith. The man who wants an ethical and spiritual basis of faith must, of course, himself be moral and religious.

A few more hints may be of service to the student. By its attacks, philosophy may help to make religion conscious of itself. The fact that certain views have been held for ages, does not establish their truth. But neither does it prove them false. Neither antiquity nor novelty decides any thing in philosophy. An object may be real, and yet our grounds for believing in it may be irrational. A man, after discovering that he

has believed without sufficient reasons, may abandon his faith; but the fact that his faith was not well established is no proof that the objects in which he believed do not exist. Our belief and unbelief do not affect the truth itself. The earth moved, though the whole world denied it. It is necessary to distinguish between the objects of faith and the psychological basis of faith. If faith is not valid without sufficient grounds, neither should it be rejected without sufficient reasons. "A logical apparatus that is to overturn the deepest of human beliefs, must have an extremely firm basis, and must have these parts so firmly articulated that there is no dislocating them." *

The conflict between reason and faith has probably not yet reached its climax. Much as we may desire peace, the mind cannot rest until it has fought the battle to the end. No truce is possible until the combatants have learned thoroughly to understand each other, and have become willing to give each other their dues. He who enters the conflict must be prepared for severe trials if he wants to make thorough work. Whatever else may be destroyed, the truth cannot be finally overthrown. If he has this confidence coupled with modesty, deep sincerity, and a religious love for truth, the student may safely enter the battle, assured that truth will at last hold the field.

Confidence in the truth, and the resolute purpose to seek it, and it only, may unite in the closest bonds philosophy and religion. Both are free, but both are bound by the truth. Co-ordination, union, and freedom claimed by each for the other, as well as for itself, are the conditions of success. The progress made in our

* Herbert Spencer uses these words with reference to Hume: *Psychology*, 2d ed., ii. 350.

age is a guaranty to the scholar that he shall enjoy greater freedom in his inquiries than former ages granted. That may, of course, be claimed as liberty, which is really an abuse; but if true freedom is opposed, progress cannot be permanently checked. The triumphs of intellect may be somewhat more slow, but they will eventually overthrow the last remains of bigotry. Helmholtz attributes the superior success of German investigators, in some departments of science, to the fact that they are "more fearless than others of the consequences of the entire and perfect truth. Both in England and France we find excellent investigators, who are capable of working with thorough energy in the proper sense of the scientific methods; hitherto, however, they have always had to bend to social or ecclesiastical prejudices, and could only openly express their convictions at the expense of their social influence and their usefulness. Germany has advanced with bolder step: she has had the full confidence, which has never been shaken, that truth fully known brings with it its own remedy for the danger and disadvantage that may here and there attend a limited recognition of what is true. A labor-loving, frugal, and moral people may exercise such boldness, may stand face to face with truth; it has nothing to fear though hasty or partial theories be advocated, even if some appear to trench upon the foundations of morality and society."*

Whatever else may be feared, we cannot abandon our confidence in the beneficence of truth. The whole truth will fit the heart as well as the head, and will be promotive of pure religion as well as of sound philosophy. "From science, modestly pursued, with a due

* Aim and Progress of Physical Science, in his Popular Scientific Lectures.

consciousness of the extreme finitude of our intellectual powers, there can arise only nobler and wider notions of the purpose of creation. Our philosophy will be an affirmative one, not the false and negative dogmas of August Comte, which have usurped the name and misrepresented the tendencies of a true *positive philosophy*. True science will not deny the existence of things because they cannot be weighed and measured. It will rather lead us to believe that the wonders and subtleties of possible existence surpass all that our mental powers allow us clearly to perceive." *

LITERATURE.

The subject of this chapter is frequently discussed in philosophical and dogmatic works, but not always with impartiality. Often it is too evident that there is more concern about the claims of some system, than to give an objective view of the relation of philosophy and religion. Deism in England, and rationalism in Germany, necessarily led to a discussion of the subject. Under the influence of Lessing, Kant, and Hegel, special attention was devoted to the relation. The works on natural or rational theology all bear on the subject. In works on the philosophy of religion (Kant, Fries, Schelling, Hegel, Caird, Pfleiderer, Lotze), an effort is usually made to determine what religious elements are demanded by, or consistent with, certain philosophies. On the Continent the recent efforts to harmonize religion are mostly based on the works of Kant, Herbart (Drobisch: *Religionsphilosophie*; Flügel: *Die spekulative Theologie der Gegenwart*), Hegel (Biedermann: *Philosophie und Christenthum*, also *Dogmatik*; Lipsius: two books on the same subjects as Biedermann's), and

* Jevons, 768.

Lotze. Ritschl's effort to exclude metaphysics from theology has led to discussions, mostly among theologians, which have produced an extensive literature. (Ritschl: *Theologie und Metaphysik*; Herrmann: *Die Metaphysik in der Theologie*; Kaftan: *Das Wesen der Religion*). It has also been attempted to construct religions on the basis of positivism, evolutionism, and pessimism (Hartmann). The religious questions common to philosophy and religion may be concentrated under theism, and the doctrine of the soul or immortality; the former including, besides the existence and attributes of God, such themes as creation, design, providence, miracles, revelation (Flint, Ladd, Pressensé's *Origins*). On the relation of faith and knowledge (*Glauben und Wissen*), there are numerous works in German, and the subject is also frequently discussed in philosophical journals.

REFLECTIONS.

Religion a personal relation to God. What basis and objects has it in common with Philosophy? Difference between Philosophy and Religion. Between Religion and Theology. Reason and Faith. Rational Faith. Historical Rationalism and Deism. Reason and Common Sense. Philosophy and Mysticism. Arguments for the existence of God. Views of Anselm, Descartes, Kant. Significance of the emotional and volitional elements in Religion. Philosophical and historical criticism (Tübingen School). Limits of thought and of being. Religion and Materialism, Pantheism, Positivism, Agnosticism. Science and Religion. Basis for Religion in human nature. Moral argument for Religion. Does the psychological basis of Religion furnish an argument in favor of the objects of Religion? What is meant by the self-evidencing power of truth?

CHAPTER III.

PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE.

PHILOSOPHY and science, the two departments in which modern intellect has attained its greatest achievements, are both coldly intellectual, and, in theory at least, rigorous in method and absolute in the finality of their results. The advocates of each usually claim independence in their respective sphere, and contend for the supremacy in the domain of thought. It is but natural that with so great similarity they should often be confounded, and that with so much to distinguish them their hostility during rivalry and encroachments should become intense. But while at times they severely repel, they at others attract each other, and tend to coalesce. That they interlace, or even amalgamate, is evident from expressions like "scientific philosophy," and "philosophy of science."*

Under these circumstances it is peculiarly difficult to determine their exact places and relations; but it is as important as difficult, particularly since they are the departments in which the severest efforts of intellect culminate.

* In the beginning of this century, it was common in Germany to regard philosophy as science (*Wissenschaft*); the same is still the case, but it meets with more opposition. A distinction is now made between philosophy which is scientific, and that which is not, as is evident from the *Quarterly for Scientific Philosophy* (*wissenschaftliche Philosophie*), and also from the Italian journal *Revista de Filosofia Scientifica*.

The student who watches the development of thought in the growth of language, will observe that "philosophy" and "science" are not so commonly as formerly employed as synonymes. As a branch in its growth may separate into two with different directions, so it has been with intellect in developing philosophy and science together and afterwards separating them into distinct tendencies. While both terms are at times still used for the same spheres, we shall see that the process of discrimination and analysis is rapidly assigning to each a peculiar class of objects, and a peculiar aim. The term "*natural science*" of course implies that there is other science also; and for the present, for the sake of definiteness, we shall distinguish between philosophy and natural science, but with the conviction that the time is not distant when philosophy and science itself shall be generally admitted to have distinct spheres.

If a word with different senses is used, it will be found that its leading or most apparent sense absorbs, as it were, the others, and is ordinarily the only one present to the mind. When used with a meaning different from the leading one, it requires special discrimination to discern it; so that we frequently get *a* meaning of a word, but not *the* one intended. When a technical term is popularized, some prominent shade of meaning is generally seized, and applied to many objects to which it is not technically applicable. "Science" and "philosophy" are thus employed and made vague. But this law is also promotive of serious error, which can only be overcome by carefully observing the exact sense of a word in its connections. To such use, or rather abuse, the word "natural" is subject. In theology it has actually come to mean unnatural (sinful, the opposite of man's original, true nature). In science it is at times used in dis-

tion from the supernatural, in which case it includes the mental in man. When this is done, the mental is apt to be assimilated to what is most prominent in nature, namely the material and mechanical. But we also use "natural" in distinction from "mental," in which case man's peculiarities are most emphasized.

When natural science is here contrasted with philosophy, we use "natural" as distinct both from the mental and the supernatural. Natural science thus includes the whole domain of nature, but not psychology.

There are two leading meanings in the term "science" which have led to confusion even in its technical use. Thus it is employed on the one hand to designate simply certainty in systematized knowledge, whether that knowledge be formal or material;* and, on the other, it designates systematized material knowledge that is certain. Thus, when the mere element of certainty is considered, there are two departments of thought which have the strongest claim to the term "science," namely mathematics and formal logic. They are both speculative, mathematics being based on space and numbers, logic on indisputable axioms, and both being developed according to inexorable laws of mind, independent of observation and experiment in the ordinary sense. That this formal knowledge is the most certain of all, is evident from the fact that mathematics and logic are not liable to the errors possible in observation and experiment; besides, all material knowledge, natural science included, depends on formal knowledge for its construction, so that, even if its materials are absolutely certain, material knowledge can at best but attain the absolute-ness of the formal laws by which it is constructed.

* Material in the sense of containing objects as well as forms of knowledge.

If certainty, then, were the sole point of consideration, we should not hesitate to pronounce the speculative departments of mathematics and formal logic pre-eminently science. But when we come to material knowledge we find that the conditions for the strict application of these formal systems are given only in nature, so that in the domain of material knowledge the term "science" is strictly applicable only to nature. If we distinguish between formal and material science, there can be no danger of confusion, since in that case the former will include mathematics and logic, while the latter will be limited to natural science. So prominent, however, has natural science become, that it is generally meant now when the term "science" is used; and to avoid confusion it would be well to confine the term to that department.

Even among scholars the term is employed in various senses. When used technically, they are apt to attach to it what is only incidentally associated, and has no claim to its exactness and severity, while when employed popularly they designate by it systematized knowledge of any kind. Thus heraldry is called "the science of conventional distinctions impressed on shields, banners, and other military accoutrements." History, jurisprudence, music, politics, theology, æsthetics, ethics, logic, mathematics, chemistry, and many other subjects, have been called sciences. Now, a glance shows that neither in their objects, nor foundation, nor method, nor degree of exactness and reliability, is there any agreement between these heterogeneous subjects. No wonder, then, that scholars are not agreed as to the meaning of the term.*

* Different writers, having different conceptions of what constitutes a science, have assigned different dates to the birth of geology and other

When we speak of natural science, we are apt to think chiefly of a certain method and its results; but we also imply a particular class of objects. The phenomena of nature are peculiar in that they cannot merely be observed like other facts before the mind, but they can also be tested so as to yield exact and definite results not dependent on subjective states. The mind, if viewed as a part of nature, cannot be subjected to the same tests throughout. Even biology presents greater obstacles than physics. The character of its experiments, and the method of drawing and testing its inferences, give natural science a peculiar severity and exactness. The physicist subjects objects to various modifications in order to discover the effect of different relations. Something is added or subtracted, or differently placed, in order to discover new properties or facts. Professor Tait says, "The essence of experiment is to modify the circumstances of a physical phenomenon so as to increase its value as a test." The perfect uniformity, the absolute exactness, and the certainty attainable in these experiments, make them peculiar; and the laws to which they are subject determine what is technically called the scientific method.

Not more severe is natural science in its experiments than in observing and recording phenomena, whether occurring naturally or the result of experiment. The same experiments can be repeated at will and by any number of scientists, thus insuring greatest accuracy. But observation and experiment furnish only the materials of science, not science itself. All the processes

sciences. Professor Huxley defines science as "organized common sense:" and Mr. Spencer, as "partially unified knowledge." Science has also been defined as systematized knowledge, rationalized knowledge, verified knowledge, classified knowledge, etc. — H. M. STANLEY, *Mind*, 1884, 206.

founded on them are mathematically exact. Whatever suppositions may be tentatively adopted, science itself is limited to demonstrations; so that in the strict sense, and according to its true idea, natural science is absolute. For this reason the term "science" is so often assumed to help along mere hypotheses and assumptions which have no claim either to exactness or finality. We must distinguish between the claims of science and the claims of scientists.

Strict scientists are only consistent when they refuse the application of the term "science" to objects which will not submit to the tests of their method. If their conditions are correct, music, theology, history, politics, and similar subjects are not sciences. This of course does not imply that they are neither valuable nor reliable, but only that they do not comply with the conditions necessary to constitute science in its technical sense. When we speak of a man of science, we do not mean a theologian, metaphysician, historian, mathematician, or logician, but one who devotes himself to natural science. Such expressions as "student of science, scientific study, scientific discovery, scientific progress," and many similar ones, are generally used in the sense indicated. From the more general meaning of systematized knowledge, the term has thus come to be appropriated for knowledge of a certain kind, obtained in a particular way, subject to definite tests, and absolutely exact and reliable; and nothing will be lost by limiting the word to what is, in the strictest and most technical sense, scientific. In doing this, science will not only be different from philosophy, but will also have a peculiar sphere, distinct in method and limitation, and clearly separated from all other departments of learning.

Natural science seeks to discover the causes of physi-

cal events, and attempts to construct a system of the laws of nature. "To find the *law* by which they are regulated, is to *understand* phenomena. For law is nothing more than the general conception in which a series of similarly recurring natural processes may be embraced." *

The declaration that natural science aims to discover the laws of nature, is essentially the same as affirming that it seeks the forces of nature. The laws are simply statements of how the forces work, giving the formula of the operations of natural causes.† "Force" and "cause" are, however, words which seem to furnish explanations of phenomena which they in reality do not give. In using them, the mind should determine whether they interpret facts otherwise than by the substitution of another fact. Do we know what a force is, or how a cause works to produce an effect? We are apt to imagine that we have explained *how* a thing is done, when we have only shown that it is done. It is a deep inquiry to determine whether with what we call force we ever get farther than from one fact to another. In its last analysis a law gives only a method of procedure, or a general fact which embraces all facts of the same kind. The law of gravitation is itself a fact which includes many others; but neither Newton nor any

* Helmholtz, *Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects* (Appleton), 370. P. 393 he says "that what physical science strives after is the knowledge of laws; in other words, the knowledge how at different times, under the same conditions, the same results are brought about." Professor Tait states: "The object of all pure physical science is to endeavor to grasp more and more perfectly the nature and laws of the external world." — *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, 347.

† "Our desire to *comprehend* natural phenomena, in other words, to ascertain their *laws*, thus takes another form of expression, — that is, we have to seek out the *forces* which are the *causes* of the phenomena." — HELMHOLTZ, 372.

other human mind conceived the explanation of the law itself.

Its aim to reduce phenomena to laws attaches natural science closely to the facts it attempts to formulate. "Nothing can be learned as to the physical world, save by observation and experiment, or by mathematical deductions from data so obtained." * These deductions of course include all the direct logical inferences from the facts, and it is in these that scientists most of all reveal their intellectual power. It would be trivial to state that science demands the severest mental efforts, were it not that in some quarters the view prevails that science is the product of mechanical routine, as much within the power of the shallowest as of the profoundest minds. Then, pretenders so often obtain popularity by palming off their thoughtless empiricism as science, that beginners are liable to forget that mere observers and experimenters are to the scientist what the hod-carrier is to the mason. All phenomena are valuable in proportion as they are elaborated and mastered by thought. Newton's great discovery required few facts, but enormous intellectual effort. Profound scientists recognize the need of emphasizing the mental vigor essential in scientific pursuits, for the reason that so many imagine that science requires nothing but a registering and classifying of facts. It is forgotten that the facts observed in nature can only be connected and related by the mind, and that the laws of nature are mental products from the given data. "Isolated facts and experiments have in themselves no value, however great their number may be. They only become valuable in a theoretical or practical point of view when they make us acquainted with the *law* of a series of uniformly recur-

* Tait, 342.

ring phenomena, or, it may be, only give a negative result showing an incompleteness in our knowledge of such a law, till then held to be perfect." * Science, in dealing with facts for its highest purposes, is as purely intellectual as is philosophy in relating and developing concepts.

Not mere observers, but the thinkers, have made this "the century of natural science." The victories ascribed to the laboratory are really the triumphs of reason in the laboratory. It might be misleading to speak of a philosophic element in the profound scientists from Newton till the present; and yet it would express their constant tendency to pass from the concrete to the abstract, and from facts to laws, principles, and system. The materials with which science deals being more apparent than its method, the sense has been honored with the functions of the reason, and it has been overlooked that the progress in physical studies has been due to a scientific empiricism, mastered by a scientific rationalism. † However unpopular speculation may be among empirics, it can be healthy as well as sickly, and is too deep an impulse of the mind to be ignored by real scientists. But the difference between science and philosophy is, that in the former the speculation is limited by facts and their laws, while in philosophy the concepts and the mental laws are the limit. Whoever has passed from the facts of science to science itself will agree with Whewell ‡ in emphasizing the need of facts *and* reason, the "observation of things without, and an inward effort

* Helmholtz, 369.

† The indications given by the senses, unless interpreted by reason, are utterly unmeaning. But when reason and the senses work harmoniously together, they open to us an absolutely illimitable prospect of mysteries to be explored." — TAIT, 342.

‡ History of the Inductive Sciences, Introduction.

of thought." He adds, "The impressions of sense, unconnected by some rational and speculative principle, can only end in a practical acquaintance with individual objects; the operations of the rational faculties, on the other hand, if allowed to go on without a constant reference to external things, can lead only to empty abstraction and barren ingenuity. Real speculative knowledge demands the combination of the two ingredients, — right reason, and facts to reason upon. It has been well said, that true knowledge is the interpretation of nature: and thus it requires both the interpreting mind, and nature for its object; both the document, and the ability to read it."

Nature does not write or impress its facts and laws upon a passive mind, and it is no such immediateness of scientific knowledge which distinguishes it from the philosophic. Science is not the product of sensationalism, though the denial of the possibility of knowledge anywhere else than in regions accessible to the senses has led to the more exclusive study of the phenomenal world. The merit of turning thought from scholastic subtleties to empirical investigations belongs largely to Bacon; but those who regard his emphasis on the observation of facts, as giving the essence of the modern scientific spirit and tendency, have failed to appreciate the intellectual energy in science. Bacon's great service to science consists rather in the general direction he gave to thought, than in the introduction of a complete method of scientific processes. He did much to banish useless inquiries, and to substitute for them researches which promise fruitful and certain results; but it was an impulse to a certain course of inquiry, rather than a full indication of the route to be taken.⁸

In discussing the relation of philosophy to science, we must distinguish the true scientist from mere empirics. While the aim and method of the latter put all reconciliation with philosophy out of the question, because they depreciate thought and exalt the sense to the throne of reason, the philosopher has much in common with the former, and can easily come to an agreement with him respecting many essential points in science and philosophy. The purely intellectual element in his pursuit brings the scientist into sympathy with the philosopher, while the philosopher unhesitatingly admits all that the scientist can justly claim for his method and its results; and if both the philosopher and scientist are deep and broad, there can be little danger of conflict.

Although the advance of science is due to the intellectual use of the facts, it is still the explanation of the *facts* that is sought; and scientists are usually suspicious of conclusions wholly beyond their reach. The facts are held to be the test of all speculations respecting nature. If scientists admit, that, in any department of thought, there may be knowledge of objects which cannot be subjected to the test of facts, they deny that it is scientific. In natural science, therefore, thought is limited, being tethered to the facts. Besides observation, experiment, and mathematics, it is found that speculation, hypotheses, and theories are indispensable; but they must be based on facts and tested by them, and their sole value consists in their ability to explain the facts. In the strict sense, the work of natural science is completed when the laws of nature have been discovered and systematized; inferences and generalizations transcending the test laid down by science cannot be regarded as lying within its domain, however reliable in themselves.

Our liability to error induces us to seek in sense and reason a corrective of each other, and to regard the truth as resulting from the harmonious action of both. Only an unthinking sensationalism can claim that the last appeal should be made to the immediateness of our perceptions. Science has clearly demonstrated that our sense-impressions need correction by the judgment. I see light, and hear sound; but no number of impressions can convince me that, aside from eye and ear, light and sound exist in nature. I touch a piece of iron and a cloth in the same room, and find the one colder than the other; and yet I know that both have the same temperature, my sensations being determined by the power of objects to conduct heat. Thus our intellect is the ultimate appeal, not the sense. As in its inferences, so also in its observations and experiments, natural science makes the reason supreme. The difference between ordinary and scientific observation and experiment is simply this, — that the latter use the sense and its objects according to rational principles, while the former do not. Instead of the usual assumption, therefore, that sense and reason are to each other a corrective, we shall be nearer the truth in saying that reason uses the data of sense as aids in drawing legitimate conclusions. And natural science must be viewed as the rational interpretation of nature, based on a rational use of the facts, and subjected to the rational test by facts.⁹

So far there will probably be no dispute between the philosopher and the scientist. Whoever objects to the expressions “rational use” and “rational test,” and to the supremacy of reason and the subordination of sense implied, need but substitute the word “irrational,” to see the absurdity of his position. By eliminating the rational, he cuts off all dispute, for there is no basis left

on which the disputants can stand. The only controversy possible between the philosopher and scientist would be respecting the sense of the word "rational," — a dispute which cannot be settled by science with its appeal to the test of facts (where is the standard reason given as a fact?), but only by philosophy.

No one questions the reliability of the results obtained by means of the scientific method. Formerly philosophers, indeed, proposed to substitute speculation for this method; that is now, however, universally admitted to be wrong. But a conflict begins so soon as the question is proposed, whether the laws of nature established by science are the limits of knowledge. This is the same as the inquiry, whether there is other than scientific knowledge. It seems almost absurd to ask the question; but some so exalt science that they not only refuse to join Du Bois-Reymond and others in inscribing *Ignorabimus* on their banner, but every other attainment so dwindles in comparison with science, that they call it knowledge only by courtesy. A scholar eminent in one department may get into a narrow rut, and be unable to see over its edges any thing worthy of notice. Compared with the omnipotence of science, one may hear philology, literature, history, and logic, to say nothing of metaphysics, theology, æsthetics, and ethics, spoken of with a degree of contempt.

The cause of science will not be retarded, but promoted, by distinguishing between those who have really caught its spirit, and such as are scientists only in name. If the latter speak disparagingly of other pursuits in order to magnify their own importance, they can work mischief only if regarded as speaking in the name of science. The question, whether there is any thing beyond the limits of strict science, is answered by scien-

tists themselves in their efforts to get beyond. The limits of science are evidently not the limit of thought, and the mind cannot rest when it has reached them. Scientific men construct cosmologies, and frequently adopt materialistic or idealistic theories of the universe, which are wholly extra-scientific. It may even happen, that speculation is zealously denounced in the interest of exact science, but this only serves to increase the astonishment at finding so many winged speculations in works of scientists. The imagination plays a much more prominent part in constructing theories termed scientific than is generally supposed. Herbart held that imagination is essential to all discoveries, and that there is as much of it in original thought in science as in poetry. "It is very doubtful," he says, "whether Newton or Shakspeare possessed the greater imagination." Surely our age need not abuse Kepler for his fancies, nor pity Newton if he believed in alchemy.* The reliability of what the mind imagines possible is to be determined by direct questions to nature, to be answered by means of tentative experiment. The mere mental combinations and theories of scientists must of course be subjected, as far as possible, to scientific tests; but their very existence, to say nothing of their abundance and utility, proves that the mind cannot be compressed within the limits of exact science.¹⁰

The confidence with which we speak of natural science is justified so long as we remember that it confines itself to phenomena, and that its observations are necessarily limited. We enter the domain of mystery as soon as we inquire into the essence of things, the nature of forces and causes, and the totality of natural phenomena. Both the progress of science and the division

* Jevons, 505.

of labor have increased the difficulty of generalizations comprehending the total results of scientific inquiry.¹¹ While specialization, so marked a feature of our age, greatly promotes the advance of the separate sciences, it also has serious disadvantages. The rigid specialist cannot get a comprehensive view of science even, still less of knowledge in general; he is also in danger of becoming unjust to other branches, and of losing appreciation for every thing but his specialty. The undue exaltation of one department of thought destroys the unity of knowledge, and the organism of all the sciences. He who is supreme in a specialty may go far astray when he makes it the standard of all intellectual achievements, the criterion of all truth, the basis of all generalizations, and the law for the interpretation of the universe. Mere specialization, in exact proportion to its perfection, makes knowledge fragmentary. For systematic mental development, and for a complete and comprehensive view of things, the mind must go beyond these specializations. This is a demand of the specialties themselves. Sometimes the limits of their spheres are in dispute; who can settle it without rising above the limitations of each? Divisions are matters of mental convenience, and analysis is but a preparation for synthesis. But how can we form a correct synthesis of all the sciences and their results? In going beyond his specialty, the specialist ceases to be a specialist; and it is no disparagement to his eminence in a particular sphere to say that the exclusive training for and in his specialty has probably unfitted him for the totally different problems which lie beyond. These problems are, in many cases, the deepest, and involve the highest interests. Shall they be ignored? Shall they be left to the fancy? Or shall man be specially prepared to

grapple with them? The mind demands their solution, or, at least, the most earnest effort, with the best means, to solve them. If natural science could do the work, no one would hesitate to consign to it these problems; but, lying far beyond the test of physical facts, science cannot even attempt to solve them without becoming philosophy.

The unity of nature is an axiom of science, and the basis of all induction. But is this axiom given by isolated facts, or by the special sciences? No one questions that there must be unity in the final results of all the sciences; but can a specialty teach us any thing respecting the results of all investigation? There are principles which are common to all thought, which determine the character of all valid research, are the criteria of all truth, and lie at the basis of all the sciences; now it is self-evident that what is common to all the sciences, and constitutes the essence of science itself, cannot be a specialty of any particular science. If any one claimed it as a monopoly, the others would immediately rebel. No natural science regards itself called upon to make these principles a specialty; each one, as a rule, simply takes them for granted, and works on them. Such, for instance, are the principles of knowledge. Every science rests on these, and all its investigations and constructions must be determined by them; yet it might never get to nature itself if it had first to answer the numerous questions pertaining to the theory of knowledge. All that can be expected of a specialist is that he master these principles; and the failure to do so is often fraught with serious consequences in scientific investigations.¹² All inferences should be logical; but the specialist cannot be expected to prepare a logic on the basis of his specialty, and then make that logic

the basis of reasoning in the specialty. Then there are axioms, as in mathematics, which are taken for granted, and yet the question of their validity involves the perplexing problems connected with the nature of what are called necessary truths. So, too, there are such notions as space, time, motion, change, substance and accident, being, cause, and many others, which are commonly used as if perfectly clear, and yet they are full of mystery.* They may, indeed, be so habitually taken for granted that they hardly seem to involve unsolved problems, and habit may lead one to regard his assumptions as demonstrations. But the critical mind, which does not run in a narrow groove, and is not enslaved by dogmatism, sees that they involve the deepest problems of the human intellect; and it also knows that every solution opens new fields of inquiry. With all the brilliant discoveries of science, the sphere of mystery has been enlarged and darkened. The problems which arise out of the depths of science and cannot be solved by it are philosophical, and must be answered, if at all, by philosophy.

The study of the principles, organism, and final consequences of science, has led scientists themselves to connect philosophical speculations with their specialties. In Descartes and Leibnitz, philosophy and science were intimately connected. Kant passed from mathematics and physics to metaphysics and ethics. Lotze and Harms went from medical studies to philosophy. Hart-

* How are we to think matter? Is it the unchangeable basis of phenomena, or is it also changeable? If it is itself changeable, is there any thing in the universe that is not subject to change? If matter is regarded as an unchangeable substance, how can we account for the manifold phenomena of the world? To dismiss these subjects as irrelevant, means that the mind's inquiries must be checked whenever they go below the surface.

mann claims to base his speculations on the results of natural science, according to the most approved scientific method. Professor Wundt declares it was the natural sciences which, "almost without my knowledge and desire, led me toward philosophy;" and also states that now the sciences which lately seemed farthest removed from philosophy have not been least affected by it.* Helmholtz and others on the Continent adopt fundamental principles of Kant's philosophy. In England, Locke, as developed by Hume and Mill, is the leading authority among scientists. These philosophers, not the sciences, are the source of the prevailing sensationalism and empiricism. In the doctrine of causation; in the hesitation to regard the uniformity of nature as established beyond question; in the substitution of heredity, association, and experience, for the necessity of reason; in the suspicion with which thought, rising above the impressions through the senses, is viewed, we see the philosophy of Hume. The argument sometimes met with, that a miracle is possible because the uniformity of nature is no necessity of reason, is simply using Hume against Hume. And the view of Darwin and the Darwinians, that the power to form abstractions does not distinguish man from animals, is nothing but Berkeley's argument against abstract ideas, adopted and made current by Hume. Indeed, scientists usually place themselves on some philosophical basis, on which they construct their theories; and the conflicts among scientists are usually philosophical, not scientific. Just

* "Nicht am wenigsten sind aber diejenigen Wissenschaften von der Philosophie berührt worden, die ihr vor nicht langer Zeit vielleicht am fernsten gestanden, diejenigen, die mich selbst — ich darf wohl sagen fast ohne mein Wissen und Wollen — der Philosophie entgegengeführt haben, die *Naturwissenschaften*." — *Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Gegenwart*, 5.

because it is so absolute, and always appeals to facts, and to demonstrations based directly on them, science cannot be disputed. It does not dispute, it demonstrates.

We are consequently justified in affirming that science, in proportion as it is deep, will recognize the necessity of philosophy. The isolated thoughts or laws furnished by the experimental sciences, instead of satisfying the mind, impel it to form a union of the fragments, and to draw from them the ultimate consequences. It asks, What is the result of all the sciences? Into what ocean do they pour their contents? Starting with the given data and their laws, what may be inferred respecting the first and final causes? In these queries are condensed some of the most important problems which experimental science suggests, but which lie beyond its sphere, and in the domain of philosophy. The mind continually strives to trace relations, to bring remote objects together, and to unite the separated. In this it is controlled by an impulse which may be rudely checked, but which cannot be satisfied until that ultimate unity is discovered whose existence is a postulate of reason.¹³

Much of the opposition of scientists to philosophy is due to the spirit of positivism, which lauds experience, but fails to see that the laws drawn therefrom involve abstractions whose processes are subjected to philosophical, not scientific tests. Comte would ruthlessly banish thought from the highest regions, and confine it to phenomena. His system denies the rights of the mind itself. Its author and some of his disciples (especially Littré) imagined that their positivism was allied to the Kantian criticism; but it is evident that they totally failed to catch the spirit of the critical philosophy, particularly of its earnest efforts to reach the limits of

thought, and to conserve the basis of morality. Positivism is not merely unhistorical, but also uncritical. Without taking the trouble to examine thoroughly the mental powers, it determines arbitrarily the limits of thought; and in this essential element its method of procedure is the very opposite of the critical philosophy. Positivism is dogmatism exalted to absolutism.¹⁴

Positivism is not, however, the only source of antagonism between science and philosophy. Various philosophical systems have been seriously at fault, and have aroused opposition. In Germany the schism occurred during the first decades of this century, when the influence of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel determined the prevalent character of philosophic thought. The speculative tendencies were carried to such an extreme that experiment was regarded beneath the dignity of philosophers and scientists, who were expected to unravel all mysteries *a priori*, and to spin the laws of nature, as well as of mind, out of their own brains. For "philosophy" Fichte attempted to substitute the term *Wissenschaftslehre* (the doctrine of science), which was intended to give the laws of science. In the work with this title he claims that the volume takes no account of experience, and that its doctrines would be true even if there were no experience. The same tone was adopted by Schelling and Hegel. While experience was spoken of disparagingly, speculation was made supreme and regarded as containing all the treasures of wisdom. But during the *a priori* frenzy (1790-1840) *

* A description of the beginning of this frenzy is given in my *Life of Immanuel Kant*, chap. 11.

I am well aware that all of Hegel's disciples are not prepared to admit that their master went to the extreme in speculation. There are many points which are left obscure by Hegel himself, and the fierce disputes in his school have only served to add to the confusion. Some

the natural sciences made rapid progress, and completely emancipated themselves from the influence of speculative philosophy. A great re-action came. The speculative systems had prevailed in State and Church and literature; but before the middle of the present century a different spirit became dominant. The *a priori* explanations of nature were laughed at; the speculations of philosophers were viewed as air-castles; and science, based on the most pains-taking collection of facts and the severest induction, became supreme. It seemed as if an impassable gulf had been fixed between experimental science and philosophy. With their extravagance the really solid and grand achievements of the speculative systems were also rejected. Science became haughty and exclusive. Experimentalists looked with as much contempt on speculators as these had expressed for the former; and shallow empirics revealed their wisdom by an ignorant sneer at profound philosophers. Science claimed the entire domain of the real, while the realm of visions was assigned to philosophy. This development since Kant's *Kritik* appeared enables us to understand why in Germany philosophy and natural science are more sharply distinguished than in other lands. *Naturphilosophie* is not used like "natural philosophy" in England and America to designate physics, but speculations respecting nature; hence it belongs to philosophy, not to science.

Respecting the beginning of that conflict which

of his disciples claim that on the value of experiment, on the relation of experience to reason, on the significance of the particular or individual and the general, and of the concrete and the abstract, Hegel had been misunderstood. This may be true; but in that case both the disciples and the master are to blame for contradictory statements, and for the use of terms which seem to teach one thing when they mean something different.

drove philosophy and science into hostile camps, it will be interesting to hear so eminent a scientist as Helmholtz.* “Certainly, at the end of last century, when the Kantian philosophy reigned supreme, such a schism had never been proclaimed; on the contrary, Kant’s philosophy rested on exactly the same general ground as the physical sciences, as is evident from his own scientific works, especially from his *Cosmogony*.” Of Hegel’s efforts to construct natural philosophy *a priori*, he says, “His system of nature seemed, at least to natural philosophers, absolutely crazy. Of all the distinguished scientific men who were his contemporaries, not one was found to stand up for his ideas. Accordingly, Hegel himself, convinced of the importance of winning for his philosophy in the field of physical science that recognition which had been so freely accorded to it elsewhere, launched out, with unusual vehemence and acrimony, against the natural philosophers, and especially against Sir Isaac Newton, as the first and greatest representative of physical investigation. The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect.”¹⁵

* 7-8.

This feud has by no means been confined to Germany, though it was most bitter there. The various phases of the conflict need not be considered here; but the schism itself must be taken into account in order to understand the relation now existing between scientists and philosophers. It is not a conflict between philosophy and science, which would imply that they are incompatible and that the one or the other must therefore be destroyed; but between historic systems, which are imperfect and liable to change. There is scarcely a doubt that in the controversy philosophers have been the greatest gainers, perhaps because they were most to blame originally and had most to learn. Not only have they abandoned their *a priori* constructions respecting natural phenomena, but many of them have also become earnest students of science, so as to connect their philosophical speculations as intimately as possible with the results of exact research. Naturally they attend rather to laws and principles than to the details of science, though these have also received much attention. To remove the charge of vagueness and uncertainty, they have attempted to give philosophy as much of the scientific basis and method as is consistent with its character and aims. If a philosopher now placed himself on the *Naturphilosophie* of Schelling or Hegel, he would in his own fraternity be laughed at for his pains. The conflict has made philosophy more modest, more critical, more solid, and consequently more reliable.

There are also scientists who have been gainers from the conflict. The masters in science recognize their limitations, admit the significance of the theoretical element, encourage the study of the cognitive faculties and of logic, while carefully excluding metaphysics from science. The cry, "Return to Kant," came largely

from scientists, who felt the need of supplementing science with a critical philosophy. Such a prejudice has, however, been excited against philosophy, that many students of science have ignored even the study of logic; and their works also prove that they do not distinguish clearly between sensation, experience, and reason.

Herbart's words, uttered at the beginning of this century, sound like a prophecy: "It cannot be otherwise than that the neglect of philosophy should result in a frivolous or perverted treatment of the fundamental principles of all the sciences." So common has this treatment become in certain quarters, that earnest voices are heard among scientists, to say nothing of philosophers and others, favoring more thorough discipline in philosophical studies. Even the materialist, Dr. Louis Büchner, holds that the riddles of life, if to be solved at all, require philosophy. He declares that no special science can give this solution; the only hope is in the results of all, developed according to logical principles.* Professor Haeckel † also complains of "the lack of philosophical culture, which characterizes most of the physicists of the day." He claims that many of the errors of scientists are due to their neglect of philosophy, and to that "crude empiricism" which they laud as "exact science." "The numerous errors of the speculative natural philosophers in the first third of this century have brought all philosophy into such disrepute among exact scientists, that they cherish the strange illusion that they can construct the edifice of natural science from *facts* without a *philosophical connection* of the same; from mere *observation* without *understanding*. Only by

* *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 1871, No. 283.

† *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*.

means of the most thorough permeation of philosophy and empiricism can the indestructible edifice of true monistic science arise." While Helmholtz throws the weight of his influence in favor of the study of the cognitive and logical elements of philosophy, his colleague, Du Bois-Reymond, does not hesitate to make the charge, that among scientists there is a lamentable lack of philosophical training and dialectic acumen. In his "Seven Riddles of the World," he said that the manner in which his address on "The Limits of Natural Science" had been received proves that "the national philosophic culture, of which we are accustomed to boast, does not appear in a favorable light." So completely "has philosophy been shoved aside, that even where natural science itself has in many points reached the stage of philosophizing, there often appears a great lack of preliminary conceptions, and ignorance of what has really been accomplished." It seems strange that scientists should have found it necessary to defend logical studies and deep thinking in science, but that has been the case. Opposing the empirics, who want to make science superficial, Liebig said, "In natural science all investigation is deductive or *a priori*; experiment is only for use by the process of thought, just as arithmetical calculation; thought must precede it in all cases if it is to have any significance. An empirical investigation of nature, in the usual sense, does not exist."* Fechner recognizes the need of metaphysics; and declares that while the scientist stops with the atoms, these by no means satisfy the mind, which strives to go beyond them. After a war between natural science and philosophy, we now see them "gradually coming to themselves and making peace with each other, which promises to be the more

* *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. xi., quoted by Barutschek.

lasting, since the very problems which claim the attention of modern science are of such a character that their solution is possible only on condition of co-operation between natural science and philosophy.”*

The antagonism between philosophy and science is evidently drawing to a close. Both parties have erred; their approach now is on the basis of truth, of mutual need, and mutual help. Professor Huxley holds that “the reconciliation of physics and metaphysics lies in the acknowledgment of faults upon both sides; in the confession by physics that all the phenomena of nature are, in their ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of consciousness; in the admission by metaphysics, that the facts of consciousness are practically interpretable only by the methods and formulæ of physics; and, finally, in the observance by both metaphysical and physical thinkers of Descartes’ maxim, — assent to no proposition the matter of which is not so clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted.”† In his *Logik*, Ueberweg says that “the so-called empirical sciences would have to abandon their scientific character, if they wanted to reject all thoughts transcending direct experience.”‡ In 1873, the Academy of Sciences in Berlin admitted to membership two philosophers, Professors Zeller and Harms. The address of welcome contained these sentences: “If the signs of the times do not

* *Die Grundprincipien der Schellingschen Naturphilosophie*, by Dr. R. Koeber. See also Wundt’s *Einfluss der Philosophie auf die Naturwissenschaften*, and *Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Gegenwart*.

† Lay Sermons, Descartes’ Discourse on Method. The only difficulty is in the third condition. If all the phenomena of nature are, “in their ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of consciousness,” how can the facts of consciousness be practically interpretable by the methods and formulæ of physics? This makes consciousness interpretable by consciousness.

‡ At the close.

deceive, the reconciliation of philosophy and the natural sciences is gradually approaching. . . . The most important discoveries in natural science shed their light over connected phenomena of extensive spheres, and they of themselves impel to seek a *comprehension of the universal*. Ingenious representatives of the natural sciences approach philosophy, and admit that the mission and method of both are not irreconcilably hostile. Whatever is gained permanently by philosophy in historical and scientific tendencies, will revive the consciousness that all the sciences are one."

Objections to philosophy are still common; they are not, however, directed so much against philosophy *per se*, as against certain historic systems and methods. To lay their faults to the charge of philosophy itself, is as rational as to blame science for the methods of mere empirics. Certain philosophical systems have been visionary; but we are advocating sober, critical philosophy, not wild speculation. The charge that philosophy is not exact, may mean that its objects cannot be weighed and measured. But this is the fault, if fault at all, of the objects, not of philosophy. Does any one blame science for determining only proximately the distance of a fixed star, or, perhaps, resorting to guesses on the subject? Ideas cannot be put into scales, or determined by inches; there are no pints or pounds for truth and morality. But this is no argument against either philosophy or the existence and value of its objects.* These may be real, though not tangible; and because so purely intellectual, it is difficult to define

* "The study of logical and mathematical forms has convinced me that even space itself is no requisite condition of conceivable existence. Every thing, we are told by materialists, must be here or there, nearer or farther, before or after. I deny this, and point to logical relations as my proof." — JEVONS, 768.

them, and communicate the conception of them to other minds.

The objection that philosophical systems have often changed is no argument against philosophy itself. The charge that it has accomplished nothing is based on ignorance of its own progress, and of its great service in developing science, and promoting all departments of intellect. Philosophy is fundamental; and its value is not diminished because the foundation itself was hid from most men, while the superstructure it bore was evident to all.

Many of the objections to philosophy may as cogently be urged against science. That, too, has problems of long standing, which are apparently no nearer solution than when first proposed. Can it explain the origin of life, or sensation, or consciousness, or the connection of mind and body? Can it in sound, say in music, sharply separate the physical, the physiological, and the psychical elements? But questions like these are endless; and if they do not arise, it may be because in science men so often operate with symbols which are taken for explanations, but in reality explain nothing. Science, like philosophy, the deeper it goes, the more fully it realizes that it exposes problems rather than solves them. It should also be remembered that science itself thrusts upon philosophy the deepest problems; and if these are unsolvable, it proves that science itself must remain a torso.

The definiteness and exactness of science also have their limitations. Has it been determined where plants end, and animals begin? Has the limit of species, or even their exact nature, been fixed? Is there any thing definite respecting the use of such important terms as atoms, matter, force? What is the bond of union

between chemistry and physics? What is ether? What are the connecting links between gravity, light, heat, and electricity? * But it is useless to multiply instances. Surely it is no argument against natural science, that its deepest problems have thus far remained unsolved; but this makes it the more unaccountable that such an objection should seriously be urged against philosophy.

The lack of agreement among philosophers has been used against philosophy; but how is it with scientists? Within the last decades the most bitter controversies have been those of the latter. "Physical science itself, as it becomes general, grows to be contested. . . . The larger conceptions and principles of physical inquiry are so notoriously under dispute at the present day, that it is almost trivial to mention the fact." ¹⁶ Science invites to deep research just because so much remains to be done. "We have but to open a scientific book, and read a page or two, and we shall come to some recorded phenomenon of which no explanation can yet be given." † Is it surprising, then, that philosophy has unsolved problems? The same author says, "It ought to be added, that, wonderful as is the extent of physical phenomena open to our investigation, intellectual phenomena are yet vastly more extensive."

Absolute as science is in its proper sphere, it is, as

* Wundt (*Aufgabe*) says that, within the memory of the present generation, gravity, light, heat, and electricity were each subjected to a special method of explanation, and each in reality required a particular theory of matter. Accordingly in different departments of science different theories of matter prevailed!

† Jevons, 754. Du Bois-Reymond gives the following as the seven riddles of science, some of which he regards as beyond all hope of solution: 1. The nature of matter and force. 2. The origin of motion. 3. The origin of life. 4. The apparent design in nature. 5. The origin of sensation. 6. The origin of rational thought and of language, which is intimately connected with it. 7. The freedom of the will.

we have seen, severely limited to that sphere ; and the masters in science continually warn against transcending these limits, and treating philosophy as if lying within the domain of science. The two departments do not conflict. Instead of dictating them, philosophy accepts and uses the facts and laws scientifically established, making them factors in its inferences. Neither does science encroach on philosophy ; but gratefully accepting its fundamental principles, science rejoices if it takes up for solution the weightiest problems. All the sciences press toward a unity attainable only with the help of philosophy. To check philosophy proper is to check thought itself.

If in its search for ultimate principles philosophy takes up, for criticism, thoughts with which scientists continually operate without making them subjects of special reflection, that is no interference. Philosophers who habitually deal with mental phenomena and abstract terms are, in all probability, best prepared to investigate them. Some of these terms have already been indicated ; as, substance, cause, being, time, space, motion, matter, force. Philosophers may render important service by elucidating the concepts for which they are supposed to stand ; they can at least determine whether the concept is consistent with itself, or contains contradictions. Thinkers recognize the obscurity of these terms, though ordinary investigators are apt to imagine that they have a definite knowledge of the concepts, or the reality which they represent. Investigators, as they go deeper and become conscious of the fact that they use symbols for reality, learn modesty. Balfour Stewart says, "It thus appears that we know little or nothing about the shape or size of molecules, or about the forces which actuate them ;

and, moreover, the very largest masses of the universe share with the very smallest this property of being beyond the direct scrutiny of the human senses, — the one set because they are so far away, and the other because they are so small.”* Therefore we are obliged either to dismiss these subjects, or else to resort to speculation. Since the deepest inquiries of science always impel to theoretical investigations, all that it can ask is that philosophy base its speculations on reliable data, and conduct them according to the most rigid logic.

Healthy speculation, or the thorough elaboration of concepts and their consequences, is essential to science. The scientific method is possible only because there are concepts and principles on which it rests, which themselves are not within the limits or under the necessity of (empirical) scientific demonstration. And the scientist does not hesitate to use notions which he cannot test scientifically. What use could he make of atoms and the theories founded on them, if he were limited to his senses and the test of facts? An atom may be thought, but it cannot be perceived. “The limits placed upon our senses, with respect to space and time, equally preclude the possibility of our ever becoming directly acquainted with these exceedingly minute bodies, which are, nevertheless, the raw materials of which the whole universe is built.”† Another eminent scientist says, “An atom in itself can no more become an object of our investigation than a differential.”‡

* The Conservation of Energy (Appleton), 6.

† Balfour Stewart, 9.

‡ J. R. Mayer. See Correlation and Conservation of Forces, by W. R. Grove (Appleton), 347. Tait says that the question of atoms is one whose “solution seems to recede from our grasp as fast, at least, as we attempt to approach it,” 284.

The most various properties have been attributed to them, and even their materiality has been questioned. Yet, in spite of this, there are those who, in the name of science, make atomism the explanation of mental as well as of natural phenomena. Philosophers do not question the right to use the notions of atoms and matter, but they insist that these are only symbols for an unknown something. So physicists speak of force as the cause of phenomena. Faraday says, "What I mean by the word 'force,' is the *cause* of a physical action; the source or sources of all possible changes amongst the particles or materials of the universe." Mayer says, "Force is *something which is expended in producing motion*; and this something which is expended is to be looked upon as a cause equivalent to the effect, namely, to the motion produced."* Tait denies that force is a thing at all. "It is not to be regarded as a *thing*, any more than the bank rate of interest is to be looked upon as a sum of money. . . . *Force is the rate at which an agent does work per unit of length.*"† Force, then, is cause, something, rate,—all concepts that involve philosophical inquiries. Hume was any thing but a scientist, yet his contribution to thought consists chiefly in his discussion of causation. And many scientists take their notion of cause from Hume's philosophy.

Thus one need but take the concepts which all scientists must use, in order to see the absurdity of attempting to banish philosophy. Science and philosophy have many notions in common, which can never be the direct product of experience, and can be tested only by critical thinking. All that lies behind bare and isolated phenomena is a mental product. No

* Grove, 379, 335.

† 357, 358.

observation can discover substance, cause, or power; and those who admit nothing but observation and its direct results must, like Hume, deny their existence in the external world. They are concepts, not percepts. If philosophy is rejected because it deals with such concepts, then science must also be rejected, for its fundamental notions are of exactly the same character. If philosophy does not speculate, then scientists must do it. And it is remarkable how philosophers and scientists may come to the same conclusions, independently of each other, and often by different methods.*

The more fully the relation of philosophy and science is considered, the deeper the conviction becomes that they require each other. Both are necessary for an intelligent consideration of the world-problem, and for all rational attempts to solve it; both are parts of the same great system of knowledge. We may reject, as too indefinite, the definition of Herbert Spencer: "Philosophy is completely unified knowledge;" † nevertheless, there is truth in it, since no knowledge, no science, can be completed or unified without philosophy.

Besides the notions held in common by philosophy and science, there are many in which scientists are interested, which nevertheless belong chiefly or wholly to philosophy. Among these are the problems of

* Schopenhauer reduces all force to will; not only the force in man, but also in nature. A. R. Wallace (Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection) holds a similar view. He says it seems probable that all force is will-force. Matter, he holds, is force, and nothing but force. Matter in the popular sense does not exist, and cannot be philosophically conceived. Zöllner has placed the views of Schopenhauer and Wallace in parallel columns, thus making their similarity the more apparent.

† *First Principles*, 539. If knowledge is unified in its ultimate principles, it becomes philosophy.

monism, dualism, pluralism, materialism, idealism, pantheism, theism, the nature of freedom, the immortality of the soul. Many other questions must remain unanswered, or be left to philosophers, or to them and scientists conjointly. Science and philosophy must co-operate. Each must find an inspiration, a corrective, a help, and, in a measure, a limitation, in the other. Antagonism means the destruction of self in proportion as the antagonist is destroyed. Their free and harmonious co-operation, while each remains perfectly independent, is the only ground of hope for the best results both in science and philosophy.

It is surely a strange phenomenon, that the mind can so lose itself in the contemplation of the objects of nature as to forget itself, its processes, and its own laws, which alone make a knowledge of nature possible. Is it not a species of infatuation or frenzy? Not a few seem even to forget that natural science has significance only for the mind, not for nature, the object of investigation. Unless some human interest is to be promoted, it is difficult to understand why bugs should be so diligently studied and classified. It can hardly be claimed that any blessing is to accrue to them, or that nature is thereby to be exalted. But if some interest of humanity is to be subserved, and if all study of inferior objects is somehow to promote the welfare of the highest of all, why not then regard also the study of humanity, of mind itself, as of the utmost importance, and all other knowledge as valuable in proportion as it furthers a knowledge of self, and is promotive of human interests?

There are already evidences of a decided re-action against the tendency which would make the mind a mere tool to work with in the quarries of nature,—a

tool which can neither understand itself nor the purpose of its work. Enough has been said to show that it is not the real scientists who are guilty of thus inestimably degrading the mind. The re-action is simply the rebellion of the intellect against the attempted degradation; and the leaders in science are also leaders in the re-action. Unfortunate would it be for human progress, if the systematic ignoring of what concerns humanity most on the part of empirics, should lead to a depreciation of real science. Nature need not be less studied; but the mind, too, has claims, and will see to it that they are not ignored. "Unmistakably the centre of gravity in scientific inquiries is gradually being shifted. The natural sciences have passed their most flourishing period, the mental sciences are approaching theirs." * How far the prophecy of the eminent thinker who gives expression to this thought shall be fulfilled, must be left to the future. But we cannot suppress the wish that there may be before us not less of natural science, but more philosophy, and more general attention to mental phenomena. A healthy intellectual period cannot bury or hide the mind under its possessions, but will appreciate those possessions as the wealth of the mind; and all attainments will be esteemed in proportion to their real dignity and to their relation to the highest interests. Unless indications deceive, the progress of thought among the Greeks will be repeated in our day, namely, from matter to mind, and from nature to humanity.

* Wundt, *Logik*, II. 516, 517: "Doch unverkennbar verschiebt sich allmählich der Schwerpunkt der wissenschaftlichen Forschungen. Die Naturwissenschaften haben ihre Blüthe hinter sich, die Geisteswissenschaften gehen ihr entgegen. Die Einflüsse des Naturalismus auf die letzteren, die noch überall in geschichtsphilosophischen Systemen, in sociologischen und naturrechtlichen Theorien zu spüren sind, werden damit von selbst verschwinden."

May we not also expect, that, as Aristotle followed Plato, so now rigid, rational philosophizing, uniting induction and deduction, will follow an unbridled speculation in philosophy?

REFLECTIONS.

Various senses in which "Science" is used. Its true sense. Scientific method. Limits of Science. Relation of Hypotheses and Theories to Science. Relation of Philosophy to Science. Hostility between them. Historic reasons for the antagonism. Tendencies toward Philosophy in Science. Philosophical elements in scientific works. "Law" as used in Natural Science. Does it refer to force? Does it explain the cause of phenomena? Can Science get behind phenomena? Does it determine quality, or only quantity? What is meant by "natural"? Empiricism and the work of Science. Relation of Philosophy to the basis of Science. What problems does Science give Philosophy? Science and the limits of knowledge. The scientific method, and mental and historical phenomena. Objections to Philosophy applicable to Science. Co-operation of Philosophy and Science. Condition for this co-operation.

CHAPTER IV.

PHILOSOPHY AND EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

PSYCHOLOGY, the doctrine of the soul, treats of the mental activities, seeking to analyze and interpret them, so as to discover their laws, and to give a complete system of the operations of the mind. A general view of cognition may be obtained by regarding the mind as subject, and all its knowledge as object. If, now, we take up for consideration the mind as the subject to which all knowledge is object, we can ask, What is that mind? and what does it do? The first question pertains to essence, namely, the substance or nature of the mind, and belongs to metaphysics. The second, pertaining to the mind's activities, gives the sphere of psychology. When we turn from the subject to the object, we find that the latter includes all that comes before the mind; it therefore includes the whole domain of knowledge.

In psychology the mind, as activity, is both subject and object. It reflects on itself, takes up for investigation its own operations, and seeks to understand its method of dealing with the various objects engaging its attention. When we demand of the mind that it make itself the object of inquiry, it at first seems to be equal to asking the eye to behold itself. But this is not the case. We distinguish between the mind and its operations, and ask that the subject consider those operations

as objects of knowledge. Returning to the analogy of the eye, we find that it is simply required to give an account of what it sees. How the mind actually proceeds when it beholds its own activities and other objects of inquiry, is a problem as insolvable as that of the *modus operandi* of the eye in obtaining vision. That we can watch our mental operations, is established as a fact, as fully as that of seeing with the eye; and it is the given fact for which an explanation is sought. Psychology therefore deals with facts. Not with facts in general, however, but only with such as are a manifestation and revelation of its own processes.

When psychology is defined as mental science, or science of the mind, it must be explained in what sense the term "science" is used. "Mind" also requires explanation, in order to determine whether psychology considers it metaphysically or phenomenally, or, perhaps, in both senses. Besides, the term must not be taken in the limited sense of intellect, but in that wider one, including all the inner operations. It stands for soul, and embraces all the psychic processes, whether intellectual, emotional, or volitional. It is the more important to emphasize the breadth of the term "mind," because there is a tendency to discuss most fully the cognitive faculties, which are constantly employed in describing the psychic processes; but in the careful study of feeling and volition, and in determining their relation to each other and to the intellect, much of the future progress of psychology may be expected. All ambiguity will be avoided by defining psychology as the system of the soul's operations. It is a psychic biology, aiming to explain the origin and movement of the soul's life as revealed in its activities.

It is easy to form a general conception of this disci-

pline ; but its extent, the complication of its phenomena, and its interweaving with other disciplines, make its exact limitation difficult. Many works on psychology furnish proof of this. As dealing solely with the mind, it may seem to comprehend whatever we know, — all knowledge being a possession of the mind, and a product of mental processes. This is as true of natural science as of the doctrine of the soul itself. There are for us no facts but those of consciousness; and if we know aught, it is because we are conscious of it as produced according to the principles of knowledge. To regard psychology, therefore, as including all data of consciousness, makes it comprehend whatever exists for the intellect. In that case it would be so comprehensive as to be the only possible study. But consciousness with its contents is not the subject-matter of this discipline; its peculiarity consists in the manner of viewing these contents. Psychology does not consider what they are in themselves, but only so far as related to the soul, and as revealing its activities. The contents of consciousness are objects contemplated solely for the sake of seeing in them the subject. If I am conscious of light, I can abstract the fact of consciousness, and consider the light itself, inquiring, What constitutes it? With what velocity does it move? How does it affect plants, animals, and inorganic matter? These and similar questions are not psychological, but belong to natural science. I, however, enter the domain of psychology when the consciousness itself, not the light, is the object of inquiry; as when I ask, How did I become conscious of the light? What is meant by the fact that I am conscious of it? How does this fact affect my thoughts, feelings, and volitions? In psychology we therefore abstract from the contents of

consciousness the psychic elements, and make them the objects of inquiry. Thus all processes of the soul, from the most elementary to the most complicated, are included in the study, as sensation, experience, thinking, the affections, the æsthetic impressions, and the action of the will. We might call it a natural history of the mind. While logic seeks the laws necessary to discover the truth, psychology inquires into the actual processes of the mind. The former is, therefore, normative; the latter, historical and descriptive.

From this definition of psychology it is easy to determine its relation to the other departments of knowledge. In all of them the knowing subject is concerned; they consequently have a psychological basis. When I consider the conservation of energy, I want to learn its nature and working; but the very words "I" and "consider" have a psychological bearing. We cannot, in fact, utter a sentence without implying psychology. This shows the fundamental character of the discipline; it lies at the basis of every thing that is for us, because we can know of it only through the mind, the object of psychology. If we adopt the language of Fichte, and hold that there is nothing but the Ego and the non-Ego, we at once see that we can view all things only from our standpoint, and as related to us. We can behold no object except in the light of our soul; or we can say that the soul is the eye which sees all objects according to its own structure. Now, what the study of the eye is in optics, that is the study of psychology to all other objects of learning.

It is, however, not definite enough to define psychology as the doctrine of the soul. That soul, as we have seen, may be considered according to its essence, the questions involved being such as these: What is its nature?

Is it simple, or compound? Is it material? Or, we can confine our attention to the operations of the soul, inquiring, How does it act? The inquiry into the operations of the soul is now commonly regarded as the business of psychology.

The total separation of the two ways of viewing the soul is the result of development. In the Socratic school psychology was treated as a part of physics; afterwards it was connected with metaphysics. Even when treated as a separate subject, it at first contained the whole doctrine of the soul, the metaphysical elements receiving special prominence. Christian Wolff was the first to divide psychology into empirical and rational. To the former he assigned the task of describing the inner (psychic) processes and arranging them systematically, while the rational made the nature of the soul its starting-point for the explanation of the psychological phenomena. The empirical was accordingly to make the facts of consciousness its basis, while the rational was theoretical. His own example, however, illustrated the difficulty of keeping the two wholly distinct.

In the division of psychology into empirical and rational, Wolff still has followers, while some have united both, and still others recognize only the empirical. The searching criticism to which Kant subjected the mind led him to reject rational psychology as impossible. Herbart, who of all German writers gave the strongest impulse to psychological studies, wanted in psychology a description of the mental phenomena as learned by observation, also metaphysics for the explanation of their origin, and mathematics so far as quantitative elements enter into the operations of the mind. But his contemporary Beneke, who also did excellent service in promoting psychology, rejected both metaphysics and

mathematics from the study. He held that it should be purely experimental, and adopt the method of the natural sciences, beginning with experience, and rationally developing the results thus obtained.*

In England there has been a strong tendency to absorb the whole of philosophy in psychology. This movement was begun by Locke, completed by Hume, and imitated by their followers. In his "Treatise of Human Nature," Hume discusses some of the profoundest problems of philosophy, such as the nature of abstract or general ideas, being and non-being, substance, time, space, force, causality, and the like. In the Introduction he says correctly, "that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another." How comprehensive he makes the system of human nature, is evident from the following: "There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security." If Hume's statement, that "the principles of human nature" give "a compleat system of the sciences," is taken literally, it results in an idealism as perfect as that of Fichte. In that case psychology includes philosophy, all science, and in fact all knowledge. He does not distinguish between the principles of human nature as the subjective condition

* Hence the title of his work: *Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft*, 1845.

of the sciences, and the sciences themselves: he confounds the soil with its products.

By reducing philosophy to psychology, Hume obliterates the distinction between what is and what ought to be, makes the mind a mere observer where it is called to be a critic, and a passive recorder of phenomena where it is called to be positive energy and a lawgiver. Empiricism is thus made a law, when it only furnishes materials for laws. Besides the other defects of his psychology, he makes sensation and association the norms of all thought, and in his philosophy of experience fails, with Locke, to do justice to the mental factor in experience. The dread of innate ideas leads him to reject what is innate in all mental processes; namely, the subjective conditions for receiving and elaborating impressions from the external world. In reducing logic to psychology, he fails to discover the very laws of thought, which he continually uses in order to destroy the validity of thought as soon as it rises above empiricism. His dogmatic scepticism is contained in the first sentence of his *Treatise*, a sentence not proved, but a pure supposition. The importance of psychology, in its proper place, cannot be over-estimated; but out of its sphere it becomes the means of the most serious perversions.¹⁷

While Locke and Hume make psychology essentially philosophy, the systems which consider it as both rational and empirical must also assign it, or at least its rational elements, to philosophy. That it was originally taken up and developed by philosophy, just as physics, is not surprising; but when in the process of development it becomes independent as an empirical subject, with an aim distinct from that of philosophy, it of course cannot retain its original place any more than

physics. Present tendencies are intent on withdrawing it from the metaphysical and rational to the empirical, and thus to sever its connection with philosophy.

In his aim to describe, explain, and systematize the phenomena of mind, the psychologist is an historian. No more than a writer of human or natural history, can he describe all that occurs in his special department; but he selects what is most valuable and characteristic. This does not mean that only such phenomena are chosen as can be fitted into what is known of the organism of the mind; for frequently the exceptional is valuable for progress, in that it gives important problems for solution. Mysterious phenomena worthy of scientific investigation are unfortunately left largely to charlatans. That many supposed marvels are based on trickery, is no evidence that this is the case with all. So-called spiritualism, second sight, and numerous strange phenomena well authenticated, lie wholly beyond our present powers of explanation; but that does not prove their mystery impenetrable. We no longer believe in witchcraft; yet under that name many things occurred which are astounding revelations of mental affections, and are of great interest to the student of mind.* The true psychologist does not turn away haughtily from things beyond his ken and such as cannot be made to fit into his theories, nor does he sneer at what seems to savor of jugglery; but he regards the unusual and the marvellous as likely to contain revelations of value. While formerly mysterious phenomena absorbed too much attention, they are evidently too much neglected now. The fact that superstition gives interpretations which the psychologist cannot accept, is

* Many illustrations of this may be found in Horst's *Zauber Bibliothek*.

a reason for seeking the correct explanation. Both the facts and their meaning must be determined according to the principles of the scientific method. The student of psychology, while regarding as most important what is most common and evidently within reach of the interpreting mind, will learn in proportion as he enters the depths that there are mysteries of absorbing interest and worthy of efforts at solution. Particularly is it essential to guard against hasty conclusions as to the limits of the mind's operations, — conclusions calculated to check inquiry and thus to hinder progress. Physiognomy, phrenology, and so-called mind-reading (usually a misnomer for determining mere locality according to indications given to the mind through the body), and similar misnamed sciences or phenomena, deserve study, even if for no other purpose than to overthrow the errors they promote. Not that certain mental phenomena are mysterious is a reproach to psychology, for they may involve insuperable difficulties; but if it ignores them it is seriously at fault. Even the exposure and exact limitation of problems may be of great service. The confessed ignorance of psychologists may contain more wisdom than many of their elucidations. Nevertheless, psychology would become unhealthy if it made the abnormal and the mysterious the substance of its inquiries.

In psychology, as in natural science, the discovery, description, interpretation, and classification of mental facts, are preparatory to the discovery of their causes and the determination of their laws. The student of mind aims to learn what is, how it is, and why it is, and seeks to reduce his discoveries to a completely rounded system, an organism in which facts are members, laws are joints, and the soul's energy is the life.

Beginners in philosophy have usually studied psychology, and it is here taken for granted that they are acquainted with its general scope. Many students, however, testify that the study has served rather to arouse their minds, and impel their thoughts in a particular direction, than to give them sharply defined concepts of the nature, aim, objects, and relations of psychology. They consequently find it difficult to determine its exact relation to philosophy.¹⁸

While thus distinguishing between subject and object, between the mental processes and their products, and between psychology and philosophy, do we not force psychology into the same category as the natural sciences? When this is done by the materialistic and positivistic schools, they are only consistent with their principles. Nor can there be objection to classing psychology with natural science, if science means simply systematized knowledge and if "natural" is used in distinction only from the supernatural; but it is different when the aim is to wipe out the distinction between matter and mind. Most of those, however, who speak of psychology as a natural science, refer merely to the *method* of treatment.* To this there can be no objection. All they mean is that it must be based wholly on experience; that it is "the science of mind worked out in the way of the natural sciences."†

This is not the place to enter into the dispute between spiritualists and materialists, whether the science of mind can ever be reduced to a natural science as a part of physics, or of physics and chemistry; nevertheless, the student should be warned against hasty conclusions,

* This is the case with Beneke, J. H. Fichte, Waitz, Wundt, and others.

† *Mind*, 1883. 4. By the editor.

and reminded that (empirical) psychology has nothing to do with the question. The monistic tendency is apt to conclude hastily in favor of whatever system may at the time be in the ascendancy. When idealism prevails, it is made the explanation of all things; and when materialism becomes predominant, every thing must submit to be classed under matter. Instead of fathoming the meaning of the terms "matter" and "spirit," they are used, with all their indefiniteness and obscurity, as if perfectly understood,—matter as the only reality, spirit as the mere negation of matter. Even "substance," with which Spinoza and his successors operated so confidently, is becoming shadowy in our day; and a philosophy deeper and more serious than that of Hume may question whether the mind can conceive of the abiding reality underlying all phenomena, which it is intended to represent.

Since psychology aims to describe the processes of the soul, it must be evident that these should first of all be considered; and that, if any inference is to be drawn, it should be done after they have been fully described, not before. To begin the study with a theory of the nature of the soul, particularly when that is so much in dispute as in our day, is to begin with an unproved hypothesis and with a prejudice. We must begin with facts, operations, exactly as in nature: from what it does and can do, we must try to discover what the soul is; but to make a theory of the essence of the soul the principle for the explanation of its operations, is both unphilosophical and unscientific. No more in mind than in nature have we a knowledge of the substance otherwise than from its operations. In no other way is a manifestation of their character possible, unless it were given by direct revelation from some other source

than the mind and nature. What can a *manifestation* of mind or nature mean, other than an operation of mind or nature? We need but make clear to our minds what we mean by a manifestation, and that without a manifestation of a thing we can have no knowledge of it, in order to learn that only from their operations can we judge of the essence of objects. Indeed, an examination of the terms we apply to objects will convince us that, as a rule, these terms, so far as they have an intelligible sense, only express what these objects can do. We may imagine that we know the essence or substance, when in truth we know only the powers revealed in the operations; but these are sufficient for an intelligent apprehension of mental and material processes.

Long before our minds are trained to critical introspection or to reflection, we become familiar with words in common use. The meanings attached to them unconsciously, or at least uncritically, are apt to remain after we have become more critical. Many terms are, in fact, used with no definite sense. This is particularly the case with such as are supposed to stand for fundamental concepts, and for principles which lie far beyond observation. Words thus become symbols of ignorance and emptiness, rather than of knowledge and real content. The use of some such terms may be necessary as an indication of the object sought; but the object still sought must not be treated as if already found. Thus the terms "mind" and "matter" may properly be used to designate the object of psychological or natural inquiry; but if used metaphysically, as if they explained the essence, they deceive us.

While careful to avoid empty phrases, and especially to reject them from the foundation on which we build,

we must rigorously insist on investigating every thing according to its own laws. In this respect both idealism and materialism have erred, and past experience has taught that all reasoning *per saltum*, from one sphere into another, is apt to lead to confusion and error. Analogical reasoning must be closely watched, the more so because it is often insidious, and asserts as final what has not even been established as probable. In respect to mental operations, analogical reasoning is frequently applied. There are laws which are applicable to limited spheres only, and their application to a different sphere is a perversion. When the mind is familiar with a certain sphere, it is liable to form the habit of applying the laws of that sphere to subjects with which it is less familiar; perhaps it even makes their application universal. Materialism and idealism frequently depend much less on facts or correct reasoning than on mental habits, so that their strength is in association rather than reason.

Physics and chemistry cannot explain life, much less the mind. Trendelenburg thought he had discovered in *motion* something common to matter and mind; but, aside from other difficulties in his explanation, he uses motion as applied to material and mental phenomena in different senses. At best there is only analogy, not identity; motion applied to the action of the mind is used figuratively.

The most eminent scientists agree with philosophers that, however intimate the relation of matter and mind, it is impossible to explain the operations of the latter by the known laws of the former. Respecting the substance or essence of mind, we are in the presence of a mystery thus far inscrutable. This is, indeed, not peculiar to mind; matter, as we have seen, is equally

mysterious. Neither spiritualism, nor idealism, nor Spinoza's "substance," nor Professor Bain's "double-faced unity," helps us out of the difficulty, or throws any light into the darkness. If matter really does account for mental phenomena, it must certainly have something never yet discovered in what is called matter. Those who speak confidently of mind as material, evidently use terms without considering their sense. Lotze declares that "it is nothing but an empty popular phrase to claim that the doctrine of the life of the soul is to be transformed to a natural science, — a phrase which either has no meaning, or else signifies that an attempt is made to hear with the eyes, and see with the ears." * Yet the "inveterate habit of confounding the psychological and the physical" has become quite common, and is justly pronounced "the bane of modern psychology." †

While popular scientists frequently confound the two, the profound are usually more careful; though even they are sometimes betrayed into transferring the laws with which they are familiar, into regions where they are less at home. Men like Helmholtz, Virchow, Du Bois-Reymond, Tait, Huxley, are too cautious to endow matter with properties never yet discovered in it. If all of them, Helmholtz and Tait excepted, at times use expressions with a materialistic flavor, they are careful at other times to correct them, and to admit their ignorance of the mental substance. Wundt says, "I, too, regard it improbable that purely psychological doctrines, whether facts or theories, can ever be deduced from physiological statements." ‡ Professor Tyndall makes the following admission: "The passage from the physics

* *Medicinische Psychologie*, 32.

† James Ward, *Mind*, 1883. 481.

‡ *Vierteljahrsschrift für wiss. Philosophie*, 1879. 357.

of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. . . . Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electrical discharges, if there be such; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, — we should probably be as far as ever from the solution of the problem: How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable.”¹⁹

In the use of such adjectives as “mechanical” and “vital,” we are also in danger of taking imaginary for real knowledge. They indicate certain methods of operation, but nothing respecting the essence of their sources. What a substance must be in order to work mechanically, is no more intelligible than the origin of vital, mental, and spiritual phenomena. The laws of the mechanical processes can be determined with more exactness than the psychological; but we deceive ourselves if we imagine that we understand what is inorganic and mechanical better than the organic and mental. Those who think that the mental processes are made clearer by calling them mechanical, need but attempt an explanation of the latter term in order to learn that, in essence, it is not a whit more intelligible than the other.

The despair of finding the real essence of mind has been the most powerful motive for banishing metaphysic from psychology. But has it really been banished? Every step in psychological inquiry confronts us with metaphysical problems; and however decidedly they may be pronounced irrelevant, they are usually either

actually discussed, or underlie the discussions. Hume professes to be purely empirical; but surely his empiricism never discovered that "what we call a *mind* is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions," or, that a "connected mass of perceptions . . . constitute a thinking being," as he says in his *Treatise*. Even the declaration, made by some modern writers, that the mind is to be viewed, not as substance, but as action, is metaphysical. If the natural sciences may postulate matter, there is no reason why psychology may not postulate mind as a peculiar entity.* It must, however, be treated as a mere postulate, and the supposed essence must not dominate the entire investigation, as if its nature were established.

Aside from the nature of the soul, how shall we view its activity? Is the soul distinct from the activity, or is it nothing but the action? If it goes out wholly in action, what is the basis for future activity? These inquiries lead beyond empirical to rational psychology, but it is almost impossible to ignore them; and in psychology, as in every other department, the deepest problems lead to philosophy. The metaphysical factors which enter into intellectual activity, whether external and internal, or wholly mental, seem to find but a poor analogy in the action of hydrogen and oxygen when uniting to constitute water. It is more correct to say that they become, than that they form, water. A better analogy is apparently found in two bodies, which, by affecting each other, excite electricity, the bodies themselves remaining distinct from their product. The conception of mind, as cause, does not remove the difficulty in the relation of the soul to its activity. Aside from the other difficulties in the conception of cause, can any

* Discussed more fully in the chapter on Metaphysics.

thing be called a cause unless it goes out wholly into the effect? Probably the best view of mind is that of force and energy, or (since the technical sense of "force" in natural science might be objectionable) of power and energy, the latter being merely the former excited to activity.* Mind must not be made the synonyme of consciousness; it also exists during sleep. Consciousness is but one of its modes of activity, much of its most important working falling below consciousness. Our unconscious mental activity lies at the basis and accompanies much of that which is conscious. There are degrees of wakefulness; and when most fully awake, and when its attention is most strained, the mind may be conscious of processes which at other times are hid. The unconscious mental activity is no doubt as rigidly subject to law as is the conscious.—Connected with our emotions and volitions, as well as with our intellectual operations, there are unconscious and, therefore, mysterious processes. As our unconscious activity influences the conscious, so it seems that the unconscious may be influenced by the conscious, as by discipline, volition, the formation of habits, and by fixing the attention on certain thoughts or objects. It may be that certain activities are conscious at the time but not remembered, and consequently are held to be unconscious. Thus, our childhood is a blank to us now, not because we had no consciousness then, but because we do not remember what then affected us.† It is an interesting query: If an impression is forgotten, and then remembered again, what becomes of it during the period of forget-

* For a discussion of the soul as substance and as action, see Wundt, *Logik*, II. 502

† Are not various occurrences during sleep to be explained in the same way? We are conscious of them at the time, but forget them; that is, we do not remember the consciousness.

fulness? There can be no question that the form and the intensity of consciousness have much influence on the memory.

Even when viewed as purely empirical, treating only of the activity of the mind, psychology is beset with difficulties. Those who want to place it in point of experiment on a level with the natural sciences must not forget that it does not admit of the same exactness. The psychologist does not have the mind so completely under control as the physicist or chemist the objects he investigates; besides, he cannot use the same instruments to measure and weigh. His object is even more complicated and difficult than that of the biologist. From the very nature of the case, there is no hope of ever making psychology as exact and definite as the natural sciences.

The terminology also offers difficulties. Words are used vaguely; the same term is frequently employed for different operations, and different ones for the same activity. Then there is great diversity in the manner in which thought, feeling, and volition follow one another, in many cases putting invariable rules out of the question. So much depends on individual peculiarities, on training and surroundings, that an endless variety is presented to the student of psychology. If he confines his study to his own mind and to those immediately about him, he will be narrow. Exclusive attention to his own people, or a special predilection for them, is the source of the all but universally prevalent national prejudice. Even by taking into account the enlightened nations of a particular period, a comprehensive view of man cannot be obtained. In order to overcome narrowness and prejudice, a scholar must study all nations, at all periods, and under all circumstances.²⁰

From this it is evident that the field whence psychology draws its materials is exceedingly large. In order fully to understand the mental operations, it must observe them in all the departments entered by the mind. The psychologist is naturally directed first of all to his own mental processes. These are capable of the most direct and most perfect study, though introspection is at first extremely difficult. There is another difficulty in the fact that the very effort to observe the mental operations is apt to modify them. Most of our experiences can be studied only in the form of reminiscences; when the experiences occur we are not usually in a mood to study them. Those psychologists err, however, who affirm that we cannot observe what is directly before the mind, but only what has become an object of memory. They forget that what memory contains is always a presentation of what is actually present, whatever its relation to the past may be. all

Next to the study of self comes the observation of others. That of children is especially valuable, their processes being most simple. In the case of older persons many things complicate the process of observation. In watching them, allowance must be made for the necessary imperfections in observation, and also for the possibility of a disparity between the inner state and its outward manifestations. In the latter respect the emotions and volitions present peculiar difficulties. {2}

Valuable materials may also be gathered from biography, history, travels, linguistics, sociology, ethnology, and from all subjects that treat of man either individually or socially. Asylums and courts of justice furnish important subjects for study. The impulse given by Darwin has led to the careful study of comparative psychology — an important field if fact and fiction are

distinguished, if analogical reasoning is kept in check, and if human mental phenomena are not made to interpret the action of brutes, in order, in turn, to use the brutes to interpret man. There is, in fact, not a subject of human interest from which the psychologist may not learn important lessons. But it must not be forgotten that the systematized general thoughts, mirrored in the individual facts, constitute psychology.

So extensive is the field that, after a general survey, the student may find it advisable to make a specialty of some particular department. Not only is there need of specialists, but there is also great encouragement for them. There can be no thorough treatment of the whole unless the various parts have been mastered. The exhaustive work within narrow limits, whether confined to a particular class of phenomena or persons, must not be isolated, but made tributary to the whole. There is not a department in which the need of this special work is not felt. Even in England, where so much attention has been given to psychology, and whose philosophers are mainly psychologists, there is a marked lack of specialists.* The same is true of America, and indeed of all countries. There are, it is true, tendencies to specialization now, but chiefly in the relation of mind to body.

The distrust with which speculation is viewed has served both to make the empirical method predominant in psychology, and to make psychology itself a favorite study. Not only does it receive an unusual amount of attention in Germany, England, and America, but also in France and Scandinavia, so that new and excellent works on psychology abound. Psychological experi-

* "For all the name it has made in the world, English psychology has never been remarkable for its elaboration in detail." — *Mind*, 1883, 2.

ments have also become common, chiefly through the influence of those conducted in the University of Leipzig; but their sphere is necessarily limited. While there has of late been much progress in psychologic research, even the most thorough works * make the impression that respecting some of the most important functions of the mind only a faint beginning at interpretation has been made. Even respecting the sphere, the method, and the relations of psychology, there is so much uncertainty, that the beginner is apt to be greatly puzzled as to fundamental concepts of the study. Since psychology is the necessary basis of philosophy, its own imperfections will seriously affect the latter.

It would require a work on psychology itself to give a full account of what is still required for the development of the discipline; but hints on the subject may serve as a warning against most common errors, and indicate what is most needed to insure future progress.

The beginning of conscious life is involved in mystery; perhaps it dates back to existence in the womb.† In the observation of infants the subject is complicated by the fact that it is impossible to determine exactly what is conscious and what merely reflex activity.

The view has become general, that "we are only conscious as we are conscious of change," or, as Bain says, "We do not know any one thing of itself, but only the difference between it and another thing." Thinking is comparison; and consciousness consists, mainly at least, in the discrimination of objects. But if there is

* As that of Volkmann in German, and of Sully in English.

† On the conscious activity of infants at various periods after birth, see Kussmaul: *Untersuchungen ueber das Seelenleben des neugeborenen Menschen*. Hoeffding thinks it possible that the unborn child has a sensation of touch and motion: *Psychologie*, translated into German by Bendixen, 4.

no consciousness without discrimination, then the genesis of consciousness becomes impossible. With what other conscious act shall the first one be compared, and from what shall it be discriminated? It seems to be more correct to say that a determination of the *what* of consciousness requires comparison with other objects, but that the fact of the mere consciousness of an indefinite something, of a dark, undiscriminated impression, does not require such comparison. The first conscious act must therefore be indistinct, an unexplained presence; and because so indistinct and uncomparred and unrelated, it is not remembered.

More important than speculations on the genesis of consciousness is the resolution of abstract terms dominating psychology into the concrete realities for which they are supposed to stand. It is astonishing what influence these abstractions have acquired in psychology, where the concrete is supposed to rule. Among these terms, "consciousness" itself is one of the most important. It is commonly used as if a kind of faculty underlying all the rest, something like a flat surface on which objects stand, or which reflects them like a mirror. There is in the mind no real object answering to the term; but there are conscious objects or states of which we are aware, and "consciousness" is simply an abstraction from these objects. By dropping all the objects before the mind (all the real content), and retaining solely the fact that we were aware of their presence, we get the abstract notion of consciousness. By treating it as a concrete reality, the term does not merely become inexplicable, but also leads to confusion and error.

The same kind of abstraction is found in thought, feeling, volition, and numerous other instances. Just

as there are conscious acts, but no reality which corresponds with consciousness except in these acts, so there is no thought in the abstract, but there are individual thoughts. But another process of abstraction is here found. Not only is the general term "thought" treated as if something concrete, distinct from definite, individual mental acts, but it is also regarded as if it could be abstracted from the mind itself and could exist independent of that mind. Thus we speak of thought in books, in institutions, in nature, forgetting that outside of mental operations there can be only symbols of thought, while thought itself is found only in the mind possessing it. Thought can never be separated from mind, as if it could have an independent existence. Thoughts, feelings, and volitions are always definite, concrete, with particular contents; they are not something merely on the mind, but they are acts, states, manifestations of that mind, and absolutely inseparable from it. Thoughts cannot even be communicated; only symbols can be given, and thus other minds can be led to construct the same or similar thoughts. Instead of imparting thought, or reduplicating it as if by some photographic process, every thought is formed or elaborated by the mind that possesses it, so that, whatever its suggestive symbol may have been, the thought itself is a creation of the mind whose state it is.

While it is impossible to banish abstractions, and substitute for them the concrete, we should be careful to use abstract terms for what they really are, and not hypostatize them as if they had a substantial existence of their own. Thus we cannot do without the term "mental process;" yet it is a mere abstraction, being wholly empty and unmeaning, unless there is some

content in the mind with which some process is connected. We speak about such processes as if directly exposed to view: yet we never observe a process itself, or become conscious of it, but are aware only of certain objects with which processes are performed. In that abstract term "process" we embody the thought that something goes on in the mind: but take away that concrete something, and nothing will go on; that is, there is no process, no going on, unless there is some particular content passing through stages of development.

While warning the student against taking mere generalizations for the concrete, it is scarcely less important to urge him to estimate aright the anatomical process to which the mind is so often subjected. That it is a unity, a living organism, with members, but without fragments, is not sufficiently considered. Why not have a synthetic as well as an analytic psychology?

A law of vast importance, but heretofore overlooked by psychologists, is that found in the process of forming mental states, which become the condition and criteria of all mental activity. According to this law, sensations become perceptions, and percepts concepts. Thus I receive certain impressions through the eye, and at once say "tree," immediately and unconsciously passing from the impression to the concept. So we develop ourselves into certain states which become permanent; and it is these states that are affected by impressions, and it is these states that act. Thus our states are an embodiment of our total past experience, a summary of what we have thought, felt, and willed. Not all the individual impressions received are before the mind, but their effect is there. The law that prevails is this:

There is in the development of the mind itself a generalizing process, just as there is in thought. Thus as a general term includes under it all objects having the marks of that term, so the mind itself passes through a generalizing process; and every stage of mental development is the product of all the stages through which the mind has passed, and contains in itself the elements of all those stages. Our perceptions, our judgments, our affections, always depend on the state attained. Hence the differences in these respects at different periods. What we think, feel, and do is always a product and reflection of the state we are in. For all our intellectual operations, for æsthetics and religion, the law is of greatest significance. A man always does what he is at the time.

There are many other points in psychology which deserve especial care on the part of the student; but the above are of a more general character, and better adapted to this volume than the details in psychologic study which should receive particular attention. They may also give a hint of what yet remains to be done in psychology.

In the development of psychology itself, there has been a process of specialization, so that it has been differentiated from subjects with which it was formerly identified. This is not only true of its former inclusion in physics and metaphysics, but also of its relation to physiology, logic, ethics, and æsthetics. Instead of being amalgamated with allied subjects, they are now grouped around it so as to form a circle of disciplines by themselves. Being still in the process of this development, we cannot determine the final results of the various efforts at classification; and the very terms used for different subjects are continually undergoing

changes. Psycho-physics (physiological psychology, mental physiology, æstho-physiology) treats of the relation of the mental to the physical or physiological processes. There is no agreement as to how much of this relation belongs to psychology, or whether any of it falls within the domain of psychological inquiry. It is admitted that the action of the body, particularly of the nerves, has great influence on the mental states. There is a preponderating tendency to consign the whole subject of the relation of the mind to body, to psycho-physics as a separate discipline. Highly important as anatomy, physiology, and especially neurology, are for the psychologist, they are preparatory studies, and his special department begins with phenomena distinctly mental. No motion, however essential to sensation, can explain the fact of sensation or of the conscious state. We do not doubt that there is more than parallelism between the physiological and the mental; but we can no more explain how the former becomes psychical than we can explain how a volition produces physical motion. Besides psycho-physics, we have comparative psychology, treating of man's relation to brutes; also pathological psychology or psychiatry, discussing the effect of diseases on the mind. Anthropology has at times been treated as a science of man; but it has also discussed the relation of the soul to the body, and has been viewed as a history of human nature. While physicians pay special attention to the relation of physical to mental disorders, lawyers and ethical writers discuss the relation of the physical state to morals, especially the relation of diseases and insanity to crime. Sociology, and in fact all studies connected with human nature, are intimately related to psychology. The applications of psychology are numer-

ous. A good beginning has been made in biblical psychology (Delitzsch, Beck), and also in the psychology of different peoples (*Voelkerpsychologie*, Lazarus and Steinthal). So there may be a psychology of religion, of humor, of various classes of persons, and of different professions. By specialization the subject can be indefinitely enlarged.

Psychology thus finds its proper place between the natural sciences and philosophy; forming, as it were, the connecting link between the two. On the one hand, it is intimately connected with physiology and the whole department of biology, while, on the other, it leads directly to the various philosophical disciplines. Owing to its intimate relation to other subjects, psychologists have found it difficult to confine themselves to the discussion of mental phenomena and their laws. Some drop psychology too much into physiology, while others exalt it too much into the domain of philosophy.

Viewed here in its relation to philosophy, this is not the place to consider the practical value of psychology; yet it should be remembered, that, just as the psychic processes construct philosophy, so they are also the means for the practical application of its speculations. In this respect its relation to ethics is peculiarly intimate. Psychology gives a knowledge of conditions for mastering self and others; and he who understands the association and sequence of the thoughts, affections, and volitions, and the relation of thought and desire to the will, has essential conditions of power. Comprehending humanity, this discipline embodies more wisdom than the Greek maxim, "Know thyself." For pedagogics, or the application of the theory of knowledge, of ethics and æsthetics, to mental training, psychology is of the first significance. In order successfully to instruct and

train others, the teacher must understand the mind and its functions. It is not accidental that Herbart's school developed psychology and pedagogics conjointly. The two naturally go together. A healthy psychology would banish some of the prevalent views of education.

But psychology must not be expected to do all the mind requires; it cannot take the place of philosophy.* The tendency to confound the two spheres makes this warning doubly necessary. In describing what transpires in the mind, and in reducing this to laws and system, psychology does not give the philosophy of the intellect, of the emotions, or of the volitions. In order to discover the norms of thought, of emotion, and of volition, we must ascend from the phenomenal to the rational, from psychology to philosophy. But for every study it is fundamental, making us acquainted with the soil from and in which every subject must grow.

Every serious study may be a preparation for philosophy; but psychology is peculiarly its propædæutics. In the exact description of the origin and nature of the facts of consciousness, in its careful observation of the mental processes, and in its thorough analyses, psychology not merely gives philosophy its practical basis and legitimate sphere, but also promotes the introduction of scientific exactness into philosophical inquiries. From what actually occurs in thought, feeling, and volition, we want to rise intellectually to what ought to be, just as, volitionally, we want to proceed from the ideal

* Numerous efforts have been made to apply psychology to education. But unless psychology is made philosophy, or at least includes it, the ideal of education is not even made the aim in these efforts. Psychology is not the law of mental development: this prerogative belongs to philosophy, with its norms, ideals, and principles. But a knowledge of psychology is a condition for their application in pedagogics, — the discipline for the psychological application of philosophy, for the sake of mental development.

as the law for the real. However the exclusive advocates of either may protest, the problem to be solved is the union of the empirical and the rational, of psychology and philosophy, — a union which, however, fully recognizes their differences.

It is evident that among scholars, the philosopher, most of all, needs psychology. Unless he can distinguish clearly between the different objects and degrees, and the various processes of consciousness, he will be in constant danger of uniting what should be separated, and *vice versa*. Psychology is the door to philosophy.

Enough has been said to indicate that this must not be understood to mean that psychology is to be the law for philosophy. Even if the process of sensation could be perfectly described, with the causes, the conditions, the manifestations, and the inter-action of thought, together with the relation of thought, feeling, and volition to one another, that would not determine what the mind ought to be and do, any more than the manners of an age give us ethics. We must look to the theory of knowledge for the norms of thought. And even in psychology, both in its construction and study, we find a constant application of this theory necessary. To view empiricism as the sole guide in psychological inquiry, is a serious mistake. It is not sufficient even in considering the simplest elements of knowledge, because so much is implied in them which can never become an object of observation. Thus, the relation of mind and body; the mental and physical factors in the process of sensation; the conceptions of the Ego, of the mind, the soul, and consciousness; the distinction between impressions and the comparisons, abstractions, development, and conclusions, of which they are the occasion, — require, for a full understanding, much that is never

given directly in experience. Indeed, much that is considered in psychology requires the highest powers of the mind, and the deepest processes of thought. He who treats the mental process as a mere beholding of what is directly reflected from consciousness, cannot form a psychology worthy of the name. What is thus beheld is but the material to be interpreted by thinking. Psychology is not termed empirical because it is formed by an empirical process, but because it is the description and scientific interpretation of such a process.

REFLECTIONS.

Define Psychology. Difference between Empirical and Rational Psychology. Relation of the former to Natural Science. Scientific method in Psychology. Relation of Empirical Psychology to Philosophy. Viewing Mind as Subject and Object, wherein does Psychology differ from other disciplines? Psychology as Propædæutic to Philosophy. Relation of Psychology to the Theory of Knowledge. To Psycho-physics; Psychiatry; Anthropology; Biology; Physiology; Sociology; Pedagogics. Distinction between the Soul and its activity. Mind and Matter. Mental and mechanical processes. Empirical Psychology and Metaphysics. Psychology and Philosophy in England. The Psychological and the Rational Process. Sources of Psychology. Difficulties and Importance of the Study of Psychology.

CHAPTER V.

DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.

As the mind is one, so also is there unity in its possessions. Every element of knowledge is indissolubly connected with every other, either immediately or through other elements. We cannot imagine a thought as isolated. If it were, how could we ever attain, understand, or remember it? Every concept necessarily forms part of the intellectual cosmos, from which nothing can be taken without disturbing the symmetry of the whole, while the addition of a single foreign element would mar its beauty. Fragmentary as our attainments seem, they are really parts of a perfect system, and need only be properly developed in order that the mind may permeate the entire universe of thought. We may, indeed, become so absorbed by a single member of the intellectual organism as not to observe other members, much less the complete system; but our limited view does not affect the vital union of the members forming the organism.

Amid the infinite variety, we are in danger of losing sight of the underlying unity, and of treating as fragments what are in reality organs. While admitting the advantages of specialization, we have also seen its dangers; and these admonish us to consider that, however extensive the particular field we cultivate, it is not the world, but is connected with all the other fields

which constitute that world. "In view of the separation affected by the pursuit of specialties, and of the depreciation of departments foreign to the specialist, so often connected with specialties, it seems to me to be one of the most important of philosophical duties to cherish the conviction of the relationship of the sciences, and to maintain that all the scientific interests have an equal right to existence."* If, then, we distinguish the various parts of knowledge, it is not our aim to separate them, but we want to make each more distinct, and to indicate its exact place in the system. Divisions consequently give the intellect an advantage in understanding and elaborating a subject. They distinguish and abstract, without parting. Just as a definition is both an affirmation and a negation,—affirming what an object is, and denying that it is something else,—so divisions are both analytic and synthetic, analyzing a subject, and forming the subject. We divide to unite.

Owing to the universal character of its principles, philosophy is best adapted to promote the conviction of the unity of thought, though with our limitations we may not be able to indicate all the connecting links. In seeking the divisions of philosophy we do not want to lose sight of the fact that it is, ideally at least, a system, and that all distinctions have significance only because they are coherent parts of a grand unity.

In dividing philosophy, therefore, we do not dissect it so as to leave only dead parts of a dead system, but we distinguish the various members which form the living intellectual organism. Just as an organ is complete only when attached to the body, so a division is not perfect in its isolation, but in its connection with

* Wundt, *Logik*, II., Preface.

the whole system. Between the divisions there are interlacings and numerous communications. Some of the connections seem to belong equally to the divided parts, and in their discussion no division can claim a monopoly of them. With distinctions in the same system rather than with mathematical separations as characteristic of philosophical divisions, we are not surprised to find that the different parts of philosophy lead to each other, and tend to coalesce so as really to form that unity which they are ideally.

The intimacy of the relation makes the distinction of the parts the more difficult, and also explains the variety found in the division of philosophy. As in anatomy we can take any part of a finger, and consider it by itself, or in relation to the other parts, or can take the finger, and consider its relation to the hand or to the arm or to the whole body; so in philosophy we can make endless divisions, and for each some reason can be advanced. But in the midst of this variety we do not doubt that some are superior to others. Our search is not merely for a division, but for the best.

We have found that the ultimate principles are the objects of philosophy. In its system it must consequently include all these principles. Until these have been discovered, neither the system nor the divisions can be perfected. So long as philosophy itself is an inquiry, an object of search, we may have to form our divisions with a view to the discovery of the principles, and cannot make them as perfect as when the system itself is completed.

In the various philosophical systems the divisions have been determined by the views of philosophy, the influence of preceding systems, the character of the age, or the desire to give prominence to particular parts.

With so many different grounds for divisions, it is not surprising that there has been no uniformity.

The particular object to which the first philosophers devoted attention was to them the whole of philosophy. We have seen that their physics was not the same in character and aim as ours. "The ancients were wholly ignorant of the investigation of nature in our sense, based on experience; we find them occupied only with philosophical speculations respecting the universe in general, its origin and its primitive substance."* To them the domain of philosophy consisted of theories respecting nature. They had made considerable progress in metaphysical speculations about the cosmos when attention was directed to the thinking subject, and theories of knowledge were discussed, and when dialectics and ethics were added to philosophy. Thus, instead of taking philosophy and analyzing it in order to find its divisions, the genesis of philosophy added one subject after another, and these formed the various parts. Plato seems to have been the first who had a comprehensive view of the proper domain of philosophy, and Aristotle the first who attempted completely to systematize knowledge.

By one of his pupils, Plato's philosophy was divided into ethics, physics, and dialectics. The last contains his most characteristic views, namely, the doctrine of the idea. His ethics includes politics; his physics, the discussion of the soul, or psychology. The subject of æsthetics is not separately treated; but discussions of the beautiful are found in different books, particularly in connection with the doctrine of ideas. In his dialectics the discussions are essentially metaphysical

* Dr. J. Müller: *Grundriss der Physik und Meteorologie*, 13th ed., Introd.

and logical. It is, however, impossible to make a sharp division of Plato's works according to subjects. He is imaginative, speculative, brilliant, and suggestive, rather than analytical and systematic, being a union of the poet and the philosopher.

Aristotle was a logician and systematizer, being in this respect the opposite of his teacher. But his efforts to systematize knowledge had significance rather for certain disciplines than for philosophy as a whole. For the present stage of development, his division of philosophy into theoretical, constructive, and practical, is of no special importance. The first includes physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the second discusses the laws of art; the third treats of ethics and politics. Logic was regarded as introductory to the study of philosophy.*

The division into theoretical and practical philosophy, prevalent since Aristotle, is not based on inherent distinctions. Besides, this division is misleading. All philosophy is theoretical; even in ethics it gives the theory or principles of conduct, and in æsthetics the theory of art. That division also encourages the false notion, already prevalent, that the theoretical is not practical, whereas it may be intensely practical and the

* The condition of Aristotle's works is such that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact nature of his division. The perplexity is partly owing to the fact that he seems to have had no fixed principle of division, and in different works he proposes different ones. In the *Topics* he speaks of philosophical problems as ethical, physical, and logical; while in the *Metaphysics* he divides as indicated above. He does not, however, always regard philosophy as the genus under which the various philosophical disciplines come as species. Frequently the view is found in his works, that there are different philosophies. This is implied when he speaks of metaphysics as the "First Philosophy," and when in his *Ethics* he speaks of *another* or a *different* philosophy. Zeller divides Aristotle's works into those devoted to logical, metaphysical, physical, ethical, and æsthetic inquiries.

basis of all conduct. It is a thoughtless popular prejudice, that the superficial and immediately apparent is practical, while the deep and thorough is not, — a view which philosophy is to combat, not to promote.

There has been much philosophizing which was not completed by forming a system. Among the Greeks this was true particularly of Socrates; among the moderns, of Leibnitz. Their thoughts were, however, full of inspiration, gave impulses and germs for future systems, and became influential in giving direction to the course of philosophic thinking. As Aristotle systematized knowledge in the Socratic school, so Wolff in that of Leibnitz. Even Kant left no complete system; nevertheless, his works have been the inspiration of the entire process of philosophical development in Germany for a whole century, and have deeply affected thinking in other countries. In point of comprehensiveness and grandeur of aim, the system of Hegel, developed out of Schelling's system of identity, must be placed in the first rank. With an introduction (*Phaenomenologie des Geistes*) intended to prepare the mind for the highest speculation, the system itself, consisting of logic and metaphysics (not two, but one subject), natural philosophy, and the philosophy of the spirit, aims at nothing less than the unfolding of absolute knowledge. The dispute as to the merits of this system and its division is not ended. It is not surprising that in this vast repository of profound thought there should be much to inspire the highest admiration, and also much to meet decided opposition from those occupying a different stand-point. That the system and its divisions are not final, is generally admitted in Germany even by those who are warm admirers of Hegel. The author himself at different times made different divisions.

The various divisions of philosophy thus far prevalent no more determine the true division, than the various systems determine the definition of philosophy. Not all philosophers have aimed at a logical division of the whole subject. When we consider the limits of knowledge, and the tendency to make some specialty supreme and absorb the attention, we cannot be surprised if but few philosophers are able to treat the whole of philosophy systematically and with equal ability. In the entire course of philosophic thought, men like Kant and Hegel have not been numerous; and in our day, partly owing to their labors, the demands made on philosophy are greater than in their time.

At present there are writers who include but one subject in philosophy, as metaphysics, psychology, or the theory of knowledge. There are others who are more true to the history of philosophy, and yet either fail to exhaust the subject, or else include too much. No one questions the right of philosophizing without regard to definite system, or the right of taking any one department and treating it separately, without regard to the rest; indeed, the latter course is often valuable for the sake of giving due prominence to a neglected subject. But such procedure does not help us to a proper division.

In the history of philosophy, the systems may be treated chronologically, without regard to their inherent connections; in that case, the various methods of division are considered as they arose or appear in the systems. But even where the aim is to give the division inherent in the subject, independent of the historical origin and development, a variety of divisions is possible, just as in natural science, owing to the different stand-points from which the subject is viewed.

A mere grouping or classification of subjects according to external or superficial marks indicates that philosophy itself has not been penetrated. For the distinction of parts there must be an inner reason; if we connect them intimately, there must be inherent oneness, or organic union. The divisions must exhaust the subject, but must include no more than it does. The principle of division must be the same for all parts. Each part must be unique, and none embrace the same class of objects as another.

If the absolute beginning of philosophy could be found, and the genesis of its development, we might discover the divisions by following the process of the unfolding. Hegel claimed to have found this beginning in the abstract concept of being, and the process of both thought and being in the dialectic method. But neither the beginning nor the method has been established as final. Some philosophers claim that a concept or idea must be the start of philosophy, but there is no agreement as to which the seed-thought is. Others hold that some fact of consciousness, something given as certain, must be the beginning; but there is no consensus respecting the experience which deserves the preference. Other philosophers deny that there is any absolute beginning for philosophy. Certain it is that none has been established. The beginner is not in a condition to discover or intelligently adopt one, and it would defeat the very aim of philosophical instruction to take such an absolute starting-point for granted, and then let it determine his divisions and entire course in philosophy.

Reluctantly, but necessarily, we abandon the hope of giving the student the ideal principle which lies behind all others, and is their source, and which need but be

analyzed to give the divisions, and developed to give the absolute system of philosophy. If we imagine that we have found what is still an object of search, we may fail both to seek and to discover the desired object, and, what is worse, we shall envelope ourselves in an illusion. Under the circumstances, we can only take the definition, and let that determine the division, the aim being to discover by synthesis, rather than analysis, the component parts.

We therefore ask, What must those principles be which give the ultimate explanations? This question can only be answered by finding the different classes of objects whose principles are sought. An examination of consciousness is thus required in order to discover the various groups, including all possible objects of contemplation. The first class, which strikes us on account of its prominence, is that included under the notion of the real, that which exists. This leads to an inquiry into being itself. What is meant by being? What can we learn of its nature, origin, and design? The inquiry into being in general leads to questions of concrete being, the nature of various objects, their relations and activities. By pursuing this thought, we should embrace in our investigation all real objects of knowledge. We, however, exclude from philosophy all that pertains to experiment, and is empirical; this leaves for our department all purely rational questions respecting being.

We, of course, do not contemplate being as abstracted from thought, but as the object of our thought. This at once puts us or our own being in relation to other being; and, aside from the inquiry into abstract being, we inquire, What relation do we sustain to other beings?

The first question, What exists? is thus supplemented by another, What is my relation to existence? But why make our relation to being specially prominent? Why not consider our own relations and activities under the general head of being? Simply because we, as inquirers into being, have a special interest in our own relation to other objects, and therefore we make it a point of special investigation. The two points of our philosophy are therefore included under the questions of being and of our peculiar relation to objects.

Our conscious relation to reality cannot well be considered as a whole, because this relation itself is of a threefold character, depending on our intellectual, emotional, and volitional activities. This gives us, besides the principles of being, those of thought, feeling, and volition, as the divisions of philosophy.

But the same result will be obtained by taking from consciousness the four groups which form all the subjects of rational inquiry; namely, we find in consciousness the concepts of being, of thought, of feeling, and of volition. Nothing can be conceived which is not somehow included under these heads, or under a combination of them.

The principles of being belong to metaphysics. Our intellectual relations involve the question of cognitions, and are included under the theory of knowledge. The subject most fully developed under this head is logic. Our emotional relations involve the general subject of the feelings, and are included under the theory of the feelings. This department has received less philosophical attention than the other elements of our psychic nature, and is consequently less fully developed. The emotions connected with the beautiful have received most attention under the head of æsthetics. Our voli-

tional relations involve the inquiry respecting what ought to be done, or the theory of conduct. This is the department of ethics or morality. Leaving room for the development of subjects under the third and fourth heads, — now still incomplete, — we have the following division of philosophy: —

1. Metaphysics.
2. Theory of knowledge.
3. *Æsthetics*.
4. Ethics.

More important than the question, how we get this division, is this: Is the division justifiable? This involves two others: Does it include all the ultimate principles? Can it be still further reduced?

Philosophy deals with the real, not with the visionary or imaginary. Now, as intimated, besides being, thought, feeling, and action, we cannot think of any other objects of inquiry. To beings with different or more powers than ours, there might be other subjects for investigation, just as the man with sight has a sphere of inquiry which the blind cannot enter. But we can form no conception of beings with powers totally different from ours, and therefore cannot consider relations peculiar to them. Rationally we can inquire only into what is, including relation and activity; and then, for the reason indicated, we can consider specially our activity and relation as thinking, feeling, and willing. The division, consequently, includes all principles which can be subjects of inquiry for us.

The question, Can the division be still further reduced? must be answered in the negative. Nothing would be gained by saying that philosophy is divided into being and our relation to being, since the latter is divided as indicated.

It is not intended to substitute, for the old division of the mind into numerous faculties, the three powers of the understanding, the heart, and the will. That the mind has modes of action which can be distinguished in thought, however they may be united in their source, is evident. There are serious objections to the division into separate faculties, lying side by side without organic union; and it is no explanation of mental operations, to postulate certain faculties, endowed with certain powers, and then to regard all the activities as but the product or working of these faculties. In this way the very thing to be explained is taken for granted; besides, the unity of mind, the mental organism, is destroyed.* In its varied activities it is the mind itself that is seen. Nevertheless we cannot resolve thought, feeling, and volition into a primary activity from which the other two are developed, or of which all three are but manifestations or branches. Repeated efforts have been made to find the seed from which all our mental activities grow; but they have not proved successful. Is feeling the original psychic state? Or is there something distinct from feeling, thought, and volition, containing them in embryo? We do not know what this something is; to call it the soul itself, throws no new light on the subject. We cannot tell how these three activities proceed from the soul. They are in operation long

* Herbart and Beneke rejected the usual division of the mind into faculties as innate distinctions. Such an analysis had a show of knowledge, but it was verbal rather than real. In all its activities the same mind is seen, but in different lights; and if the faculties are regarded as indicative only of these various activities, they may promote a clearer apprehension of the mental operations without destroying the underlying unity. We do not view the faculties as distinct from the soul, but as modes of the soul's activities, through which the character of the soul reveals itself.

before we reflect on them, and we cannot get behind these conscious activities to their unconscious origin. Many hold that feeling comes first; and there seems to be ground for letting it precede thought and volition. But by taking any activity as primary, we cannot show how the others grow out of it, or just how feeling and thought develop into or produce volition. In all psychic states, however much the one or the other may predominate, we cannot absolutely separate feeling, thought, and volition, any more than we can make one the germ of the other. Their exact relation is, therefore, still an unsolved problem. All we can say is, that they are products of the same mind, and are so related that they affect one another. We, however, separate them ideally and consider each by itself. The question of their relation really belongs to psychology. Psychology also furnishes our division of philosophy, since it is an analysis of consciousness which gives the objects of rational inquiry.

Philosophy is rational knowledge, namely of principles; or it is principiant knowledge. On first view it may therefore seem as if the theory of knowledge, instead of being a part of philosophy merely, is the whole of it. This view has a number of advocates, and is promoted by the prominence given to the theory of knowledge or epistemology. This is, however, an error based on a lack of proper distinctions, and would more likely be avoided if for "theory of knowledge" we substituted "theory of knowing." All principles are elements of knowledge, but they are not all principles explanatory of knowledge. We mean by these principles only such as are concerned with knowledge purely as knowledge, giving the interpretation of the knowing, and not of any particular kind of knowledge. As in

psychology the soul's activities are considered, not their products as distinguished or abstracted from the soul itself (as the object from the subject), so in our search for the principles of knowledge we abstract the content of thought, and contemplate knowledge as knowledge, not as this or that kind of knowledge. As after discussing psychology we still find certain contents of the soul to consider, namely the notion of being, of thought, of feeling, and of volition, as well as other departments of knowledge, so after the theory of knowledge (knowing) or the principles of thinking, we still have the content of knowledge to consider; namely, the principles of being, feeling, and willing.

That a certain primacy thus belongs to the theory of knowledge, is evident, and it deserves great prominence. But even from this point of view we shall have the same divisions, though not in the same order. Philosophy deals purely with rational knowledge (genus); and in rational knowledge it seeks the principles (species, distinguishing it from other rational pursuits). As rational knowledge of principles, philosophy must explain knowledge itself, which gives the theory of knowing or of knowledge. This is fundamental for all intellectual operations. Having found the principles of knowledge, we can view all other rational inquiries as merely an application of these principles. But why are these principles applied in philosophy? For the purpose of finding the principles of being, feeling, and acting.

I cannot see how complete principiant knowledge can omit any of these, or can include more. They exhaust our inquiries into ultimate principles, and each division has a clearly marked field of its own. Other divisions extant presuppose a different idea of philosophy, or do

not exhaust the subject, or make subdivisions primary. Our division intentionally omits the application of philosophy to other objects, as law, language, religion, etc., — applications which are endless, and do not belong to philosophy proper. Under the four divisions all applications of philosophy may be classified, each being placed under one or more of them. Thus there is no inquiry which does not involve an application of the principles of knowledge. Law, politics, and sociology are largely ethical, and may be viewed as coming under social ethics, or as an application of ethical principles to society.

The theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, deserve especial attention in an introductory work ; the former on account of its fundamental character, the latter because its inherent difficulties are so great. But æsthetics and ethics are also worthy of careful consideration. Their spheres are more easily comprehended than those of the other two subjects, and their discussion lies more within the range of ordinary thinking ; their ultimate principles are, however, beset with difficulties.

For the reasons given, the different departments of philosophy will be discussed in the following order : —

First, *The Theory of Knowledge* (Noetics).*

Second, *Metaphysics*.

Third, *Æsthetics*.

Fourth, *Ethics*.

* In Germany this theory is called *Erkenntnisslehre*, *Erkenntniss-theorie*, *Wissenslehre*, *Wissenstheorie*, and sometimes *Noetik*. The word "epistemology" has gained limited currency in English for the same subject. Since, however, we already use "noetic" as an adjective, the same word or "noetics," analogous to "metaphysics," "æsthetics," and "ethics," might be used to designate the theory of knowledge.

REFLECTIONS.

Why divide Knowledge if it is a unit? Principles determining the Division. Can the analysis of any one principle give the Divisions of Philosophy? The Division. The reason for this Division. Does it exhaust the subject? Criticism of other Divisions. Why not consider the Philosophy of Religion and *Naturphilosophie* as also separate Divisions? Does Philosophy become psychological by going to consciousness for its objects? Where can Philosophy find its objects if not in consciousness? Difference between an empirical object, and an object of consciousness. How does an empirical become a rational object? Reason for discussing the Theory of Knowledge first.

CHAPTER VI.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (NOETICS).

THE infinite variety of being, thought, feeling, and volition, comprehended in philosophical contemplation, forms a unit in that all is considered only so far as rational, and as leading to or included in the ultimate principles. The intellectual threads, on which every thing is strung in philosophy, are rational and principiant, and objects are philosophically significant in proportion as related to these threads. The philosophic element, in the multiplicity of concepts, forms the bond of unity; and that element is the object of search in the effort to pass from the desire for wisdom to wisdom itself. In philosophy, therefore, we do not seek knowledge in general, but the knowing element in all that is known. The aim to attain full and the highest intellectual consciousness leads philosophy beyond the consideration of a knowledge of particular things, to the consideration of knowledge itself, making that the object of rational and principiant inquiry.

The problem of knowing, or of knowledge, is fundamental. The mind which recognizes the responsibility of giving to itself a full account of itself, knows that it must consider the nature and conditions of knowledge, before it can rationally discuss the various objects of knowledge. An object of knowledge is meaningless, unless the knowledge, of which it is the object, is under-

stood. Our cognitions are a purely intellectual relation between the subject and the object; and this relation, being the fundamental conception of knowledge, is the light in which all objects known must be beheld. Not the soul (psychology), not the objects to which it is related (reality, beauty, morality), form the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge. This subject-matter is nothing else than the correct thought-relation between the knower and the known, neither of which is considered alone, nor even at all, except so far as they are necessary to bring out the idea of all pure knowledge. The principles involved are those which pertain to knowing as knowing; therefore they are general, and apply equally to all departments of thought. The question, What must a mental product be in order to be knowledge? excludes from a content of consciousness every thing that is peculiar, except what constitutes the peculiarity of all knowledge. Between the knower and the known we want to discover the knowing. For all intellections, the problem is consequently fundamental; and if we regard psychology as the preface to philosophy, the theory of knowledge is its introductory chapter.

In the haste to acquire objects of knowledge, this introductory chapter is frequently skipped. More intent on possessing than on giving an account to itself of the character of its possessions, and the processes involved in their acquisition, the mind overlooks the deepest problems of the nature and criteria of knowledge. Under these circumstances it is not strange that the intellect fails to get the full mastery of itself and its acquirements; and with all its boasted wealth, it does not so much possess as it is possessed.

THE NEED OF SUCH A THEORY.

This theory becomes a mental necessity so soon as the mind reflects on itself, and demands proof of the validity of its processes, and of the reliability of their results. Whenever we rise from the psychological view to the critical inquiry into what must be in order that our intellectual attainments may be true, we enter the sphere of philosophy, and begin to construct a theory of knowledge. The reason in the mind insists on rational standards, and requires thought to justify itself. The philosophic spirit cannot rest in consciousness or even self-consciousness, but only in truth-consciousness.

Under the objects of knowledge lies the question, What is knowledge? The answer to this gives rise to other questions: Is knowledge possible? If so, under what conditions? To what extent? How can it be tested? Only those who have taken the answers for granted can fail to see the difficulties and fundamental character of these problems. None but the thoughtless, who have never made clear to themselves the meaning and foundation of knowing, will regard an inquiry into the possibility of knowledge useless. This possibility has repeatedly been denied, and all supposed knowledge has been pronounced mere opinion. This scepticism was by no means confined to the ancient Greeks. In modern times it has been quite common, particularly in certain departments of thought. This is evident from the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and Comte, and also from agnosticism. This scepticism is not confined to theology and philosophy, but extends also to science. Ferrari, an Italian philosopher who died in 1877, even denied the possibility of science, holding that "Logic and Nature are contradictory in themselves and be-

tween themselves, and thought, which would dominate facts by applying itself to their real elements, is of necessity involved in error."* Even Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* is not final; and that eminent thinker was unable to find any other proof that our minds do not deceive us when they present clear and distinct conceptions, than the fact that God is truthful, and consequently will not permit our minds to deceive us. But we reason in a circle if the proof of God's existence depends on our reason, and then the validity of reason is made to depend on the existence of God. Our age has not merely inherited the scepticism of previous ages, but it has also overturned the dogmatism of the past, has undermined arguments formerly supposed to be irrefutable, and has thus deepened and broadened doubt and suspicion.

Whoever understands the deeper undercurrents of the age must appreciate the need of subjecting the problems involved in cognition to the most thorough examination; and even a superficial view shows the importance of critically determining the grounds of certainty. These grounds will be valued in proportion to the love of truth. The honest doubter, and the anxious searcher for an immovable basis of knowledge, know the difficulty of attaining certainty respecting many of the most important subjects. On the same points, conflicting views prevail among those who have equal facilities for understanding them.† Marked dif-

* *Mind*, 1878. Barzellotti on Philosophy in Italy.

† Every discussion makes the need of reliable grounds of certainty evident. The origin of Locke's celebrated work is an instructive example. In "The Epistle to the Reader" he says, "Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this essay, I should tell thee that five or six friends, meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficul-

ferences prevail respecting the inferences to be drawn from the same scientific experiments; and with all their exactness and thoroughness, scientists are by no means agreed respecting the principles and results of science. One need but hear witnesses of the same occurrence testify under oath, to learn how hard it is to determine simple questions of fact; and even when the facts are admitted, different and perhaps opposite inferences are drawn from them. When we pass from facts to complicated systems of thought, the difficulties are multiplied. In religion the conflicting views are innumerable, and all must have some basis, valid or invalid. One will affirm the doctrine of the Trinity as stoutly as another denies it; and an Athanasius may be as ready as Servetus to die for what he regards as certain. In philosophy the theories respecting the first principles vary greatly, and thus the foundation is laid for divergences throughout the entire domain of thought. The theory of knowledge teems with unsolved problems pertaining to the nature, the origin, the conditions, the limits, the relations, and the value of knowledge.

So important has this theory become, that it threatens, for the present, to absorb all philosophical inquiry. Since it involves the questions on which all knowledge depends, their fundamental character requires that they be settled before others pertaining to cognition can be determined. In America, Great Britain, France, and Italy, the conflicts between empiricism and rationalism,

ties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with." The attempt to solve this problem resulted in the *Essay on Human Understanding*.

materialism and idealism, theism and atheism, make the significance of the theory evident. In Germany, philosophical journals and books are full of the subject, and the best thinkers devote their best efforts to the solution of the problems involved.*

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LOGIC.

One of the principal difficulties in noetics consists in determining the place of logic. The old lifeless skeletons which formerly constituted this discipline do not meet present demands; and the numerous recent works on logic in America, England, and Germany, seek to give the study more life and greater practical value. But unanimity respecting the nature, sphere, and method of logic has not yet been attained. Some hold with Kant that the laws of thought are its subject-matter; others make it a discussion of the principles of induction, so that it becomes more directly the propædæutic of the sciences; and others want it to include the whole theory of knowledge. This is the case with Ueberweg, who defines it as "the science of the normative laws of human knowledge." His "Logic" discusses perception, space, and time, and the relation of perception to reality, as well as the usual topics of formal logic. Ulrici opposed Ueberweg's method, and advocated logic as the basis of the theory of knowledge, giving the norms of thought, while the theory determines the nature and possibility of knowledge. Sigwart regards logic as the doctrine of the art

* "Speculative philosophy has in modern times changed in character from a theory of being into a theory of knowing." *Mind*, 1883, 21, by the editor. "The theory of knowledge, besides being separately treated, is included in all the newest expositions of logic, dominated as these no longer are by the old formalistic conceptions." — WUNDT, *Philosophy in Germany*. *Mind*, 1877.

of thinking, its aim being to establish reliable and general rules for thought. Instead of including the entire theory of knowledge, he wants logic to determine the correct method of thinking (methodology). Among the most important of recent German works is that of Wundt, whose title indicates its aim: "Logic: An Inquiry into the Principles of Knowledge and of the Methods of Scientific Investigation." The first large volume is devoted to the theory of knowledge, the second to the method of the sciences. Of the great mass of learned material, comparatively a small proportion belongs to what was formerly discussed in works on logic. These are but a few samples of the variety of opinions on the subject.

Logic, as giving the forms of correct thinking, can no longer be isolated, but must be brought into organic union with the other elements of knowing. This, however, does not require that it include the whole process of obtaining knowledge, perception for instance, or that it consider the material as well as the forms of thought. The norms of thinking are sufficiently important for separate treatment, and they constitute the peculiar province of logic. Logic is thus part of the theory of knowledge, and properly comes under the head of origin of knowledge, namely so far as that origin depends on correct thinking. This place secures its immediate connection with all the members in the organism of knowledge. That it cannot exhaust the whole subject of knowing, is evident, though it performs a most important part. Thinking is a method of knowing; in order that the method may result in truth, it requires the right beginning or a proper object. But if logic is to begin with sensation, and to determine the correctness of perception and the right apprehension of its

object,—in other words, if all that precedes the act of thinking is also to be considered,—then logic must include a large domain of psychology. By making logic the synonyme of the theory of knowledge, it must also determine the relation of thought to reality.²¹ The form of thought must have some kind of content; how is that obtained? What is its validity when obtained? These questions include much more than belongs to the historically limited sphere of logic. There is no need of changing this sphere. The laws of thought, or discursive thinking, can still be regarded as the domain of logic, which the larger theory of knowledge includes as one of its parts.*

The comprehensiveness of the theory of knowledge makes divisions necessary even for a general view of its multitude of important subjects. There being no generally accepted division, one will here be made which seems best calculated to give the student a clear conception of the subject, and to prepare him for its study. The divisions and their discussions in a preparatory work must, however, be viewed as a mere preface to the depth and breadth of this profound and extensive theme. Each of the three heads under which we consider the general subject seems inexhaustible.

1. *What is knowledge?*
2. *How is it obtained?*
3. *How is it completed?*

* Volkelt (*Phil. Monatsh.*, 1881. 540): "It is my conviction that the theory of knowledge should not be absorbed by logic, but that, on the other hand, logic should be reduced to a part of this theory. This theory is the more general, more comprehensive, science. In the course of its investigations it unavoidably comes in contact with logical thinking, and must test it according to its objective worth. This task cannot be performed without considering the most general forms and laws of thought, which are usually discussed in logic."

1. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

The problem for solution is the exact meaning of the expression, "*I know.*" From the object known we abstract for examination the knowing. The first glance shows that knowledge is not co-extensive with the contents of consciousness. In distinction from the emotions and volitions, it is intellectual. But there are also intellectual elements in imaginations, opinions, and beliefs; yet we do not include these in knowledge. With whatever tenacity held by the mind possessing them, they are not authoritative for other minds. They are recognized as having something peculiar, individual, perhaps arbitrary, but not what is necessary and universal. Knowledge, on the other hand, is universal, and has objective as well as subjective authority. If discovered by one mind, it can also become a possession of others, and the grounds on which it rests must be valid for every intellect understanding them. It does not, like so many of our mental products, depend on peculiarities of mind or training or experience, but on an inherent necessity. Our inclinations and will may effect its recognition, not its reality. It is absolute and final; it dominates the intellect like a tyrant, and yet the intellect itself is that tyrant.

The intellect does not create knowledge, but produces it according to necessary laws. Just because it beholds itself in this product, the mind cannot alter the knowledge without changing itself. Intellect culminates in knowledge, and recognizes it as an imperative. Knowledge is power, but it is power which is absolute restraint. The mind is helpless in view of it, and there is no freedom except in absolute submission.

Knowledge is truth apprehended, or truth become

conscious. We ascribe objective reality to truth; it exists even if we do not know it, and it remains unchanged by our denial and rejection. We cannot make, but may discover it; and cognition is the process for making the objective subjective. Whether we regard the truth as consciously existing in any mind, as God's, or not, we know that our mental attitude toward it has no more effect on it than our recognition of the external world affects its course. The truth is thus a realm of its own, complete, perfect, absolute. By entering this realm, our intellect appropriates its possessions and is enriched, but the realm itself is not impoverished. Knowledge is an individualization of truth, a mental realization of an ideal existence.

We can define knowing as a perception of truth, — a perception based on grounds evident and certain. A man may dream the truth, or have a presentiment of it, but that is not knowledge. Truth may be possessed without being known as truth, while much that is thought to be known is really a deception. Standards vary; where many claim to know, the more critical discover only prejudice or opinion. What a man regards at one time as absolutely known, he may later reject as false, or as beyond the limits of the knowable.

If such mistakes and self-deceptions are to be avoided, knowledge must be sharply defined, and its criteria given. We speak of the absoluteness of reason, but forget that in this sense reason is an abstraction, and that our minds are fallible, still wrestling with the problem, how to attain the ideal reason. The same mind that knows must also have the criteria of knowing. It must determine for itself the standard of truth. But this standard is not true, unless a universal standard for all intellect. If peculiar, it is false. With itself, its

criteria, the mind should therefore be mercilessly critical in determining what to accept as knowledge. The vast majority are satisfied with mere opinion, take it for knowledge, and inquire no further; hence the importance of shaking these opinions by doubt, so that the mind may become conscious of itself, and pass to knowledge. But even after the mind has become conscious of itself, and is willing to rest only in what is reliable and can stand the severest test, it is extremely difficult to determine the limits of the knowable. Particularly hard is it so to draw the line between faith and knowledge that they can in all cases be clearly distinguished. Both have degrees, and at times they seem to merge into each other. Faith may be based on knowledge, and must be if reliable; but can knowledge ever be based on faith? If only that is known which is absolutely demonstrated, then nothing is known. Something must ultimately be regarded as so certain that it needs no demonstration, otherwise all reasoning is in a circle. If every thing must be demonstrated, on what does all demonstration finally rest? With what can we begin? For instance, can we prove that our faculties do not deceive us? If any one attempts this, he must do it with the very faculties he is testing; that is, he must take for granted that the faculties, whose reliability he is testing, are reliable. Call it a belief, an assumption, a postulate, a self-evident truth, or what you will, something must at last be taken as so certain, that it needs no proof; and that must be made the ultimate basis of knowledge, and the starting-point of reasoning.

Nor do we ordinarily limit knowledge to such absolute demonstrations. When we test such generally accepted laws as causation, gravitation, the indestruc-

tibility of matter, the conservation of energy, we base their universality on some undemonstrable postulate. The direct observation of the working of any law is necessarily limited, yet we do not hesitate to declare it universal. Nothing is regarded as more certain than the demonstrations of mathematics; yet they all rest on self-evident truths, which are axioms just because undemonstrable, though certain.

Knowledge presents four questions for consideration. What is its object (subject-matter)? What is our conception of that object? How is the conception related to the object? What is the degree of certainty respecting that relation?

Let us suppose the object to be a man. If my conception of him is correct, I have the truth, but I may not have knowledge. That conception, while perfectly true, may be a mere opinion; I may only believe that he has a certain character. What I opine may be true; what I hold as certain may be false. The difference between knowledge and opinion need not be in their object, since that may be the same in both; but there must always be a difference in the grounds on which they rest. A correct opinion only becomes knowledge when I know (not merely opine) that between my conception and the object conceived there is harmony. This psychological element of certainty is, therefore, essential to knowledge.

The truth in a mind may consequently be far more extensive than its knowledge. The former is simply the agreement of a percept or concept with its object; the latter, however, implies that this agreement is known. The difference between a true faith and knowledge consists in the fact that in the one case the truth is believed, in the other it is known; but both

have the truth. A concept, opinion, or belief may be true or false. Knowledge is always true.

Knowledge, then, is a conscious possession of truth : a possession whose grounds are recognized as being in harmony with reason, and, therefore, irrefutable ; or, *knowledge is the legitimately and certainly recognized (conscious) agreement of a percept or concept with its object.* Thus if we have a subject and predicate, knowledge consists in the established certainty of the harmony between the two ; or, if we have a perception of something real, knowledge will consist in the established certainty that there is harmony between the mental presentation and the thing for which it stands.

Percepts and concepts exist only in consciousness, and always are, in themselves, what they appear to be. It is not in beholding them that mistakes occur, but only in passing judgment on what they stand for. I commit no error in imagining a fictitious character ; but I deviate from the truth as soon as I ascribe external reality to the fiction. I abide in the truth so long as I take my concepts for what they really are. A mind fully conscious of itself and of the nature of its possessions cannot err. Viewed in this light, we can define knowledge as perfected consciousness.

Taken in the widest sense, knowledge embraces all that is known, irrespective of its character. Hence it includes fiction, and numerous other things, which are of little or no significance to the scholar. The only knowledge worthy of philosophical investigation is valuable and real. Whatever its idealism, philosophy aims to become absolutely realistic ; it therefore rejects every concept regarded as the intellectual counterpart of some reality, when, in truth, it is but a mental fiction. Not only does the mind create such fictions, and then pro-

nounce them realities, but it also takes words for concepts, and objectifies its own concepts, as if external existences. We speak of accidents, for instance, as if they occurred in nature; but reflection teaches us that they only represent our way of viewing certain occurrences. Chance and accident vanish when their causes are understood. Perhaps these words are used only to indicate that something occurred without intention on our part. From this it is evident how essential to knowledge is the correct interpretation of our concepts.

Where reason is made the supreme arbiter, there is no danger of excluding ideals from knowledge. As objects of search, or as the goal to be striven after, they are the highest reality. The true man is an ideal; but he is the only real man, all others being imperfect copies. When, therefore, we speak of the real as the object of knowledge, it is taken in the twofold sense as embracing what exists, and also what ought to be. It includes whatever is true. Not only nature and mind, but also their source, relations, activities, and products, are its objects. In mathematics we have objects of knowledge, even if there be no objective (extra-mental) reality to correspond with its figures and demonstrations. All that is real to the mind, and has significance for it, is an object of knowledge; otherwise, æsthetics and ethics could never be objects of rational inquiry.

When we say that knowledge aims at an exhaustive understanding of the real, what is meant? We understand a thing when we know its nature, its origin, its relation to other things, and its purpose. A little reflection shows that nothing can be fully understood unless every thing else is known. Aristotle says in his *Ethics* that the philosopher must follow things in the order of their origin, and declares that the beginning is

half of the whole, — a proverb whose application to knowledge is evident. But in order to comprehend fully the origin of a thing, we must follow its near and remote causes through all the processes by means of which it has been developed, going from effect to cause, until we reach the first cause. So, in order to comprehend the relations of an object, its connection with the whole universe must be traced, since every thing is somehow involved in these relations. The purpose or design of a thing is fully understood only when all its connections, from the nearest to the remotest, are considered. It is thus seen that the thorough study of any one thing leads to inquiries which involve the whole universe of being, and that to know one thing perfectly means to know all absolutely. A deep and broad conception of knowledge reveals our own attainments as extremely limited.

This intimate relation of all objects, so that they constitute a universe in which nothing is isolated, greatly complicates knowledge. It is impossible to know all individual objects, nor is it profitable to spend one's strength in acquiring unconnected details. From the philosophic point of view, the comprehension of details under laws and principles is far more valuable. That individual objects must also be studied, is a lesson which science is constantly teaching. And every science has its (material) logic to determine what shall be regarded as scientific knowledge in its special department. So there are laws of historic, literary, and linguistic criticism, to determine what the conditions of knowledge in their respective departments are. But the facts in nature and mind thus learned become means for induction and generalization. The intellect itself impels us to pass from facts to laws, which are

the foci concentrating all the rays of knowledge. Thinking condenses knowledge into its essence.

While all knowledge, even that of the most insignificant details, is truth known as such by the mind, the variety in its objects is infinite. Only by classification can we gain the intellectual mastery over the innumerable objects. Systematized knowledge is most available, and in forming its attainments into system the mind both develops and economizes strength. The best methods of classification, as we have seen, are determined by inherent characteristics, not by incidental or external marks. The nature of their union, and the amount which objects have in common, determine the intimacy of their relation, and the order of their classification.

It is a general rule, that, the more objects have in common, the smaller the class to which they belong, and *vice versa*. The same thought may be expressed in another way: A concept is rich in content, in proportion as it is small in extent; and the poorer in content, the greater in extent. Intensively and extensively, concepts are thus in inverse proportion. In the concepts tree and organism, we find that the latter includes the former, and all that can be predicated of the nature of an organism is true of the tree; but the concept tree also contains much more than the more general concept organism. In content the concept tree is much the richer, but the concept organism embraces many more individuals than tree. A tree is an organism only so far as it has elements common to all organisms. The last sentence implies that the concept organism is poorer in content than tree, but richer in the number of objects embraced.

However, then, we may classify an individual, it

always contains more than the class-name indicates. This is merely saying that the concrete is richer than the abstract. The object before me is a tree, but it is something more; it is an oak, a white oak, a particular one, with a certain form and size, with a certain number of leaves and quantity of fruit, and with numerous other peculiarities. When we assert that an object belongs to a particular class, we only indicate that it has the marks (*notae*) common to all the objects of that class. Knowledge of this kind is general, abstract. When I say, "This is a man," I indicate nothing that is peculiar so as to distinguish him from mankind in general. He may be any man. Yet our general notions are indispensable for reasoning and for all thinking; we cannot even give a definition without them.

The most general (the most abstract and the emptiest) of all notions, that of being, includes extensively all that exists, but indicates nothing respecting existence except that it is. Can we predicate any thing else of all being, except the empty fact of existence? Is there any quality or property which belongs to all things that are? Perhaps the very thought of being implies something else. If this is so, and if we could discover this something else, we should gain new knowledge applicable to the whole universe of being. By increasing the intensive content of a general term, we increase our knowledge of all objects included under that term.

The general concept, of course, has significance only because there are concrete objects which it includes. The concept man is useless unless there are men. Are the universals purely mental, or do they represent real existences? Aside from the conception there is nothing that can be called absolutely tree, man, or moun-

tain ; but there are trees, men, and mountains. A still more vital question is this: Have we really general concepts, or have we instead only general terms to which no concept corresponds? Berkeley and Hume contended that what we call general or abstract ideas or notions are pure fictions. An abstract idea they declared an impossibility. By viewing a number of similar things, say triangles, they held that we apply the same term to all, but that to this general term nothing in our mind corresponds. The term "triangle" does not stand for a general notion, but it stands for each particular triangle. We consequently have general terms, but no notions. An inference has been drawn from this view, especially by Hume, in favor of empiricism and sensationalism, to the rejection of the higher and more abstract activities of the mind.

Emphatically, however, as they reject all general notions, Berkeley and Hume themselves give evidence to prove that they are more than mere words. Thus they institute comparisons between objects, and abstract that wherein they agree from that wherein they differ. What is the result of this process? The general concept which is designated by the general term. From a number of triangles I abstract that wherein they agree. They all have three sides, so drawn as to enclose space, and to form three angles; but the peculiarities of these triangles—the length of the sides, the size of the angles, the amount of space included—are not considered. The result of this process of abstraction is, that what all the triangles have in common is obtained. The general term "triangle" does not indicate the peculiarities of any particular triangle, but only what every figure must have in order to be a triangle, whatever else it may have. A general notion is conse-

quently real, and is the product of a most important mental operation. We go a step farther, and declare that the general notion is not merely a mental reality, but, so far as it is a notion of things, something real corresponds to it. There is no universal in nature; but we make the mistake of looking for some particular object which corresponds with the general notion, when it does not stand for a particular object at all. It stands for what is found in all objects of that class, but which cannot be exclusively concentrated in any one thing. That which constitutes a mountain is found in all mountains; what makes a figure a triangle must be in every triangle.

The difficulty with Berkeley, Hume, and their followers, on this subject, is, that they do not distinguish between perception and conception. Hume distinctly rejects all that cannot be perceived; it is either a fiction of the mind, or a word without meaning. Now, we can perceive only the concrete; but by mentally elaborating our percepts (by thinking), we form general notions. We cannot perceive them as we do objects of sense, but we *conceive* them; we do not make an individual presentation to the mind of what is general, but we *think* it. What Hume wants to behold as an "impression" or "image" of a thing, the mind wants to contemplate as the intellectual counterpart of reality.

We study particulars to get a knowledge of all like particulars, and we generalize to individualize. Knowledge in any comprehensive sense is obtained by processes of generalization and individuation. Cognition must attend to details, but general notions are equally indispensable to knowledge.

The question, how far knowledge extends, may also be considered both extensively and intensively. It

would be presumptuous to claim that our cognition is co-extensive with being. The unconscious processes of our own minds lie wholly beyond the sphere of our knowledge; and there may be entire regions, wholly different from those known, which we cannot enter, and of whose very existence we cannot even form a conception. With other or different senses and intellectual powers, regions might be revealed which must now remain hidden. The limit of knowledge is one of the most interesting and most difficult problems in the theory of knowledge.

The extent of knowledge intensively considered refers to the limits of thought respecting the objects within the sphere of cognition. How far does our knowledge of things extend? The uncritical imagine that through their senses they come into direct communication with things, and learn to know them immediately; but, in reality, we know directly only what is in our consciousness. Mentally we never come in contact with things themselves. They reveal themselves to us through their qualities or forces; they are manifested to us through the percepts we form of them. It is not exact enough to say that we know a thing from what it does, for it may do much of which we can know nothing; but from what a thing does to us (how it affects us), we infer what it is. We thus distinguish between phenomena and things themselves. According to Kant, we can know only the phenomenal; the thing *per se* ("das Ding an sich"), we cannot know. That things can only be known according to what they are to us, is self-evident. It is but saying that things can be to us intellectually only what they are to us intellectually. The existence of a substance underlying the qualities which appear to us is an inference, the cor-

rectness of which is much disputed at present. To our minds a thing is always what it does, or is able to do. Matter is to us simply the sum of its known forces. If we are not satisfied with this view, we must make it the dark something in which the forces inhere, and from which they proceed; its further definition is still a problem. To define the soul as immaterial is, as we have seen, purely negative, showing what it is not, but giving nothing positive. Directly we know only its activity; all else is inference. Even the problem of its immortality is a question of conscious activity. By a critical examination of cognitions, we become conscious of our limitations; and growth in the knowledge of self is largely a growth in the consciousness of our ignorance.

The relation of knowledge to reality has been involved in much perplexity. We do not doubt that things exist, whether we have any knowledge of them or not. Our thinking does not affect the existence of any thing except the thought itself. Nor is the thought of an object identical with the object. What, then, is their relation to each other? Have we in our cognitions a possession of reality, or of its copy? Or is thought, perhaps, independent of external existence, being wholly a mental creation? So far as these questions belong to an introductory work, they can best be considered under the next head.

2. ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

This subject might be relegated to psychology if the process of the acquisition of knowledge could be watched and exactly described. It is, however, performed unconsciously (at least without being remembered) long before it becomes an object of attention

and reflection. We can still watch certain processes in the formation of knowledge afterwards, and the question of the origin of knowledge involves important psychological elements; but psychology cannot solve the problem unless we are prepared so to enlarge its sphere as to include the critical inquiries of Kant, as well as the sceptical but dogmatic processes of Hume.

Since the time of Descartes, there has been much dispute as to whether there are innate ideas. The advocates of the doctrine regard as innate the ideas called universal and necessary. It is not meant that they are universal in the sense that every human being has them, but that they are necessarily developed in every mind attaining a certain stage of culture. The dispute about innate ideas has in large part been fruitless, because the terms were not sharply defined. Descartes himself did not state the doctrine clearly. Locke, in his attack on innate ideas, showed that children, idiots, and savages do not possess them, and therefore concluded that they cannot be innate. He proved that these ideas are not born with us, but that experience is necessary for their presence in consciousness; that is, he clearly established what probably no philosopher ever questioned, namely that at birth the mind has no ready-made notions lying about in consciousness. His attack, however, made it necessary to define more carefully what is designated by the ideas pronounced innate. In answer to Locke, Leibnitz admitted as true that to the intellect nothing is innate, *except the intellect itself*.* He saw that the real question, namely, whether there are not certain principles inherent in the mind which determine what is necessary, was

* "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus."

not touched by Locke's arguments. He held that of course there are no complete notions at birth, but that the mind has certain tendencies or aptitudes, which, with proper development, give necessary truth. These innate aptitudes he uses as the synonyme of "innate ideas." The meaning is that certain notions are *imply*, not *explicite*, in the mind at birth. Whether this is true, is the real question at issue.

In this sense Locke himself would no doubt have accepted the doctrine of innate ideas. His view of reflection, besides sensation, as a source of knowledge, really implies it.* But, as the expression is ambiguous, and has often been misunderstood, it is better to avoid the words "innate ideas," and substitute for them inherent mental aptitudes or laws.

Kant rejected innate ideas, in the literal sense, as distinctly as Locke did, but taught that there are certain innate conditions of knowledge, certain mental forms, which are the mind's contributions to percepts and concepts.† He held that all knowledge *begins* with experience, but that all is not the product of experience; this is the first thought of the *Kritik*. He taught that in per-

* That the mind acts according to innate laws, is not merely implied throughout Locke's Essay, but also in his First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

† In writing against Eberhard, Kant says: "The *Kritik* absolutely admits no ideas (*Vorstellungen*) which are created or born with us; all without exception, whether belonging to perception or to conception, the *Kritik* views as acquired." Respecting *a priori* conceptions, he, however, adds, "But there must surely be a ground in the subject which makes it possible for the ideas to arise in a particular way and not otherwise, as well as possible to apply them to objects not yet given; and this ground at least must be innate." He declares as innate "the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought." Drobish ("Zeits für exacte Phil." 1862. 6) in quoting these passages says, "Thus Kant, also, does not regard his *a priori* forms as innate ideas, but as acquired."

ception the mind furnishes time and space, which are purely internal, as the mental forms into which all the materials or contents furnished through the senses must be put. For the concepts the understanding furnishes certain categories, such as quantity, quality, relation, and mode. These categories, however, do not appear in the mind at birth. Sensation is necessary to arouse the mind to activity; but when thus aroused, it furnishes these various forms of knowledge spontaneously. "No one would have the concept of cause if by means of experience he had not perceived causes. No one would have the idea of virtue if he always lived among those who are nothing but thieves." Hegel also regarded innate ideas as only *implicite* in the mind at birth: they are there in the form of capacity.* Lotze held the same view, declaring that the meaning of innate ideas is "that the mind is so constituted, that, when manifold impressions are made on it, its own nature" leads it to what are called necessary truths.† Harms advocated the same doctrine.‡ "Innate to the mind are neither emotions, nor knowledge, nor strivings; but it is innate to it to feel, to know, to strive; and in feeling, knowing, and striving, it is subject to a law which must be there if we recognize it, and cannot be merely a product and habit of knowing. It is innate to the eye to perceive every impression as color; it cannot perceive tones. It is innate to the feeling to perceive every emotion as an agreeable or disagreeable state. But neither feelings nor percepts are innate. Just as little are concepts innate; but it is innate to us to know

* "Nur als *an sich* und in der Weise der Anlage im Menschen vorhanden." — *Ency.* I. 136.

† *Nord und Süd*, 1882, 340.

‡ *Abhandlungen der system. Philosophie*, 137.

objects. It is no more a habit of consciousness to know objects, than a stone has learned by habit to fall. The laws of knowledge operate in knowing before they themselves are recognized."

From the time of Leibnitz to the present, German philosophy has been dominated by the thought — most fully developed by Kant — that certain mental elements which are innate determine the character of our thinking. Even the realism of Germany* which has lately asserted itself is no exception to this rule. The one-sided attention to this innate element has led to idealism, just as its neglect in other lands has led to sensationalism and materialism.

Repeated efforts have been made by mysticism to account for our highest notions by viewing them as revelations. The mind is supposed somehow to be in immediate communion with God, so that a knowledge of Him is obtained directly (not through means). Mysticism, though often intimately connected with philosophy, is not a part thereof, but a problem for solution.

But even if the mystic's view of the direct communion of the mind with God is rejected, there may be what is termed intuitive knowledge, such, namely, which is not dependent on logical demonstration. Some notions are so self-evident that the mind at once, without any media, sees their truth. It is a kind of intellectual beholding or contemplation of truth. That the mind has this vision, as it may be called, is beyond dispute; the only question can be respecting the reason why the mind immediately perceives truth in this way.²²

The hint given, while speaking of psychology, respecting the state we form in the process of development, may be of service to us in interpreting what we call

* As that of J. von Kirchmann.

intuitive ideas. As a sensation is at once interpreted into a percept, so certain concepts are at once pronounced true. The recognition of their truth requires no conscious effort on our part; it is immediate. The states in which we have these intuitions are the result of culture, and the processes of this culture can undoubtedly be determined. That the beholding is by a state which is not innate, but the product of development, does not affect the value of the intuitions. They may be based on innate conditions in the very nature of our being, so that the ground of their necessity is in our constitution. It would be proper, then, to speak of certain ideas as necessary, and therefore universal.

We do not mistake, then, in pronouncing as a reality the immediate beholding of certain ideas as true; but we mistake in supposing that this vision is a direct state of nature rather than a result of development. And we also mistake in supposing that such immediate beholding pertains only to what are commonly called intuitions. They are but the operation of a very common law of our being, — a law working in the formation of all habits, and in all judgments, in which the mind overleaps certain links in the process of reasoning. The mind, after itself passing through certain processes of generalization, generalizes unconsciously. The steps originally conscious in forming a judgment are afterwards omitted. The first and last link of the chain are seen, and, without examining the rest, the mind knows that they are all in their place.

The various efforts somehow to get a knowledge of objects directly or otherwise than through sensation, have been opposed by those who held that the mind is wholly passive, or at least wholly dependent on external objects for what it knows. The advocates of empiri-

*Repetition, then, tends to
make mental processes
more more intuitive.*

cism have been no more careful in the use of terms than those who taught the doctrine of innate ideas. Whoever regards the mind as originally both empty and passive, and always under the dominion of impressions from the external world, must make sensation the source and explanation of all cognition.

Locke's well-known figure of the mind as "white paper," is frequently quoted as evidence that he regarded the mind as passive. "Let us, then, suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished?" * Locke, however, does not use this comparison to prove the mind inactive, but merely to show that at birth it has no ideas. When he says that it is like "white paper," he only means to say what he adds, that it is "void of all characters, without any ideas;" but the inference so often drawn, that paper may be written on, but cannot write on itself, is drawn by others, not by Locke. That he does not regard the mind as passive, is evident from the same section, when he says, "Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking." To the question, Whence has the mind "all the materials of reason and knowledge?" he answers, "From experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself." But this experience, he holds, consists of sensation and reflection; the external and internal factors co-operate. After speaking of sensation, he says of reflection, "The other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the oper-

* Book II. 1, 2.

ations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we, being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself.”*

The hints given by Locke respecting reflection were not fully developed by him. He says it might with propriety be called “internal sense,” thereby indicating that he regards its function mainly as that of an observer of the inner operations, and not as a power that works over the impressions received. Even in his view of reflection he does not rise above the psychological to the rational activity of the mind. But some of his followers neglected the hints he gave concerning the mind’s activity, and made the outer sense the only source of knowledge. In France, Condillac taught that the mind is passive; through the senses the world writes its figures, or photographs its images, on the soul, which may view them, but has no active part in their production. But even if the soul were passive in receiving impressions through the senses, it surely cannot be so, as Condillac supposed, in working them over in thinking.

Materialists go still farther than Condillac, who did not hold that the soul is material. Epicurus regarded the soul as not different from the body, and held that the images in the mind are produced by the constant emis-

* Book II. 1, 4.

sion of fine particles from the surfaces of bodies. Thus material copies were thought to pass from things into the mind.* Modern materialists regard thought as merely a physiological function of the brain. Buechner teaches that the soul itself is nothing but a special endowment of the vital force, conditioned by the peculiar construction of the material of the brain. He says (*Kraft u. Stoff*), "The same power which digests by means of the stomach, thinks by means of the brain." Some materialists speak of thought as a phosphorescence of the brain; but this figure throws no real light on the mental processes. All such illustrations take it for granted that we know body better than mind, when the fact is "that we know more of mind than we do of body; that the immaterial world is a firmer reality than the material."†

Respecting the origin of knowledge, conflicting views are thus found to prevail. An idealism, which views all cognition and its objects as a direct product of the soul, has found advocates, as well as sensationalism and materialism, which regard the external world or matter as the only source of all that is known. We shall be fortunate if amid this confusion we can give hints to the beginner to direct him to the way in which the solution of the problem may be found.

It is universally admitted that knowledge begins with experience; by examining this, therefore, we may learn something respecting the origin of knowledge, and the factors it contains. Much as experience is discussed, it is too often treated as if its exact nature were already determined, and needed no further inquiry. The manner in which the subject is frequently discussed makes

* Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, first ed. 29.

† Huxley, *Science and Culture*.

the impression that even Locke has not been carefully studied; and in some instances his standpoint is treated as if Berkeley, Hume, and Kant had written in vain. The most evident things are reiterated, while the points needing elucidation are overlooked.

In the sense now generally adopted, experience does not primarily express the act of testing or trying, nor any other act except the observation of what is in consciousness. In the broadest sense we experience whatever we are conscious of. We may hesitate to say that we experience a thought or an idea; but it is certain that we do not have an idea or a thought unless the fact that we have it is a matter of experience. It is true that it is more common to use the term "experience" with reference to sensations and feelings; and in proportion as intellectual activity enters into sensation, the less apt we are to apply the term "experience" to it. We experience the pain caused by a burn; but in the beauties we see, and in the music we hear, the intellect is more active, and we do not speak of these as experience in the same sense as of pain or pleasure. We experience trials, but think thoughts and do deeds. When we thus speak of thought and deeds, it is, however, the active mental element (the producing factor) to which attention is called, not to the fact of our consciousness of that activity. What we thus distinguish from experience is our own intellectual activity, and it is thus seen that the term is used for a state in which we are affected rather than active. When our attention is directed absorbingly to intellectual or volitional efforts, we experience little; but when we yield ourselves more to the spontaneous processes of our minds, to the immediateness of our feelings, we experience in a peculiar sense. Experience thus pertains to the psychological

rather than the rational processes. There is more of it in the busy scenes of life than in mathematical demonstrations. And by systems of experience, so termed in philosophy, we mean those which have much immediateness, spontaneousness, depending much on direct sensation and observation, not so much on the mental elaboration of the material thus gained. An experientialist is afraid to speculate, for fear of losing the blessings of experience. No one thinks of calling Hegel's system a philosophy of experience; but Locke, Hume, and their followers have produced systems which may be so called with much greater propriety. Sensationalists stoutly oppose the intuitionists, overlooking the fact that in point of immediateness (absence of discursive and inferential thought) they are really one. Sensationalism affirms for the outer what intuitionism claims for the inner sense; and there seems to be no good reason for crediting the testimony of the one, and rejecting that of the other. If extremes, they may serve each other as correctives.

Experience is, as we have seen, an infallible guide so far as a knowledge of what is in consciousness is concerned; it is in its explanation that errors arise. It is itself purely subjective, and indicates nothing as to the origin of its objects. They may come from within, or from without, or from both. To appeal to experience, therefore, as the source of all cognition, does not prove that source to be either external or internal. Whether consciously or unconsciously, "experience" is, unfortunately, often used as synonymous with "sensation." When men claim to have settled the origin of knowledge by declaring that it comes through experience, they have in reality indicated only one of its media, not its origin. Many, besides confounding experience

and sensation, also confound mere impressions on the senses with knowledge. By ignoring what Locke called the "internal sense" or "reflection," the sensationalist may imagine that he has succeeded in putting all his mental operations outside of his mind and into things.

Let us begin with percepts (sight, sound, etc.), and see whether they receive their character wholly from external objects. In order that there may be perception, it is not enough that the organs of sense be affected. If this takes place during sleep, or while the attention is absorbed by something else, there is no perception. This is only found where the mind receives, or re-acts against, the impressions made on the organs. In every perception of external objects we postulate three factors, namely an external object, the tactual impression on the senses, and the activity of the perceiving mind.

Our percepts are not copies of what transpires in the external world, which, consequently, cannot be the only factor in their production. The man who is color-blind sees objects in a light different from that of the man who is not. Sound is also conditioned by the character of the ear; and it is similar with reference to all sensations. But the third factor, the perceiving mind, must also be taken into account. We see light, and hear sounds, and yet the external factor consists of vibrations of ether or air. "It can at once be proved that no kind and no degree of similarity exists between the quality of a sensation and the quality of the agent inducing it, and portrayed by it. . . . Our sensations are, as regards their quality, only *signs* of external objects, and in no sense *images* of any degree of resemblance." *

* Helmholtz, Popular Lectures, 390, 391. In another place he states that our sensations are only symbols of the objects of the external

Thus, even in the most elementary experience, we must take account of other factors than the external world. We make mistakes respecting sensation, and afterwards correct them; these mistakes and corrections are mental acts. In our perceptions the judgment is active, though perhaps unconsciously.

If now we take sensations as elements of all knowledge, we have, from the very beginning, to deal with a mental factor which sensationalism is apt to ignore. When two objects, the external world and the mind, co-operate, the result must be regarded as the product of both factors. The motion resulting from the impact of two moving bodies can be determined only by considering both bodies and their motions. This is simply an illustration of the law of all activity, whether material or mental: whenever objects affect each other, the result is the product of both.

In knowledge itself there is absolutely no factor external to the mind. That the impression on the organs of sense is a condition for a knowledge of external objects, is true; but it is only a condition, and cannot properly be called a factor of knowledge itself. Aside from this, all that pertains to knowledge is purely the product of mental activity, or of the intellectual elaboration of what is given in sensation. Were the mind passive, or had it nothing but consciousness, so as to reflect objects as from a mirror, it would be impossible to do any thing with a sensation except to view it. The sensation even would be present to the mind only so long as the impression itself continued; its longer

world, which correspond with these somewhat as written letters and the sounds correspond with what they represent. They, indeed, give us information respecting the peculiarities of the external world; but not better than we can give a blind man information of color by means of verbal description.

retention or reproduction would require memory. But even with memory, it would be impossible to change the original form; and, aside from isolated impressions, all knowledge would be out of the question. A sensation cannot develop itself, and cannot attach itself to other sensations; it is nothing at all by itself, but only something for the mind that has it. To ascribe to it the power of developing itself, makes it an independent substance. Whoever speaks of the energy of sensations to develop, compare, analyze, or unite themselves, need but know what the statement means, in order to see its absurdity. A mathematical problem can as easily solve itself, or separate points connect themselves to form a line.

From the mind itself, as well as from the external world, the understanding gets materials of knowledge. Our emotions and volitions and thoughts are products of the soul, and are as truly a revelation of reality as are our presentations of external objects. The wildest notion that ever entered the human mind has as real a cause as the deepest truth, or the clearest perception. A notion is not wild or false because uncaused, but because it itself, or its cause, is misunderstood. The apprehension of the cause of any mental phenomenon always gives real knowledge. Frequently the material obtained by watching the mental operations is far more valuable than that whose source is external, since it gives revelations of self.

But whether the occasion of it is inner or outer, experience itself is always purely mental. It never occurs outside of the mind, nor can we ever have a perception of any thing not in the mind. Whoever has seriously reflected on the subject must see that nothing can be more absurd than the statement that we have an expe-

rience of the outer world. How can the mind get outside of itself and inside of that which is outside of itself? All that we can experience respecting the outer world is in the form of mental impressions, whose source or occasion is in that world.

Those who try to reduce the mental activity in the formation of knowledge to a minimum may claim that the mind can do nothing but develop its sensations, and that this is meant by the statement that all knowledge is the product of experience. These persons, however, usually forget that there are perceptions from within, as well as from the outer world, and that the whole process of developing the sensations and perceptions is subjective; it is done wholly by the mind. In this process the mind does not proceed arbitrarily, but according to laws. But these laws are its own. Of its perceptions it can make only what, under the circumstances, its laws demand. The percept is a tool of the mind. The mechanic uses the saw as he pleases, but he cannot use it as a gun; in its use he is limited by the nature of the implement. The union of different percepts, the formation of concepts by abstracting elements common to the percepts, and all the processes of reasoning and thinking, are purely mental, and are determined by the object of thought and the laws of mind. Even in the case of the experientialist, the external factor, though absolutely necessary, dwindles to a minimum in his investigations.

The purely mental element in these processes is not observed, because it usually works spontaneously and unconsciously, and because the attention is not directed to it, but solely to the object under consideration. Just because the intellect is not foreign to us, we do not readily observe its operations. They are means to

which we have become accustomed, and we lose sight of them while intent only on the end they are to accomplish. It is altogether different with the impressions received through the senses: we take them up consciously, in order to work them over. Only by a special effort of reflection can we learn the significance of the processes usually performed unconsciously.

Besides ignoring what is taught respecting the mind by its own operations, the cardinal error of sensationalism is based on the fact that it fixes the attention only on the beginning or condition of our knowledge of external objects; but the fact that all we know, whatever its external conditions may be, depends on the laws of the mind, is overlooked. The nature of the mind ultimately determines its own processes under given conditions, so that we cannot otherwise perceive, experience, or think, than according to the principles implanted within us, or according to the constitution of our being. The laws of thought that dominate our intellectual life are our own nature. Their working is involuntary, at least ordinarily, and they can be learned only by watching their operations; but when once discovered, they are final for us. We may explain and illustrate these laws, and give the principles involved in them, and indicate the sphere of their operations; but we cannot go farther in our explanation of them, than the statement that we are so constituted that we cannot do otherwise. Whoever questions the validity of his mental laws, thereby invalidates his own objections. It is more irrational to question the validity of our mental laws than to question the validity of a law of nature; for the validity of a law of nature depends, for us, on the validity of our mental laws, by means of which the laws of nature are established.

Observation furnishes nothing but isolated facts. How, then, do we get general laws, — those of nature, for instance? An apple hangs on a tree; I cut off the stem, and the apple falls to the ground; I connect the change of location with the cutting of the stem, calling the latter the cause of the change. Were this repeated a million times, and always with the same result, it would not teach me that every change *must* have a cause, but only that, as far as I have observed, every change has a cause. Observation gives us only facts, but never the necessary and universal.* Whence, then, the general law that every change must have a cause? Should we not substitute for it: Every observed change had a cause?

We experience the fact that we have the law, but no amount of experience can give the law. Hume makes the law of causation the product of a mere habit of mind. We learn it, he claims, by observing that changes have (what we call) causes, or we accustom ourselves to assume a cause for every change. To this habit he naturally denies the claim of establishing any necessity or universality. Only in mathematics, dealing not with reality but with the relations of ideas, does he recognize absolute laws.

It is a fatal objection to this theory of habit, that it does not account for the law it proposes to explain. By observing the same act often repeated, and always with the same result, I may form the habit of expecting that result under the same circumstances; but this expectation is not at all the thing whose explanation is demanded. What is to be explained is the fact, that

* "Necessity and strict universality are, therefore, sure signs of knowledge *a priori*, and they are inseparably connected." — KANT, *Kritik*, Introduction.

we have the notion that every change *must* have a cause. This necessity is purely mental. I can change a mere habit by setting a *must* against or over it; but I cannot alter the law that every change must have a cause. But even if Hume's position is admitted, it confirms the fact that we cannot get behind or beyond the laws of the mind, for the theory of habit in the end amounts to this: It is the law of mind to form the habit of regarding every change as having a cause. And the recent efforts to explain certain or all general notions as hereditary amount to the same thing; namely, that it is a law of mind, in the process of development, to transmit, by inheritance, general notions. Thus stated, the doctrine is that of innate ideas in a literal sense, and is liable to the same objections. The meaning intended is, however, that a mental predisposition to form certain general notions is inherited. But, supposing that this is really hereditary, are the tests of the hereditary also hereditary? Are the rational criteria of truth inherited? Only so long as we move in the sphere of psychology, can heredity have any significance in interpreting mental phenomena. The grounds of truth and the principles of knowledge, to be found only by profound investigation, cannot be hereditary; no more than hard-earned money is inherited. The fact is, that no rational theory whatever can be framed whose ultimate basis is not some law inherent in the mind itself. As soon as we pass from the descriptive and historical to the rational, we are wholly dependent on the unalterable laws of thought. These laws are, consequently, the ultimate appeal in all questions pertaining to knowledge.

We are now prepared to inquire into the validity of thought which rises above mere observation. We have seen that all knowledge, however elementary in charac-

ter, and whatever its primary conditions (or source), depends ultimately on our mental laws. Now, if the normal action of the mind can be trusted in observation, why not in other respects? The same mind forms the percepts and the concepts; and there is no reason to regard its normal action a whit more reliable in one case than in the other. We distinguish between ordinary and scientific observation, the latter being reliable because made according to critical methods whose validity the mind has established; while the former does not comply with rational demands, and is consequently liable to mistakes. The same is true of all mental activity; if exact, critical, normal, it must be reliable. And the burning question in the theory of knowledge is not, What can be known by means of observation and experiment? but this, What are the laws of mind, or the norms of thought?

Not merely is all thinking determined by these laws, but it is also a revelation of them. We may direct attention so exclusively to the objects before the mind as to disregard the mental activity, or we can make the latter the subject of study. In considering the law of gravitation, we naturally inquire into its operations throughout the universe; but we can also inquire into the activity of the mind in the formation of the law itself. The scientist sees nature through the law, while the mental philosopher sees the mind in the same law.

All these considerations lead us to change the question, Is there a purely mental element in knowledge? so as to read, Is there any knowledge without a purely mental element? This must be answered in the negative. But this is different from the question, Is there any knowledge whose source is purely mental? Whatever may originally arouse the mind to activity, all that

we know of the mind itself is learned only from its operations. But the mind can create no knowledge of real objects. All that we can know of reality must be given either directly through the senses or through the operations of the mind, or it must be an inference from something thus known to exist. Hume saw correctly that we infer from the existence of an object known, the existence of another unknown object, on the principle of causality.

But even if the mind can work only if some material is given it from within or without, what it makes of this material, or infers from it, is the product of its own activity. While it cannot construct a real world of objective existence, it does construct an ideal world which to it is real; besides that which is, the mind recognizes what ought to be. From habit we may at first form the notion of what is becoming; but when its activity is properly aroused, the mind subjects it to a higher, an absolute *ought*. This imperative the understanding does not find in any thing given directly in consciousness, but in it the mind objectifies itself. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that the mind has been trained by experience; but experience gives no ideals. In forming them, the mind is wholly a law unto itself. In its ideals, it mirrors itself.

It has already been stated that our mental laws, unless made the subject of special reflection, work unconsciously. Thus our universal notions usually come, we know not how. Necessity and universality are the product of the mind; that they are inferred from facts given by observation, does not interfere with their mental character. A particular fact or truth is nothing but that particular fact or truth, and in itself implies nothing except that and what it is. All that is implied,

or inferred, is put into it solely by the mind. But in every particular fact the mind sees a necessary and universal truth. Whatever occurs once must always occur again under the same conditions. The single occurrence is given by observation, the "always" and "must" are added by the mind.

In order to discover the origin of the notions called universal, necessary, self-evident, intuitional, we must notice the process of their formation. This process is determined according to our mental constitution, or a law inherent in our being, and, aside from this, nothing is innate. The process itself only takes place after the mind has been aroused to activity, and has attained a certain stage of progress.

Much of the embarrassment of philosophers, from Hume to Mill, would have been avoided if the law active in the formation of our universal notions had been discovered; if instead of resting with custom, habit, association, as final, these themselves had been properly explained. The law of mind which produces our general ideas is final for us, and with its discovery our inquiries must end. What this law is, we can of course learn only from its operation.

We have seen that notions called necessary and universal are the product of states formed in the process of development, being generalizations of the mind's own generalization. Let us now see whether we can discover the law according to which what is pronounced necessary and universal is formed.

Logicians usually regard it as a fundamental law of mind that *A is A*; even with the sign of equality ($A = A$) it is thus interpreted. Now, that *A is A*, is undoubtedly true; but it is empty tautology which neither in itself nor in its application has any signifi-

cance. But the formula that *A equals A*, gives a law of the mental operations very fruitful in its application. In this formula, A is not the same A in both cases, but the one is exactly like the other, and we interpret it to mean: Every A is equal to every other A. Thus let $A = \text{stone}$, then, according to the formula, every stone is equal to every other stone; a statement which at first seems absurd, but which, properly understood, is literally true. Every stone, as stone (without reference to kind, quality, size, or other peculiarities, but simply as stone), is really equal to every other stone considered merely as stone. Let $A = \text{power}$, or cause, or any thing else, and it will be found that the formula is always applicable. Power is always power, and as power it equals all power as power. A, wherever found, as A, always equals every other A.

A mental standard is a criterion for the mind only if this law is correct. It in fact lies at the basis of every comparison and of every judgment. Just because it is so universal in its application, it is important to formulate this fundamental law distinctly. It is but an application of this law, when we affirm that what occurs at one time will always occur when the same conditions are given.* If fire burns to-day but not to-morrow, then fire is not the same to-day and to-morrow; that is, fire is not fire, or A is not equal to A. If at one time an unsupported object falls to the ground, a like object under exactly the same circumstances will always do so. A single event contains all the laws involved in all equal events, just as completely as all the events contain those laws, though it may require many experi-

* Time and space, whether regarded as purely subjective, or as both subjective and objective, have no influence on occurrences; it is only what is in time and space that can have such an influence.

ments to discover with scientific exactness the nature of the event, and of the laws involved.

The same fundamental law applies to the qualities of things, and is active in all systematizing and classification. If life is that mark of a single object which constitutes it an organism, then it is necessary to constitute any other object an organism. If a single change needs a cause, then every change needs one.

From this law we readily learn the origin of the truths held to be necessary and universal. The mind finds them *implicite* in particulars, and from these infers them. Experience is necessary for their discovery, but it does not give them; they are conclusions of the mind, and in it they have an *a priori* basis.

All analysis and synthesis are performed according to the law given. In all its processes the judgment acts on the supposition that things are alike or unlike; its function is that of comparison, to determine whether an object or a notion is like or unlike A. Since the mental standards determine our judgments, we can see why our knowledge is not limited by observation. The general laws and axioms, according to which we judge the material furnished by observation, are a mental necessity, behind which we cannot go. All assertions to the contrary are somehow contradictory. To limit the law that every event must have a cause, by experience, is to destroy the law itself; it is a law only because it is not limited. J. S. Mill limits the law to experience, and supposes a case which is really inconceivable. "I am convinced that any one accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose, will, when his imagination has once learnt to entertain the notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many

firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed law ; nor can any thing in our experience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case. The grounds, therefore, which warrant us in rejecting such a supposition with respect to any of the phenomena of which we have experience, must be sought elsewhere than in any supposed necessity of our intellectual faculties." * We may observe events without inquiring into their causes ; but we cannot really think or conceive them as succeeding one another at random, without any fixed law. In order to do this, we should have to think A as not equal to A ; that is, we should have to conceive events, somewhere beyond observation, as not events. Even if an event could happen without law, the mind could not conceive it as thus happening ; it can only think according to law, and its law for conceiving events is according to the law of causality. If anywhere a change needs no cause, then it nowhere needs one ; if it has one, it is purely accidental.

Unconsciously, but with absolute reliability, the mind draws conclusions according to its inherent laws. When we become conscious of these laws, and make them the object of reflection, we can do nothing but accept their validity. All our reasoning cannot alter them, for reasoning is itself but an exercise of these laws. If the

* *Logic*, II. 95. Mill is entirely consistent with the principles adopted from Hume, when a few pages later he says, "The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise called the law of causation, must be received not as a law of the universe, but of that portion of it only which is within the range of our means of sure observation, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases. To extend it further, is to make a supposition without evidence, and to which, in the absence of any ground from experience for estimating its degree of probability, it would be idle to attempt to assign any."

mind intuitively sees the truth of an axiom, that is final. The only possible question could be whether it is really an intuition. If a single real intuition could be overthrown, it would invalidate the reliability of all mental processes. Whether, therefore, necessary and universal notions are called inferences, axioms, intuitions, or any thing else, they have their basis and absolute authority in a mental necessity.

In answer to the question, What is the origin of knowledge? we therefore answer, It is neither wholly from within nor wholly from without, but both the external and internal factors co-operate in its formation. Knowledge is mental, and the external can never be more than merely the occasion of it; but there is no knowledge of which the last analysis does not somehow include, or lead to, both factors, though they are by no means always equally prominent.

The hints given on the origin of knowledge have prepared us for the question, What is the relation of knowledge to the real world? Whatever views may be held respecting the nature of that world, no one doubts that besides the thinking mind there must be other real objects. Every effort, however, to demonstrate the existence of a world external to us must fail, because we never can get out of or beyond our subjective state.* The usual argument to prove its existence is that we become conscious of certain phenomena without any effort on our part. They must consequently have their

* It is generally admitted that the existence of external reality cannot be proved. "The reality of what is objective to us can never be severed from its subjective basis; therefore it can never be a matter of absolute certainty, but at best only very probable." — VOLKELT, *Phil. Monatsh.*, 1881, 534. Mill, *Logic*, I. 9, states that at present "it is universally allowed that the existence of matter or of spirit, of space or of time, is in its nature unsusceptible of being proved; and that whatever is known of them is known by immediate intuition."

source in something else than ourselves. With eyes and ears open we cannot help seeing objects and hearing sounds. In ourselves we can discover no activity which accounts for the appearance of these perceptions, and we have no control over them; they are apparently forced upon us. It is, therefore, concluded that their cause must be in something else than ourselves.

This reasoning is, however, based on the supposition that we are conscious of all our activity, whose products are manifest in consciousness. But this is not the case. There must be in us, as we have seen, a sphere of great activity lying wholly beyond consciousness; a sphere whose existence must be postulated in order to account for much that appears in consciousness. Many thoughts arise unconsciously whose origin must be in ourselves. Thus we try to recall a name, but fail after long effort; we dismiss the matter, and it comes without effort. We think of one thing, and a thought altogether different enters the mind. Behind our conscious processes there must be others of which we are unconscious; and it may be that our unconscious activity is much greater than the conscious. It is consequently impossible to prove that something must have entered the mind from without, because we are not aware of having produced it. But the fact that we cannot demonstrate the existence of an external world does not weaken the conviction that it is a reality. Idealism cannot be refuted; neither, on the other hand, can it demonstrate the non-existence of the world. Aside from absolute demonstration, there is the strongest ground for accepting its existence. Indeed, we are tempted to declare the demonstration impossible, just because the existence is self-evident.

Postulating, then, that there are objects external to

us, what is our intellectual relation to them? The things themselves do not enter the mind, nor can the mind enter the things. We receive impressions from them through the senses; but it has already been shown that these impressions are not duplicates, or even photographs, of the things themselves. We have no way of comparing our impressions with their sources, except by means of impressions. Our minds never deal directly with the objects, but only with the effects which they produce. Our intellect cannot come in contact with things; directly we deal solely with phenomena, and our world (that of which we are conscious) is purely phenomenal. This conclusion has been regarded as derogatory to the validity of knowledge, and the most persistent efforts have been made to overthrow it; but reflection only proves that no other result is possible. We can know things only as they are related to the intellect. This relation is one of knowing, not of being. From the very nature of the case, things can be to our intellects only what they appear to us. Even if the mind could somehow come in direct contact with them, things could be known only from their relation to us as knowing, or as they appear to the mind. Objects manifest themselves to us by means of qualities or forces; but these are qualities of the things themselves. Hence we can know things only through the relation of their qualities to our intellects.

This conclusion does not in the least depreciate the value of knowledge. Our knowledge is real as *knowledge*; it is not, however, any thing real outside of the mind, nor does it profess to be. Do what we will, our intellect can no more project its percepts outside of our minds, than we can stand on our shoulders. We have a real knowledge of real things, but of things as they

manifest themselves by means of their properties to our minds through the senses. In the intellect, we have not things themselves, but a knowledge of them; not objective reality, but a conception of it. In knowledge, therefore, we have symbols of things, intellectual views, or mental representations of them; and, as such, their validity is beyond question.

Much of the discussion respecting the relativity of knowledge leads to confusion, because the meaning of this relativity is not fathomed. We can speak of knowledge as the product of a relation, — as that of a subject to its object, of the ego to the non-ego; but knowledge as knowledge is never relative. It is knowledge only because it is absolute for all mind. If, however, the meaning is that the objects of knowledge can be conceived only as related, then there is no room for discussion, for the statement is self-evident. Things that belong to the same universe are necessarily related; how else could they constitute one universe? In conceiving objects as related, we consequently conceive them as they are. The absolute, in the sense of something unrelated, is a pure abstraction; but even as such, it is a contradiction in itself. As soon as you think the absolute, you think it as related to the intellect, and thus it ceases to be unrelated. The absolute has become a bugbear in philosophy by treating it as unrelated, whereas, in that sense, the absolute is inconceivable. To affirm that we do not know things absolutely in the sense of exhaustively, is, perhaps, too evident to require serious discussion.

The affirmation, then, that we know things, means, of course, that we know them as they appear to us intellectually. If by thing *per se* we mean a thing as it is in itself, but not to us, it necessarily lies beyond

our power of apprehension. If we conceive it at all, we necessarily conceive it as it is to us, or appears to us, not what it is independent of this relation to us. Whatever I conceive must be related to my intellect; if, now, I should conceive it as not thus related, I should conceive it, not as it is, but as it is not. The whole discussion of the thing *per se*, begun by Kant, is an attempt to discuss things as if there were no intellect; an attempt to apprehend things with the mind as if there were no mind. Kant puts things *per se* (*noumena*) and phenomena, or things as they appear, in opposition, just as if they excluded each other. If for thing *per se* we put the essence of a thing, which is really meant, it becomes evident that the phenomena need not be wholly foreign to the thing itself, but may be a reliable manifestation of it. That things are to us only what they appear, is no evidence that they do not, in some measure, appear to us as they are.

That our knowledge of things is not synonymous with the being of things, can only disappoint when the nature and aim of knowledge are misunderstood. In knowledge I do not seek real existence, but an intellectual apprehension of it; I do not want things, but I want to understand them. There can be no confusion unless we confound being with a knowledge of being.

These reflections make it seem strange that the theory of knowledge should ever have been regarded as the discipline which considers the relation of knowledge to things. The latest German work on this theory says, "The general aim of the theory of knowledge pertains to the solution of the problem, whether and to what extent objective knowledge is possible;" * and the large

* Volkelt: *Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie*, 1886; 545.

volume is devoted to the question of the objective value of subjective knowledge. This view of the subject has become quite common. But why call it theory of knowledge if its subject-matter is not knowledge itself, but the relation of knowledge to things? It considers the relation of intellect to things, which is a relation of knowledge; and its sphere is the whole department of knowing, whether that be subjective or objective, or both. In the complete and thorough discussion of the entire domain of knowledge, the objective value of subjective percepts and concepts is included, but it does not exhaust the subject.

It has already been intimated that we cannot compare things as known with things as not known (or other than as known); all we can do is to compare one concept of external reality with other concepts of the same,—a process by means of which we never get away from our conceptions. If I could somehow compare a concept with external reality, I should have for comparison a concept which has ceased to be a concept, and has become the reality external to it. That the intellect moves only in the sphere of the intellectual, should never be a question for the intellect.

Since all knowledge depends ultimately on the laws of thought, the main thing is correct thinking. This is the province of logic.

LOGIC.

Logic, as one of the conditions for the attainment of knowledge, is naturally placed under the general head: *Origin of Knowledge*. Here the term is used in the sense of pure or formal logic, not material or applied. Its aim is to give the laws of thought (normative laws of pure thought), without taking into account the

objects of thought. It seeks to answer the question, How must we think in order to attain the truth? What must the sequence of thought be in order that truth may be the result? It thus deals simply and purely with the thought-conditions of knowledge,—conditions which apply equally to all content.*

It is not definite enough to say that logic is the science of “the necessary laws of thought.” For, if the laws sought are necessary, how can we do otherwise than think according to them? If necessary, they must operate whether we know them or not. Yet, properly understood, it is correct to say that logic treats of the necessary laws of thought.

Thought is not lawless or arbitrary; it is a rigid, perfect system, of which mathematics is but an illustration; it is an organism, in which part fits into part, and part follows part, with perfect regularity and consistency. As in the solution of a mathematical problem a single mistake vitiates the entire process which follows, and makes the result false, so it is with all our mental processes; one mistake vitiates the whole. It is common to say that logic aims to prevent these mistakes by giving the laws of correct thinking, and the criteria by which all thought must be tested. This will do if we understand what is meant by *correct* thinking; it evidently means the proper sequence of thought. All real thinking is correct; if there are mistakes, it is because there is a lack of thought. He who says $2+2=5$, does

* Pure or formal logic thus differs from applied logic, which treats of the laws of thought in relation to the material or content of thought. Pure logic gives formal truth, applied gives material truth; the former shows under what conditions thought harmonizes with itself, the latter gives the laws which show the relation of thought to its content. By limiting logic to the laws of thought, we also distinguish it from Hegel's view according to which the principles of thought are also those of being.

not think $2+2$, but $2+3$. So he who says: Most men die a natural death, therefore Socrates died a natural death, does not think at all. Errors, then, do not spring from thinking, but from the failure to think; it is by thinking that we discover errors, which are the product of thoughtlessness somewhere. If thinking can err, where is the corrective of thinking? We often use words instead of thoughts, and thus make mistakes; but by thinking through a subject, and by putting thoughts into the words, we correct the errors. Logic, then, simply gives the laws of all thought, and these it learns from thought itself; it gives the laws according to which men must think in order to get the truth, but these are at the same time the laws which all men follow who really think.

Viewed in this light, logic gives the deepest philosophy of the mind. In its thought, the intellect manifests itself, and in the laws of thought we have the laws of the intellect. Those who see in pure logic only rules for attaining a knowledge of other objects — not of the mind itself — do not know what a revelation they miss. Thus in the study of what is called formal logic, real knowledge is gained, namely of the mind. In considering the forms of thought, these forms themselves are the material of knowledge.

Logic deals with concepts, and with them exclusively. With language it deals only so far as it embodies thought; and with things it deals only through their concepts.²³ Language is viewed in logic purely as a symbol of thought.

The basis of all reasoning must be absolutely reliable and universally applicable, namely axioms. The primary law is that of identity, or rather equality (being in reality two laws), namely that *A equals A*. Its

converse is the law of contradiction. A is not equal to non-A. From the law of equality we also get that of excluded middle: Every thing equals either A or non-A.

These three laws contain the principles of all comparison; namely, that a thing is like or unlike the standard, a third supposition being excluded. All processes of syllogistic reasoning are comparisons or determinations of likeness and unlikeness.

Abstraction also depends on the same laws: it is comparison for the sake of discovering and abstracting what is common to different objects. B, C, D, differ; but $B = a, b, c, d$; $C = a, e, f, g$; $D = a, h, i, k$; that is, they all agree in that they have *a*. We can express the thought thus: B does not equal A except in so far as it is the same as A. It is this A, or this element of sameness or equality, which we want to find in abstraction. In this way the marks of things, which constitute them classes, or arrange them under the same concepts, are found. When we search for what is common to things, we call the process abstraction; when we search for what is common to events, we call the process induction.* Deduction is the reverse, and may be viewed as a concretion of the abstract.

For science, as well as philosophy, logic is fundamental, and has been regarded so since the days of Aristotle.† It is so essential because it disciplines the mind for every department of thought, and gives the normative laws of all thinking. Within the last fifty years great efforts have been made, both in Germany and England, to develop logic beyond the bare skeleton which came

* Taine, History of English Literature, on Stuart Mill, says, "All the methods of induction, therefore, are methods of abstraction."

† Cicero calls it *Ars omnium artium maxima*.

down through the middle ages from Aristotle.* But the much already done shows how much yet remains to be done.

Since logic is usually treated more fully in our institutions of learning than any other department of philosophy, it is not necessary to enter into details here. It is, however, important to note that the correct sequence of thought is by no means a guaranty that truth will be the result. Only on the right basis, or with truth as the starting-point, will correct thinking end in truth. And it will generally be found, that, when men disagree, their logic is less at variance than the premises from which their reasoning starts. Before entering upon an argument, the disputants should first determine whether each does not start with a postulate different from that of the other. The assumptions are often of far greater significance than the proofs.

In the tendency to specialism, there is a twofold danger; namely, of choosing a basis for reasoning without a sufficiently broad induction, and of applying the results of our reasoning to spheres that really lie outside of this application. In the one case our argument is too narrow, in the other too broad. In determining the basis from which reasoning starts, all that really pertains to it should be taken into account. By putting into that basis more than belongs to it, we get results that are not warranted. Thus some draw from their notion of a substance inferences of the greatest importance without ever considering what the substance really

* In Germany numerous works on logic have appeared. Hegel gave a new impulse to the study by his work on the subject. Among the more recent books are those of Ulrici, Lotze, Ueberweg, Sigwart, Wundt, Schnappe, Bergmann. In England Whately revived an interest in logic; and works on that subject have been published by Hamilton, Mansel, Mill, De Morgan, Whewell, Boole, Venn, Jevons, and others.

is, and not aware that what they infer from the substance is only that with which their own imagination has endowed it. Hence the object of reasoning should first of all be thoroughly mastered. Then the conclusions should be rigorously confined to the objects to which they have been found actually to apply. Reasoning that pertains to quantity does not explain quality. What applies to material processes has significance only for all that is known to be material. Physiological demonstrations can determine psychological questions only if it has been proved that physiology is psychology, or that they have a sphere in common. Just because it has become so customary to determine what is true in one sphere by what has been established in another, the student should train his mind severely to limit his conclusions to the objects and spheres for which they have been established.

Three rules, then, are essential for the attainment of logical truth: master the object of thought so as to know its content; reason correctly respecting that which is known of the subject; limit the conclusion to that respecting which it has been established.

3. COMPLETION OF KNOWLEDGE.

Not merely truth, but truth in greatest perfection, is the aim of intellect. That restless impulse to know, which the Germans call *Wissensdrang*, or *Wissenstrieb*, may be the inspiration of but few; among these, however, are all philosophic thinkers. Nothing short of the deepest thought in the most perfectly developed stage and in the best form can satisfy the aspiring mind.

Hints on the development of knowledge itself (not merely of an individual's attainments) are found in

works on logic, psychology, and pædagogics; but the subject is usually treated in a fragmentary manner. Its importance justifies separate treatment, in order to secure for it more thorough and more systematic discussion. The philosopher and educator find that it teems with weighty problems; and the student, who wants to become a thinker as well as a learner, and who desires to increase knowledge as well as to master what is already known, will seek principles so to guide him in his researches as to develop the best results from the thoughts already attained.

The very idea of developing something new from what is known, implies that the new is somehow connected with the old, or lies in it as in embryo. The present rests on the past, and the future lies in the present, and there are threads which lead from the one to the other. So when we speak of the completion of knowledge, we want to find the threads which lead from the known to the unknown. Thought is a seed with a certain degree of development at a particular time; and future progress consists in the development of what is still undeveloped in the seed, or but imperfectly developed in the plant.

The completion of thought, therefore, implies absolute dependence on the seed, but independence of the development already attained, in the sense of not being limited by it. Independent, original thought, guided by the energy in the living seed, is the condition for passing to what is new and yet old; for developing, as Hegel would say, the energy of the flower into the fruit which it virtually contains.

For the increase of knowledge in any department it is, therefore, essential to learn what stage of development has been attained, otherwise there is danger of

wasting time in searching for what is already found. A true philosophy does not undervalue history, but assigns to it the proper place in intellectual training. Historical study may not develop intellectual strength as greatly as philosophy and science; but only when one has learned what others have done in his specialty can he understand what yet remains to be done, or work successfully to do what is still needed. In the historical knowledge, seized by a philosophical mind, there may be important hints and impulses for new development. New problems may be suggested, the failures of other thinkers will serve as warnings against wrong methods, and all that has already been accomplished should be the starting-point for accomplishing what is yet to be done. Even if it gives only this starting-point, the historical knowledge is valuable, since it may save from tedious wanderings over beaten tracks. The methods of others may be fit for a help or guide, but not for a tether. The student must avoid ruts; and with a safe compass, he must not fear to launch out into the deep. A pupil may find a teacher's method invaluable for disciplinary purposes; but he cannot hope to add any thing new to the stock of knowledge by only repeating experiments performed much better by some one else. The young mathematician might learn much by repeating Newton's elaborate and intricate calculations, but he would not be likely to add any thing to mathematical science by the process.

There is scarcely any danger that philosophy will repeat the mistake of under-estimating observation and experiment; but, from what has been said, it is evident that there is danger of expecting from these themselves what can be wrested from them only by the energy of

thought. Whatever may transpire outside of the mind, and however necessary for knowledge it may be, intellectual progress depends on the amount of thought put into the results of observation and experiment. While this is true in science, the need of great mental energy in regions not so immediately connected with observation is still more apparent.

As no one can master or develop all subjects, the student, after securing a liberal education, is obliged to limit himself; he must choose something as a specialty if he wants to become an authority in any thing. The choice of the proper subject for special study is of the first importance, and is by no means wholly determined by the profession or general calling chosen. In order that the choice may be rational, the student must not merely take into account his ability, circumstances, and opportunities, but also the importance and fruitfulness of the subject. Inquiries may be of subordinate value and not worth the time spent on them, or they may be resultless because the subject itself is fruitless. Especially in philosophy, on which so much effort has been spent in fruitless inquiries, is it important to select for profound study important and fruitful problems.

Usually the progress of knowledge is regarded as a growth in the comprehension of the causes of things. Science is largely an inquiry into immediate causes, as philosophy is an inquiry into ultimate principles, which must include the first and final causes. All deeper thought seeks the explanation of what occurs, by determining its origin (the genetic method). Here it is not necessary to emphasize the investigation of causes, since its importance is generally admitted; it will be more helpful to take up neglected elements.

Frequently causes lie wholly beyond our reach, or an

inquiry into cause may be irrelevant. Thus, to inquire into the cause of being is the same as inquiring into the being which existed before being. But in dealing with objects there are numerous other problems than those which pertain to cause,—problems which are concerned with a full understanding of the thing itself. We can ask what it is, how it compares with other objects, where it is, and what it can do; that is, instead of inquiring how a thing became what it is, we concentrate our investigations on the nature of the thing itself.

In philosophical inquiries we deal with ideas and concepts, which are remote from concrete objects. The region of pure thinking is peculiarly difficult, thought itself being the sole guide and corrective of thought. Unless here the mind is fully master of its concepts, it is liable to take the flights of fancy for the process of reason. Instead of taking the psychological standpoint, and merely observing the movement of objects in the mind, philosophy checks this movement in order to enter the objects themselves, to think them exhaustively, so as to leave nothing in them or pertaining to them obscure. We thus pass, as it were, from physics to chemistry; from mere relations and conditions and movements, to the nature of objects. Take, for instance, the notion of substance. In common parlance the word is used as if perfectly understood, but critical reflection shows that there are depths in it which the mind has not fathomed. We thus operate with the word as a mere symbol, while the thought itself is lost. The meaning of the term “substance” should be probed until no further inquiries respecting it are possible, or until the limit of thought has been reached. The more comprehensive and abstract a term, the greater the temptation to use it vaguely; and this vagueness neces-

sarily extends to all objects included under the term. Common among such vague terms are "being," "cause," "matter," "spirit," "consciousness," "person." The pronoun "I" is a rich subject for reflection. Does it include all that is meant by soul or spirit? Does it include the body? Is it the representative of the whole man, or only of the conscious self? If it stands for the personality, what is the exact meaning of that personality? Does the "I" stand for a substance, or is it only an aggregate of the various states of consciousness?

By thus taking up subjects, and giving to itself a full account of them, the mind soon discovers that it is in the habit of operating familiarly with concepts which are full of mystery; that it is prone to inquire into the causes of things before understanding the things themselves; that it takes symbols for things and concepts; and that in many, perhaps by far the most, of our mental operations, we are only half awake. It is only by deep and persistent reflection that we become sufficiently conscious of ourselves to see that our intellectual life is largely a dream, — a dream in which we dream that we are awake. In being aroused to full consciousness, the mind makes real progress, attaining a state which will influence all its future operations. The result is not merely a clearing of the understanding, but also a development of our knowledge. Even if no new objects are discovered, the old ones are made more distinct, and whatever is in them is unfolded. But this very process may also lead to something else; namely, to the discovery of germs rich in the promise of new developments.

This method of taking a subject and holding it steadily before the mind to let the light of the intellect illumine every part of it, is wholly different from what is called discursive thought. We do not proceed from

one thing to another, but abide by one subject. Our thought moves, but around and through and in the same object. Subject and predicate are not taken apart and viewed separately, as sometimes seems to be the case; but the subject is seen in its predicates, so that the mind, in considering them, consciously abides by the subject. It does not enter on a process of syllogistic reasoning to infer something else from the subject. It indeed wants to make new discoveries, but those which are to be found in the subject itself, not outside of it. In comparison with the discursive, we can call this the penetrative and exhaustive method of thought.

Let A be the object of this penetrative energy of thought. Instead of making A simply a link in a chain, so that I pass from it to B, thence to C, etc., I make A the focus on which all possible light is steadily concentrated. I want to know just what A is and contains. I may already know that it contains the predicates *a, b, c, d*, but these do not exhaust it. There is an unknown *x* which I want to discover, and for that reason I confine all my investigations to A. If I proceed from the known to the unknown, it is from the known to the unknown in the subject itself. In this process thought, however, does not confine itself permanently to one point. Hegel's dialectic process has at least demonstrated this: that to think any subject exhaustively, necessarily leads beyond the subject to something else. Individual thoughts may, like islands of the sea, not be connected superficially, but at their base.

This penetrative method, a characteristic of all philosophical thinking, is so much insisted on here because its neglect is so common, and its attainment so difficult. Our modern life, with its endless distractions, and its absorption by details, with much reading and little

thinking, tends to make thoughts the waves which play on the surface, while the deep remains unfathomed. Thus the habit is formed of using subjects and predicates without thoroughly understanding them. That men, even scholars, constantly use concepts which they cannot define, is one of the worst and most common vices of modern thought.

In order to pass from the subject itself to something else, we must distinguish between what it contains, and what the mind infers from it. The oil painting before me is nothing but canvas with certain colors. Analyze the picture as I will, I find nothing but these. But how much more than these the mind infers from the picture! It was painted, it did not grow; it is the product of an artist; he had a definite end in view, embodied in the picture his ideal, and had skill in execution. And these conclusions are just as reliable as the fact that the painting consists of canvas and colors. But every inference I draw respecting the artist depends on a correct apprehension of the picture. If it is a chromo, or a copy, or a poor picture, I make serious blunders in my inferences by reasoning on the supposition that it is a Raphael.

The same is true of all objects: they contain something, but may suggest more; and what they suggest depends on what they contain. After exhausting the real contents, we proceed to what is implied by them. I want to learn from an object what it is, and what it can teach me respecting other objects and the whole universe. If what I infer from an object is really implied by it (is really a necessity of thinking), then it is as reliable knowledge as any other. In this way, and not merely from observation, we get new subjects for reflection. Why we draw these inferences, is one

of the important problems of philosophy ; how to draw them correctly, is a question for logic. Because something is, therefore we infer that something else must be. This *is*, and therefore that *must be*, really involve all that can be known. And the development of knowledge requires the mastering of the concepts of what is known to be, and then the following to their utmost limits the inferences legitimately drawn therefrom.

From this it is evident that real objects of knowledge are not merely obtained through the senses, and by watching our inner operations, but that they may also be learned from correct inferences. In science this has been proved by inferring the existence of objects, and then afterwards confirming the inference by direct discovery of the objects.

Besides this exhaustive method in treating separate concepts, progress may also be expected by connecting thoughts, and thus forming new combinations, and making these combinations the source of new inferences. New combinations of thoughts are new discoveries, and may furnish new germs for future progress. Is not all inference in reality but a relating process? Analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, are but processes by means of which implied relations are made explicit. All thinking is but explication of an implication.

If knowledge is to be completed, it is evidently not enough that separate concepts be mastered, that several of them be combined, and that the implied be made explicit by means of inferences. Disconnected thoughts, lying around loose in fragments, do not constitute knowledge in an exalted sense any more than stones scattered about constitute a building. In order to be completed, knowledge must be put into a systematic

form. It is only in a system that a thought occupies its proper place in relation to other thoughts, and attains the highest perfection of which it is capable.

In order that there may be system, a subject must be clearly defined, so as to determine its relation to the subjects immediately above and below it. After its place in the universe of knowledge has been determined by the definition and necessary explanations, the subject must be separated into parts, according to the logical principles of division; that is, the divisions must include the whole subject, but in such a way that they do not include one another.* Various methods of division are possible; and the one adopted must be determined by the nature of the subject, the stage of development attained, and the aims of the author. The divisions may be chronological or geographical; they may be determined by external marks, or by internal characteristics. The last is the most perfect, since it arranges knowledge according to its inherent relations and real connections. In every case the same principle of division should be followed throughout. If, for instance, a subject were to be divided partly historically, partly geographically, partly according to its inherent character, there would be confusion instead of system, overlapping instead of division.

Under the main ones come the subdivisions, which must also follow the same principles. A subject can be divided and subdivided almost endlessly. The analytic process may be carried to such an extent that the result is a lifeless skeleton. The scholasticism of the middle ages was fond of nice and curious distinctions, which became a kind of mania; but by this process alone, however valuable for the study of a subject,

* See the chapter on the Division of Philosophy.

living systems, intellectual organisms, are not produced. All separation is for the sake of forming the parts into an articulated union, and every true system is a synthesis of correlated parts. As nothing exists except in relations, we cannot think a thing correctly if we conceive it in isolation. There is no individual except as part of the whole; really and fully to comprehend a thing means, as we have seen, that the universe, of which it is a part, must be comprehended. But the synthetic work is usually far more difficult than the analytic. Many can take apart a watch, who cannot put it together again; and yet the pieces are valuable only because they form the watch. The dissection of the dead body is so important because it enables to understand the living body as an organism. And in mind as well as body we do not want pieces of a ruin, but a perfect system.

It is an imperfect view of a system, to regard it as a mere form which does not affect the truth itself. As the arm is something very different on the body from what it is when severed, so a thought is not the same when seen by itself as when viewed in its proper connections and relations. In the system, thought is given in its completeness or totality, with all its interlacings. All questions pertaining to relation, cause, and purpose, have relevancy only to thought in an articulated system.

The idea of system presupposes the connection of thought so as to form a unity. But how can this unity be established or rather discovered? By finding the principles involved in a subject we get that wherein all pertaining to it is united. A system consists in the arrangement of all a subject involves under its principles according to their organic relations. Some idea is

the animating spirit of every true system, giving it life and determining the various organs of the system.

From this it is evident that system is not merely of æsthetic value, nor merely an expedient for remembering and using and communicating knowledge: it is necessary for the completion of thought itself. The mind demands it. Much supposed to be well understood is found to be in a crude state as soon as an effort is made to put it into its proper place and articulations in a system. Then it is found that a truth unsystematized is only half truth; it is completed truth when its exact relation to other truth is determined. Thus the very effort to systematize thought leads to its deeper study and more perfect development. But it also makes the mind conscious of its limitations. All our systems are imperfect. Many of our thoughts, especially the highest, we cannot yet put into a system. Even the effort to harmonize them is baffled. In their isolation we do not see that they are in conflict, but it becomes evident so soon as we attempt to articulate them. Most painfully do we become conscious of limitation in our efforts to complete all knowledge in unity under its ultimate principles. This is the ideal of philosophy in its search for those final explanations which are the conditions of all systems. Only when completed can the theory of knowledge determine absolutely the limits of human thought.

REFLECTIONS.

Define Knowledge. Its Origin. Its external and internal factors. Relation to Imagination, Opinion, Faith. Subjective views and objective Knowledge. Not Certainty, but its grounds are the Criteria of Knowledge. Reasons for believing in an external

world. Kant's *Ding an sich*. The unconscious basis of conscious operations. Logic. Formal and applied. Logic as a revelation of the nature of Mind. What is meant by Norms of Thought? Can real Thinking err? Laws of Thought discovered by Logic, as mental Processes by Psychology. What is abstract thought? Does reasoning lead to the discovery of objects of existence? Explain Causation. Hume's view. Basis of universal and necessary Truth. Law of Identity, and Law of Equality. Doctrine of Innate Ideas. Views of Leibnitz and Kant on the subject. Relation of Thought to Objects. Harmony of Idealism and Realism. Can we identify the Laws of Thought and Being (Hegel)? Place of the Theory of Knowledge in Philosophy. Brilliant and penetrative Thought. Exhausting a Subject, and discursive Thinking. What is System? How formed? Its effect on Thought. Conditions for developing and increasing Knowledge. Limits of Thought. Their relation to the Limits of the Real. Significance of the Theory of Knowledge for the times. Is Reasoning more than comparison? Basis of Reasoning. Kant's analytic and synthetic Judgments. On what grounds do we infer the unknown from the known?

CHAPTER VII.

METAPHYSICS.

By generalizing the various objects of profitable thought, we can comprehend all of them under the *real*, the *possible*, and the *desirable*. The first includes all that actually is, the last embraces the ideals to be sought, and the second gives the sphere in which their realization may be expected. As the severe method of philosophy eliminates from its inquiries whatever is fanciful, it finds in the three groups all that can claim its attention. The realm of thought itself consists largely in the determination of what is possible. Many of the problems of the real can be answered only in terms of logical possibility by our intellects. The third division, the desirable, does not directly concern the theory of knowledge, which deals primarily with what the intellect regards as necessary or possible; but in that division are included æsthetics and ethics, which deal with ideals and their realization. The problem of the first division leads us into the darkest and most difficult region of thought, namely metaphysics.

This much-abused term represents the highest aim of philosophy, and the ultimate limit of intellectual aspiration. The word itself originated in the title given by one of his pupils to certain works of Aristotle. These treated of the ultimate principles of being in general, and constituted what Aristotle himself called "Wis-

dom," or "First Philosophy," or "Theology." The fourteen books under the title of "Metaphysics" were placed *after* his works on Physics; and this circumstance is generally supposed to have determined the title, its sense being that these books should follow those on Physics. It may, however, be that the title was intended to indicate the nature of the contents, namely such as lie beyond physics.*

It is only of secondary importance what the original import of the words of which "metaphysics" is compounded may have been, or what sense was attached to the compound itself by him who first used it to designate a particular subject. Aristotle himself did not designate any part of his philosophy by this term, nor is it certain that all the books placed under this title are by him. The general contents of these books may, however, be a valuable aid in understanding the original meaning of the term; but what his pupils or successors called metaphysics, can no more be a law for the sense of the term at present, than "physics," as employed by the ancients, can determine its use by scientists now. But the *aim* of Aristotle in his First Philosophy indicates the aim of metaphysic in all ages, being the thread running through all metaphysical systems.

In this First Philosophy, Aristotle aimed to discover the general principles of being, in distinction from the special sciences, which are devoted to particular departments of being.† He sought to explain what lies

* Τα μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. The preposition may mean either *after* or *beyond* (*trans*).

† "For Aristotle, metaphysic is the science which has to do with being as such, being in general, as distinguished from the special sciences which deal with special forms of being."—*Ency. Brit.: Metaphysics*.

behind all phenomena, and is their source. The main points discussed were substance, form, cause, and design, which he regarded as involving the problems connected with the essence of being. And at all times the questions connected with being, with reality, in distinction from the phenomenal, and from our conceptions, have occupied the attention of metaphysicians.*

While metaphysic has from the first dealt with being or the absolutely real, it could of course treat this only intellectually or as an object of knowledge. All questions involved might be resolved into this one, What can be known respecting the ultimate nature of reality? The principles of being are sought, the explanation of it, an intellectual apprehension of what is. Thus metaphysic of course involves the problems of knowledge, especially that of the limits of the human faculties. Does the power of thought extend to reality, or is it limited to phenomena? It is not surprising that in Hume, Kant, and others, the question of metaphysics led to an inquiry into the limits of knowledge. But in order to get a clear conception of metaphysic itself we must distinguish it from the means necessary for mastering it. Certain mental conditions are necessary for discovering the laws of nature, yet we distinguish between these laws and those conditions. The same is true in metaphysic. Its knowledge is the highest, and requires the greatest mental efforts; but it is the result of these efforts which is to be viewed as metaphysic. By keeping this in mind we shall avoid the mistake, which is common, of confounding this subject with the

* "On the one hand, we see Plato and Aristotle striving to seize absolute existence, and, on the other, to apprehend it as the cause of the apparent reality. This is also undoubtedly the main purpose of metaphysics." — FLÜGEL in *Zeitschrift für exakte Philosophie*. 1875, 15.

theory of knowledge. This theory is related to metaphysic, as the rules of science to the science formed by their application.

Before the theory of knowledge had become a special and prominent department of philosophy, it was natural that questions concerning the power of thought should be discussed in connection with metaphysical inquiries. Even now the metaphysician may find it necessary to discuss such questions, and indicate the conditions for attaining a solution of the ultimate problems; just as the scientist, even after the principles of science are separately treated, may find it necessary to discuss those principles as he applies them. But for the metaphysician the main purpose is the solution of metaphysical problems, and not to lose himself in the investigation of the means; though that solution can only be found by using the proper means, they exist for the sake of the end they are to attain. Kant's *Kritik* is an inquiry whether metaphysic is possible; and since he concludes that it is not, it is absurd to speak of that work as itself a system of metaphysics.

Questions respecting the powers of the human understanding belong to the theory of knowledge; yet every subject can take from this theory whatever it may need for its own development. But it leads to confusion to make metaphysic partly an inquiry into the limits of the understanding, and partly an explanation of absolute being, two distinct subjects being mixed in this way. We shall, therefore, distinguish metaphysic, or the principles of being, — attempting to explain the essence of what is, and giving the ground of what appears, — from the theory of knowledge, or from the rules necessary for attaining these principles.

Where the *naïve* view prevails that phenomena are

the things *per se*, or that by means of sensation we get at the very heart of being, there will, of course, be no deeper metaphysical inquiries. If common-sense is the criterion of all knowledge, we need but interrogate it in order to learn all that can be known about being. Or, if our knowledge of being is regarded as intuitive, we need but behold our intuitions to get our metaphysics. So far as sensationalism has prevailed in England, France, and other countries, the metaphysical problems have not even been apprehended. If all the gold lies loose on the surface, no one will be so foolish as to quarry the hard rock to find it. If common-sense and intuitionism contain all the treasures of wisdom, the philosophical problems lose their difficulty. In Scotland, where special stress has been laid on these two sources of knowledge, they have been regarded as furnishing the final solutions of metaphysics. Indeed, in that country metaphysic has largely been identified with an inquiry into the first principles of human knowledge. Thus Stewart speaks of metaphysic as applicable to all inquiries which aim "to trace the various branches of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of the human mind." President M'Cosh, in his "Logic" says, "The science which treats of the intuitive operations of the mind is called metaphysics; the science which considers the discursive acts is logic." Accordingly his work on "The Intuitions of the Mind" is a system of metaphysics. This makes metaphysic part of the theory of knowledge, that part namely which pertains to intuitions.* But are not questions

* In the article "Metaphysics" in Ency. Brit., the subject is defined as that "which deals with the conditions of all knowing and being." In the article of Dr. M'Cosh, already quoted, he says of the principles of the intuitions, "A system or systematized arrangement of such principles constitutes metaphysics or mental philosophy. . . . All pro-

respecting "the intuitive operations of the mind" psychological and noetic rather than metaphysical? It is well known that scepticism has shaken the confidence in these intuitive operations, so that inquiries respecting them are of great importance. But such inquiries, like those of Locke, Hume, and Kant, concern the nature and the limits of human understanding. If it is once established by the theory of knowledge that there are such intuitive operations, and that they give a knowledge of being, then this knowledge, the *result* of these operations, will be metaphysics; and then all the inquiries into these intuitive operations will be the propædæntic of metaphysics, but not the system itself.

We must hold fast the idea that metaphysic pertains to being, its principles, its ultimate explanation, its essence. Ueberweg pronounces it "the science of principles in general, so far as they are common to all being." * According to Lotze, "metaphysic is the science of the *real*, not of the merely thinkable. *Reality* is that by means of which an existing object is distinguished from the non-existing, a transpiring event from the non-transpiring, an existing from a non-existing relation." † One of the latest works on metaphysics also regards the nature of being as the object of metaphysical inquiry, and declares that it is the province of metaphysic "to explain the notion of being and the method of its attainment." ‡

Hegel, by identifying the principles of knowing with

fessed metaphysical principles are attempted generalizations of our intuitive perceptions and judgments." (593-595.)

* "*Die Wissenschaft von den Principien im Allgemeinen, sofern sie allem Seienden gemeinsam sind.*" — *Logik*, 5 edit., 9.

† *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*, 8.

‡ Teichmüller: *Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt. Neue Grundlage der Metaphysik.* 1882, 3.

those of being, made the laws of thought also the laws of reality. The process of thought is the process of the absolute or of being in the highest sense. His pantheism is a panlogism. Where thought and being are thus identified, it is necessary that one system, metaphysics, should include both. But the confidence in the discovery of this identity has been lost, and it is now held to be safer to view thought as an explanation of being than to imagine that the essence of being is already given in thought itself. The present condition of philosophy demands the separate investigation of the principles of knowledge, and then the application of these principles to the explanation of being.

When metaphysic is declared to deal with the "conditions" of being, the meaning can only be the conditions for the existence of particular objects. Let any one inquire, for instance, Why is there being rather than nothing? and he will soon find himself in a region in which thought is lost. Besides, that being which has conditions is not the ultimate object of metaphysical investigation: it seeks, above all, a knowledge of that being which is unconditioned.

The term "being" is the most abstract that can be conceived. It includes all that is, and yet indicates nothing peculiar to any kind of existence. So broad in extension as to embrace every thing, it is so empty of content (intensively) that Hegel identified it with nothing. There is no pure being in existence, except in thought; that is, there is nothing of which it can be said that it is being and nothing else. Instead of empty being, which is absolutely nothing but the thought of mere existence, all that is real is something particular. The thought of "being" is so great an abstraction that the mind at first finds difficulty in grasping it. Instead

of defining metaphysic as dealing with being or the notion of being, we can say that it treats of reality, of real existence. By the real we understand that which is not merely thought, but which exists, whether we think it or not.

Professor Harms says: "Metaphysic treats of the being of that which is thought, as it is outside of thought (*praeter notionem*); logic, however, treats of the being of that which is thought, as it is in thought. As the latter is, however, only a thought, while the former is called a reality, the one treats of being, the other of thought. Both conceptions are fundamental for knowledge, for there is no knowledge in which there is no thought and being. The conception of being applies to the known outside of thought, and that of thought applies to that known in thought." It is not, however, taken for granted by philosophy that the real in this sense is self-evident; some of the deepest problems of philosophy are involved in the notion of the real. Our consciousness informs us that thought itself is real in the sense that it exists for us; but is the object of thought any thing real? Does any thing outside of the mind correspond with my thought of an object? The import of this question will be clear to every one who apprehends the fact that we have an immediate knowledge only of what is before consciousness.

We can define metaphysics as the philosophy of the real, involving as it does all that is necessary to explain reality.²⁴ Its aim being to explain the real, the charge that it is visionary can have significance only when it becomes false to itself. Its subjects are not arbitrarily chosen; their basis is found in consciousness, and in all deeper inquiries they are forced on the mind. One

cannot think at all without coming to metaphysical problems. Experience itself needs metaphysics as much as a tree does roots. Behind the infinite variety mirrored in consciousness, the being and nature of mind furnish deep metaphysical problems. Behind phenomena there must be something that is not phenomenal, but the ground of all phenomena; this ground metaphysics seeks. At the basis of the changeable there must be something that is unchangeable; the qualities suggest a substance, and the apparent the real. Metaphysics wants to discover and explain the eternal, the immutable, the uncaused cause, the substance. Every consciousness assumes something as real; all experience presupposes it; every science takes its existence for granted; all thought ultimately seeks it; the ordinary thinking claims to have it; the metaphysician wants to make sure that it is intellectually in his possession. Experience is full of contradictions, which the mind cannot tolerate; in the ultimate source of all there can be no contradiction, for in that case it would be self-destructive. Hence the ultimate unity and harmony are sought. Something appears, then vanishes; but it can only appear if something else is that makes it appear. There can be no light unless there is something that shines. Now, what is this that is, and makes something else appear, but does not itself appear? Is it matter? Is it spirit? Is it Plato's idea? Is it Spinoza's substance, to or on which thought and extension are but attributes or modes? Is it the monad of Leibnitz, or the *Realien* of Herbart?

From this it is evident what the leading problems of metaphysics are. In the ordinary consciousness, and by the sciences, are given certain notions which are supposed to be ultimate. These are taken up by the

metaphysician, and subjected to the most rigorous test, in order to determine their validity. His aim is always to find what *is*, in distinction from that which *becomes*. Such terms as "matter" and "spirit" are critically investigated, to learn just what they present to the mind. When their exact sense is found, all sorts of questions still remain to be answered. If matter is ultimate, how does what we call spirit originate from it? If spirit is ultimate, how does it produce matter? May there not be something behind both matter and spirit, neither the one nor the other, and yet the cause of both? Perhaps both can somehow be united, so that they are in reality one, though to us they seem wholly dissimilar. Besides the question of the nature of original being, there are many others. Is this original being a unit, a duality, or a plurality? Thus the questions of monism, of dualism, and of pluralism are involved. Is the original reality but one in nature and also a unit in itself, the only one of its kind, as the God of theism? Or is it one in essence, but with many samples of the same, as the atoms of Democritus? But the various conceptions of original being are only the beginning of metaphysical inquiry,—a beginning which is yet endless. Were the nature of the original known, other questions would immediately arise. How is it related to the derived? Is the process one of creation, or of evolution? It is thus seen that the problems are those of theism and atheism, of pantheism, materialism, and idealism. In order to understand the real, we must know how it is connected so as to form a universe in which nothing is isolated; this involves the question of the relation of things. In considering the difference between what is and what becomes, we come to the questions of cause and effect. These introduce some of the deepest prob-

lems discussed by Hume and Kant. We distinguish between qualities, and the substances in which they inhere. Is the substance distinct from its forces or powers? Are, perhaps, the transpiring events themselves the only realities, while force and substance are mere mental creations? Is the form distinct from the substance? Of what is called external reality we have no conception except as existing in space; and of all that is external and internal we have no conception except in time. What, then, are space and time? But there are still other problems which lie at the heart of all reality. Is there design in the universe, or is the cosmos wholly purposeless? What rules? Reason, fate, or chance?

These and the numerous problems connected with them give the contents of metaphysics. It is evident from them that all the inquiries pertain to being, and that the ultimate aim always is to get the explanation of reality. The old division, whether adopted or not, gives a clear idea of the subjects of metaphysics; namely, ontology, cosmology, rational psychology, and rational theology. Ontology considers the principles of all being, whatever is common to all that is.* It asks what being is. What must an object be in order that being may be predicated of it? What is the distinction between being and reality? The relation of being to becoming (*Sein und Werden*) also belongs to this division, thus introducing the subject of cause and effect. The notions of substance and quality, of quantity and relation, are also involved. The other three divisions take up the three highest classes of being, or the realities contained in the abstract notion of being.† Cosmology treats of the ma-

* It has been called *Scientia entis in genere*.

† "*Scientia entis in specie*."

terial universe, and discusses matter, its connections and relations, together with space, time, design, and the other general problems involved in the existence of the cosmos. Rational psychology (also called speculative or metaphysical psychology) discusses the essence (nature) of the soul, whether material or spiritual, whether a unit or an aggregation, a simple or a compound substance; whether free and immortal. Rational theology is similar to what has been called natural theology, and treats of God so far as an object of pure reason. It discusses the question of his existence, testing the various proofs which have been adduced; also his nature, attributes, and relation to the world.*

If there is one subject which, more than any other, arouses the deepest interest, and strains the mind to the utmost, it is metaphysics. If in it speculation and abstraction culminate, it also absorbs and concentrates enthusiasm. One need but apprehend the nature of its problems in order to appreciate the deep devotion and intense application of the profoundest philosophers to metaphysical studies. Metaphysic seeks the first thought of reality in order that it may derive all others from that original, and discover the last thought; it searches for the basis (the presupposition) of all experience and all science; it attempts to solve the problems of the world, of man, and of God; it seeks the beginning of all beginnings.

The mind which understands the meaning of metaphysic, and yet treats the subject frivolously, must be essentially profane. "The anti-metaphysical twaddle of

* Lotze, who holds that metaphysic aims to discover the laws of the connection between the separate elements of reality, divides the subject into three parts; namely, ontology, cosmology, and phenomenology, or rational psychology. Rational theology, also a part of the old metaphysic, is treated separately, under the head of Philosophy of Religion.

many persons reveals great levity and gross ignorance respecting the most weighty problems." * The intellect cannot accept as final the words of M. Renan: "God, providence, immortality, are so many good words, perhaps a little lumbering, which philosophy will interpret in senses more and more refined, but which it will never replace to advantage. Under one form or another God will always be the summary of our supernatural needs, the *category of the ideal*." This writer gives a significant insight into his own mind, rather than into metaphysics, when he says, "Metaphysic is nothing but a most elevated and noble manner of conceiving and grouping things; it is to every thinker whatever pleases him." †

It is a work of supererogation to plead for the continuance of metaphysics. Some kind or other will exist as long as the human mind; the only question is, what kind? It is a mental necessity, and if the intellect cannot get a rational metaphysic, it will, perhaps unconsciously, adopt one based on mere opinion. Kant despaired of the final solution of the highest problems by the speculative reason, but he understood human nature too well to question the continuance of metaphysics. He said, "In all persons, as soon as their reason rose to speculation, there has always been some kind of metaphysics, and there always will be." A shallow empiricism attempts to flee from metaphysic as if it were a ghost; it, however, invents its own, but of the crudest sort. "Its metaphysic consists in this, that it returns to the metaphysical prejudices of the common consciousness, which it enriches with some contradictions introduced by science." ‡ Its superficial character alone

* Schilling: *Zeitschrift für exakte Philosophie*, 1863.

† Ribot: *Mind*, 1877, 381.

‡ Wundt: *Einfluss*, 24.

makes it questionable whether it is worthy of being called metaphysics. Positivism relegates the subject to the antiquated vagaries of the past, but it has a sort of metaphysic made to order for its own private use. "It requires little subtlety to read metaphysics between the lines of the positive philosophy. The difference lies between the metaphysic which recognizes itself as such, and that which does not; between the metaphysic which, because it understands the distinctive nature of its problem, does not seek the solution of it from the sciences which themselves form the problem to be solved, and that which, unaware of its own office, though unable to discard it, interpolates itself into the sciences and then extracts from them, under the guise of a scientific theory of mental phenomena, what are, after all, but the first thoughts of metaphysic clothing themselves in a new set of mechanical or physiological metaphors."* Even in England, where an abhorrence of metaphysics is often expressed, it cannot be banished from natural science and psychology, to say nothing of philosophy.†

The most serious opposition, based largely on Kant's *Kritik*, regards a speculative metaphysical system impossible. The failure of the ruling systems at the

* T. H. Green: *Contemp. Rev.*, vol. 31, 26.

† Vigorous thinkers in England, not dominated by sensationalism, are making an earnest effort to promote a deeper study of metaphysical questions. Philosophers affected by the movement begun by Kant, as well as by that which Locke inaugurated, keenly feel the neglect or superficial treatment of the profoundest problems. The late Mr. Green declared that Englishmen have not taken the first step to solve the metaphysical problem left by Hume; that, in fact, in England the problem had not even been put in "its true and distinctive form." Respecting the claim of English writers to substitute psychology for metaphysics, Mr. Green said, "It is not really, nor can be, the case that our psychology has cleared itself of metaphysics, but that, being metaphysical still, it is so with the metaphysics of a pre-Kantian, or even of a pre-Berkeleyan, age."

beginning of this century has promoted this view; but their failure must not be identified with that of philosophy. Kant's *Kritik* is not final; it is the beginning, not the completion, of the critical method. Every theory of the limits of the human understanding is liable to be negated by that understanding itself, and the intellect is likely to take its own achievements as the limit of its powers. Metaphysic is one of the ideals of philosophy, even the greatest. All the highest aims are ideals, but that is no valid reason for abandoning their pursuit. In dealing with the most difficult of all problems, it is not surprising that the intellect has wandered much in its search for the right road. Has it been otherwise in any other department? The critical philosopher is not so presumptuous as to claim that he has the explanation of the universe; but, strange as it may seem, those who most vigorously denounce metaphysics, presumptuously claim to have solved the mystery. There is an impudent materialism which is too conceited to recognize itself as metaphysic reduced to a guess and an assumption. Paulsen says, "Aside from frivolous materialists, who find some sense in the statement that perception *is* motion, there is to-day probably not a metaphysician who believes that he has the key to unlock the mysteries of the world."

In the various systems of metaphysics, we see how the world-problem has been mirrored in different minds, and how they have attempted its solution. Around this problem has been concentrated the deepest thinking of the ages. Although we cannot yet think the universe, this does not imply that the inquiry into its ultimate explanation has not taught valuable lessons. We may not be able to explain the nature of electricity, and yet the very effort to find the explanation may

teach many important truths. He who has read in the history of philosophy only the failure of metaphysics to solve its problems, may have had his eyes open, but his mind must have been closed. The problem has been made clearer; its depth and difficulties have been revealed; popular fallacies have been exposed; cherished methods of handling the problem have been proved false; conditions for the solution have been made plainer; the search for the highest intellectual attainments has led the mind into the sublimest regions of thought; and deep lessons, and numerous valuable discoveries and truths, lie all along the path of metaphysical inquiry. What one finds in the history of metaphysics depends somewhat on the ability of the seeker.

We are living in an era when metaphysic is viewed with suspicion, and when its supposed solutions are received with scepticism. There is no reason for regretting this. Metaphysic needs thorough purging. The time has come when dreams and visions and poetic inspirations must cease to be viewed as the intellectual counterpart of reality. Metaphysic has been too hasty in its conclusions, has leaped over the necessary conditions, has assumed what should have been demonstrated, and has attempted to rear its structure without properly laying the foundation. It is fortunate that the day is past when it was blindly praised, and when its wildest conclusions were accepted uncritically, — fortunate, because now its vagueness must cease, it must pass from promises to real solutions, and it must prove its premises instead of constructing mythologies. What it has lost in appearance, it will gain in substance and solidity. Metaphysic, through the very criticism to which it has been subjected, has been made

conscious of itself. The recognition and removal of its diseases are the conditions of health. It tried to soar instead of treading on solid ground. It has now learned to creep, in order to be safe. There cannot be too much healthy criticism and caution respecting the profoundest inquiries. There is, it is true, no encouragement for pretenders, or the frivolous, to enter the deep, dark mine in which metaphysicians labor, but the loss will not be appreciable; those called to that sphere will feel an irresistible impulse to enter and quarry.

So far is metaphysic from opposing inquiries into the limits of the human mind, that it has actually given birth to them. It wants to work wholly in the domain of the possible and the real. To be metaphysical in the true sense, does not, then, imply an abandonment of reality, but rather absorption in its contemplation. It is in the effort to pass from the phenomenal to the real, that the mind is most of all led to consider the question of its limitations, which is seen most strikingly in the case of Kant. Locke was more a psychologist than a metaphysician. Berkeley and Hume aimed to become metaphysicians while remaining psychologists. Kant, by far the most metaphysical of all, penetrated farthest in considering the limits of the reason. His whole investigation of the reason shows that metaphysic, instead of fearing criticism, demands it. But while it wants to determine the real limits of the mind, it opposes all efforts to fix them arbitrarily. Nothing is more deadening to intellect, or more destructive of progress, than the thoughtless dismissal of the most serious problems, with the unproved dictum, — “unsolvable!” In many cases the possibility of a solution can only be made evident by its discovery, as in the case of the law

of gravitation, the power of steam, and the electric telegraph.

Our age, critical, sceptical, and destructive, is more intent on studying the history of philosophy than on the production of great metaphysical systems. Under these circumstances the course of the beginner cannot be doubtful. Although a learner, all his learning should be a discipline in thinking. His criticism should be relentless but sound, and destructive for the sake of becoming constructive. Digging is not laying the foundation, and yet it is rational only when undertaken for the sake of the foundation and the superstructure. As the deepest of all studies, metaphysic is worthy of the profoundest efforts. No question of the limits of our faculties should be permitted to interfere with the boldest grappling with the hardest problems. It is presumptuous to fix hastily those limits, particularly in an age in which all efforts to settle the matter have signally failed; and however highly we may esteem noetic inquiries, it is foolish to claim that thought shall suspend its operations until its limits have been determined. Whether the problems are solved or not, the mind is exalted by seriously considering them, and is disciplined by penetrating as far as possible toward a solution. If the philosopher's stone is not found, chemistry may be evolved in the search.

Since the student must have some kind of metaphysic, the question is, whether it shall be rational or superficial. "No one who has been aroused to reflection can dispense with the aid of metaphysics; no period in the history of culture has been able to withdraw from co-operation in the effort to solve the great riddle of existence; and even modern natural science, which would like to reject metaphysics, has its own

metaphysic in materialism, although an extremely poor and wretched kind." * The very impulse which leads the thinker to seek unity, order, reason, in the universe, is metaphysical. Anaxagoras already thought there must be a Mind which orders the universe, and accounts for the wisdom and power manifested; and surely the progress, since his day, has not made the mind less desirous of searching for its own similitude. Why the restless impulse to seek the final solution of the problem of being? Kant, although despairing of the solution, deeply felt the significance of this question. The mind most fully conscious of itself is in its element only when it seeks what is deepest. To the philosophic thinker the cosmos, the soul, and God will always present numerous unsolved problems, — goads to inquiry; solutions found will give birth to newer and greater problems. Growth in knowledge deepens and darkens mysteries, but it also solves mysteries.

Probably at first the result of metaphysical inquiries will be of a negative character, proving supposed solutions false. Everywhere the student finds that solutions are claimed to have been made in regions where these solutions are now declared impossible. It is no easy task to test these solutions, — to clear the mind of the fictions which are taken for reality. It may be discov-

* E. von Hartmann (*Phil. Monatsh.* vii.). He thinks the view that the great problem of being is unsolvable, rests solely on the fact that heretofore it has not been solved; but this does not prove that it cannot be solved, and is no reason for ceasing the efforts at solution. But he holds it to be still more silly to regard the problem as so easy that any journeyman can solve it, or any specialist, with no particular training for the general problem. He adds: "The standpoint of modern investigators of nature is not seldom the strangest and most contradictory hash of materialistic metaphysic, of dogmatic denial of the possibility of metaphysics in general, and of subjective pride of intellect, which pronounces the metaphysical problems children's toys."

ered that even scientists sometimes work by the light of Aladdin's lamp. When mind is lost in matter, it is its first task to find itself again, or all is lost.

The true metaphysician does not aim at that beyond his reach, but to go as far as possible and grasp all within reach. Only so far as it can move securely does metaphysic want to go. And he who goes safely thus far will find enough to do without attempting the impossible.

Of fundamental importance for the beginner is the question, On what basis and by what means shall the structure of metaphysics be reared? The master mason must learn from the mistakes of former builders. There must be no arbitrary principles, no assumed basis, no fanciful method. Metaphysic must begin with what is given, which exists, and has some good reason for its existence. It begins with the facts of consciousness and the results of science, and makes them the basis of its inquiries.* It does not operate with these facts and results in a method peculiar to itself, but simply according to the laws of thought. It asks, With the given facts of consciousness and the results of science, what has reason to say respecting them? What inferences *must* reason draw from them? All science operates with the same laws of thought, and thus attests their validity; are they then less valid in their fullest development and highest application?

* Schopenhauer declares that metaphysic is based on experience, and is its interpretation. He accordingly calls it the science of experience (*Erfahrungswissenschaft*), "not, however, the individual experiences, but the total, the general sum of all experience, is its object and its source." Another says that "metaphysic can, in the end, seek nothing else than what the experimental sciences also seek: namely, to know the connection of all experience." Siebeck, in *Viertelj. für wiss. Philosophie*, 1878. He claims that the mistake has been that it attempted to find from a part of experience the principle lying beyond the whole. 175.

The problem which metaphysic presents is therefore simply this: With the knowledge that exists, what do the laws of thought teach us respecting being in general, and respecting the world, the soul, and God? This statement of the problem gives the specific character of metaphysical inquiry. In the experimental sciences the attention is directed solely to the thing experimented with; in metaphysics, however, the question is not what the thing requires, but what the laws of thought demand. The scientist is absorbed by the thing in hand, and asks, What is it? the metaphysician is not limited in his inquiries by that in hand, but by that which possesses it, which contemplates and thinks it. Surely it must be possible to determine what reason demands, what it can demonstrate, what it must postulate, and why it *must* postulate. If the mind makes mistakes in its conclusions, it has the test of the conclusions and the means of correction in itself. And when reason reaches its limit, it will as surely stop as life does at death.

There is growth in metaphysics. Depending on the attainments in science and in general knowledge, and on the application of the laws of thought to them, it will grow as there is development in these respects. It will gradually unfold its problems, and in their solution will be seen a reflection of the knowledge, the views, and the thinking of the age. Every period completes itself in its metaphysics.

It is sometimes charged against metaphysics, that into it enter other than purely intellectual elements—such as religious, moral, and æsthetic interests. So far as these dim the intellectual vision, they are disturbing forces, and must be removed; but they never act as such when metaphysic is true to itself. That it takes

them into account, is in its favor, since it proves its completeness. Whatever may be said of external nature, it is evident that every account of man which regards only his physical and intellectual condition is sadly incomplete, and that all theories which ignore his moral, religious, and æsthetic interests, are partial. The latter need explanation as much as the physical and the purely intellectual, and a system which ignores them cannot be final.

Man is not a mere calculating machine; he is a mathematician, but also something besides. There are legitimate spheres of thought where demonstrations are out of the question. The scientist, as well as the philosopher, forges chains of logic without being able to find the hooks on which to hang the first and the last links. No more in metaphysics than in science can we do without the law of probability. But the probability must be recognized as such, and not be made an axiom. The mind may have to resort to postulates whose validity is unquestioned; they may be a mental necessity, and if they are, that is final. Such postulates even the rigorous Kant admitted, and he placed them beyond the reach of all sceptical attacks. The difference between the man who admits and the man who rejects postulates is that the one knows himself, while the other does not.

Hypotheses are not science, but scientists cannot do without them; neither are they metaphysic, but it needs their help. Not in forming them are metaphysicians to blame, but in forming them without sufficient reason, or in failing to test them, or in pronouncing them final principles. In forming hypotheses, metaphysic may err, thus proving that it is human and on exactly the same footing as all other pursuits. Science too, as we have seen, has its long wanderings without positive results,

and its way to truth often lies through error. It has been said of Kepler's laws, that they "were an outcome of a lifetime of speculation, for the most part vain and groundless." No less an authority than Faraday declares: "The world little knows how many of the thoughts and theories which have passed through the mind of a scientific investigator have been crushed in silence and secrecy by his own severe criticism and adverse examination; that in the most successful instances not a tenth of the suggestions, the hopes, the wishes, the preliminary conclusions, have been realized."

In considering psychology, we found the problems connected with the essence of the mind beset with difficulties. Even if their solution were possible, this would not be the place to enter on a full discussion of them. The reality of mind is, however, of such vital importance as to be worthy of attention, even in an introductory work. Besides removing false impressions, we must aim to get a reliable and firm working basis.

We have seen that the intellect deals purely with mental products in proportion as it rises above the immediate impressions of sense. The sensations cannot even reflect or see themselves, much less can they form comparisons, contrasts, combinations, and inferences. These require mind. There are only units in nature; but we can bring them into relations, and can think large numbers. As far as we can discover, a stone in Africa and a tree in America do not affect each other; but how numerous the relations of quality and quantity which the mind can determine respecting them! The vast realm of thought, in distinction from sensation, is a purely intellectual sphere. Not that the mind here is creative, but it is determinative: it does not make something that is not, but it discovers what is. Its

discoveries are not, however, confined to what we call matter: the most of them, in fact, have no direct relation to what is known as such, but have significance only for mind. We can call the one external, the other internal, reality; and, if there is any difference in the degree of validity, it is in favor of mind rather than of matter.

By distinguishing between the impressions made by external objects, and what thinking makes of them, we postulate the existence of both the mental and the physical world. All that we term concept, idea, logical norms, and indeed the whole realm of the rational and of philosophy, transcends the material. We judge of nature itself according to the laws of our minds, and subject to this test even the direct impressions received from the outer world. The first hints from matter already contain a mental element; and in science, philosophy, and art, the mind, in the use of the conditions from the world of sense, is purely a law unto itself.

The deeper this line of thought is pursued, the more are we forced to admit the existence of mind as distinct from matter. The world of intellect is a reality,—a world utterly without significance and explanation if there is only what is known to be physical. The difference between the two is not a question of reality, but solely of the kind of reality. To deny that reality which is the only source of all knowledge of the real, lands us in the abyss of nothing. It must also be considered, that our own mental acts are the only objects of reflection of which we are immediately conscious.

We are thus warranted in asserting that the existence of mind is of all things the most certain. By no processes of observation or thinking can we account for the origin of mind from matter. As far as we can now

see, such an origin is wholly inconceivable. The last results of physiology, as well as of psychology, recognize mind as *sui generis*; and we are obliged to postulate it to account for our intellectual operations, just as much as we are obliged to postulate matter in accounting for physical processes.

We may call the mind a substance, if we mean by it only that it is the reality which stands under, and is the source of, our mental activity; but the term has been employed in such various senses and so obscurely, that its use may add new confusion, instead of serving as a real explanation. Less objectionable is the term "*entity*," indicating a real existence, the source and centre of activity, without attempting to indicate its essence. Mind, then, we affirm, is an entity distinct from other objects, with a peculiar activity, and moving in a world of its own. While thus obliged to distinguish it from matter, we do not claim that it is foreign to the external reality. They are not identical, but correlated, forming one universe, just as soul and body one person. Partly they form a parallelism or a correspondence; partly each may have a sphere peculiar to itself. The difference between the two is not sufficiently marked by ascribing to the one consciousness, and denying it to the other. The character of the thought in consciousness must also be taken into account. The mental world is not a negation of the material, nor, on the other hand, does it find in that its limits. Thought moves in a sphere which encloses, but also transcends, the outer world.

By basing our inferences strictly on the facts of mind, we shall be true to the scientific method, and at the same time have a solid basis for philosophy. Of mind, just as of matter, we know only what it does; and from

this, we infer what it is. Rebel as we may against the conclusion, to our intellects a thing is simply what it can do. It is by interpreting action that we get what we term substance, which is always an impenetrable mystery, unless we mean by it merely the power to account for certain activities. Mind as entity — as not a mere relation, not a mere quality of something else, not mere action without an actor — gives us the fundamental conception needed.

All the possible metaphysical conceptions respecting mind and matter may be classified as follows: —

1. They are different manifestations of the same substance. The ground of their unity is behind both, — in their common source. Pantheism.

2. The one is the product of the other. Theism, Idealism, Materialism.

3. They are in no way united, but only correlated. Dualism.

REFLECTIONS.

Origin of the Name Metaphysics. Aristotle's "First Philosophy." Define Metaphysics. Different senses in which used. Difficulties of the subject. Indicate its exact sphere, and the character of its objects. Define Ontology. Cosmology. Rational Psychology. Rational Theology. Possibility of Metaphysics. Necessity. Metaphysics of Materialism. Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge. Method of Metaphysics. Possible Metaphysical Theories. Criticism of each. Hypotheses in Metaphysics. Distinction between Being and Action. Does Action imply Being as its Source? Conception of Substance. Mind as Entity.

CHAPTER VIII.

AESTHETICS.

REASON in the form of feeling may be more difficult to discover than in thought and conduct, but we do not believe it to be less real. Its existence there is admitted whenever we speak of feeling as reasonable or unreasonable, — terms which indicate its quality as well as its source. We may say that in emotion reason is latent, unconscious, not sufficiently evolved to recognize itself; and that the problem for it is how to find and express itself as reason. The solution of this problem would give a complete theory of the emotions, a system of the rational principles involved, so great a desideratum in philosophy. That without their explanation a philosophical system is incomplete, becomes evident on considering how large a part of our psychic nature, not included in thought and volition, the feelings constitute.

Compared with the other mental states the emotional has received least attention, both in psychology and philosophy. The full importance of the subject is evidently not appreciated. An emotion does not obtrude itself on the intellect, but rests in itself, and tends to absorb in itself as emotion the whole soul. Knowledge and conduct require effort, and demand or solicit reflection; but feeling is supposed to take care of itself, being regarded as a state little subject to direction or

control. This neglect is the more strange in view of the fact that so many regard feeling as the soul's primitive activity, giving birth to all the other psychic operations. But even if without this fundamental significance, the feelings exert a powerful influence on the other mental states, play a prominent part in morals, and constitute the happiness or misery of life. Nor are they so wholly beyond our control as some imagine: all our volitions and efforts at culture help to form a permanent state, which becomes the source of our emotions as well as of our other mental operations.

The difficulties connected with the nature, cause, and relations of the feelings threaten to baffle all efforts to obtain a rational explanation. The feelings can neither describe themselves, nor does their course terminate in their rational equivalents. The direct testimony of consciousness merely states that they are, and that they have a certain quality and quantity (intensity). All attempts at explanation lead away from them into the region of the intellect. By concentrating the attention on them for the purpose of determining their character, the feelings themselves are modified; and every attempt to bring them under the focus of the intellect interferes with their immediateness and purity, checks their spontaneity, and introduces a foreign element. Just because feeling is immediate to consciousness, the intermediate or producing processes being hid, it is so difficult to give its philosophy. Only by a direct appeal to consciousness can we learn what it is; but even the psychology of the feelings is attended with peculiar difficulty. All explanations must be given in intellectual formulas; but it is no easy matter to find their intellectual equivalents, if it can be said that they have any. They are too volatile to be confined to the rigidity of concepts.

They are not thoughts, and yet we want to express them in thought. But we can no more transfer them from one sphere of the soul into another than we can make our intellectual apprehensions a direct counterpart of external reality. The feelings we think, by passing into thought cease to be feelings. Every definition is consequently imperfect, and comes far short of what we experience in the feeling itself. We can give descriptions of our emotional states ; but these indicate how we felt, not what the feeling in itself was.

For the deepest and most fruitful study of this subject the student is necessarily referred to his own experience. The psychological view thus obtained will, however, leave much unexplained. We want a full intellectual apprehension, a complete rational interpretation, of our emotional nature, which is only possible by the farthest removal of feeling from its immediateness ; it demands that the emotional be made rational. In our feelings, more than in any other exercise, we are passive, being subjected to their dominion ; by taking them into the domain of the intellect we make them subject to ourselves, and master them.

The very passivity of the emotional state (implied by the etymology of such words as "pathos," "passion," and the German *Leidenschaft*) interferes with the intellectual elaboration of the feelings ; and it is not surprising that those who indulge this state most are least intent on its explanation. On the other hand, the study of philosophy, with its constant exercise of reason, and with its effort to exalt every thing into the domain of the rational, tends to neglect and suppress the emotions. It is evident that the mind's passivity will be limited in proportion as its voluntary activity is increased. Not seldom philosophers fail to appreciate the significance

of the feelings, because they cannot forge them into logical chains. The critical philosophy is too cold and stern to give them their deserved prominence, even in the domain of morals. The system formed around the categorical imperative is largely a skeleton, which lacks the warmth and beauty of life. Hegel, still more than Kant, depreciated the feelings, and sometimes spoke of them contemptuously. But whatever claims a system of philosophy may have to rationality and intellectual absoluteness, serious defects will adhere to it so long as the emotions do not receive their proper place and deserved treatment.

In dividing philosophy into the principles of being, of knowing, of feeling, and of acting, we naturally expect under the third head a complete theory of the feelings. But instead of an exhaustive discussion of this theory, only one department in its wide domain has been taken out of psychology, and made the subject of special philosophical inquiry; namely, æsthetics.* This term, commonly used in Germany for the theory of the beautiful, is employed in various senses by English writers. "Æsthetics is the term now employed to designate the theory of the fine arts,—the science of the beautiful with its allied conceptions and emotions.

* *αἰσθησις* signifies perception by means of the external senses. It was used by Baumgarten (*Æsthetica*, 1750) to designate that discipline which investigates the nature and use of the knowledge obtained through the senses. Under the knowledge thus obtained is that of the beautiful. But Baumgarten, the founder of æsthetics, neither indicates the exact relation of the sensualistic and intellectual elements in beauty, nor does he give a complete theory of the beautiful. In his *Kritik of Pure Reason*, Kant uses the term "æsthetics" in its etymological sense, and applies it to sensation in general. The first part of that work he calls "Transcendental Æsthetics," which he defines as "an *a priori* science of the principles of sensation;" and he discusses, under this head, space and time as the conditions of sensation. In his *Kritik of the Judgment*, Kant uses it for the theory of the beautiful.

The province of the science is not, however, very definitely fixed; and there is still some ambiguity about the meaning of the term, arising from its etymology and various use.”* The subject is popular, and has received considerable attention in various languages; many writers, however, give reflections on art and the standards of taste, rather than a rational inquiry into the nature of the beautiful. Through the influence of Kant (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*) and Hegel (*Aesthetik*), a large number of German works have appeared which discuss the subject from a philosophical standpoint.†

The sphere of æsthetics is too limited if defined as “the theory of the fine arts.” The aim in such cases is to make beauty the essence of the discussion; but then the beautiful in general should be considered, whether found in mind, in nature, or in art. Valuable and even indispensable as a propædæutic to art, the essential element of æsthetics as a part of philosophy will be lost by limiting it to art. It has a general subject, as well as special departments; and, aside from its practical application, it has a rational value. Even if there were no art, we can well conceive that the mind would take an interest in the speculative questions connected with taste. Æsthetics, even if limited to an inquiry into the principles of beauty, or to the search for the reason in beauty, is a philosophical discipline. But the effort to make it merely a theory of the fine arts

* *Ency. Brit.*: Æsthetics.

† Among the numerous German works on æsthetics since Hegel, are those of Weisse, Vischer, Carriere, Koestlin, Krause, Schasler, and Von Hartmann. Vischer’s work, in three volumes, is the most complete discussion of the subject in the whole range of literature. The history of æsthetics has been written by Zimmermann and also by Lotze. On special departments of the subject, the German literature is also extensive and valuable. Of the older writers, Winckelmann, Lessing, and Schiller deserve special mention.

indicates the triumph of empiricism, and proves that the rational is appreciated only as a preface to the technical and artistic. If appreciated at all, beauty must be esteemed for its own sake; but this means that it must be prized wherever found.

In claiming that æsthetics is a rational discipline, which discusses ultimate problems, we do not want to ignore its psychological basis. Much remains to be done by psychology in order to determine the distinction between beauty and allied emotions and concepts. A complete scale of animal and human feelings, which lead up to the beautiful, would be valuable. Instead of antagonism, the most intimate co-operative relation should be maintained between the rational or philosophical and the psychological factors.

In order to introduce the student into æsthetics as usually treated, it will here be considered as the philosophy of the beautiful. Beauty is thus made the subject-matter. Other subjects are also discussed by writers on æsthetics; but these subjects are loosely grouped around beauty, not so connected with it as to form a distinct organism. At the close of the chapter, it will be shown that the sphere of æsthetics should be enlarged, so as to form a rational system of beauty and of allied objects. The aim of æsthetics will then be to discover the peculiar marks of all objects termed æsthetic, and to bring them into organic connection.

By examining the various works on æsthetics, we are struck with the difficulties connected with the question, What is beauty? Every one has an answer in his consciousness in the form of an impression, but not in terms of rational interpretation, which is the very aim of æsthetics. Familiar as all seem with the beautiful, its mystery becomes apparent so soon as we attempt to

define the term. The result always teaches that the impression itself is far more distinct and vivid than any interpretation we can give of it. After all that has been written on the subject, one need but examine the current definitions of beauty in order to learn how little has been accomplished for the attainment of definiteness. Much of the confusion arises from the fact that the term is applied to entirely different spheres. Thus we speak of beauty as purely subjective, namely, as an emotion, but also as in external objects. We are apt to transfer our æsthetic emotions, as well as the impressions on the senses, to the objects occasioning them. But by naming these objects we do not define beauty itself. Nor can the definition be found by indicating the characteristic marks of objects pronounced beautiful, such as grace, or an assemblage of graces, harmony, symmetry, proportion, the adaptation of means to end, and unity amid variety.

This vagueness characterized the discussion of the subject of beauty from the very beginning.* Although a favorite theme with Plato, he fails to distinguish it sharply from the true, the righteous, the good, and the wise; and different views of it are given in different books. In "Phædros," Socrates speaks eloquently of beauty; but a better discussion of the subject is found in the "Symposium," in the discourse of Diotema, related by Socrates. But instead of an analysis of beauty, we find here rather a description of the lover's ecstasy in beholding the beautiful. Plato describes beauty here as the eternal, unchangeable, divine idea, or beauty *per*

† In *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. 4, p. 199, Conrad Hermann states that the history of æsthetics among the ancients must consider chiefly the views of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of the Neo-Platonists. He regards Pythagoras as the first who entered upon philosophical inquiries into the beautiful.

se, not as embodied in any thing else. Plotinus in his essay "On the Beautiful" follows his master Plato in exalting the ideal far above all its visible manifestations. The subject received little attention during the scholasticism of the Middle Ages; and in comparison with the themes that usually engrossed the attention of thinkers, it was probably not thought worthy of serious inquiry. Locke does not discuss beauty; Hume mentions it in a few places, but confounds it with the agreeable. The result of English inquiries is indicated in the article on Æsthetics in the "Encyclopædia Britannica:" "What strikes one most, perhaps, in these discussions, is the vagueness due to the great diversity of conception as to the extent of the beautiful in the number of objects it may be supposed to denote. . . . There is certainly a great want of definiteness as to the legitimate scope of æsthetic theory." *

We pronounce objects beautiful because they excite in us the emotion of beauty. But, whatever its occasion, beauty itself exists only for and in the mind. It is as purely ours as sight and hearing; and all definitions must deal with it primarily as a mental state or as an emotion. That for its existence, at least for its origin, the notion of the beautiful depends on something external to us, must be admitted as freely as in the case of

* For a theory of art among the ancients, see Eduard Mueller: *Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, 2 vols. A brilliant rather than a profound discussion of the beautiful is given by Cousin in his *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good*. The latest German works on æsthetics are by E. Von Hartmann: *Die deutsche Æsthetik seit Kant*, and *Die Philosophie des Schoenen*. In *Preussische Jahrbuecher*, August and September, 1887, A. Doering has two excellent articles on the history of æsthetics. The discussion of the subject of æsthetics is usually so unsatisfactory that it is difficult to recommend any particular book to the student. A brief history of Theories of the Beautiful is given by Bain in *Mental and Moral Science*, 304. For the English literature on the subject the student is referred to Æsthetics in *Ency. Brit.*

vision; but it can never be conceived as any thing existing independent of mind. A metaphysical consideration of the subject would undoubtedly conclude that the emotion itself has its basis in the harmony of the inner and the outer being, so that it is a product of their harmonious action and re-action.

We speak of beauty as an emotion, a characteristic which distinguishes æsthetics from the sphere of logic, as well as from that of ethics. When we speak of ourselves as æsthetical, we do not refer to our purely intellectual activities; it indicates a state which no amount of mere theoretical contemplation and no mere volition can express.

Æsthetics can be placed under the general head of values. In this point of view it considers the subjective significance of a certain class of emotions and of the objects which excite them. By this method of classification we should have to include under values æsthetics and ethics, both beauty and right having worth for our feelings. The prominence given by Herbart and Lotze to this view of the subject makes us feel more deeply the need of a general theory of the feelings, and particularly their consideration in the light of values. Such a theory would indicate the relation of both æsthetics and ethics to our emotional nature. But even if such a theory were completed, it would not include both subjects under emotions in the same sense or degree, since in ethics the feeling is not the essence, as in æsthetics, but conduct or the will is the controlling factor.

In thus giving æsthetics a peculiar relation to the emotions, we, of course, do not so isolate it as to make it independent of our other mental operations; we only indicate its general psychological sphere. In the division of the emotions into those of pleasure and

displeasure, beauty is included under the former. Amid the prevailing indefiniteness, it is, however, frequently confounded with the agreeable, without indicating its peculiar pleasurable elements. The sharp analysis of the emotions, — an analysis psychological in character, and yet essential as a basis for philosophical treatment, — which determines the exact quality of beauty, is too much neglected. Many things please, and are pronounced agreeable or interesting, which we do not term beautiful. A companion may have all these qualities without any claim to beauty. Pleasurable impressions may be received through any sense, but only from the higher do we receive impressions of beauty. When Burke speaks of this impression as obtained also through lower senses, he confounds the beautiful and the pleasurable.

The emotion of the beautiful is not to be classed with animal passion, though this emotion may become so strong that we can speak of a passion for the beautiful. This emotion cannot, however, be put on the ordinary level of mere gratification. There is in beauty an intellectual element which exalts it far above mere sensibility; and we can call it an intellectual emotion or a sentiment, in which there is a union of intellectual and emotional factors.

Æsthetic pleasure springs directly from the beholding of the beautiful object. The beauty strikes us at once, though continued and absorbing contemplation may be necessary for its full appreciation. The immediate, intuitive element makes its effect akin to inspiration, and gives beauty the character of a percept rather than of a concept. If the soul is absorbed by mere reflection on beauty, without permitting a re-action of the feelings, the impression itself is weakened, or perhaps wholly

obliterated. Neither the possession of an object, nor reflection on its use, increases its beauty: this being independent of all extraneous circumstances.* It is also different in character from the ethical, which involves duty, implies choice, and cannot be appreciated unless it is regarded as involving freedom. Beauty is spontaneous; it is simply beautiful, and nothing more. Thus, in contemplating the highest works of art, we do not lose ourselves in considering their purpose: to do so would substitute reflection for the impression. On the other hand, the emotion must not be disturbed by the conviction that the purpose of the artist was not accomplished. The art must be such that all reflection, consciously or unconsciously, heightens the impression. Our consciousness is so limited that it carries on but one main process at a time, to which all else becomes tributary. The more absorbing and intense an emotion, the less room for reflection.

The reason why beauty pleases may be as difficult as the question why certain things are agreeable to the palate. Taste, whether used figuratively or literally, is hard to explain. When we affirm that beauty pleases for its own sake, we mean that its value to the mind consists in its direct contemplation, not in the fact that it gratifies an appetite or any animal craving, nor because it involves an imperative. But by thus giving it the immediateness of intuition, we only indicate the more clearly that it must have its basis in the soul itself. The capacity, at least, must be innate; which, of course, does not imply that the taste is not susceptible of cultivation, or that it must, in every respect, be the same in all persons. Its ground is innate, as much

* In his *Kritik of the Judgment*, Kant particularly emphasizes the fact, that the mere contemplation of an object produces the impression.

so as the power to think and choose, so that we can say that the conditions of the beautiful are found in all men. The same is true of reason, though considerable mental development is required before its exercise by the child. The taste for the beautiful, like reason, is, in a certain sense, the same in all men, and yet may be differently developed and exercised. Just because it is innate, — say as ability, or instinct, or as a germ, — and so far the same in all, we can give laws for the appreciation of the beautiful, and rules of taste and criticism; and just because so much of the individual appreciation depends on the degree of culture, the stage of civilization, the training and the surroundings, — all variable elements, — we find that there are different views of beauty. In all such cases we must distinguish between the rational or essential element, which is necessary and universal, and the accidental, which is local and temporal. Persons may be in such a state as not to be able to appreciate the beautiful, but that does not prove that there is no beauty. At different times there have been different standards of right: that, however, does not prove that there is no absolute standard, but only that the standard adopted may be false. The same is true respecting beauty. With the same surroundings and the same degree of culture, there will also be agreement respecting the essentials of beauty, thus giving its laws objective reality, and making æsthetics possible.

In vindicating for the beautiful the same eternal basis as for the true and the good, we cannot ignore the fact that the opinions respecting æsthetics differ greatly. This is partly owing to the fact that the subject, the newest department of philosophy, is but imperfectly developed; partly to inherent difficulties. Persons may

imagine that they differ respecting the beautiful, when they judge only respecting the agreeable, which depends so largely on subjective conditions. While beauty always pleases, we do not always discern between the beauty and other characteristics which please. In the same individual the taste may vary at different times. We are continually cultivating our souls, but are by no means fully conscious of the process or its results; perhaps the most marked effect of the development is on the unconscious basis and background of our conscious activity. We may, therefore, know what pleases us, though unable to give the reason for the pleasure. Indeed, the pleasure itself is apt to be so engrossing as to leave no inclination to enter upon reflections respecting its nature; and we usually pronounce an object pleasing or beautiful, without even attempting an analysis of its pleasing or beautiful qualities.

Modern German writers, especially in Hegel's school, have made much of the union of the idea with its sensible symbol as the essential element of beauty. Thus in art, an object is regarded as beautiful in proportion as it embodies and realizes an idea or ideal.²⁵ That certain ideals consciously or unconsciously form our standards of taste, is no doubt true. These standards or norms may change with our culture; but we cannot arbitrarily determine them, they must have their basis in necessary laws. They are always in the mind, and active there, though we may not be aware of their existence. The fancy is continually cultivated, and unconsciously determines the manifestations of taste as they appear in consciousness. There are no doubt numerous operations below consciousness whose influence is made manifest in impressions of pleasure and displeasure. The fancy darkly throws its spell over an object, and

heightens its beauty, we know not how. The object itself may be viewed in the light of a symbol, and is, perhaps, seen rather in what it suggests than really is. It thus becomes the occasion for fancy to exercise its creative power, and to put into the object its own ideal forms. Those who lack fancy, prosaic natures living wholly in matters of fact, of course fail to appreciate the most exquisite beauty. Those subtle elements which are indescribable, but appeal directly, instinctively as it were, to the soul, and form the essence of beauty, escape their notice. There are many who cannot appreciate the beauty of Raphael's Madonnas, because they do not see the ideas veiled in or shining through them: they see the pictures, but not what they represent.

This intellectual element in beauty, exercised consciously or unconsciously, raises it far above the impressions which come through the lower senses. More intellect enters into the appreciation of a beautiful landscape than into the pleasures of a meal, though we may be as little conscious of thought in the one as in the other. Beauty comes without effort, and suggests none: it simply presents beauty, and that intuitively. In contemplating it the soul has the standard of beauty in itself; indeed, it may be said to see with this standard, and to apprehend immediately the agreement or disagreement of an object with this norm. In all æsthetic appreciation an intellectual perception of harmony is mirrored in the emotion of the beautiful. While in the domain of logic, as well as of ethics, the soul labors, being impelled by the necessity of truth or the ought of duty, in æsthetics it is free, controlled only by its own impulses. This freedom is play for the spirit, the paradise of the most delightful spontaneity. This is

the domain in which genius revels and creates, because it cannot do otherwise. Just because it is play, the contemplation of beauty is not the business of life, but its relaxation and recreation. It is accessory to life, rather than its substance; and he who makes it his mission to behold only beauty, cannot hope to drift into the higher realms of truth and duty. Indeed, the contemplation of nothing but beauty, at last wearies and enervates. That its admiration is not devotion to the good, and that the substitution of æsthetics for ethics as the rule of life is not an exaltation of character, is proved by numerous examples of genius, — artists, musicians, and poets. We must distinguish between the adornment of life, and that life itself which is to be adorned. It is with beauty pursued for its own sake as life's highest calling, as with pleasure: it cannot satisfy. As the sole object sought in marriage, beauty soon loses its charm; or, rather, other considerations interfere with its appreciation. The speech whose essence is its adornment soon wearies, and is pronounced insipid. We pity the man who cannot leave his diamonds for fear they might be stolen, — pity him even if a duke. But in its proper place, æsthetics exalts the soul above life's vulgar associations, to the contemplation of its own ideals, and receives inspiration even from ethics. If our ideas are expressed at all, they ought to be expressed in the most perfect form.

But is beauty when ascribed to objects mere form? Is it never the substance, but merely something accessory? The question involves the extremely difficult concepts of substance and form, and of their relation. When we speak of a soul, a character, or an idea, as beautiful, the language implies that beauty is more than a form. Aside from the more purely intellectual

objects of beauty (ideas, poetry), we are, however, justified in attributing the beautiful to the form; but this form must always be conceived as the form of something, so that it is never any thing of itself. In this sense we can speak of form as constituting beauty in painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Is it not likewise the case with beauty in nature? The same face may be beautiful in repose, and ugly when distorted; in which case there is evidently no change of substance except in its form. It is the harmonious arrangement of colors or of sounds which we pronounce beautiful. The highest truth may be expressed in an abstract form, which can lay no claim to beauty, and the deed prompted by the noblest impulse may be done awkwardly; but when something in itself worthy is expressed or embodied in the manner most in harmony with the object, and most pleasing to the spirit, so that this recognizes its own ideals in the form, we have beauty. Besides the love of truth and goodness, an appeal is thus made to the imagination.

The general term "form" is a mere abstraction, while the realm of beauty is in the concrete. In every beautiful object the form is definite, as well as the form of some substance: it is always a particular form. We must therefore regard beauty as form, not as separated from the substance, but as that substance itself in a certain stage of perfection. And those substances which are capable of the most perfect form are the ones susceptible of greatest beauty.

Just as we cannot separate quality from the thing in which it inheres, so it is with form and substance. Indeed, we can say that beauty is a certain quality in objects; and the term "quality" expresses the general nature of beauty better than the term "form," particu-

larly when we speak of beauty in ideas, in poetry, and generally in intellectual elements.

We thus find the sensible and the rational, the substance and the form, harmoniously blended in the beautiful. Idealists are apt to see the æsthetic element too exclusively in the idea, while empiricists and sensualists see it too exclusively in the external forms which excite the emotion. The latter is seen especially in English writers on the subject. Empiricists are also apt to degrade it to the level of sense impressions, and to overlook the associated intellectual elements. Instead of this one-sided view, whether too exclusively idea or sense, we have in the contemplation of the beautiful a union and concentration of all the powers, but in an unrestrained manner. In the most beautiful objects the soul sees itself at its best. Beauty interprets the soul's mysterious longings and aspirations. The personality finds itself in the beautiful, and puts itself into it. The soul is interpreted in the form, and recognizes it as its appropriate body. In beauty there is something peculiarly human and soulful; it is the mirror of the spirit's ideals.

In the preceding, reference has been made repeatedly to beauty in objects. This will not be misunderstood if it is remembered that the meaning is, that there is something in them which excites the emotion of beauty. Things are not beautiful in the sense in which they have forces or are extended. The forces work, whether seen or not; but there is no beauty where there is no contemplating mind. It is not a force; it is not in objects any more than there is thought in them. But objects may be the occasion of that emotion, and we want to learn what it is that excites the emotion.

To determine what is called beauty in objects, consti-

tutes the aim of æsthetic criticism, and is an exercise of the judgment. There may be taste without criticism, because that taste acts unconsciously, immediately, being itself unaware, as a rule, of its principles of action. In criticism we seek the laws which determine its activity; we want to make the taste conscious of itself.

Beauty in objects is divided into the beautiful in nature and in art. The beautiful objects are numerous and widely different, the essential elements of beauty being the unity in the infinite variety. However absolute the æsthetic norms may be, their application in criticism depends very materially on our subjective state, as is evident from our different judgments at different times respecting the same object. There may be disturbing influences which interfere materially with the purity of the judgment. However beautiful an object seen alone, when very common it may fail to excite any emotion. The surrounding of things, or their setting, has much influence on their effect: a fact the more easily understood when it is remembered that beauty is essentially an order, arrangement, form, not the substance by itself. A beautiful woman among many plain ones makes a deeper impression than among a thousand equally beautiful. She is as beautiful in herself in one case as in the other; but the frame or setting differs, in one instance the power of contrast being absent. It is always necessary to distinguish between beauty in objects, and the psychological conditions for its appreciation.

An ideal, when embodied either in nature or in a work of art, is the concrete form of an abstract idea: it is an individual object in which the general idea is realized. The ideal woman is a specimen of the idea of womanhood, and the soul finds every thing beautiful in which

it discovers the ideal of its idea of perfection. Hence Hegel defines beauty as "the sensible manifestation of the idea."* Not the marble, as marble, is beautiful, but the marble with a certain form, so that the suggestion is not that of marble, but of some mental idea. But as the mind must at times be aroused in order to discover the thoughts hidden in nature, so it may have to be awakened to full consciousness in order to discover the ideals veiled in objects of beauty. When some other faculty is predominantly active, the fancy may not be able to throw its spell over an object, or to follow the suggestions hinted at. The spirit must freely lose itself in the contemplation of beauty if the æsthetic emotion is to prevail. There are in music no charms unless the soul's dream of harmony, of unity, and of sweetness is realized in the sounds: a scientific analysis of the notes destroys the beauty. Even if we adopt Wagner's theory that all thoughts can be expressed in sound, we must admit that we are neither able to find sounds for all concepts, nor to interpret the meaning of all sounds. Music appeals to the emotions, and it is impossible to interpret it as if every sound had a definite sense. It may be full of ideas, but they are in the form of emotions: it is thought struggling through sound and entangled in feeling. For the appreciation of music, the mood of the spirit is, consequently, of special significance. The charm of a symphony may consist chiefly in what of memory, or aspiration, or prophecy the imagination interprets into it. Night, stillness, moonlight, water, the historic associations of a place, the poetry or romance thrown over a scene, have much to do with the effect of a melody. As Kant observes, the nightingale heard in the dark forest makes a different impression from the perfectly

* "*Das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee.*"

imitated sounds when the fact of the imitation is known. The same is true of beauty in visible objects: its effect is due to our own ideas and associations. Symmetry and harmony, the agreeable blending of colors, the unity in variety, are of themselves not enough to constitute beauty: they must somehow excite the fancy, and allure the soul to attach its ideals to them. The object must not overwhelm the imagination, but give it opportunity for free and full play. If it overwhelms or stuns, the emotion is that of the sublime. This includes all that suggests the incomprehensible and the infinite. Hence the awe it excites. In the stormy ocean, in the vast expanse of the starry heavens, and in the high mountain, there is more than the mind can grasp. But while the mind is overwhelmed by sublimity, and is lost in the very effort to find itself, it is at home in beauty, and finds itself in the contemplation. The realm of the beautiful lies between the neat and the sublime.

The fact that our first æsthetic impressions are sometimes reversed, particularly respecting persons, is no argument against the immediateness of beauty. The change may not be a reversal of opinion respecting the same elements, but is, perhaps, owing to the discovery of something hidden before. Thus the charm in the expression of sentiment and in the varied play of features may be discovered only on nearer acquaintance. Grace of motion and poetic beauty of mind transcend the attraction of mere regularity or symmetry of features, or may amply compensate for their absence.

While the contemplation of beauty opens to us the whole domain of nature as well as of art, its production, of course, limits us wholly to the consideration of the latter. Is art an imitation of nature? Does it surpass nature? These are old questions, and will probably

cause discussion in the future as in the past ; but they are really irrelevant, for as they stand they can be answered both affirmatively and negatively. However much the mind may depend on nature for the means of culture, its norms of beauty must be found in its own ideals. In producing these ideals, the external or natural element is a factor, and it would be erroneous to pronounce them otherwise than potentially innate. If art aims, in some instances, at a perfect imitation of nature, that does not circumscribe its limits: it may also produce what can nowhere be found in nature, putting in one object an assemblage of graces or excellences which are not found in such perfection in any real object. Here comes the distinction between the ideal and the real. The mind has its own standard of beauty. Suggestions, hints, and various aids may be given by external nature ; but these can never do more than develop a power already in the mind. The highest art is not imitative, but the product of genius, which is a law unto itself. In a certain sense, all true art is natural. The laws of nature are simply the laws of our own minds ; hence the creations of the mind that follow its own laws are in harmony with the laws of nature. The unnatural in art is objectionable, because it violates the laws of mind. But art, while natural in the sense of being in harmony with natural and mental laws, is not limited to the objects of nature, but produces ideals not found in nature, and yet doing no violence to it. These ideals fulfil what is given in nature only in the form of types and prophecies. The ideal man is not found in reality, but he is not unnatural ; indeed, we do not hesitate to pronounce him the only true man. In its relation to nature, art is the ideal perfection of hints discovered therein. We thus

vindicate for art a sphere for creative energy. Its greatest productions transcend nature, just as mind does. This is true of the great works of art, from the masterpieces of Greek genius down to Thorwaldsen. Nature must be reflected in the highest creations, otherwise they are abortions; but the mind must be their soul, otherwise they are not creations. In art the mind rises in a peculiar sense into its own element; and in its harmony with nature, which is nevertheless a contrast, it can be original. It is as vain to hunt for Guido's Aurora in nature as to search for Milton's descriptions in history. So exalted is the true artist that we never think of classing him with the mechanical imitator or the slavish copyist. His art expresses nature, but it is *his* nature.

The term "fine arts" does not really express what is intended to be designated. The term "useful arts" shows the aim of the objects included; and when we contrast fine arts therewith, we expect the adjective to be the counterpart of "useful." Why may not the useful arts also be fine? It would be no improvement to substitute "beautiful" for "fine," since in the arts thereby designated there is much that can be termed neither beautiful nor fine. They would be more fully designated by calling them *representative* arts; their aim being to represent some object or ideal, and their value consisting in this representative element. Or they might be called contemplative arts, to indicate their purpose as intended solely for contemplation.

In all the arts called fine, there may be many things which increase the interest without heightening the beauty. Sometimes the accessories to beauty, or the associated considerations, are very prominent, and at times something else than beauty is the chief aim of the

artist. Thus the value of a picture may consist in the truthfulness with which it represents an object or historical scene. While the Laocoön was evidently intended not to offend the taste, mere beauty was certainly not its main object. It is probably an effort to put a description into marble, and the artist wanted to make it as true as possible to the description, or to the idea to be represented. One need but study the best galleries to learn how small a proportion of the art makes beauty its sole aim; very frequently it is only accessory to some other aim of the artist. The Greeks were especially successful in making their art the embodiment of particular ideas. In their statues of the gods, as Jupiter, Mercury, Minerva, Venus, some special characteristic is to be represented. The exact representation of that idea is the aim; but this is to be done as perfectly as possible, and it is in this perfection that the beauty is to be found. The beautiful is intended to bring out the truth, or the idea, in the best manner. In many works of art, beauty is, therefore, merely incidental, not the first aim. Where the direct aim, it must of course appear as the representation of a concept which is in itself pleasing. If Satan is represented as beautiful, it must be at the expense of truth. Much of Michael Angelo's Last Judgment is so full of horror as to suppress the emotion of the beautiful.

Some regard the characteristic, the peculiar, and the individual as the essential element of beauty in art. Artists have peculiarities, and the works of a master or even of a school may be recognized by certain characteristics of style. Generally it is easy to pick out the works of Titian, Rembrandt, and Rubens in a gallery. However broad and varied an artist's range of subjects, in all of them the characteristic marks of his mind and

skill must appear: he cannot deny himself in his works. Perhaps his most marked peculiarity is a mere mannerism. Its originality may make it interesting, or there may be other qualities which commend it; but in itself, as a mere mannerism, it is a defect. This becomes evident so soon as it is imitated; and it is most likely to be imitated just because it is individual and striking. Hegel, in distinction from what is peculiar, emphasized the rational and universal in art. He viewed objects as defective in proportion as they are peculiar, but perfect in proportion as they are universal. That is not beauty which pleases me only, but which commends itself as beautiful to all capable of its appreciation. The more art accordingly rises above the individual and peculiar — above mannerism especially — into the rational and universal, the more perfect it becomes, because the more ideal. But while this is true, there need be no irreconcilable conflict between the characteristic and the universal. That which is not a characteristic (mannerism) of an artist, but a peculiarity or characteristic of the object represented, becomes a source of beauty in proportion as it is brought out properly. An ideal has characteristic elements which distinguish it from all other ideals; and it cannot be represented correctly without those elements. If female beauty is to be painted, that which distinguishes it from all other beauty must be brought out; the elaborate details of dress become offensive if they hide the loveliness of the face, or receive more attention than the characteristics of female beauty. If the frame is more beautiful than the picture, the artist's aim is defeated. A discord is in itself always disagreeable; but if it serves to bring out more fully any characteristic harmony, it has an æsthetic value; it heightens the impression of beauty.

This is, it seems to me, the true place of the characteristic in art: it is an excellence so far as it heightens what constitutes the essence of beauty in an object. In this sense the characteristic is co-extensive with the ideal, and is in reality universal, while mannerism detracts from the ideal in that it attracts the attention from ideals themselves to the peculiarities of the artist. Raphael's ideals of beauty have merely psychological or historical interest, except so far as they approach the universal ideals. When we find that in his pictures of the Infant Christ and the Virgin Mary he makes every thing tend to present what is most characteristic in the beauty of the objects represented, we admire the characteristic just because it is universal. He makes the characteristic of beauty itself his peculiarity, so as to exalt his individual taste to that of the universal consciousness. That characteristic in art is valuable which represents a universal ideal. This is the harmony between the characteristic and the universal,—it is a universal characteristic.

These general remarks are only intended as an introduction to the central thought of æsthetics. Details are of course out of the question. Numerous subjects grouped around the centre must be omitted; their treatment belongs to works on æsthetics. The student will soon find, that, much as has been written on this branch of philosophy, much more remains to be done. The agreeable, the sublime, the tragie, the comical, and related subjects, need careful consideration, as well as beauty itself. The theme is fruitful and fascinating; but its proper treatment requires a union of qualities rarely found in one man. It still waits for its master.

Besides the general work yet to be done in determining the nature of beauty and its relations, much also

remains to be determined respecting the several arts. "But comparatively little has been done in a purely scientific manner to determine the nature and functions of art so as to fix the relations of the different arts to simple or natural beauty. . . . There seems even now no consensus of opinion as to the precise aims of art, how far it has simply to reproduce and constructively vary the beauties of nature, or how far to seek modes of pleasurable effect wider than those supplied by natural objects. A theory of art at all comparable in scientific precision to existing theories of morals has yet to be constructed. The few attempts to establish a basis for art of a non-metaphysical kind are characterized by great one-sidedness."* There is not even agreement as to the division of the representative arts. Architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry are the main divisions; but this classification is not complete.† Shall rhetoric be added? There may be beauty in gardening, in furniture, in dress, in oratory, in style. It will not do to dismiss these with the statement that in them beauty is not the sole or main object; neither is that always the case in the divisions given above. How about theatrical and operatic representations? The most complete union of all the arts is found in the opera, with its poetry, music, acting, and scenic effects,

* Ency. Brit.

† Cousin divides the arts into "two great classes: arts addressed to hearing, arts addressed to sight; on the one hand, music and poetry; on the other, painting, with engraving, sculpture, architecture, gardening." 167. This division according to the senses addressed seems to be too external. Is there no internal relation between the arts themselves to determine their connection and division?

Schäfler also divides the fine arts into two classes, namely those viewed simultaneously and those viewed successively. Under the first head he places architecture, sculpture, and painting; under the second, music, mimicry (pantomime), and poetry.

giving opportunity to introduce all the departments of art. This variety, with an idea as the bond of union in the various elements, adds much to the attractiveness of the opera. But, at the same time, the opera is unnatural, and this mars its beauty; it is art that is not true, and this makes it artificial. The opera wants to represent life, but in life comedies and tragedies are not sung, and men do not die with an orchestral accompaniment. The opera is not the perfection of the real, nor the ideal fulfilment of any prophecy veiled in life. The charm of music in the opera, which gives it the advantage over the drama, is also, as far as nature is concerned, its disadvantage. One must often suppress reflection if the most touching scenes are not to become supremely ludicrous. Art, whose essence is truth, may be developed into harmony with nature; but if its essence is or contains a falsehood, it never can harmonize with nature or with an ideal. The opera contains the elements of destruction in itself; and, to say the least, it is very doubtful whether a cultivated taste can permanently endure any thing so thoroughly artificial. No doubt every sentiment and emotion may somehow be expressed or interpreted in sound; but to sing the most trivial and the most solemn emotions and descriptions, — to sing household affairs, mechanical labor, historic scenes, remorse, all that pertains to life and death, to self and the world, — is ridiculous. It turns tragedy into comedy, and life into caricature. And the time may yet come when the degree of true culture attained by certain ages will be estimated by their enthusiasm for the opera. The proper sphere of the opera is in romance rather than real life.

Æsthetics as accessory to life and thought, not their essence, is subordinate. As such its value is, however,

very great. Its mission is to bring to the most pleasing perfection something really worthy of supreme excellence. Art is degraded whenever it represents a debasing object as pure, beautiful, and attractive. To pursue beauty — a pure abstraction — for its own sake, instead of something really valuable which deserves to be made beautiful, is a perversion of life and its functions, and must be placed among the aberrations of the mind. To put the fanciful and imaginative in place of the real, is a species of insanity.

The ethical element in æsthetics deserves more attention, not merely for the sake of ethics, but also of æsthetics. Numerous tendencies in art prove this, and the claim has actually been made that æsthetics is independent of moral considerations. It has been tacitly held, and also publicly proclaimed, that artists are not to be judged by the same moral standards as humanity at large. Such views are destructive both of æsthetic and of moral health.

But in its proper place æsthetics cannot be too highly prized. Thus the soul, life, ethics, religion, worship, and all that is noble, may be developed to perfection and become beautiful. Not by assigning to beauty a fictitious realm by itself, but by putting it into true and organic connection with ethics, does it obtain a worthy mission. We want to develop to beautiful perfection the substance found in metaphysics, the thought found in noetics, and the right discovered in ethics.

The student will probably find peculiar difficulty in determining exactly the nature and sphere of æsthetics. In the current literature on the subject he will be struck more by the multitude of details than by the precision

and definiteness of the discussion. *Æsthetics* is still in its preparatory stage; the discussion is tentative, materials are gathered, and classifications are made. But the time for synthesis into a compact, completely rounded, and sharply limited system has not yet come.

After the preceding general consideration of the subject, the student's attention is now directed to two points as especially worthy of consideration, both for the sake of obtaining clearness, and a basis for future progress. These two points are: the determination of the exact sphere of the æsthetic emotion, and the explanation of the conditions of æsthetic appreciation. A careful consideration of these points will lead into the very heart of the subject, and will concentrate attention on what is most essential in æsthetic theory.

First, then, *What is the sphere of the æsthetic emotions?*

The very question implies that there is in these emotions something which constitutes them a peculiar class. What now is it that makes them peculiar? What are the characteristic marks of what we term the æsthetical? Evidently we make a mistake if we treat beauty as the characteristic mark of the æsthetic. That beauty does not exhaust the sphere whose limits we are seeking, is tacitly admitted by all writers on æsthetics when they draw so many other subjects into the discussion. Thus, in considering the representative arts, they cannot confine attention to beauty, that being but one of many elements entering into those arts. *Æsthetics* as the theory of these arts must necessarily include all pertaining to them, while beauty alone leaves much in them unexplained. But the sublime, the tragic, the comical, are usually treated as also belonging to æsthetics,—surely sufficient proof that there is a large

class of objects having in common what is called æsthetical, and that of these objects beauty forms but a part, not the whole. We must thus try to discover what beauty and these allied subjects have in common to constitute them æsthetical.

That æsthetics lies in the domain of the agreeable, is universally admitted. Thus, whatever its source may be, the æsthetic effect is always pleasing. Even when the subject is tragic, it must be so presented as to be fascinating. But the peculiarity of the pleasure in such cases has not been clearly defined; and for this reason the æsthetic element in agreeable objects has often been confounded with the agreeable in general. It is of first importance, therefore, to seek the characteristic mark of the pleasing element in æsthetics.

We have already seen that whatever is low or merely sensual is not æsthetic. The vulgar does not belong to the sphere we are seeking. The same is true of all that does not rise above the limits of mere sense-impressions into the sphere of the intellect. Likewise the impressions through the lower senses are excluded; they do not furnish material for such intellections as are required in æsthetics. Taste, smell, touch, and the organic sensations are too grossly real, too directly adherent to the material, to admit of the spiritualization found in æsthetic concepts. Sight and hearing are more intellectual, the media through which they are excited are more refined, their spheres are more exalted; and, while less dominated by gross matter, they are more free for intellectual play. The very extent of the spheres of these two senses suggests a certain degree of freedom; while the others move in a small sphere, and are severely limited. The higher senses give immediate play to the intellect, while what the other senses present must be dropped

before such play is possible. The latter are therefore properly called the lower senses, and are the conditions for the lower pleasures of life, while the others are higher in the intellectual scale, and furnish material for æsthetics. Whatever is æsthetic must transcend the vulgarly or physically agreeable, such as the pleasures of appetite, and must rise into the sphere of intellectual contemplation. The æsthetic emotions consequently imply a certain degree of intellectual development, and also culture and refinement. The æsthetic element in Plato's "Symposium" consists in the intellectual, not in the gustatory, feast.

Having now risen to the agreeable as a mental quality, and having taken æsthetics out of the realm of vulgar pleasures, it remains to determine its exact place among refined gratifications. The question is, What is the intellectual character of æsthetic pleasures, or what peculiarity in our intellectual operations constitutes the charm of æsthetics?

All æsthetic pleasures are, of course, subjective, but they are not personal; that is, they do not spring from the fact that on me, as an individual, any benefit has been conferred. What is purely personal and exclusive, pertaining to me only, and of interest only to me, is excluded from æsthetics. There is thus nothing selfish in it. The joy that springs from an acquisition of fortune or of honor is no more æsthetic than is the taste of a savory meal. Neither is a tragedy in real life æsthetic. This gives an important hint as to the place of æsthetic emotion; it is not found in any natural affection, nor in any real experience. Joy and sorrow occasioned by real personal affections are not in the sphere of æsthetics.

Nor is the purely intellectual element, intent only on truth and understanding, the sphere of æsthetics. This

excludes mathematics, logic, and science. However great the pleasure connected with the discovery of truth, the demonstration and judgment of truth do not constitute the essence of æsthetics. That these may be the occasion of æsthetic emotions, is not questioned, but from them these emotions do not spring directly.

It is thus evident that the real alone does not constitute the sphere we are considering. It must be some particular aspect of the real, or some relation it sustains to the intellect, or some notion or suggestion of the real. Thus the mere reality of a flower, or the science of that flower, or the fact that edible fruit will grow from the flower, has no æsthetic significance. For the cow that eats it, but not for the artist, the mere reality of the flower is the only consideration. That nevertheless truth and reality, particularly in the form of ideals, are essential to genuine æsthetics, has already been sufficiently indicated.

The entire discussion forces us to regard the imagination as the sphere of the æsthetic emotion. Not the logical inferences from the real and from truth constitute æsthetics, but what the mind in its free play, according to the laws of possibility, makes of them. The combinations and creations in æsthetics must be true (according to rational principles) while free. Thus the imagination is not wild, not a lawless fancy, and its products are not monstrosities, but it works within the domain of reason. All its productions, if æsthetic, have, however, a relation to our emotional nature; their appeal to the soul is responded to by a feeling of pleasure.

The imagination deals with the real in a representative manner, and this representative element is characteristic of all æsthetic objects. Not, then, what an object is in itself, but what it represents, what it is in point

of suggestiveness, makes it æsthetic. The mere fact of brilliancy, no more than its carbon, makes the diamond an æsthetic object; that fact may be made simply the occasion of scientific inquiry, without an appeal to the emotions. So a real sorrow is simply sorrow, but its representation or description may be æsthetic. See the storm with King Lear! Suffering itself is painful; yet its description is not only free from actual suffering, but may also be very fascinating. So the descriptions of pleasure may, by means of representative elements, produce æsthetic effects. Thus, in what are termed beautiful arts, the effect depends on what they suggest, on what they represent, and on the manner of the representation. In thus transferring the sphere of the æsthetic emotions from the real to the representative, we find the interpretation of the conspicuous part played in æsthetics by symbolism.

The representative element in art will readily be admitted, but its existence in natural objects termed beautiful may not be so evident. This may be a reason why æsthetics has by some writers been limited to art, while the beauty in nature has been excluded. But a careful study of the æsthetic effects of natural objects will also prove that these effects depend on representative elements. Thus no natural object has an æsthetic significance if beyond its bare reality it has no suggestions or inspiration for the mind. A landscape viewed merely as so much nature, or as of certain utility, has no æsthetic value. But when, aside from its utility and science, nature appeals to the imagination, it may have æsthetic effects. A mouse may be one thing to the peasant, and something very different to the poet Burns; yet its bare reality may be to either of less significance than to a cat. It is thus evident that the

æsthetic effect depends in every instance on what the mind associates with an object, or on what the imagination interprets into an object or constructs from it. Not the little faded flower is charming, but the withered hopes it symbolizes make it so attractive.

The discussion of the sphere of the æsthetic emotions has already led us to the second point, which we must now consider more fully; namely, the *conditions of æsthetic appreciation*.

The consideration of this point confirms in a remarkable degree the correctness of the indicated sphere of the æsthetic emotions. We do not look for æsthetic appreciation where the training has been merely utilistic or scientific; how, then, is it obtained?

This appreciation is only possible when we rise above the naturalistic and realistic standpoint, into the realm where the imagination moves amid symbols and representations, and is free to form its own constructions. Æsthetic appreciation thus depends on a peculiar kind of culture,—a culture in the discernment of the representative element in objects, and also a culture of the feelings which respond to this element. All other things being equal, the minds richest in suggestiveness (minds called by the Germans *geistreich*) will be most æsthetic. With the richness of suggestion we must not confound the depth of emotion; what a mind lacks in variety of suggestiveness may be compensated for by depth of emotion. The broken column on a tomb may be richer in suggestion to the poet than to the mother who erected the monument; but the one suggestion to the mother excites deeper emotions than all the suggestions of the poet.

The æsthetic faculty, as it may be called, like all other mental powers requires exercise, training, develop-

ment. The first things that claim attention are such as meet physical needs; hence the appetites are so predominantly exercised for years, and we cannot speak of æsthetic appreciation in the infant. For the development of this appreciation, or taste, the exercise of the imagination is the condition. With its earliest intellectual operations the child enters the sphere of the representative. Thus the very name "mamma" is a symbol, being representative, as all language is.

In order to understand the conditions of æsthetic appreciation, we must again recur to the formation of mental states. We are apt thoughtlessly to regard every judgment as independent of our subjective state; we treat it as if invariable and universal: in other words, we treat subjective judgments as if they were objective. Where judgments are purely mathematical, logical, or scientific, we of course place ourselves on the objective standpoint; and we generally make the mistake of regarding all judgments as of the same character. This is fruitful of error, particularly in social, ethical, æsthetic, and religious matters, and in all cases when a purely subjective element enters into the judgment. There is a large class of subjects which cannot be determined according to the strict principles of exact science. We might call judgments respecting them subjective, determined largely by the estimated value of objects to ourselves; although the aim should constantly be to attain the objective standpoint, which is the norm.

Since so many of our judgments, opinions, and views depend on our subjective condition or state, it at once becomes evident that attention to the state is of first importance. The very word "taste" refers to the subjective state, and thus implies that the norms of taste

are not necessarily found in objective nature or art. Let us call this inner condition, on which so much of æsthetic appreciation depends, the æsthetic state. How is it formed?

We have seen that, whatever of our mental processes is conscious, the formation of mental states of more or less permanence is a process below the horizon of consciousness. As in the growth of plants and animals, so in the development of mental states, we can see the results, but not the process itself. The temporarily conscious operations of the mind leave a permanent impress on the mind itself: they must be viewed as real operations or conditions of that mind, not as mere happenings on its surface. Every thought, in proportion as it is deep, works changes in the mind, and no thought leaves us as it finds us. Particularly by repetition are ideas and thoughts embodied in our state, assimilating, as it were, the mental organism to them, and determining the character of its life. All habit is an illustration of the fact that there is a tendency in our nature to become what we do.

Under certain processes of culture the representative element becomes a permanent and a prominent factor in our mental state. Thus certain objects become symbols, and their real meaning may have less significance than the symbolical. But not only does an object lose its real in its representative element, but the thing symbolized is also lost in the symbol. How often is a word taken for the concept, and the sign for the thing signified! Idolatry is a striking illustration. Thus we may have hieroglyphics, but not their interpretation. The power of symbols or of the representative element depends on mental association; and this association depends on past experience and training, as they have

become permanently embodied in the state which they have formed. The very fact that they have formed the state implies that they are somehow subsumed into that state, and continue to live and work in it. Thus on our past history the associations and the suggestions of our minds depend. Owing to the difference of states and of consequent associations, that which causes one to weep makes another laugh.

The process of forming representative elements and symbols goes on ceaselessly. While all language is based on this process, it is most apparent in that which is figurative. One thing is made to stand for or to represent another, so that an object may be the symbol of an infinite variety of objects. Then the association of an object takes the place of the object itself. Thus the joy that springs from an object may make that object the symbol of joy in general; as light, a feast, a song, or a dance. In this way objects which most deeply or most frequently affect us become representatives of all objects of the same class.

There is thus a constant cultivation of a state in which the representative element is prominent, a state which is the condition for æsthetic appreciation. And our æsthetic state depends on the difference in the mind's symbolism. The moonlight has a different effect on one who sees in it only a condition for more efficient work at night, from what it has on him to whom it has associations of poetry, music, and love. Its effect on lovers on the Grand Canal at Venice differs from that on the gondolier who earns a few more sous than in a dark night.

In the state formed gradually by culture we have the standard of æsthetic appreciation. It may be a prosaic or poetic, a commercial or an æsthetic, a scientific or

an imaginative state; but whatever the state, it is always the condition of æsthetic effects. We judge, esteem, appreciate, feel, according to that state which conserves in itself the sum total of the impressions made on us during the past; the present factors in influencing that state must of course not be overlooked. Hence the difference in impressions on the same person, by the same object, at different times.

Just because the state itself determines the nature of the impressions, we are not conscious of the standard according to which the impressions work. In æsthetics there is usually an immediate beholding; the impression is received directly, intuitively, as it were, by the sum total of the state. The mental process in the impression is, like all other mental processes, known only in its results. The mind's standard in the appreciation is the state that mind is in; or we may say that the standards are latent in the mind, being there potentially and working there, but not consciously. Thus it requires a special effort of reflection to determine the reason of æsthetic appreciation, the taste being first and immediately active as appreciative, and then as critical; it first receives the æsthetic impression, and then searches for the cause of that impression. Appreciation and criticism are therefore not necessarily equally strong in the same person.

The immediateness of the æsthetic beholding or intuition is proof that the mind is, at the time, not conscious of the standards according to which it acts; yet it is commonly ignored that the mind unconsciously acts according to its standards or ideals, just as it unconsciously forms them. Even when in vigorous exercise, they may elude the efforts of reflection to discover them; and it is not surprising that but few per-

sons are aware of the standards which determine their appreciation. In order to determine all the elements which enter into the appreciation of a flower, scene, or picture, all the factors embodied in our state through the whole course of past development, and now working there, would have to be known. No more in a purely intellectual than in an æsthetic appreciation is the whole past experience involved. We must therefore conclude that the ideals formed in the process of development and actively working in the mind are its standards of appreciation; but these ideals are embodied in our state, or help to constitute it, so that they work in that state itself, though unconsciously.

Since unconscious associations and unconscious ideals operate in æsthetic appreciation, we can understand why so much remains obscure in the process. We have not consciously at command all the factors which enter into æsthetic emotion. In art criticism we, however, seek to interpret the emotion by analyzing its elements. The various processes which the student of art at first performs slowly, laboriously, and consciously, at last become habitual, easy, and unconscious. Thus even the rules of criticism, like those of grammar, work directly, and are applied unconsciously. While æsthetic appreciation is therefore immediate, the condition for its immediateness and character may be the product of years of development.

There is a striking difference in the effect produced by the different arts. This is largely owing to the nature of the representative element. Poetry is the most definite of the arts, music the most indefinite. The preceding views will help us to understand this. It has been said that poetry appeals to the feelings through thought, but music to thought through feeling.

Indeed, we may arrange the various arts according to the distinctness of their representative elements, — a striking confirmation of the theory that the representative is the sphere of æsthetics. Poetry is so definite because it uses language which expresses ideas in the clearest manner. But let one hundred musicians hear the same piece of music, and the chances are that no two of them will agree exactly as to the thoughts intended to be expressed. The explanation is found in the symbol used; namely sound, but not in the form of articulate language. Sound, as a symbol, is vague, the same tone being capable of different interpretations. The obscurity of the symbol thus explains the fact that the appeal of music to the imagination is so indefinite. And yet therein, in part, is its power, since it gives so much free scope to the imagination.

After determining the exact place of æsthetics and the conditions for æsthetic appreciation in general, special inquiries can be instituted respecting beauty, the chief object of æsthetics. In beauty we have the highest object of æsthetic appreciation, the culmination of taste. All that constitutes the æsthetic element in any object must also be found in beauty. Thus its sphere is found in imagination, in an intellectual symbolism. Perhaps the most serious mistake has been made in the attempt to treat it as the only æsthetic object, or as peculiarly æsthetic, whereas it shares its general characteristics with other æsthetic objects. But in beauty certain æsthetic qualities reach their highest development. Into beauty enter the reason, the spirit; beauty pertains to what is most agreeable to the imagination. Perhaps the term "beauty" is used so vaguely, and applied to so many merely agreeable objects, just because it lacks those striking peculiarities which have

been sought in it. Whatever is beautiful has a peculiar excellence; and, instead of a peculiarity of quality, beauty is rather an exalted degree of qualities also found in objects not pronounced beautiful. *Beauty is an æsthetic emotion, excited by a pleasing object which appeals to the imagination with a degree of perfection approaching the ideal.* Beauty, thus, always pleases. The medium of the pleasure is the imagination; and it pleases, because it approaches the highest concepts of excellence in representation. Thus the blending of agreeable sounds in music, the harmonious arrangement of colors in painting, the symmetry of form in statuary, are beautiful in proportion as they present to the imagination representations of pleasing objects in a state of perfection approaching or suggesting the mind's ideals.

Beauty is thus mental: it is an idea, existing in the mind. But there are numerous symbols of beauty. The idea may be embodied in an object; that is, certain objects may be symbols of the idea, or they may represent ideals.

Since beauty, like sight and sound, whatever its occasion may be, is always mental, the soul is peculiarly drawn to objects in which beauty is represented. The soul seems to discover itself in such objects. Beauty, so far as spoken of in objects, meets, expresses, and interprets the soul's longings, though often indistinctly, as in music. And genius in art consists in the power to form constructions and creations which appeal with an ideal effect to the imagination, and express most perfectly the soul's conception of representative excellence.

REFLECTIONS.

Etymology, Meaning, and History of *Æsthetics*. Define Feeling. Importance of a theory of the Feelings. Their Origin. Their relation to Thought and Volition. Their Immediateness. Does Feeling determine Values? What is Beauty? Relation to the Pleasurable. Is Beauty always an idea or ideal embodied in form? Unconscious mental basis of the Beautiful. Beauty in mind and in objects. Freedom or play of the soul in contemplating Beauty. Power of contrast on the emotion of the Beautiful. Effect of reflection on the emotion. Relation of Beauty to Goodness and Truth. Distinction between Beauty and its conditions. Is Beauty in the ideal, or in its representation? Views of Beauty in empirical and idealistic schools. Is it mere form? What is Genius? In what sense is it a law unto itself? Is it unconscious of its law? Define Art. Give its divisions. Aims of the so-called Fine Arts. Classify them. Indicate the æsthetic element in each. Advantages and disadvantages of the Opera. *Æsthetic* value of the various Arts. Aim of *Æsthetic* Criticism. Define Taste. Can Beauty ever exist as the sole quality or characteristic of an object? If Beauty is perfection of substance (in quality or form), can Beauty have a value independent of the substance? Apply this to Poetry, Oratory, Style. What value is attributable to Beauty in objects? Application of *Æsthetics* to education, religion, and other departments. Define the sphere of the *Æsthetic* Emotions. The significance of the representative element. Symbolism. Conditions of *Æsthetic* Appreciation. How are mental states formed? What elements are conserved in our states?

CHAPTER IX.

ETHICS.

HOWEVER complete a thought may be in itself, we regard it as complete in its relation to our personality only when it somehow affects the feelings and the will. When knowledge becomes æsthetical and ethical, we have seed and flower and fruit. But also in another sense we see in ethics the crown of philosophy. Being based on a knowledge of thought, of being, and of feeling, it concentrates the results thus obtained, in order to find the principles of morality, and to construct the theory of doing. While thus the completion of rational thought, it is, on the other hand, also fundamental, since ethical principles are involved in the construction of logic, metaphysics, and æsthetics.

As a philosophical discipline, ethics seeks the principles of the volitions or of conduct. It is rational and theoretical, aiming at the discovery of the principiant element in action. It is frequently placed under the head of practical philosophy, since it aims to give the law for all practice; yet it is not an art, but the philosophy of the art of the true life. There are numerous phases of life which it does not discuss directly, but in no sphere is practice possible whose fundamental principles are not found in ethics. It seeks not the totality of reason in conduct, but this reason so far as it has a moral bearing. Hence, instead of ethics, we have the term "morality," or moral philosophy.

A clear and distinct apprehension of the idea of morality reveals a sphere different from metaphysics, noetics, and æsthetics, yet intimately connected with them. All it has in common with them is made peculiar in that it is viewed exclusively in its moral aspect. It is the peculiarity of the ethical concept on which attention is now to be concentrated.

Both an intelligence which works necessarily, and a law which operates blindly, exclude the ethical idea. This idea involves, as a constitutive element, the conception of an alternative. A being without choice is reduced to the level of natural objects, controlled by force, and cannot be moral. The doctrine of fate annihilates the will, and makes ethics impossible. Equally destructive of ethics is the doctrine of chance. If there is no unalterable law, then there is no standard to which conduct must be conformed in order to be moral. Morality cannot be arbitrariness. If each will can determine arbitrarily the ethical, then morality is not objective: it is not grounded in reason, and cannot fix a rule of action. If fatalism retains the name of ethics, it reduces the discipline to a natural science, while chance reduces it to chaos.

All morality involves choice between alternatives, but not every choice is a moral act. The character of the choice is determined by the end in view, and by the means for the attainment of that end. The ultimate end chosen (design, purpose, aim, motive) always involves ethics; but the choice of the particular means for its attainment is not necessarily moral. If the ultimate aim is carnal gratification, the choice is manifestly immoral; if right is the aim, the choice is moral. It is the ultimate aim, — the object sought as the consummation of all choices, — which determines the character of

the life, casting its light or darkness over the entire course. There may be mistakes in the choice of means to attain the end, but success or failure may involve much that lies beyond our power; and we are not responsible for the inevitable, nor for a knowledge beyond our reach. Not results beyond our control, but solely the ends honestly chosen, and consistently sought, determine the moral quality of life. Hence the attributes generous, miserly, noble, selfish, good, bad, right, wrong, may designate the life as a totality, giving the ruling motive as the vital force, and determining the ethical character of the products. Hence character, judged as a totality, and not according to separate acts, which may be exceptional, must be measured by the end chosen, and by the measure of consistency with that end. That life's aim also affects the choice of means, and determines the character of the means, is evident. Consistency with a good purpose makes bad means impossible. But for the realization of certain ends various means may appear to be equally effective and good. In that case it becomes morally indifferent which is chosen. If means are morally equal, the choice may depend on other than ethical grounds. By following to its utmost consequences all the considerations which enter into a choice, we should undoubtedly, in every instance, come to an ethical principle; but this does not mean that what ultimately involves ethics also implies an ethical element in the details of the choice of an individual, since the ultimate principles rationally involved may lie wholly beyond his reach. Not what is ultimate in ethics, but what is ultimate for me, in my peculiar circumstances and with my peculiar attainments, is the standard of my responsibility. Such reflections make evident the need of a general theory

of conduct as a preparation for ethics, just as in æsthetics we felt the demand for a general theory of the emotions.

Can a being perfectly good, and meeting with no opposition, be called moral? Its perfection would be much like that of a law of nature; the difference being that the perfect being would work intelligently, with a definite end in view. God is moral in the sense that He is always perfectly in accord with the moral law, not because He has an alternative. We must view Him as the source and embodiment of the moral law, and His deeds as expressive of the perfection of His nature. He is free in that He is not subject to external restraint. His acts are determined by His own nature. In Him, therefore, we find freedom and necessity united. The term "morality" can consequently be applied to God in a peculiar sense only; and to prevent confusion, it is better to avoid it altogether, and substitute for it "holiness."

The subject-matter of ethics is the good, or that which has moral worth. If in the good is found the characteristic mark of all that is ethical, it must be determined what constitutes the distinctive peculiarity of the good, what its criteria are, how it is related to truth and æsthetics, wherein consists its distinction from the pleasurable and the useful, and how it can be attained. Such subjects as man's personality, his relation to God, the freedom of the will, the nature of conscience and character, the essence of right, virtue, duty, responsibility, and the questions connected with motives, means, and ends,—all belong to ethics. It thus deals with the problems which involve the greatest concerns and the deepest interests of life; and one need but appreciate its significance, to understand why so many

thinkers have viewed it as the culmination of all philosophy.

We distinguish between philosophical and theological, or Christian, ethics. While the latter discusses the principles of morality found in and demanded by the Christian system, the former investigates those discoverable by human reason. In speculative theological ethics (especially the work of Richard Rothe), there is a union of Christian and philosophical elements. While Christian and rational ethics may be treated separately, they cannot be permanently divorced. A complete philosophical ethical system must include the Christian elements which are rational; and a Christian system of morality cannot ignore any ethical demands of the reason. They cannot both be final unless there is an essential agreement between them. If such an agreement cannot be established, either the Christian or the rational system will be regarded as supreme, and the other subordinate, or else the one will attempt to supersede the other. If Christian ethics is viewed as a purely human product, philosophical ethics will seek to give its rational explanation, and will wholly absorb it,—all that is in it being valued only so far as it is rational; but if viewed as divine in its origin, its relation to philosophical ethics will have to be determined. Christian ethics must be rational, not indeed in the sense that all its principles can be discovered or fully explained by limited human reason, but in the sense that faith in them must be reasonable. We are concerned here, however, only with philosophical ethics.*

* On the relation of Christian to philosophical ethics, see Dorner, *System of Christian Ethics*, 17-28. For the literature on ethics, philosophical, as well as Christian, see the same work, 28-42. The valuable list of English and American works on the subject, 39-42, is by the translator, Professor C. M. Mead.

While in theological ethics the principles are taken from Scripture, philosophical ethics searches for them in the light of reason. The objects of its search are the good, absolutely and relatively, and the ultimate grounds and norms of conduct. Its principles must be universal, applying to all moral beings, and including in their application both the individual and society. The essence of the ethical impulse is the imperative *ought*. While it works immediately, unconscious of the ingredients involved, it is really very complicated, and includes all that pertains to the moral process. That something ought to be, implies that it is not, and also that it will not come of itself. The very possibility of ethics, therefore, implies incompleteness, imperfection, — a recognition of a more perfect state than the existing reality, and the need of effort for its realization. We do not feel ourselves bound by the things that are, but by that which ought to be. The imperfect real is not our standard, and cannot give it. The ideal is our law. Being in antagonism with the existing reality, this law cannot have its origin in the things about us. The consciousness of an *ought* springs from a contemplation of the contrast between the real and the ideal. Ethics is a forecasting, a projection of the mind beyond what is, and a prophecy of better things. We stand on the real, but only to rise above it, and to work up to something beyond. We must not, however, imagine that the mere contemplation of the imperfect and the perfect makes morality possible. We must recognize ourselves as related to both, as somehow responsible for the relation sustained, and as able to promote the ideal by the use of the real. Thus the ethical always involves a process, an effort, a development. It is possible only in a world that is imperfect, and yet has in it the seeds and condi-

tions of perfection: it involves ideals, the possibility of their attainment or of approach thereto, and a consciousness of responsibility respecting their realization. Much as intellect and feeling have to do with ethics, the will is the supreme factor.

From the time of Socrates till the present, an effort has been made to discover the principle of morality, or the standard of right. The fundamental question has been, What is the ultimate appeal, the final law? In opposition to the sophists, who made morality, as well as truth, something subjective, individual, a matter of opinion, Socrates aimed to establish it on a universal and eternal basis. Plato finds the moral ideal in God, who is the supreme good; and this is the view prevalent in his school. While the same idea lies at the basis of Aristotle's ethics, he discusses, in his book on that subject, moral conduct and the particular virtues more fully than the fundamental principles. The importance of the subject has led to the frequent discussion of ethics in recent times. Principles formerly thought to have been firmly established are now attacked. Different philosophical schools have set up different standards of right; and in this, as in the other departments of philosophy, the conflict of different views is radical. Respecting details, as well as many general rules, there is much unanimity; but respecting the ultimate principles, such as the nature, the basis, and the criteria of the good, there is great diversity. It is in ethics that the fundamental differences of theism and atheism, of idealism and materialism, are most apparent. While much remains to be done in order to determine particular moral laws, the most essential thing needed is the discovery of the basis on which the whole system of ethics rests.

Viewed with respect to this basis, the various ethical schools are usually grouped under two heads; namely, the intuitional and the utilitarian. These names, however, embrace a great diversity of views. Frequently the intuitional and utilitarian principles are represented as diametrically opposed; but sometimes an effort is made to unite, or at least to reconcile, them. Too frequently the fundamental principles adopted are stated so indefinitely that their exact nature cannot be determined. The terms "intuitionism" and "utilitarianism" themselves need more careful definition. As a general rule, the intuitional school finds the standard of moral conduct inherent in man, as something *a priori*, not learned from experience. If this is taken in the sense that the capacity for morality is innate, so that man need only be properly developed in order to become ethical, it is difficult to see how any objection can be found to this position. It puts the innate element in morals on exactly the same basis as that in noetics and æsthetics. But if the *a priori* element excludes the *a posteriori*, so that not merely the capacity for morals, but also the moral ideas, are made innate, intuitionism is subject to the same objection as the doctrine of innate ideas in general. But if it is found that there is a basis for morality in the very constitution of our being, ethics will be placed on an immovable foundation. Right will have its source and law in the very nature of things, and should be done for its own sake; and then it is an end in itself, not merely means for attaining something else. It is this absoluteness and ultimateness of right which the intuitional school seeks to establish. The utilitarian school, on the other hand, denies that there is such an inner, inherent standard, but holds that the useful determines the right; hence the name "utilita-

rianism." The useful has itself been variously conceived, sometimes being taken in a lower, at others in a higher sense; sometimes as the means of pleasure, or happiness, or well-being, or some other real or imagined good. Bentham held that it is the aim of morals to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and this view has generally prevailed in modern utilitarian ethics.

It is not surprising that the relation of the principles of the two schools continually varies. Sometimes these principles approach each other, as if a truce was to be made; and then again they are antagonistic. They are treated as if they excluded each other, when this is not necessarily the case. A utilitarianism may be possible which is in perfect harmony with intuitionism. The subjects overlap: they are two circles which intersect and thus have a part in common. Both, if they go deep enough, must take something as innate; both must learn from experience; both recognize the useful. Hence, in reality, both are intuitional, and both are utilistic. According to their usual treatment they, however, differ in their intellectual apprehension of the right, not respecting what is innate, unless intuitionism means innate ideas, or utilitarianism means that absurd empiricism which finds outside of the mind what can only be in the mind. There is no reason in intuitionism itself why it should not regard right as inherent in our nature, and determined by the constitution of things, and yet regard the right as the useful. The difference is thus less a question of inherence than of intellectual development; though it is evident that the intuitional school seeks a metaphysical basis, while the utilitarian moves more in the realm of the phenomenal. Yet when traced back to its source, the impulse

to do right, whether it be synonymous with the useful or not, must necessarily have its basis in the nature of our being. Whatever may be its external occasion, the *ought* is always inner, personal.

As intuitionism refers primarily only to the psychological source of ethics, so utilitarianism refers primarily only to means, not the end. Both names are, therefore, objectionable as a designation of the entire system of morality. A less satisfactory word than "utilitarianism" could hardly have been chosen for the ultimate principles of morality. The useful is always means, never an end. How, then, can the means to an end be the end of moral conduct? Perhaps we cannot conceive an ethical system in which the right and useful are not in the end perfectly harmonious. But if the useful is the law for ethics, we at once ask: Useful for what?

There are certain precepts which we regard as of binding authority. What constitutes them an imperative command?

It is here assumed that this authority really exists for every normally developed human being. Its non-existence would prove a being not moral. If the intellect may be so perverted that the normal exercise of thought becomes impossible, why may not the moral nature be so perverted as to fail to discern between right and wrong? But the moral perversions of men, and the diversity of views respecting the right, are no evidence that morality has no basis in the constitution of human nature.

Morality, being something objective, and the same for all responsible beings, not mere subjective preference, whim, opinion, or arbitrary determination, it is as subject to laws as are our reasoning faculties. The deepest inquiry must always conclude that these laws

have their basis in the nature of things; and that, in their ultimate consequences, they must tend to produce harmony. Laws which govern phenomena cannot themselves be made phenomenal. Were there no moral order in the universe, our moral laws would not be harmless fiction merely, but an actual perversion. However we may define the right, its last interpretation must be consonant with our own being and with the design of things. This broad and deep view of morality reveals it as objectively real and eternal. But we must distinguish between the absolute norm for morality and its conscious possession. Just because so deep, it is difficult of discovery; and different views of the standard of right arise from different apprehensions of the nature and source of things, or because the individual and the temporal, instead of the universal and eternal, are made the basis of morality.*

We are not born with a code of morals ready for immediate application; such a code can only be formed by training and education and surroundings. As these vary greatly, so may the views on particular points of conduct, however universal and alike the innate moral basis. But why is a moral training at all possible? Because there is moral capacity in man, making him

* It is the narrow and shallow conception of morality which constantly leads us to misapprehend its nature. The very terms generally used to designate moral conduct and relations need but be understood in their full breadth and depth in order to get at the essence of morals. When we speak of the right, we do not get the full meaning of the term unless we take it in all its relations; namely, right in consideration of all that exists. We want to do what is due and proper, not merely when we consider ourselves only, but in view of other men also, of the universe, and of God. If we cannot take all this into the account in moral action or in determining the right, the difficulty is with our intellect; and our inability to apprehend the broad, eternal basis of the right should not lead to a perversion of morality itself.

susceptible to moral impressions, and capable of moral aspiration and of resisting immoral tendencies.

While no amount of training or education could make a being ethical unless it had an innate moral capacity, the peculiar direction of morality in an individual depends largely on the intellectual development. The different elements of our nature are so intimately related that the state of the one must also affect that of the other. The innate element of conscience consists not in the apprehension of this or that conception of right, for that would imply the existence of innate ideas. With increased knowledge, our previous judgments may be reversed. It is thus seen that they are intellectual, dependent on our mental attainments. So long as the purely theoretical element in morals is made its essence, conscience cannot be regarded as either innate or unchangeable. Conscience is an impulse to the right. This impulse has its basis or possibility in the nature of our being. Without this emotional or impulsive element, we might contemplate truth theoretically, without any feeling of personal responsibility respecting it. When the intellect has discovered the right, conscience impels us to do it. Conscience, viewed as merely or mainly a discernor of right, is put on an intellectual basis. How inadequate this view, is evident from the fact that conscience does not merely impel to do the right known, but also impels to seek the right and the truth. Thus instead of being an intellectual apprehension, conscience is an impulse behind all intellectual activity; it is the ethical energy in human nature.

Viewed in this light, conscience reveals a most important aspect of our nature. The fact that we are not indifferent to right and wrong establishes the truth

*Hyslop's
ethics*

that we are moral beings, — a truth whose significance for our position and relations in the universe is of inestimable value. This truth is the basis of all ethics. We may not always be able to determine with absolute certainty what is right, but that does not interfere with the absoluteness of conscience. The way to the right may be lost, but this very possibility implies that it exists. So the impulse to seek and to do the right may be partly suppressed by lust or other agencies, and thus the normal action and development of conscience may be hindered. But the absence of certain tendencies and impressions, under particular circumstances, does not prove that in a normally developed human being they would not be present. The arguments against the innateness of conscience are largely of this negative character, and in reality prove nothing against morality as an essential element of human nature.

While emphasizing healthy moral views as a condition of healthy moral conduct, we need not hold with Socrates that correct knowledge is the only thing required. In a being otherwise perfect, this would indeed be the case; but, as we have seen, there is as striking evidence in human nature of emotional and volitional as of intellectual perversion. What is apprehended as right by the intellect must be chosen by the will before there can be moral conduct. The frequent rejection by the will of what is recognized as right, is too common to require special mention. The different elements of our nature, involved in morality, greatly complicate the subject. While the will is the most essential factor in the realization of morality, this will depends largely on the proper relation of the intellect and the emotions to the right. In morals we have an aspect of truth different from that given in logic and

æsthetics, an aspect which puts us into peculiar relation to it: the relation of responsibility. In morality we are made to sustain a personal relation to the truth.* An intellectual being without the ability to discern right and wrong, and without the feeling of responsibility, would wholly miss a certain aspect of truth. The truth would be viewed only in its objective relation, not as having a personal interest. Such a being would lack a peculiar sense, and all that pertains to morality would be as foreign to him as color to a blind man.

That personal relation to the truth which exists in morality is the ground of all moral law or of duty. Take that away, and it becomes absurd to talk of morals. How do we account for the consciousness of this relation? Why can we not rest in the contemplation of the ideal good, just as we do in that of the ideal beauty? Ethics begins when besides the contemplation of the ideal we recognize any degree of responsibility for its realization. There is always in morality a categorical imperative, though its content may differ from that formulated by Kant. What makes this imperative *ought*, always found in morals and never in any thing else? We have answered that it has its seat in conscience; but this leads to the question, How did it get there? In rational ethics we seek an explanation of that impulse which is the basis of morality.

In harmony with a broad tendency of modern thought, conscience has been pronounced a product of evolution. How this was possible is not explained satisfactorily, nor is there agreement as to the exact nature of the process; but whatever the differences respecting

* A relation involving the whole person as a person. Personality involves self-consciousness (the consciousness of self as distinct from all other objects) and self-determination.

details, evolutionists usually regard conscience and the whole of ethics as the product of natural development. Some lay the stress on heredity, by means of which certain predispositions and tendencies are supposed to be explained; others emphasize the training, the influence of the environment, and the association of ideas induced by habit. The theory of evolution has certainly directed attention to important elements heretofore too much neglected. The basis with which an individual starts (whether the product of heredity or not), the historical development into whose results he is placed, the statutory laws, the customs of the people, the prevalent views of morality, and the habits he forms, are all potent factors in determining his views of morals and his moral conduct. The correct theory of ethics cannot be found by ignoring or rejecting these factors, but by fully considering them, and critically distinguishing their real from their imagined influence. Since what is innate and implicitly (potentially) present may be subject to evolution so as to be explicitly (really) present, there is no reason why intuitionism and evolution may not be harmonized.

Over-zealous Darwinians (especially materialists like Carl Vogt) are apt to create suspicion even respecting those elements in the theory which are well-founded. Thus, as is so common in such cases, the theory is established before the inductions justify it, and then it is used as an absolute law to interpret facts. The efforts to evolve morality and religion from brutes depend wholly on analogical reasoning; and it is evident that frequently human elements are interpreted into brutes, in order to discover in brutes ethical and spiritual germs. If the animal *could* develop itself up to man, or if something *could* be added to it which would make it human,

the question would be settled. But this very possibility remains to be proved. The process of evolving men from brutes is too often accomplished by first making men brutes. Here is a region in which hypotheses luxuriate in the name of exact science. Some of the very advocates of this theory fail to study man himself as an individual, as a part of humanity, and in connection with the history of human development. Until the specific element of morality is found in matter or in the animal,—not merely an imagined something from which its evolution may be imagined,—we shall be limited to its discussion where certainly found, namely in man. The apparent analogies, mere interpretations on our part, do not establish a real likeness or sameness.

Heredity, the laws of association, historical development, the training of the individual and his environment, the statutory laws and prevalent views of legal right, can at best account only for prevailing moral opinions. They never lead beyond the historical and psychological contemplation of morality. Let us suppose, too, that, in accounting for what is, they explain the opinions respecting what ought to be, and give an impulse to seek what is recognized as right. Now, if besides these nothing else were involved in morality, the question of its origin might be settled, very largely at least, by an appeal to these factors; the origin of the imperative *ought* would of course not be explained. But these are not the only factors. Instead of letting all that may have come through inheritance, the laws of association, historical development, training and environment, the constitution and laws of a land, the views of legal right, or any or all existing views and theories, determine the ethical laws, I subject all these to criticism, interpret them rationally, accept some and reject

others, and form a standard of right which is not given by all of them combined. There is such a thing as historical morality, but we distinguish it from the rational and philosophical. The latter may even use the historical as a help in the formation of its ideals; but history or custom can never determine the character of rational ethics. The laborious ethical process starting with the historical, the hereditary, and the environment, but rising above them under the sole guidance of reason, and making all of them subject to its criticisms and laws — surely no one will claim that this process is hereditary, or associational, or historical, or a product of the environment. The fact is, that purely evolutionary morality, in ignoring the rational element, is not morality at all; it reduces the moral processes to natural law, and thus robs them of the very thing that makes them moral. But rational morality can use all that such evolutionists claim, and can give it full weight in determining the character of morality. Give evolution something to evolve; give education something to educate; give the environment something that is environed; determine not merely what the laws of association do, but *why* they work as they work; in other words, let reason give an adequate philosophical explanation, instead of the partial psychological and historical ones usually given, and all that enters into morality will receive its proper place in the system. We only get morality when we interpret what is, and what must be, into an *ought*; and this interpretation is only possible if the interpreter is rational, personal, and responsible. I can be moral just because I can rise above all that I have been made by heredity and other influences, toward an ideal which springs from my own being, and whose contemplation impels me to seek its realization.²⁵

Whoever admits the distinction between what is and what ought to be, virtually admits the supremacy of mind in moral questions. It is in morality that the autonomy of mind appears in its most perfect form. Unless we are a law unto ourselves, whatever may be needed to develop us to become such a law, a system of ethics is impossible. Man is an ethical being because he can be himself in the inexorable nexus of things, and can say *yes* when the environment says *no*. In ethics man lifts himself to the height of his own ideals, and rises from things to personality. Morality is not a creation out of nothing, but from that which is only in mind. We cannot go behind this: our mind is so constituted that in its normal development the moral ideals are produced. This may be called idealism, because the ordinary realism cannot produce it or even account for it; but it is an idealism which is the intensest, and the only true and abiding realism.

We have already found that the utilitarian and intuitional schools do not necessarily exclude each other. Even if the basis of morality is intuitive, that does not exclude a utilitarianism which adapts means to a certain end, though it opposes the substitution of means for end. The end sought by utilitarianism may be pleasure for the individual or society at large, or it may be the preservation of the individual and society, or welfare, well-being, health, efficiency. In all these cases the right (in the sense of means) is determined by the useful. Where morality is viewed as part of biology or natural history, it will be regarded as somehow the product of the effort of conscious life to follow "the line of least resistance" or "the line of least pain," and to make hunger or physical craving its occasion or source.

Usually hedonism and eudæmonism reject the ego-

tistic and favor the altruistic or social view, recognizing the happiness or welfare of society at large as the great aim of morals. It is admitted, too, that the pleasures sought are not the low ones, but the highest. Sometimes they are spoken of as rational, and the desire to attain them is called a rational desire in distinction from the sensuous. The meaning of course is not that the libertine and savage, in the pursuit of gross pleasures, have morality to perfection. This is not even the doctrine of Epicureanism, though it is frequently so understood. The social and rational are connected as intimately as possible with this pleasure. But taken even in its most rational sense, can pleasure or happiness be regarded as the ultimate end of conduct?

In examining utilitarian writers, one is struck with the difficulty of remaining consistent with their theory. It is frequently found that they actually abandon the theory, or else make concessions on important points. Thus J. S. Mill, a true Benthamite in the theory that pleasure is the only good, makes a significant confession.* Speaking of a crisis in his mental history, he says, "I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken *en passant*,

* *Autobiography*, 142.

without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self-consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, exhaust themselves on that; and if otherwise fortunately circumstanced, you will inhale happiness with the air you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal questioning. This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life." Surely a strange end that is defeated when made "the direct end"! If enjoyments are to be taken "*en passant*," without being made a principal object," it is hard to understand in what sense they are to be made the ultimate end or "principal object."

If happiness is the sole object, then the means for its attainment must be right, and there is no difference in the moral *quality* of pleasures; yet this the advocates will not admit. As soon as any moral quality aside from the pleasurable itself is admitted, pleasure ceases to be the sole object of moral choice. If the happiness of others is the final moral law, then if I have the choice of making fifty good men or fifty-one bad men supremely happy, I ought to confer the happiness on the bad, and leave the good in misery. If not, why not?

The debauchee makes pleasure the ultimate rule of conduct: why condemn him? To say, because his pleasures are wrong, is yielding the whole point, and making something else than pleasure the rule. At best it can only be claimed by the hedonist that the debauchee is mistaken as to the means of obtaining

pleasure, since by his licentiousness he destroys the very capacity for enjoyment, and ruins himself. The state of a man may be such that what pleases him works destruction ; then he must be put into a state in which his pleasure will conduce to his welfare. This means that if a man's state is right, his pleasures will be beneficial. Make yourself what you ought to be, then you will do what gives the highest pleasure. No one doubts that if he becomes perfect his greatest pleasure will be in the perfect, and that this pleasure will be right. But here character is made the great aim, being viewed as the end to be attained irrespective of the pleasure, while pleasure is regarded as but a natural consequence of that character. Not what is merely means is sought, but the end for which the means are the condition ; not what is merely phenomenal, as pleasure, is the aim of ethics, but what is substantial and permanent, namely a state or character.

But if character is the ultimate aim for the individual, why shall he make any thing else, as happiness or welfare, his aim in dealing with his fellow-men ? If for himself character is the condition of the highest well-being, must it not likewise be so for every other member of society ? Those who admit this may still claim that, while character is the great aim, it is sought solely for the sake of the happiness it affords. One need but state the proposition in this bald way to show that no one can really advocate it ; and it may be unconditionally affirmed that he who seeks character solely for the sake of pleasure, will neither form a perfect character nor attain the highest pleasure.

If pleasure or happiness is the aim, how can I ever feel it a duty to sacrifice for the sake of others ? It may not be to me a pleasure to sacrifice myself for

others; indeed, if it is a pleasure, it is hard to understand wherein it is a sacrifice. Hedonism either destroys all sacrifice for human welfare, or else reduces it to the blind instinct or impulse of the brute. To regard sacrifice as the result of calculating the amount of pleasure to be gained, destroys its nobility. Sacrifice is noble when performed for the sake of right and duty, and it is regarded noble in proportion to the intensity of the suffering. That the joy of doing right more than balances the pain of the suffering, may be true, but it does this because it is right; but the right is not done for the sake of securing greater pleasure.

Frequently the appeal is made from pleasure to the right. A man finds his joy in the lowest pleasures,* and he is urged to forsake them because they are wrong. Surely in such cases the appeal is not made from one pleasure to another, but to something qualitatively different. If the difference in the pleasure is only quantitative, the man living in the grossest pleasures of vice differs only in degree from the man who is virtuous, benevolent, and in every respect morally perfect. With pleasure as the standard, misery is the only vice.

In the discussion of utilitarianism, it is common to confound things that are wholly distinct, and for this reason so much of the discussion is inconclusive. The confusion is largely the result of confounding an intellectual with an emotional element. Thus the apprehension of the right is continually contrasted with the desire for happiness, whereas the two may be in perfect harmony. The conflict in this case, if there is any at all, is between the intellect and the emotions. Instead of contrasting the intellectual apprehension of right

* How can pleasures be low if the pleasurable is the right?

with a desire, we should compare the intellectual apprehension of right with the intellectual apprehension of the pleasurable. When this is done, it will at once be seen that the two are not synonymous. The apprehension of the right, in the broadest sense, takes into account all moral relations. Applied by the individual to himself, it implies a correct relation to all things. If he takes account only of his intellect, or only of his feelings, or only of his conduct, his view of the relation will be partial; he must take his whole being into account. This relation must include the family, humanity, in fact, all things in all their bearings, in order to be full and perfect. In all respects the individual wants to be right in his relation to all things. The right in this full sense is what is due or becoming, what is in harmony with truth, with God, with the perfect ideal. The fact that we cannot take so deep and broad a view of things does not interfere with the idea and the eternal basis of right itself. This rightness of relation, this correctness of myself in view of the whole universe of being, involves the right relation of my being, and all that proceeds from it; and thus includes character and apprehension and desire and conduct, and not feeling merely.

When now we turn from this broad, all-comprehensive, rational view of right, to the pleasurable, what is the difference? While the former includes the pleasurable so far as right, but only as an element in connection with rightness of being, thought, and conduct, the pleasurable as the aim of morality takes a partial view of right, namely only so far as related to the feelings, and ignores all the others. For this reason, however the pleasurable may be harmonized with right, it can never be the complete basis of ethics; it puts a

part for the whole, and thus destroys the possibility of a perfect system. Another vice in this method is the fact that it makes this part an emotional instead of a rational element.

The deeper we pursue these considerations, the more defective hedonism appears. Its advocates cannot be consistent, because they put on the throne what is subordinate; they make the conclusion the major premise. It is certainly strange that vulgar pleasures and the highest approval of conscience should be put into the same category as pleasurable. Better substitute for pleasure rightness of emotion, and under this include all the feelings which spring from a proper relation to objects. It thus includes intellectual joys, peace, and all true gratification, but rejects false pleasures which have their source in a false relation to things. We thus distinguish ethical from base pleasures. The standard of the former is something objective; the standard of the latter is subjective only.

This rightness of being and relation, demanded by ethics, presupposes that there is a possible harmony between the moral being and the universe.* With this deep basis of ethics in the nature of things, we shall have no difficulty in harmonizing the views which make the right and the pleasurable the end of morals. We have already seen that the former, as the more comprehensive, includes the latter. If there is reason in the universe, then the right relation of being must result in pleasure to a creature with sensibility. Pleasure is, in fact, only a harmonious emotional relation. Rightness in being and relation implies harmony, satis-

* To view man only in relation to his environment is belittling, unless the whole universe, physical and spiritual, is regarded as that environment.

faction, and all the emotions which can spring from the proper influence of one being on another being. Where the right, then, in the full comprehensiveness of its meaning, is attained, pleasure must be one of the results. It is an effect, but not the whole, there being other effects also; it is not a cause or the end. It is a good; but a good which has its source in the supreme good, in a character which puts a man in every respect into the right relation. When this right relation is contemplated rationally, I get the idea of right; when I view it in relation to my emotions, I get the notion of pleasure, happiness, welfare; when I view it in relation to conduct, I get the law for moral action.

When morality is compressed into the sphere of the emotions, instead of being viewed as a rational principle, its aim must of course be made happiness or pleasure. If the desire refers to a feeling as the object sought, it must of course be happiness. All feelings are pleasurable or painful; no one can desire the latter, unless he can desire what is not desirable. To speak of a desire for pleasure, is really tautology; we can have no other desire as desire. In opposition to all such efforts to make morality merely emotional, Kant is right in emphasizing the purely rational element in ethics; but he goes too far in wholly rejecting the emotions from ethical conduct. A course is not right because I desire it, but I ought to desire it because it is right.

Is feeling the sole motive power of the will? Many claim that this is the case, and it is taken for granted by those who affirm that the pleasurable determines the right. But in spite of the generally adopted theory to the contrary, feeling is not the sole motive power of the will. There is no feeling unless it is felt; and it is evident that much of our conduct is not preceded by

emotion. So in the purely theoretical contemplation of the right, we can decide what it ought to be in the abstract, without considering our emotional nature. Having decided what it is theoretically, in the abstract, it can be chosen as the theory of conduct without considering its personal application and without giving an occasion for any personal feeling to arise. Not in the abstract determination of right, any more than in any other abstract question of truth, need my feelings be aroused. But in the specific application of the theory, when it comes to practical details, personal feeling enters into consideration. In determining the right in the abstract, we carry on a purely intellectual process. And when the right has once been determined, there is no reason why it should not be made the law of conduct, without considering feeling, or even against feeling. We seek the truth because it is the truth, something final in itself; we seek the right because it is right, also something final. And if feeling or prejudice interferes with truth, we reject such interference; and we do so equally respecting the right. So far from letting our emotions determine conduct, reason demands that its own voice is supreme and shall alone be heard. A moral judgment is an imperative; but just because it is a judgment, it is not an emotion. The love of duty or the pleasure in the doing does not lessen the morality in the case; the moral element is, however, not in the love or the pleasure, but in the duty. As in æsthetics, so in ethics, we form a state (character), and the norms embodied in this state act directly, without waiting for an emotion to intervene. In ethical conduct we do what we are, not merely what we feel.

The root of many perversions in ethics is to be found in the false theory that feeling is the sole motive power

of the will. Can we not choose to make reason the standard instead of feeling? Undoubtedly. But what is the motive in thus choosing reason? The fact that this choice is worthy of my being. I thus prefer worthiness of being to phenomenal emotion. Only by confounding preference, which may rest on other than emotional grounds, with pleasure, does the theory of feeling as the sole motive of the will find any basis. There may indeed be a choice between different pleasures, but there may also be a choice between pleasure and reason. Even if we view ethics wholly in the light of values, we can value the law of reason above the impulse of an emotion. We can choose nothing in which we do not somehow have a personal concern and an interest; but it is a mistake to regard feeling, or more specifically the feeling of pleasure, as the only human concern. I may even recognize it to be my duty to do the very thing my feelings oppose; if, then, conscience can oppose all impulses to pleasure, how can pleasure be the impulse of conscience? By making subjective pleasure the standard of ethics, its ideals are degraded and destroyed.

One of the latest German works on ethics* affirms that "what is in no sense a good for me, I cannot desire solely for the sake of good to others; but only in case it also has for me a perceptible and appreciable value. In this sense it must be affirmed that in every human volition is necessarily involved not merely eudæmonism, or a reference to the feeling of pleasure in general, but also egoism, or the reference to the feeling of personal pleasure. It is totally impossible for a human being to choose an end, and the necessary means for its attainment, which have no relation to his personal feeling."

* *Vorfragen der Ethik*, von Dr. Christoph Sigwart; 886, p. 6.

It should readily be admitted that every choice is related to our feelings, and the realization or failure will necessarily effect the feeling; but this is not the point in dispute. The question is whether feeling is necessarily the motive or the aim of the choice? This presents a radical problem, and the character of a system of ethics will depend largely on the nature of the solution.

In ethics we move in the domain of values, and no choice is possible unless the object chosen has some worth in our estimation. This is implied in the choice itself, and is an essential element in all volition. But it is a mistake to make the feeling of pleasure the test of worth. If an object has worth for me, I of course rejoice in its attainment; but if I choose it because it is noble, true, right, it is a perversion to make the joy which is merely an incidental result of this choice the motive of the choice. I do not choose the true for the reason that I prefer it to the false, for that is putting truth on a level with mere subjective whims; but I prefer it to the false because it is the truth. In other words, the ultimate ground of choice is not the mere fact of preference; but the fact of truth is the reason for the preference, and the ultimate ground of choice. I thus make truth the rule for my preference, not my preference the rule for the apprehension of truth. In choosing the truth as truth, I do not at all consider the effect on my feeling; how, then, can feeling be the motive of the choice? By making it the motive, we simply make an effect the cause. The very fact that I can choose what is right in the abstract, and because it is right, without regard to the feeling produced, is conclusive proof that I choose for the sake of the right, not for the sake of any pleasure it may produce. Even in the choice of the right, I have satisfaction or pleasure; but it is not for the

sake of this pleasure that I make the choice, but for the sake of the right, and the pleasure is simply a concomitant of the choice. Let us say that we love the right, and that we choose it because we love it; then of course the choice of right, as a mere choice, is put on a level with the choice of the basest gratification, although it may spring from the noblest nature. But why do we love the right? Not because it produces pleasure in us, but because it is in harmony with a righteous character. And where reason has become the guide of life, the right is loved and chosen for the sake of what it is, not for the sake of the emotion it excites. So I affirm that I take pleasure in truth; but does that mean that I value truth only for the sake of the pleasure it excites? It is thus evident that the real motive in choice, whether selfish or altruistic, or purely rational, or whatever it may be, depends on the character of the person, and on the rule adopted for life. I, of course, cannot prefer a thing without preferring it; but that does not mean that I prefer a thing because it gratifies, since the question of gratification may not at all have entered into the consideration. If I can contemplate an object as it is in itself, abstracting wholly from its relation to my feeling, then I can also abstract from my feelings in choosing it. Against my feeling I can put an imperative *ought*, and can choose a standard against my feelings. In other words, reason, conscience, character, as well as the desire for pleasure, can be made the motive of conduct. Epicureanism is possible, but so also is stoicism.

It is thus evident that a sharp distinction must be made between the motive of the choice and the feeling which is merely concomitant. The very fact that there may be reason in a choice, implies that the rational element may predominate over the emotional.

The position here taken disposes of such questions as these: Does ethics depend on something inherent in the mind and on the relations of the mind, or does it consider only results? Is it grounded in the constitution of things, or in considerations of what is yet to become? Such inquiries are based on a supposed antagonism, where in reality there is none. What results, and what ought to become, must somehow be in the constitution of things. In the completeness with which it contemplates objects, ethics takes into account both what is and what ought to be. But in considering what ought to be, ethics again takes into account the constitution of things. It aims at a state, something that abides, not merely to produce a transient emotion. Instead of making a feeling the standard of reason, it makes reason the standard, and feeling an element in the process of realizing its end. By making emotion its law, we reduce ethics to the level of æsthetics; but by making it inhere in the constitution of things, and seek a state or condition in harmony with the ideal of this constitution, we get the true idea of ethics.

We have now attained a standpoint from which we can judge all moral claims. Every aim short of the rightness mentioned falls short of the final aim. This, of course, does not imply that the aim itself is wrong; it may be right but not final; it may be embraced in that final aim, as an arc in a circle. If it is said that the aim is the survival of the fittest, we ask, fittest for what? If the survival of the fittest means the fittest to live, that is likely to survive without any help. How can the fittest to live do otherwise than survive the unfit or the less fitted? If the aim is the preservation of life, the question arises, why preserve life? Neither is the "efficiency of the social organism" the final aim.

Efficiency for what? Every aim short of rightness of being and relation fails to reach the tap-root of ethics. Every deep inquiry pushes down to this rightness; and while the modern horror of metaphysics may seem to absolve men from the necessity of finding this tap-root, it does not oblige them to deny its existence, and to affirm that the roots lying on the surface are the deepest.

Do what we may, we cannot get morality as a natural process, but only as a process of reason. To the *must* in nature, I oppose the *ought* of reason. So if the pleasurable only is the object of choice, we are forced to take our place with Socrates, and say that we need but know the right to do it. The *ought* in this case, as much as in the other, becomes a *must*. I ought, however, to do the right even if I cannot see just what pleasure will flow from it; I ought to do it even without considering the question of pleasure. If the pessimist sees in suicide, not merely of the individual but of humanity, the only hope of relief from misery, why not commit suicide? Ought not the parent to strangle his child if that is the only way to save it from misery? What *right* has he to let it live if happiness is the reason of the *ought*?

The freedom of the will involved in ethics has caused much speculative difficulty. Its theoretical explanation was regarded by Kant as impossible, but he held that it is a necessary postulate of the practical reason; and he did not hesitate to declare that the primacy belongs to the practical, not to the speculative reason. Alternatives are presented to us, as, for instance, the objects of reason and of sense, and we choose the one and reject the other. So far there is no practical difficulty. True or ideal liberty is frequently spoken of as a union of

freedom and necessity, namely, the voluntary choice of that which is true, right, eternal, or which is for reason a necessity. This removes from the freedom of the will all mere arbitrariness. If it wants to be truly free, it must choose what is objectively true and right. The ultimate ground of this freedom is in the spirit; it is free because it has the power of self-determination so far as its own conduct is concerned. It can choose between an external and an internal law; it can become a slave of things, or can be a law unto itself. This is involved in the idea of personality. Our reasoning is so involved in the chain of cause and effect, that we usually regard all cause as itself only the effect of something else. We even regard being as involving the idea of cause, when it does nothing of the kind. Change involves the idea; but being is that which *is*, while only that which *becomes* involves the idea of cause. A being that is free does not necessarily create, but it chooses. It cannot be part of the mechanism of nature, that mechanism which in our day is often so exclusively viewed as to be made the standard for judging all things. The spirit cannot be mechanical and yet have choice. We, indeed, imagine that we understand the mechanism of nature, while the choice of the spirit is pronounced an unfathomable mystery. But we have seen that we understand the one just as perfectly as the other, the necessity in nature being not a whit more explicable or rational than the choice of the spirit. Besides, if the mechanism of nature is the law of mind, then not only does all the mystery remain, but thought is also involved in contradictions. How can this mechanical necessity produce the conviction of freedom, of choice, and all the activity of conscience? Then the belief in freedom, and all other

views, true or false, are a necessity. But if necessary, they must be true; in other words, error is truth. Not on a mechanical, but only on a rational basis, is a system of ethics possible.

In our subject philosophy verges on religion; morality is, in fact, their point of contact and the ground which they have in common. While in rational ethics we consider man in his relation to the universe, in religion we consider his relation to God. But ultimately his relation to the universe depends on his relation to God, and thus religion and ethics are found to have essentially the same basis. In any true sense, a system of ethics is impossible on atheistic principles. If, for instance, there is no design in the universe, there can be no end which I ought to realize. It is absurd to claim that man ought to seek certain results, if he is not made or intended for any thing. In ethics we have the very strongest argument for design. Even utilitarianism need but be probed to the bottom in order to discover that it must finally rest on a theistic basis. With nothing but matter and invariable laws, it never can establish the fact that I ought to sacrifice for the good of the greatest number; all it can do is to claim that I must let myself go as the unalterable laws force me. Even if I can persuade myself that there is a moral order of the universe, or a moral law, whose source is not in a personality, I do not see how this involves an imperative. Why not let this law or order take care of itself? It must be self-evident, that without the conception of obligation a system of ethics is not possible; but it is equally clear that to affirm obligation without giving its ground is irrational. For the fact of the *ought*, the reason demands the *why*, in order to learn whether the fact is authorized. Just here is the point

where various systems fail: they attempt to build ethics without laying the foundation. They do not go deep enough; they assert responsibility without giving a sufficient reason for it; they construct a system which has significance only for personality, but ignore personality itself, or at least its legitimate inferences; and their whole work is an effort somehow to conjure from the *must* of nature the *ought* of reason. What wonder if in such systems of ethics the essential characteristic of ethics is wanting? However we may try to avoid them, there are certain postulates without which a moral system is impossible: Personality as the ground of obligation and the condition for its apprehension; reason or design in the universe, giving certain ends or an end to be realized; and a future life for meting out that justice which is not attained here. If these are admitted, it will also be necessary to postulate the existence of God, without whom it is impossible to find for them a rational basis.

REFLECTIONS.

Definition of Ethics. Relation to other departments of Philosophy. Rational and theological Ethics. Basis of Ethics in human nature. Different Systems of Ethics. Their relation to this basis. Relation of Right and Happiness. Criticism of Intuitionism and Utilitarianism. What is Conscience? How regarded by Evolutionism? Objections. What is involved in the concepts of Obligation and Responsibility? Define Personality. The Useful, or Means as an End. The Conception of Freedom demanded by Ethics. Ethics of Materialism. Source of Ethical Ideals. What is the Good? God as ethical. Personal and social Ethics. Relation of Law, Politics, Sociology, to Ethics. Ethical

demands in view of Socialism. Pleasure and Worthiness. Ethics of Feeling and of Reason. Why seek the Happiness of the Greatest Number? Sacrifice; Benevolence. If Pleasure is the end of Morality, how can pleasure ever be wrong? What is involved in the conception of base pleasures? Brute-impulse and Conscience. Hope of Immortality as based on Ethics. Kant's Argument on Immortality. Heredity, Environment, and Rational Ethics. Objective Standard of Ethics. Mind freeing itself from things in Ethics. Ethics and Design. Is he responsible for any thing who is not intended for any thing? Kant's Categorical Imperative. His Essence of Morality in a Good Will. Aristotle's Essence of Morality in the realization of the Design of our being. Is a Good Will original or acquired? How is Remorse possible? Is a knowledge of Right and Wrong innate? What is innate? The relation of Reason and Feeling to Volition. Ethics as the culmination of Philosophy. Freedom of the Will. Relation of Morality to Religion. Postulates of Ethics.

CHAPTER X.

THE SPIRIT AND THE METHOD IN THE STUDY
OF PHILOSOPHY.

INQUIRY among students from the most prominent institutions has revealed the surprising fact that they were permitted to finish their collegiate course without receiving special instruction respecting the aim and value of the particular studies, and respecting the proper spirit and best method in their pursuit. As a consequence, certain branches were studied simply because required as conditions of graduation, not because their importance for mental development and practical application was appreciated. Under these circumstances it is not strange that so many studies are pursued in a mechanical way, and tend to hinder rather than to develop the spirit of the real student. A study should be made rational by indicating its nature and aim, and by showing how it can be pursued most successfully. It is certainly presuming too much to suppose that the student understands the purposes of studies which are entirely new to him; and many who are eager to learn do not get the full benefit of instruction in the classics, mathematics, history, and philosophy, because they are left to grope their way in the dark. The answer of many students to the question, Were you taught the aims of your various studies, and the best method of pursuing them? is, "No; I was left in

the dark until I discovered, after years of hard toil, what I should have known in the beginning." Not a few admit, even after graduation, that they do not know how to study.

Of all studies, philosophy is the most purely rational; and in order that its pursuit may be rational, the student should get a clear idea of the nature of philosophy, of the aim and spirit in the study, and the best method for attaining success. If heretofore the chief aim has been to determine the nature and purpose of philosophy, the attention will now be concentrated on the demands made by philosophy on the investigator; in other words, we shall now consider the spirit and method in the study of philosophy.

While this spirit and method are necessarily involved in all the preceding discussions, their separate treatment affords an opportunity for a definite statement of what was all along implied, and for giving a summary of the conditions essential for the solution of the problems presented. While this chapter is therefore in part a review of the course already taken, its chief aim is to help the student to become an independent philosophical inquirer.

Philosophy is theoretical wisdom, or the idea of wisdom traced to its ultimate principles. The study of philosophy requires practical wisdom, which consists in the choice of a worthy end, in identifying the spirit with that choice and end, so that it becomes an embodiment of them, and in selecting the best means for the attainment of the end. For the student of philosophy, practical wisdom therefore requires a clear conception of philosophy itself, and a knowledge of the way to its attainment,—requirements peculiarly difficult when the mere comprehension of the nature of the desired object

demands such laborious investigation as philosophy. If an object can be discovered only by pursuing the way that leads to that object, it is not very logical to ask the student to determine definitely the object desired, in order that he may find the way to it. This forecasting of the mind, this anticipatory and prophetic element, which becomes the impulse and guide to realization and fulfilment, is among the most important of our mental functions. A sketch is thus made by the mind which it afterwards fills out; an ideal is shadowed, and life is absorbed in the effort to make the ideal itself clearer and real. Thus we define an object, and then we seek the object itself with all its wealth of fulness. Were the definition more than a shadow, we should not be required to follow its outlines so long and laboriously in order to find the substance. But how important the shadow of philosophy if it leads to the substance which casts it!

The object of search is brought nearer and becomes more distinct in proportion as progress is made in the journey. The mountain outlined against the distant horizon gives but a faint idea of the real ascent. Just as the domain of science grows clearer, as conquest after conquest is made, so the nature and the sphere of philosophy can be understood only in the ratio of progress in philosophical study. The student must expect the greatest difficulties in the beginning; but with the right start, he will find that every forward step leads him to greater clearness and to richer possessions. The most extensive view can be obtained only on the summit; but every progress in the ascent enlarges the view and makes the summit itself more distinct.

Philosophy, then, is presented to the student simply

as a problem for solution. He is requested to define it sharply, and to ponder the definition until the outlines stand distinctly before his mind. But for the contents of philosophy we are obliged to refer him to the solution itself.

The subject-matter of philosophy may be represented by concentric circles; the outer one representing being; the next, the theory of knowledge; the third, the theory of feeling, or æsthetics; the fourth and innermost, the theory of volition, or ethics. Philosophy does not propose to exhaust the contents of these circles, but only to give the principles and their rational systems. In each case philosophy goes behind the details to find the first thought, the beginning, not dependent on other thoughts, but itself the condition of all thinking in that particular circle. A dark background, impenetrable to our reason, may lie behind that basis from which all our reasoning must start; but human philosophy does not demand the discovery of what is absolutely first, but only what is necessarily the starting-point for human thinking. If we are unable to comprehend the whole circle of truth, philosophy demands that the mind pass to the utmost limit of its capacities, so that it may reach what for human reason is ultimate. Philosophy is thus a limitation for the sake of a determination of the first and last rational thought. Distinct from religion, and yet in many respects intimately related to it; sharply separated from the special sciences, yet giving the basis and completion of all science; related to psychology as the temple to the vestibule; related to history as the rational to the phenomenal, and to life as the theoretical is to the practical,—the ideal philosophy is peculiar, with its domain clearly marked, and yet in living connection with all the other realms of

thought. Philosophy can no more exist by itself than we can breathe without air; and other departments are no more complete without philosophy than is the genesis of the oak without the acorn as its seed and fruit.

Philosophy, which is viewed objectively as a system of ultimate rational principles, is to be made subjective, or the real possession of the mind. In the effort to solve this problem, the question respecting the spirit required in the study of philosophy is of fundamental importance. While the spirit is first considered, we are well aware that it cannot be wholly separated from the method. Thus dogmatism, scepticism, criticism, eclecticism, empiricism, and idealism indicate a particular method in philosophy, but also a certain spirit as the source or accompaniment of the method. While the one always accompanies the other, we give the preference to the spirit as supreme, and as really the determining factor.

An attractive view of truth regards it as a seed planted in the mind as the soil, and growing according to its own inherent powers and laws, into the whole system of truth. This makes a truth its own spirit and method, the mind merely furnishing the nourishment required for the growth. Then a correct thought deep and broad enough need but be discovered and planted in order to develop itself into the whole system of philosophy. The figure certainly has the merit of indicating the absorption of the mind required in the development of philosophic systems. But the objection to it is that a process is attributed to thought which is really performed by the mind itself. No thought grows of itself; all the productiveness attributed to it inheres in the mind. It is consequently better to change the figure, and to regard the truth as an organism which

has become independent of the womb, and develops itself, and appropriates all that enters into contact with it. This organism is the spirit itself as the embodiment of a particular truth. The energy of thought is but the intellectual energy of the mind itself. Without hyperbole we can say that the truth becomes spirit, and the spirit truth. It is no more possible to divorce the spirit from its thought, than to separate the sap from the living tree. The consideration of the condition of the spirit is therefore of primary importance, since its character and degree of attainment determine its apprehension of truth, beauty, and goodness, and the nature of the development formed by the apprehension of them.

Intellectual development is as truly self-culture as is the formation of character; and it can never be understood so long as we regard it as a process which takes place in us, but of which we are not a part. Of every one it must be said, "As he thinketh in his heart, so is he." A new thought is a new mental fibre; it both gives us what we had not, and makes us what we were not. The mind is not a receptacle into which thought is put and held, as something distinct from it; but an organism, which in the production of a fresh thought puts all its mental attainments into new relations by introducing this new element, and also itself attains new relations and assumes new attitudes. Whatever it may be potentially or ideally, the intellect is really only what it thinks; and in the deepest sense a man possesses intellectually only what he thinks.

This view of the organic union of the mind and its products — instead of the mechanic one permitting a total separation of the two — reveals the essentialness of a true spirit in the investigation of truth. In our thoughts we have not merely a manifestation of truth

or error, but also a revelation of the intellect. It is not exact enough to say that in intellectual progress there is a constant series of action and re-action, for there is in reality only mental action; but we can say that the truth grows in the mind, and the mind grows in the truth.

Since the mind and its products constitute an organism, all that has intellectual significance must enter this organism and become part of its constitutive elements. There are in reality no laws for a mind except so far as they are laws of that mind. Rules for a study or an art are valuable in proportion as they become spirit. Their aim is pædagogical. Coming first as a foreign element, they are to domineer over the mind until it is trained into harmony with them, and becomes an embodiment of them. We learn rules of grammar to forget them; but we so completely grow them into ourselves that we naturally speak correctly. The same is true of logical, æsthetical, and ethical rules; their mission is accomplished when they become life and spirit, act spontaneously, and require special reflection if we are to become conscious of them. Genius does not ignore law; it is law become personality and spontaneity. Since its rules are so purely personal and subjective, not foreign and external, genius may be least able to explain its operations.

Rules being for discipline and for training, their significance, particularly in philosophical studies, consists less in what they teach than what they make us. The spirit itself must be true if its impulses are to be toward the truth. In a peculiar sense a man's philosophy depends on himself; in the system he produces, the philosopher gives expression to himself. Hence Fichte said, "The philosophy which one chooses is determined

by the character of the man ; for a philosophical system is not a dead article, it is animated by the soul of the man who has it." In the case of Fichte, as well as of Kant, the strong moral elements of the man are seen in his philosophy. How can a philosophy be true to the man, unless he himself is the soul of the system ? We can seek and comprehend only that to which there is an analogy in the mind ; and we can produce those thoughts only whose seeds are within the soul. These considerations make it evident that philosophy, so often treated as purely objective and as a mere abstraction, can become real, concrete, only by becoming subjective ; and that the subjective state, the character of the spirit, will determine the objective character of the philosophy. This is only an application of the law that the cause must be equal to the effect.

The influence of thought on volition is universally recognized, but the power exerted by the will on the thoughts is not fully appreciated. Thinking contains an ethical as well as a logical element ; and frequently, when mistakes and errors occur, the will rather than the intellect requires changing. Pestalozzi's saying applies to intellect as well as to life : " If a man resolves any thing firmly, he can accomplish more than he believes." Jacobi affirms,* that experience and history had taught him, " that the action of man is less dependent on his thinking, than his thoughts depend on his conduct." We are not philosophers by nature, nor is the usual training calculated to make us philosophical thinkers. In order to philosophize, it is necessary to infuse the energy of thought with the energy of the will. Amid the ordinary interests and tendencies of men, it requires a character of peculiar strength to devote the

* In a letter to Hamann.

intellect to the problems of philosophy, and to make the sacrifices involved in this devotion. The Greeks regarded philosophy as in a special sense a free choice, as something that must be deliberately willed, and purely for its own sake. He who cannot exercise this rational choice, and put his whole spirit into it, has not grasped the meaning of philosophizing. The necessity for philosophy is in the irresistible energy of the free mind. So far is it from finding its occasion in the ordinary pursuits of life, that philosophy may even interfere with many of them, regarding them unworthy of the effort required. It is not accidental that it does not usually appear among a people until their immediate necessities are supplied, and industrial and commercial interests have ceased to absorb the attention. Philosophy is not pursued as a bread-and-butter study; it does not lead to wealth, but it gives riches their true value as means, while despising them as an end; the learned professions do not make it a condition of membership; it is not necessary to make a man popular, but rather unfits him for the usual level of popularity. "No man of science ever has in view the utility of his work," said Liebig; indeed, he is too much absorbed by science itself to consider any ulterior aim. The same is true of the philosophic spirit. It does not ignore or question the utility of its pursuit, but neither does it permit this utility to distract its purely rational aim. The immediate use of philosophy consists in the satisfaction it affords the mind itself, and in that it constantly impels the mind to become deeper, higher, and broader. If what is vulgarly called "practical" robs the mind of its ideals, or leads to their depreciation, philosophy denounces it as a positive degradation of individuals and nations. The ideals, as forecastings and prophecies

of the mind, give freshness, inspiration, and a worthy aim to the spirit, and furnish the standard by which the practical should be measured. They are real, not as actual attainments, but as ends to be sought ; and their destruction means the death of the highest mental life. Where the ideals die, pessimism flourishes.

If asked to concentrate into one term all that constitutes the true spirit of the student of philosophy, I refer to the etymology of the word, and answer : the love of wisdom. Love is an affection, and cannot be translated into thought ; but when wisdom is loved, the affection has its source in the conviction of the desirableness of wisdom, and the consciousness of its lack. Where conceit flourishes, there is no room for philosophy. Humility grows with depth ; and the profoundest philosopher is intellectually the humblest. Intellectual pride may lift the empty head, never the full one. Few fathom self enough to know how little they know. The true student of philosophy soon learns that mental verdancy culminates in conceit, just as the folly of fashion in vanity ; and in proportion to the depth attained will he appreciate the well-known saying of Newton, "I do not know what I may appear to others, but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me." Only those who know not of the undiscovered ocean are lost in pride over the pebble and the shell.

The work of Socrates consisted largely in leading the mind to examine itself with a view of becoming conscious of its needs. The knowledge of one's ignorance he regarded as the essence of wisdom. Plato (*Symposium*)

puts into his mouth the sentiment that neither the gods nor any one already wise either philosophizes or desires wisdom, for one longs only for what he has not. Nor do the ignorant seek wisdom, because they are satisfied with their ignorance. Both the stupid and the conceited are thus excluded from philosophy. Plato frequently emphasizes knowledge of self as the most important object of search. In his *Phædros*, Socrates says that he has no time to spend on the interpretation of the mythologies, and states as the reason the fact that he does not yet know himself, and so long as he is ignorant of self he regards it ridiculous to investigate other objects. Self-knowledge is thus made the object of supreme importance. When he comes with Phædros to a plantain-tree, on the bank of the Ilissos, Socrates breaks out in rapture over the beauty of the scenery, which is strange to him. Phædros is surprised that the scenery is not familiar; but Socrates answers that he is eager to learn, but that country and trees teach him nothing, while he can learn from men in the city. Without depreciating other knowledge, we must emphasize, with Socrates and Plato, the knowledge of self and man in general, as a primary condition for the study of philosophy.

The love of wisdom gives both the impulse and the aim in philosophical inquiries. Wisdom can be found only in the truth. All truths are not equally important, but whatever is not true is worse than worthless. Philosophy, viewed as a subjective state, is an absorbing passion for the highest and the final truth. With the purity of this passion no interest must be permitted to interfere. However intense the passion itself, the pursuit requires singular calmness and deliberation. The mind must concentrate its energies on the subject under

consideration, losing itself in that, and following it unhesitatingly to its legitimate conclusions. The truth alone excepted, no results whatever are to be considered. Philosophy wants to get at the heart of things, so as to discover their source and interpret their nature; these do not conform to our views and inclinations, but we must conform to them. The philosophic spirit is revolutionary, and yet conservative, being ready to destroy itself and all things else if not conformed to the truth, and equally ready to sacrifice all to preserve existing truth. Not seeking to make the subjective objective, but the reverse, it cannot be enamoured with the arbitrary, is not controlled by the accidental, and laughs at the transient fashion in opinions. It seeks the eternal, and knows that nothing but truth is eternal. The power of truth is the thinker's power and hope. The reception given to the views of Copernicus made Galileo hesitate to publish the results of some of his investigations. But Kepler wrote: "Have confidence and go forward, Galileo! If I see aright, there will be few of Europe's more important mathematicians who will dissent from our view, so great is the power of truth." Every student of philosophy must say with Locke: "It is truth alone I seek; and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence soever it comes." It is not necessary for a man to be a philosopher; but if he wants to be one in reality, not merely in name, he must be true to the truth.

Schopenhauer declared that it was not in harmony with devotion to truth, for a philosopher to accept a position as professor of philosophy. He affirmed that in the teaching of philosophy in the university the disadvantages were greater than the advantages; and he spoke with contempt of the philosophy of the cathe-

dra (*Kathederphilosophie*). He thought it unworthy of a philosopher to be dependent on the appointing powers, and held that the considerations of the state and religion might induce him to swerve from the truth; and to accept pay for his instruction made it seem as if the teacher was more intent on making the truth minister to himself and family than to devote himself wholly and disinterestedly to the truth. This view may be an extreme; but it must be admitted that an official position as teacher of philosophy has by no means always been promotive of an unbiassed and independent relation to the truth. And from Descartes to Hartmann, some of the most influential philosophers have not been professors,—among them, besides the two just named, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibnitz, and many others, particularly English philosophers. A discipline whose realm is the highest truth can evidently be promoted by those only who unreservedly consecrate themselves to the truth, regardless of emoluments and of opprobrium; and a philosophy that is not free is not worthy of the name. But if the philosopher retains his freedom, an appointment as teacher of philosophy may be an efficient way of promoting the truth.

For the philosophic thinker, the danger of prejudice consists in the fact that its influence is mainly unconscious, working so insidiously as to make its cause the synonyme of truth, and then enlisting all the energies in favor of that cause. When once entertained, prejudice never rests until it becomes universal and omnipotent. The persistence of force applies fully to the mind. A course deliberately chosen will in time control the intellect unconsciously; it forms habits to which every thing is made tributary. A single volition

may be as a seed which grows through life and assimilates to itself intellect, heart, and will. However difficult it may be to become conscious of the principles which control us, they must be known if the pernicious power of prejudice is to be destroyed.

Views transmitted from generation to generation are thoughtlessly adopted and, fortified by the blind zeal of prejudice, are made norms of thought and action. Where heredity, history, and the dominant factors of an age, usurp the place of reason, we find men thrust into ruts from which they can be forced only with a painful wrench. Whoever has seized the idea of philosophy as reason in the exercise of its universal and eternal functions, can hardly understand the possibility of making national prejudice a factor in philosophical studies.* Endowed with the universality of reason, philosophy is superior to the peculiarities of ages, nationalities, and schools. It is better to call it *super-national* than international, since its principles represent what is above the nations, rather than what is interpenetrative and common to them. What difference can it make to him who is absorbed solely in the search

* This prejudice is most senseless in philosophy, yet not uncommon: traces of it are, in fact, found in every land. Speaking of the disciples of Rosmini and Gioberti, Barzellotti (*Philosophy in Italy*, *Mind*, 1878) says: "The disciples clung to the words of their masters, and rejected all innovation and all impartial study of foreign doctrines. The sentiment and the idea of 'Italianism' in philosophy, which were certainly exaggerated by Gioberti, but yet when he wrote had some justification, became in some of his followers a prejudice and a pretext for narrowness of mind and ignorance of all modern culture." "The upholders of Italian doctrines erred in despising German philosophy, while they did not know it; the Hegelians and Kantians erred in wishing to make Italians think wholly in the manner of Germans." Professor Mahaffy says, "In reviewing the theories of past thinkers, the main objects with Stewart and his school were to magnify them if they were Scotch, and to decry them if they were unorthodox." (*Princeton Rev.*, 1878, July, 225.) Similar instances might be multiplied.

for truth, whether a system originated in Greece, Germany, England, Scotland, or America, if only it is true? The philosophic spirit scorns every effort to make truth, science, philosophy, or religion, questions of nationality, just because it seeks what is deep and broad as humanity. While philosophy thus transcends the temporal and the local, it does not ignore the abiding and universal elements in them, but seeks their interpretation and appropriation. A system is necessarily largely influenced by the age and national peculiarities, and it cannot be true to its author and his surroundings unless it has a flavor of both. If the development of philosophy is to be promoted among a people, the growth and present condition of the nation must be considered. The attainments made are the starting-point for all future progress, and the soil into which all imported seeds of culture must be planted. Every system of philosophy is racy. Imported systems must consequently be grafted on the tree of knowledge already growing; they must somehow be adapted to the national life if they are to be assimilated; or, the national life, if false, must be so changed as to bring it into harmony with the truth. But it is not the temporal or national peculiarities which give a philosophical system its rational excellences. Truth is cosmopolitan.

Whatever the ideal of philosophy may be, every actual system is, in a measure, the product of past systems and of the environment. Even those which laid greatest claim to absoluteness are no exception. Hegel held that it is the mission of philosophy "to seize the present and the real." He regarded the truly real as the rational, and said, "It is the task of philosophy to comprehend that which is; for that which is,

is reason. As far as the individual is concerned, he is, of course, a *son of his age*; and philosophy likewise is *the translation of the age into thought*. It is as foolish to imagine that any philosophy transcends its present world, as that an individual leaps beyond his age." * While there is truth in this, every system, to be worthy of attention, must be more than a reproduction of past systems and of its own age: it must be an interpreter, critic, and prophet. Above all, philosophy must not become the imitator of the prevailing fashion. The philosopher, seeking to get from his age those elements which are eternal, namely, the principles lying behind phenomena and controlling them, must maintain his independence, and strive to rise above the particular, individual, and variable, into the realm of pure and universal reason. A philosophic system is the product of a free, rational thinker, under the influence of past systems and his own age. Especially to philosophers does the saying of the historian Ranke apply: "Great men do not make their age, but neither are they made by it. They are original minds, who independently participate in the conflict of ideas, concentrate the mightiest of them, those on which the future depends, develop them, and are developed by them."

A philosopher cannot divest himself of his peculiarities and individuality: how should they affect his philosophy? No one can deny or transcend his nature, but he can cultivate it into the truth. The principal point to be decided is, whether the individual should be made the test of truth, or whether the universal is the law to which all that is individual must conform. Individuality is the standpoint of the ego, universality that of reason. Philosophy seeks *the* truth, not *my*

* Preface to *Philosophie des Rechts*.

truth. History deals largely with opinions, with the exceptional and the individual; philosophy, with what is universally the eternally rational.

Philosophy is destructive of credulity as well as of prejudice. Whatever of Kant's system may be rejected in the progress of thought, the critical spirit he introduced will remain. The philosopher takes for granted nothing which is subject to demonstration; and if any thing accepted cannot be demonstrated, he must give the reason for this inability, and the reason for the acceptance. In this respect he is no less rigid than the mathematician. Indeed, he is in some respects more rigid. While the mathematician assumes axioms, the philosopher makes axioms themselves objects of rational inquiry. Errors long cultivated are with greatest difficulty rooted from the mind, and even after the most critical investigation the truth may escape our grasp. It is particularly in adopting a system or principles, that the student should be on his guard.*

* Whoever would learn with what caution philosophical works should be read, need but examine any thorough criticism of eminent authors. The student who is in danger of undue influence from a favorite author or teacher would do well to consider that ages of careful testing may be required to determine a correct estimate of a system. Thinkers are still intent on sifting the systems of Kant and Hegel, and even the relative merits of Plato and Aristotle have not been finally settled. With all their excellences, H. Spencer's works, as a system of philosophy, cannot stand the tests of the criticism of the age in which they appeared. On this subject the student will find the articles, begun in the *Contemp. Rev.*, December, 1877, by the late T. H. Green, valuable. In the same journal, January, 1878, Jevons gives an instance of the difficulty of discovering the errors of a subtle philosophical writer. He states that, according to the traditional requirements of the London University, he was obliged to use part of J. S. Mill's works as text-books. For twenty years, he says, he made these works a study, and for fourteen he used them as text-books. "Some ten years of study passed before I began to detect their fundamental unsoundness. During the last ten years, the conviction has gradually grown upon my mind that Mill's authority is doing immense injury to the cause of philosophy and

In the deepest sense the philosopher seeks reality, aiming constantly to get at the essence of things. Not that he despises phenomena or form, but he seeks to value them at their worth. The steady aim at intellectual realities is especially demanded in an age when so many delight in visions. Truth has not set its seal on the soul which requires rhetoric, poetry, or fictitious adornments to make the truth acceptable. It may require considerable philosophic depth to distinguish between the truth and its trappings, between the substance and the style.

Few things are more intolerable than the scholastic boor, who wears his logic on his sleeve, demands a demonstration for what belongs to natural impulse, and who deadens thought, emotion, and inspiration, by torturing them into the Procrustean bed of his syllogisms. Philosophy is not to pervert nature, but to aid it in realizing its ideal. The era of Wolff, when men wanted every thing in lectures, sermons, books, and conversation, to conform to mathematical rules, is past; the mechanical and artificial character of his philosophy is not adapted to an age of vigorous and healthy thought. Rousseau was right: education is a naturalization of men, not their transformation into machines.

It would be a wrong to the student to leave on his mind the impression that in the study of philosophy any thing can take the place of the severest toil. Mental power is essential, but not enough; it must be converted into energy. The mind must put itself wholly

good intellectual training in England." He even declares: "I undertake to show that there is hardly one of his more important and peculiar doctrines which he has not himself amply refuted." Many other equally severe charges are made against him. Numerous other examples might be given, all of which are warnings, especially to the beginner, to be extremely slow and critical in adopting a system.

into the subject. Whatever genius may do in art, he who depends on it in philosophy will fail. All philosophers have been toilers. The student of philosophy, as well as of science, may learn a lesson from the patient, steady labors of Newton. He would admit no difference between himself and others, except in perseverance and vigilance. "When he was asked how he made his discoveries, he answered, 'By always thinking about them;' and at another time he declared that if he had done any thing, it was due to nothing but industry and patient thought: 'I keep the subject of my inquiry constantly before me, and wait till the first dawning opens gradually, by little and little, into a full and clear light.'"

It should not be the first aim of the student to learn many things, or to adopt or form a system; but to think, to think correctly and profoundly. If this is well learned, it makes him the master of systems; and if nothing else is gained, it will pay him for the effort to penetrate the most abstruse subjects, and to solve the most intricate problems. If in other studies the attention is directed mainly to the acquisition of knowledge, in philosophy the aim is depth,—the pursuit of a thought to its ultimate source, and the reduction of the multiplicity of phenomena to their underlying principles; so that, instead of gathering new materials of knowledge, the aim is rather to find the absolute explanation of what is already found. But by this thorough appropriation of what we have, the deepest and best new possessions are gained. The delving process reveals treasures of wisdom never to be found on the surface. Just as in the chemical substances, so in intellect, much that was thought to be simple is found to

* Whewell, II. 192.

be compound; what was viewed as isolated, is seen to be intimately connected with other thoughts and to lead to them; what was pronounced exhausted is, by renewed study, made to yield fresh seed-thoughts; hidden recesses, new principles, and undiscovered territories are thus revealed, and new applications are made possible.* The mind, thus disciplined, in the course of time forms the habit of looking at things from the rational point of view, and the deep, exhaustive study of subjects becomes the natural bent of the intellect. The spirit endowed with energy of thought, with a comprehensive grasp, with a disposition to go to the depths, and with the ability to descend through the infinite variety to the fundamental unity, has the elements of a philosopher. The one advice to be given to the student, and always to be repeated and emphasized, is — Think.†

The requirements are such that, if fully appreciated, they may deter many, who are eager to learn, from devoting themselves to philosophy. Without complying with these hard conditions, much may be learned from the reading of philosophic works; but they must be fully complied with if the subject itself is to be truly entered and the philosophic spirit cultivated. The

* Herbart (*Einleitung*, 192) says, "Every system which does not wholly separate its theoretical from its practical part, has hidden sources, which the author himself does not fully understand, but which must be exposed in the course of the examination."

† Schaarschmidt (*Phil. Monatsh.* 1877, 5), speaking of what is required of him who would become a philosopher, says, "It is the activity of the polymathist, one might almost say of the panmathist, which is required as a preliminary. And yet the positive, so-called exact knowledge is still the least of the requirements; for it is not knowledge which constitutes the philosopher, but thinking, concentrated, thorough, methodically trained thinking, to which the sum total of scientific attainment is but a premise with which it starts in its search for the last abstractions and highest ideas."

numerous efforts to popularize systems may have a measure of success, but what is deepest in philosophy cannot be made popular. There is no hope of success for those who do not think in the best sense, except that they may get a smattering of what others have thought; but their minds can more easily be filled from other sources than philosophy. The study is not for those who want to taste many things and digest nothing, or who neglect solid food in order to live on desserts, a process which promotes mental dyspepsia. Those who want to receive their truths as happy intuitions, or imagine themselves philosophers by instinct, should be sent to learn a lesson from the instinct of the ant and the bee. Philosophy may be dreamt of, but is never dreamt. But for the slow, patient plodder, there is every encouragement: for that brilliancy, however, which wants to scintillate its philosophy, there is none. Where independent thought is wedded with a genius for toil, the best results may be expected. A man may be an orator, a poet, or an artist, who cannot be a philosopher; he may be a philosopher, and lack the qualities which shine before men. Philosophy does not go by leaps. Every foot of ground must be conquered and earned before it can be possessed; nothing is inherited, nothing comes by lot or chance, nothing is bestowed as a gift. The student of philosophy may learn a valuable lesson from the slowness and accuracy of scientific investigation. Herbart said: "Instruction in philosophy, without exactness, makes only fantasts and fools." Enthusiasm may be a help, but it creates no truth; it is valuable if it leads to depth, but an injury if it encourages flights from solid ground into regions of revery and mythology. Philosophy has no oracles, and no miracles of speculation. It is the most prosaic prose, whose sole

apology for existence is the fact that the mind cannot do without it.

When beheld from the street, the painted windows of a cathedral are all blurred; in order to see the figures distinctly, and to learn what sacred scenes are represented, one must enter the temple, and view them from the sanctuary itself. So it is with philosophy: to see and appreciate it, the temple itself must be entered. Many come to the door, few pass through the vestibule; perhaps the momentary opening of the door gives a faint and fleeting impression of the grandeur, and affords a hasty glance at significant but uninterpreted symbols. However others may hesitate, let the true student enter boldly; it is his sanctuary. For the earnest thinker, there is every encouragement to study philosophy. If little has as yet been done that can be regarded as final, so much the more remains to be accomplished. Herbart's words apply to our day as well as to his own: "The truth lies before, not behind us; and let him who seeks it look forward, not backward. In his reflections, let him advance as impelled by the problems presented."* He will find limitations, but even their discovery is of great value; and within the limits of the mind he will find more than enough to enlist his best energies in philosophic pursuits. Should it be discovered at last that the ultimate problems of being are unsolvable, he will find even in metaphysics vast regions which the mind can explore and in which new discoveries are possible; while the theories of knowledge, of feeling, and of volition are practically inexhaustible. There may be subjects which are not worthy of great energy; but worthy of greater effort than we can exert are those problems which underlie all others, involve our deepest interests, and constitute the domain of philosophy.

* *Einleitung*, 212.

Having considered the SPIRIT, we now turn to the METHOD in the study of philosophy.

This method must not be confounded with any supposed absolute method of philosophy itself, nor with the method adopted by a particular system, as eclecticism, idealism, or the Hegelian dialectic process. It is not our purpose here to determine how philosophy itself must proceed, but how the mind ought to proceed in order to study philosophy. The subjective method of study, not the objective method of philosophy, is under consideration.

The pedagogical training for philosophy is one thing, the mastering of a philosophical system another, and different from both is the formation of the system itself. While the first is the chief aim of this volume, it can accomplish its purpose only by keeping the other two continually in view as the goal of the mental discipline. In the process through which the student himself must pass, he wants not merely to learn philosophy, but also to become a philosopher. Out of his present self and his surroundings, he seeks to develop himself to the ideal, so that the highest prophecy embodied in his intellectual being may be fulfilled. According to Hegel, what the mind is implicitly (*an sich*), potentially, or in idea, that it should strive to become really. The thinker knows that reason as attributed to the human mind is an abstraction, not a concrete reality. Reason, like philosophy itself, is in a process of becoming; but it is not yet. When the student objectifies philosophy, abstracting it as something wholly apart from mind, he recognizes it as still requiring a certain process of development toward perfection. That process which he ascribes to objective philosophy, must be performed by his own mind in the study and the development of

philosophy. This subjective process is long and laborious, and his habitual methods of intellect may have to be changed. Instead of thinking around and about things, he must try to enter their heart, so that he may get their essence. Not by magic does he pass from the surface to the interior; he must slowly drill his way into the innermost part, in order there to get a standpoint so as to view the whole circumference from the centre. Every description of an object from the surface, or from a point between the surface and the centre, is partial: it misses the centre, and all that lies between the point of view and the centre. These descriptions may be true so far as they go; but their mistake begins when they proclaim themselves as an exhaustion of the subject. Thus there are works on noetics, metaphysics, æsthetics, and ethics, which are rich in excellent suggestions; but the inquiries move along the shell, and therefore fail to reach the kernel, the seat and source of all life.

The ultimate philosophic aim is always the idea, — the perfect idea, not isolated, but in a completed system. In its idea an object is comprehended; in that, and in that only, we see what it is. In its most compressed form the idea is a word, as “philosophy,” “metaphysics;” or it is a definition. But a word is a mere point, a definition is a mere outline; the developed idea is the whole system in its completeness. Thus “philosophy” is a word, of which we give a definition, and which stands for a perfect system. This process from the empty to the full, from poverty to wealth, from the compressed to the expanded, is common to all ideas. We can say that the term “philosophy” contains the definition and system; this is true, but they are contained in a latent form, and the problem is how to make all the implied content a real possession of the mind; just as the word “spirit”

contains *in nuce* all that conscious personality involves, but just what this really means has been the deepest problem of philosophy in all ages. Indeed, there has been much discussion whether this spirit exists in all possible fulness as conscious personality, or is still toiling its way up to the real of its ideal.

From this it is clear what the aim of the student of philosophy must be: not to think at objects or of them, but to think the objects themselves, that is, to apprehend them intellectually. This he does by getting into the centre, by grasping the idea. But this idea is not to be seized merely as a word or definition, but as a system with all its wealth of thought. In this way he is to master philosophy by comprehending its idea, not as a mere point or outline, but in its fullest development and with the richest content.

This aim of philosophy is again emphasized here because its clear apprehension is the condition for securing the method that leads to the desired goal.

The appreciation and rational elaboration of the profound problems of philosophy require preparatory discipline as well as mental maturity. The subject naturally belongs to the higher classes in college or to a post-graduate course. In Germany, the university is regarded as the proper place for its study. All rational inquiry, the study of principles, generalizations, abstractions, and profound investigation of any kind, may serve as a preparation; but the best discipline for the mind properly prepared is philosophy itself. In the preparatory training, all is valuable in proportion as it teaches the pupil to think for himself, to be critical, exact, thorough and discriminating, and to distinguish between subject and object, and between the object before the mind and what it represents.

The best work in philosophy requires the union of the scholar and the thinker. The supreme aim is to philosophize on the deepest and broadest basis. *Multa* for the sake of *multum*, is the motto of the philosophic student; and no department of thought, no interest of humanity, is to him a matter of indifference. The larger the field in which he gathers his materials, and the more comprehensive his view, the more complete will be his generalizations, and the more reliable his inductions and deductions. While going back to the beginning, and taking for granted nothing that needs proof, the progressive philosophic thinker makes what has already been accomplished the starting-point for what remains to be done; in the known he seeks the thread to the unknown. While philosophy is not to be studied exclusively in its history, that history must nevertheless be mastered for the sake of penetrating the various systems of the past, and understanding the philosophical tendencies and needs of the present, thus securing the basis on which thinkers must build. In that history the weightiest problems of reason are presented, as well as the efforts of the greatest minds to solve them. The genesis of problems in history corresponds largely with that in the mind of the individual; and the genetic study of philosophic thought not merely develops the mind, and both reveals and solves difficulties, but it also develops philosophic thought. Memory is valuable as an aid in philosophizing, but a hinderance if it becomes the substitute. The philosopher is not made by learning, but by critically mastering systems; not by committing, but by thinking and perhaps transcending the thoughts of other thinkers.

Original thinking, so strongly emphasized as essential for the true study of philosophy, is often but little

understood by those expected to engage in it. Perhaps they think it implies that even the basis and the content of the thought are to be originated. They forget that the mind does not create its objects of philosophic contemplation out of nothing, and also that reason acts according to established and unvarying laws. Not a few make fancy the most active agent in what they call thinking, regarding it a merit to be able to begin anywhere and end nowhere. Not a few systems would be less brilliant, but more substantial, if their fictions were banished, and only their rational thought were permitted to stand.

Being subject to the most rigorous laws, original thinking rejects every thing that is merely subjective. Thinking is not original because peculiar to him who performs it, but because he does what all who truly think must do in the same way if they take up the same course of thought.* The original thinker is one who does independently a work which is really as universal as mind. If his work lacks that universal character (or objectivity), it may have a psychological interest as a peculiarity, an eccentricity, or as a monstrosity; but it has no claim to philosophic thought.

The thought we pronounce original must be about something. Whence this material of thought? We have already seen that the mind does not absolutely create it; the material must somehow be given to us, or be the product of something thus given. In an absolute sense, that is, without a *posteriori* conditions,

* There is no private property in thought. If a man can originate any thing intellectually, which has significance for himself only, and which cannot be communicated, he is welcome to hoard it. He has found something which everybody else would have thrown away as worthless. My feelings may be my own, but my thought must be universal if it is to be rational.

no thought is *a priori*; just as in an absolute sense none is *a posteriori*. The object of original thought is either found in consciousness (so full of materials before philosophic reflection begins), or is given through the senses, or is obtained from the thinking or investigation or observation of others. The subjects thus obtained, or found by reflecting on these materials, are elaborated by thought, worked over mentally, so that the mind may discover what is in them, or may be inferred from them. If the mind adds any foreign matter to them, it is not done by original thinking, but contrary to all thought. What is original in the sense of adding unwarranted elements, should be sedulously avoided as the root of error. Real objects, and valid thought on these objects, are the conditions of original thinking in the true sense. Such thinking is solid, fruitful, and abiding; and its value consists in the very things which distinguish it from the processes which are arbitrary, vague, unsubstantial, and wild.

It is thus evident that any real subject may be the occasion of original thinking. The mind can take it up in order to fathom it, so as to discover all it is, intellectually considered. Original thought consists in all those efforts of thinking which lead to the discovery of what was before unknown to the thinker himself, though it may have been known to others. A discovery to the individual may be old in history; we may learn much that is new to us, without producing any thing new.

Ordinarily the mind is left to its spontaneous operations, without an effort to give its thought special energy or a particular direction, much less to make the thinking itself an object of rational inquiry. Philosophy checks this vagrant course, in order to throw

thought back on itself, and oblige it to give a full account of itself. Even when the object is not the thinking, but the content of thought (the thing thought of), the question which philosophy considers is: What must I think of this? Thus in metaphysics, although real existence is the object of thought, the question to be answered is: What must I think of existence? What do the laws of thought require respecting it? If in the experimental sciences (psychology, of course, excepted), the mental processes are largely or wholly ignored, while the attention is absorbed by the object; in philosophy, whatever the object, the claims of the thinking subject are fully recognized. The mind knows that the object is its own, and that the treatment to which that object is subjected depends wholly on the mental laws.

There is thus good ground for the view that philosophy is intimately connected with psychology. For all the purposes of philosophy, a knowledge of psychology is of fundamental importance. Although philosophy is not psychological, but rational in its method, — considering what must be, not giving descriptions of what occurs and an account of the laws uniting phenomena into a system, — psychology helps us to find the philosophical problems. The concepts given in consciousness, but not fully elaborated by psychological study, give the materials with which philosophy begins, as well as the divisions of philosophy. What must be left by psychology as problems, is taken up by philosophy for rational solution. All other subjects also furnish such problems, but it is by the study of the mind itself that we become most fully conscious of them.

After the processes of cognition have been consid-

ered psychologically, we take up for philosophical contemplation, first of all, the theory of knowledge. It occupies the first place in the study of philosophy proper, because on it, as a foundation, the entire superstructure rests. Men may, indeed, think correctly without understanding the laws of thought; but philosophy is only possible when thought is self-conscious. This self-consciousness is particularly demanded when the prevalent scepticism can only be met by an appeal to the criteria of thought. Taking into account the condition of philosophy and the spirit of the age, it is not strange that so many emphasize this theory as the main, if not the sole, problem of philosophy. To its solution we must look for a firm basis and reliable method. The stress placed, since Aristotle's day, on logic as propædæutic to all other studies, must be extended to the whole theory of knowledge. The student who prizes philosophy as rational knowledge will proceed rationally only if he, first of all, inquires into the nature, the origin, the validity, the method, and the limits of this knowledge.

It is, of course, not meant that no other part of philosophy should be taken up until all that pertains to this theory has been finally settled. In that case we should never get beyond the theory. As all the other parts of philosophy learn from this theory, so it may learn from all of them. Only by developing all departments and elements of knowledge, can the theory itself be made complete. It is no evidence of vigorous, healthy thinking, to regard knowledge itself impossible until the details of the theory are settled, or to spend all the time on the theory and miss the knowledge for whose sake it exists.

After the theory of knowledge, it seems most logical

to take up metaphysics, both on account of the fundamental character of the thought of being, and because this thought is involved in æsthetics and ethics. But the inherent difficulty of the subject, and the present unsettled state of metaphysical inquiry, may make it expedient to leave it to the last. All the other philosophical studies will then be a preparation for it, and the mind will come to it after that thorough discipline which is required in order to apprehend its problems. This course is the more practicable now, because the other departments of philosophy avoid, as much as possible, the introduction of metaphysical questions. Still the ideal course makes ethics the crown of the whole; but even if placed before metaphysics in the course of study, it may be made the goal of all. Its study before metaphysics does not determine its place in the system, nor does it imply that ethics is to be finished then; it can afterwards be made a specialty, and all other investigations tributary to its development. The whole course of study in college or university is, after all, only preparatory for later philosophizing. From the seed then planted, the whole life is to develop and reap the fruit.

The scheme then is: Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, Æsthetics, Ethics, Metaphysics. The applications of philosophy are almost endless, and this is not the place to discuss them; their consideration must be left to those who take up the specialties to which they see fit to apply philosophy. Thus the jurist will prefer the philosophy of law, the statesman the philosophy of politics, the linguist the philosophy of language, and the theologian the philosophy of religion. Just as with the application of philosophy, so with the study of its own departments; one may choose this, another

that department, as a specialty, each according to his peculiar needs. But for completeness all are necessary.

If antiquated subjects live only in history, others live both in history and in the present. Among the latter we class philosophy. For this reason we cannot agree with those who treat it as worthy of study in its history, but not according to what it is in itself. Only what is finished can be found in perfection in history.

In the study of philosophy, what place shall, then, be assigned to its history? * Were there a history of philosophy itself,—of the connected and progressive development of philosophic thinking, of the growth of the organism of rational thought,—not merely of the various philosophic systems, it might serve as a most valuable introduction to the study of philosophy. Even when the history of philosophy means the history of the successive systems, as is now the case, there are advantages in placing it at the beginning of the course as an introduction to philosophy itself. The thoughtful student finds this history fascinating, and full of inspiration; and the effort to master the various systems is a fine discipline for philosophizing. But there are also serious disadvantages in putting it first. The student is not yet prepared to comprehend the leading problems, much less the systems themselves; for this, the study of philosophy proper is the only adequate preparation. The mind unprepared for this history is confused by the numerous perplexing themes, and lost in the laby-

* The impulse given by Hegel has led to the production of many valuable histories of philosophy, and the most eminent living writers on the subject have come from his school; as Erdmann of Halle, Zeller of Berlin, and Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg.

rinths of speculation.* Instead of clear conceptions, a medley of indistinct notions is usually the result. Some imagine that in this history they study philosophy itself, and perhaps claim to understand philosophy after learning a few ideas from different systems. Many current views of philosophy have their source in the reading of the philosophic thoughts of others, rather than in the study of philosophy itself.

A method to be highly recommended is the simultaneous study of every department of philosophy, both according to its essence and in the light of its history. In this way the history of philosophy will be studied by subjects. Where this is done, there is hope of clearness and definiteness, and results both fruitful and lasting may be expected. Thus in connection with the study of logic its history might be considered, especially the views of Aristotle and Kant, and those prevalent during this century. Besides the general history of the subject, the views of eminent philosophers on particular points should be studied when these points are under consideration. By this method the history will bring the subject itself into clearer light, and the study of the subject will promote the understanding of the history. Thus the theory of knowledge cannot be properly studied unless the views of Locke, Hume, Reid, Kant, and others are taken into account. The same is true of metaphysics, æsthetics, and ethics; a knowledge of their genesis and development essentially promotes their comprehension. After the various parts of philosophy have thus been studied in connection with their history,

* Hegel was certainly not inclined to make philosophy easy for students; but he pronounced the history of philosophy, which Herbart and Schelling recommended as propædæutics to philosophy, too difficult for that purpose. — *Philosophische Propædæutik*, XVIII.

the student will be prepared for the study of the entire history of philosophy, which can then be taken up. To master a subject at the same time in the light of its history, and rationally, is the true philosophical method; and with every branch of philosophy, the essential elements of its history should be connected.

Besides the study of the history of philosophy by subjects, as a preparation for its study as a whole, the reading of the principal works of eminent philosophers is to be commended. Among the ancients, selections may be made from Plato (*Symposium*, *Phædros*, *Republic*) and Aristotle (particularly those on Dialectics and Ethics); among the moderns, Locke, Spinoza (*Ethics*), Hume (*Treatise*, first part, or *Inquiry*), Kant (*Prolegomena*, *Kritik of Pure Reason*, and *Kritik of Practical Reason*), Hegel (*Philosophy of History*, *Phænomenology*, and *Logic*), and Lotze are worthy of special mention for this purpose. If only a few works can be read, let them be taken from Plato, Aristotle, Locke, and Kant, with selections from philosophers in the present century.

Hardly less important than its history is the study of the present status of philosophic thought. In it will be found many of the conditions and demands with which the philosopher must reckon. The exact status of philosophy is, however, an exceedingly difficult problem, particularly at a time when there is a multitude of philosophical thinkers, but no dominant system of philosophy. Isolated problems, conflicting tendencies, a search for a reliable basis for system, criticism, eclecticism, and all the uncertainty and mere tentativeness, so common in crises, are characteristics of philosophic thought in this age. The present neglect of philosophy is not so significant when it is remembered that Kant and Hegel also complained of this neglect in their day.

The lack of unity and continuity in the philosophic literature of the day is cause for greater regret.

The status of philosophy can be learned from the philosophic literature of the day, particularly from the various philosophical journals.* While the problems of philosophy are always the same, peculiar circumstances may make special demands for the solution of particular ones. The very uncertainty prevailing at present, respecting the criteria and the limits of knowledge, makes noetics especially valuable. The importance of metaphysic, and the suspicion with which it is viewed, attach peculiar interest to the question whether we can really get behind phenomena to the underlying reality. Theism and atheism, spiritualism and materialism, are of as momentous significance now as ever. The problems of realism and idealism, of empiricism and rationalism, also press for solution. Perhaps the exclusivism in past tendencies has made it evident that systems are apt to err rather in what they deny than in what they affirm, and that now the time has come for the union and harmonious co-operation of tendencies formerly regarded as hostile. Thus the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements in knowledge are both essential factors; realism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism, really seem to be complements to each other, rather than antagonistic. The philosophic movements within a century have at least proved that systems supposed to be opposite may both have elements of truth. In Germany there is a tendency toward English empiricism; in England and America there is a tendency toward German speculation, — certainly a hint that each by itself is not

* The philosophical tendencies in Germany, since the death of Hegel, are given in a work just published: *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart*, by Dr. Moritz Brasch.

sufficient. A narrow and exclusive method cannot meet the demands of the day. The one-sided tendencies of particular systems in the past may have served to produce a greater development of certain phases of thought than would otherwise have been possible; but the development of a principle to the utmost may also serve to prove that it is not comprehensive enough to include and explain what was expected of it. Thus a one-sided course, by exhausting itself, may prepare the way for a synthesis of what was before repellant.

The synthesis necessary for that comprehensiveness and unity which are so urgent a demand on philosophic thought, may require a much more thorough elaboration of particular concepts, as a preparatory stage. The exhaustive treatment of particular thoughts is as fruitful now as ever, and may be more impartially performed than when a reigning system demands solutions according to its own peculiar principles.

Among the multitude of problems demanding solution, those suggested by natural science are made especially prominent. Aside from materialism and evolution, the question of design demands attention, also the limits of scientific accuracy, and the reliability of thought transcending the domain of science. The very tendency to specialization in science also suggests the need of the unity of the various sciences, as well as the ultimate unity of all thought. Pessimism, agnosticism, and the great interests of faith and hope, also present numerous important problems. From all that has been said in the various chapters, it is evident that the critical demands of the age are such as to place the emphasis in philosophic thought on laying the basis rather than on rearing superstructures.

The philosophical problems have become so numerous

in our day as actually to be bewildering, and the student may be puzzled to decide which to take up for study. Where so many seem to be urgent, the temptation may be strong to make the study comprehensive rather than thorough. The two methods do not exclude each other, however; there may be a comprehensiveness which is a preparation for thoroughness, and thoroughness in a limited sphere may be the road to comprehensiveness that is thorough throughout.

Those who make a specialty of philosophy will of course regard their studies at college or in the university as merely laying the foundation on which they hope to build in after-life. Even they may find it advisable to concentrate their efforts on a particular department after completing the general study of philosophy. Others, who cannot make a specialty of it, may yet want to master some one of its divisions. Which to choose will depend mainly on capacity, taste, aim, and calling. Psychology, as an introduction to the whole, cannot be omitted, whatever part may be selected for special investigation. Of philosophy proper, the theory of knowledge and ethics are the most essential. Were the theory of the emotions fully developed, it might take its place beside (or between) these, as almost or quite as important. The subject of æsthetics has special significance for artists, critics, literary men, and public speakers. The theologian, besides ethics, will find metaphysics indispensable.

Thus far the attention has been directed chiefly to the study of philosophical systems, and to the training of the mind in philosophizing. A philosopher may add no new contributions to the stock of knowledge, but he must, as we have seen, be an independent thinker. With the laws of thought as his sole guide, he cannot

be the slave of any system, not even of his own, except so far as slavery means absolute subjection to the truth.

The exalted aim of the student to become an independent thinker is worthy of highest commendation. He does not merely want to learn what has been said about a subject, but what is actually in it. For the method necessary to realize this aim of the original, independent thinker, we must refer to the full discussion of the theory of knowledge, but preliminary hints may here be given.

The notion that philosophy has a method peculiar to itself, is false. The laws of the mind are always the same, but the objects to which they apply differ. Thus there are objects of sense, and objects of pure thinking. Our reasoning respecting objects is of course conditioned by their nature. Thus mathematical reasoning is valid only for mathematical objects. But we are tempted to postulate in the mind itself such divisions as pertain only to the nature of the objects contemplated. The same laws of thought are seen in different lights, according to the difference of the objects. The process of reasoning in all thinking is that of induction and deduction, the one never wholly separated from the other. While in its reasoning, in its analytical and synthetic judgments, philosophy does not differ from science, the aim and objects (phenomena) of science attach it more closely to observation, and the results of its reasoning can consequently be more readily tested by experience. Science thus has means of verification which philosophy cannot have.

The fact that its conclusions cannot be verified by experience, makes it the more necessary that the reasoning in philosophy should be infallible. Its method is absolutely reliable; if, then, its start is equally so, there

is no reason for questioning the results legitimately obtained. The result of scientific investigation would require no verification if it were not for the liability to error in the process itself. The same is true of philosophy. With a firm basis and a reliable method, there is a possibility of error only when the method itself is not strictly followed.

In philosophizing, the first aim should consequently be to secure a starting-point which is absolutely reliable. Without such a foundation, the validity of the entire superstructure will be doubtful; or, if the basis is false, the system which rests upon it must be so likewise. Therefore both in examining other systems, and in independent philosophizing and constructing new ones, the beginning or seed of all must be subjected to the most thorough scrutiny.

Modern philosophy began with an effort to find a basis whose validity cannot be questioned. If here scepticism is not rooted out, it can never be done. Without stopping to consider the value of the results of Descartes' investigations on this point, it is enough for our purpose that the one thing which cannot be questioned, even if all others may, is the fact given in consciousness. That there are such facts; that I am conscious of something, or that there is a consciousness of something, — is beyond all doubt. What these facts mean, is of course a different question.

With this consciousness we start in philosophy, as well as in science. But while the latter asks, How am I to explain the thing experienced? philosophy asks, The experience being given, what do the laws of mind (reason) require? Science attends more to the external conditions of experience, philosophy more to the internal; science attempts to explain phenomena by discov-

ering their laws, philosophy seeks to get at their essence by finding what the laws of mind must infer from the phenomena. To science the phenomena themselves are the principal subject of consideration, being the centre around which all the investigation moves; to philosophy they are but the occasion for deeper inquiry, the start for the speculative work of reason.

Philosophy thus, like science, beginning with experience, with the given and the real, which it seeks to interpret, has a perfectly reliable basis. Its proper sphere is the real; only so far as related to the real does it consider the imaginary and the possible. Beginning with what is given, philosophy carries its inductions as far as thought can go. The phenomena given to philosophy are of course not those pertaining merely to the external world; they include also the subjective elements in thought, feeling, and volition, all of which are made objects of rational inquiry. Any germinal thought legitimately obtained may be made the nucleus of a system; but the comprehensiveness of the germinal power is also the limit of the system.

A critical study of philosophical systems proves that many of them rest on mere assumptions. Their character as assumptions is not changed by the fact that their authors regarded them as intuitions or self-evident truths. Particularly respecting what is deepest, most mysterious, and of greatest concern, has an effort been made to secure axioms or some kind of intellectual vision. The repeated failure of attempts to found philosophy on such a basis has made thinkers suspicious of all systems constructed on *a priori* principles. No one doubts that truths are more valuable isolated than when spuriously connected so as to form a false system. There is, however, great fascination in the idea of

developing all philosophy from a single principle; and, indeed, it is the only ideal method for completeness of system. The aim in such cases is to make philosophy as much as possible like mathematics. Having adopted its principle, it calls in the aid of axioms and definitions to evolve the system. The most perfect example is found in Spinoza's *Ethics*. A system thus constructed is, of course, valid for those only who accept the premises and definitions; and by successfully attacking these, the whole superstructure falls. In view of the imperfections and limitations of philosophy, the application of this ideal method has thus far been found more valuable for attaining unity, or at least system, than absolutely reliable conclusions.*

After the principles have been found, this method is comparatively easy. Thus the germinal notion may be that of substance, monads, the ego, the subject-object, the unity of thought and being, the unconscious, or something else; all that is required being the unfolding of the seed-thought. Any fruitful thought, if comprehensive enough, can be made the basis of a system; great ingenuity may be displayed in developing the principle adopted, and the logic can be rigid as in mathematics:

* Instead of banishing the *a priori* method from philosophy, as Kant aimed to do, it flourished most vigorously among his immediate successors. Thus Reinhold laid stress on the establishment of one supreme principle from which the whole of philosophy is to be evolved. Fichte eagerly seized this idea, and wrote to him that he looked on him (Reinhold) as having introduced among men the conviction that all inquiry must proceed from a single fundamental principle. And then the search for this principle began. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sought to find the idea which contains the explanation of the universe. Absolute knowledge, and the knowledge of the absolute, have an irresistible attraction for the eager student; and it is not surprising that the promises made by these men, especially the last, aroused great hopes and enthusiasm. The culmination of all philosophy was supposed to have been reached, and the key which unlocks the mysteries of the universe to have been found.

yet as an interpretation of reality the whole may be worthless, explaining not what is, but only what would be if the assumptions were true. The essential questions in determining the beginning are not sufficiently weighed: Is the basis true? Is it adequate? Is it fruitful? Systems depending on definitions are in danger of being purely verbal, explanatory of words but of nothing real, thus defeating the very aim of philosophy.

The starting-point of a system being assumed, instead of being found as something given, or instead of being demonstrated, it may become necessary to construct the system for the sake of proving the assumptions. Thus if an unconscious something is assumed as the reality behind phenomena, it may require the philosophy of the unconscious to justify the assumption of the unconscious, or to prove that the assumption is inadequate. It must not, however, be supposed that in philosophy any more than in science we can dispense with hypotheses and theories. Much as philosophy may accomplish, it never can, by any induction, reach the absolute beginning of all things. Thus far all efforts have failed to ascend, step by step, from the infinite variety of phenomena to the ultimate unity of all being. In our efforts to do so, we soon become painfully conscious of our limitations. Not satisfied with isolated truths, we seek completed systems; in order to construct these, we need principles which cannot be discovered by induction. But if theories become a necessity, there must be some valid basis for them, depending on reality and reason, not on imagination. The mind finds in the phenomena themselves hints of what must be behind them; but they are mere hints. All the suggestions and hints given must be weighed in forming the theories; and after being formed, every possible test must

be applied to them. Thus, a theory must be consistent; it must accomplish all that is required of it; and it must not come in conflict with any known truth. And after all these conditions are complied with, it must be regarded as what it really is; namely, a mere theory. Other theories may also comply with these conditions, and yet they cannot all be true.

By claiming for its statements only what they are worth, philosophy will gain in modesty, but also in reliability. Whatever is demonstrated must be held as immovably fixed; many things may be true which cannot be mathematically demonstrated, but we must not hesitate to treat assumptions and theories according to what they really are. It may require some sacrifice to take this position with reference to a pet theory, but it is the only safe and honest course. Theories are to be held as continually subject to verification; but whether or not held as such by their advocates, succeeding systems will not fail to test them according to their worth. If under these severe conditions a final system is impossible, philosophy has the consolation at least of sharing the same fate with all subjects of human inquiry: there will always be a contrast between the real and the ideal.

It is respecting the ultimate of all thought, that theories are most prevalent. This x unknown to philosophy, however apprehended by faith, is too far removed to be an object of observation; nor can we ever hope to extend the chain of our logic to that x . Hence the resort to theory. The theories proposed can, perhaps, neither be demonstrated as true, nor proved false; yet their origin and grounds, their consistency with themselves, and their application to reality, are valuable tests; and the history of philosophy consists largely

of the critical tests to which the various theories have been subjected in the progress of thought.

The mind cannot rest in a void. If unable to penetrate to the essence of the reality behind phenomena, and to the ultimate basis and source of the universe, it may be obliged to resort to postulates or hypotheses as a practical rest for thought. Plato's realm, in which ideas have a metaphysical existence, may be fiction; but even fiction may contain truth, and even a myth may be but the clothing of a precious philosophic thought. The various functions attributed by theistic thinkers to God may not be mathematically demonstrable as realities; but there must be a First Cause of that which reveals itself as not primitive but derived; and is there not a deep philosophy, to say nothing of theology, in the very effort of the mind to find a Being in whom all truth and beauty and goodness inhere, and from whom finite minds derive their fragmentary conceptions of them? Less, perhaps, in the final results attained does the mind reveal its true character, than in its strivings and tendencies; and even in its aspirations and postulates the philosopher beholds reflections of the otherwise hidden depths of the soul.

These considerations justify the conclusion that philosophy is ideal, and that the real systems must be viewed as aspirations and essays, not as realizations. Nevertheless, systems which are not final may have valuable truths and needed aspects of truth; and the fundamental principle adopted may be true, even if not demonstrable. The value of philosophic thought by no means consists solely, or even chiefly, in the completed systems produced; it may do the best service in removing existing errors, and in establishing individual truths and principles. Even the fragments

of philosophy may be very precious, though the master-builder is not found to form of them a symmetrical structure. In philosophy the preconceived plan of the system does not determine how the materials must be shaped and fitted into it, but the character of the system is determined by the nature of the materials. If heretofore the architect has come first with his plan, and has made that the law for the selection and adaptation of the building material, we may henceforth be obliged to reverse the process, and make the careful gathering and shaping of the stones for the building the condition for the plan and structure of the edifice itself. The philosophic builder must be a quarrier and a stone-cutter before he becomes an architect.

It is frequently found that the principles adopted by philosophers are true, but that there is a mistake in their application; they are taken as absolute and final, when they are relative and limited. May not spiritualism and materialism both have spheres in which they are true, while their application outside of these is false? There is no doubt a harmony and unity underlying the differences between matter and spirit; but so long as the unity in the duality is not discovered, we must apply each to its sphere and limit it strictly to that. However stringently the mind may demand monism, no monism brought about by violence can receive philosophical sanction. According to an innate impulse of our minds, we must aim at the final explanation of all things by discovering the ultimate principles; but we must distinguish between the aim and the actual attainments. That this distinction must never be lost sight of, is a lesson taught both by the present status and by the whole history of philosophy.

Another evil to be deprecated results from a desire

to propose something new, and to develop original systems. Such a spirit may become a passion, in which case it is the philosopher's evil genius. The sole aim in philosophy is truth, no matter who its author, or whether it be old or new; and whoever cannot sacrifice the itching for novelty, and the vanity of ambition, to this aim, lacks the requisites of a philosopher. Lotze justly remarks that in our day philosophy is less in need of originality than of exactness. A signal advantage in the natural sciences has been their continuous development. The results of past investigations have been made the beginning of new progressive movements. Scientists have worked with and for one another, and have thus co-operated in promoting organic growth in science. But in philosophy the spirit of individualism has largely prevailed. Instead of seeking to promote continuous development, philosophers seem rather to have been intent on the destruction of the labors of their predecessors, and on the construction of a peculiar system of their own. The destruction of systems was the more easy, because their foundation was not solid, or because they were badly constructed. Healthy growth and lasting results cannot be expected unless the conservation of old truth is regarded as sacred a duty as the discovery of new truth.*

* The evil here deprecated has been deeply felt by philosophers, and repeated efforts have been made to secure more co-operation among them, and more regular and steady progress in philosophy. Trendelenburg, preface to *Logische Untersuchungen*, says, "Philosophy cannot regain its former power until it acquires permanence; and it cannot gain permanence until it grows in the same way as the other sciences, namely, until it develops continuously, not beginning and ending in every head, but historically taking up the problems and unfolding them." Various methods have been proposed to secure this continuity, such as conventions of philosophers to discuss philosophical questions, and philosophical associations. But the end can only be attained if philosophic minds themselves resolve to do this work. A philosopher

The student is, however, in greater danger of an evil the opposite of this; namely, the hasty adoption of the system of another as the embodiment of all truth. The authority which in philosophy belongs only to the truth is frequently transferred to an able and admired teacher. Intellectual receptivity and independent thinking, deep appreciation and a critical spirit, should be united in healthy proportion. The true teacher always makes his system and instruction subordinate to the truth. The very vigor and independence of a philosopher may serve to make mere disciples, as well as profound and original thinkers. The schools of Kant and Hegel have shown that the disciples of eminent philosophers may be blind in proportion to their enthusiasm, and that a philosopher's cloak may conceal an imitator and a fanatic. Although in his lectures Kant continually warned his hearers against this spirit, he could not suppress it. The wise student regards all books and instructions as means of mental discipline, as well as for the communication of truth; and he will find it consistent with the deepest respect for teachers, to subject all that is taught to the severest tests of reason. Absolute dependence on the truth is the only true independence.

The numerous conflicting systems, which have arisen from the fact that there was no continuous development, have added to the suspicion that philosophy is caprice rather than reason. If the scepticism of the day is not as deep as that of Greece, it at least doubts the ability of philosophy to discover the highest truth. The consequent criticism to which the systems have been subjected is cause for congratulation on the part

need not produce a new system, but he must make truth the sole aim of his search, and recognize it according to its real worth wherever found.

of those who have confidence in the power of truth to maintain itself. The most thorough diagnosis may be required for the transition from disease to health. The sceptical spirit and critical method, connected with a conservative tendency, have given rise to eclecticism. This refuses to accept any system of the past, but claims that there is truth in all, and hence selects from all.* But if eclecticism is to be of philosophical value, it must have fixed principles to determine the method of its selections; in other words, there must be a philosophy behind eclecticism, if it is to lay claim to rational procedure. The ability to select the truth presupposes a standard by which it can be tested; this standard, whatever it may be, is itself the nucleus of a philosophical system. How far eclecticism is from being final, is evident from the fact that it may be based on either rationalism or empiricism. A man's philosophy is not determined by his eclecticism, but his eclecticism by his philosophy. Nevertheless, it has an important mission. It proceeds on the supposition that all systems have truth, but that none has it all; and it is an admis-

* It has flourished most in France, under the leadership of Victor Cousin. It naturally promoted the study of the history of philosophy. Bigot (Eclecticism in France, *Mind*, 1877, 367) says, "Its fundamental principle was this: In philosophy every thing has been said; the age of systems is past; all we have to do is to question history, to take what is true out of each system, and from all these elements to form a *perennis philosophia*. . . . It was a doctrine without originality, and standing absolutely aloof from the discoveries of science." Cousin's eclecticism is brilliant rather than deep, eloquent rather than definite or consequent, inspiring rather than convincing, and rhetorical rather than philosophical. Instead of seeking an immovable basis, it skips from one system to another, taking what pleases its fancy, but ignoring the rest.

In all countries, eclecticism as a method rather than a system plays a prominent part. The prominence given to the history of philosophy is evidence of this. Even if no system is regarded satisfactory, scholars want to get what they can from the various systems.

sion that we are not yet prepared to construct the final system. It is a characteristic of the philosophic spirit, that it critically examines the various systems to discover their truths and reject their errors. But this is only a preparatory process; it trains the mind, and furnishes it with materials for reflection. The mind goes beyond eclecticism as soon as it inquires why it seeks, and how it knows, the truth. This inquiry leads to the root, while eclecticism is but the fruit.

The criticism so much insisted on here is by no means the end in philosophical training; it is but a method for attaining something better. Mere criticism is not production; and it has been observed that critical minds are not usually productive ones. Filing is not a process of growing. When the critical habit is intent only on the discovery of error, what wonder if the truth itself is missed? The discernment of error is important on account of the hidden truth discovered in the process. The value of the scavenger consists in the cleanliness he promotes. Criticism for the truth's sake, and as promotive of productiveness, is therefore the aim. But even if criticism is only a handmaid, its work in a philosophic Babel may be of supreme importance when under the guidance of a wise mistress.

As the start in philosophy is most difficult, the student may need something more specific respecting the beginning. It has been stated that we are to rise from psychology, science, and other departments, to philosophy; but how? Take any supposed knowledge, and test it to the utmost; the tests applied to it will involve the theory of knowledge. Get what these tests imply, or the ultimate basis on which they rest, and you will have the theory itself. Each division of philosophy is like the side of a pyramid: thus, if we begin with

any concept of knowledge, and trace it far enough, we come to the apex, the principles of knowledge. The same is true of being. All that is, must contain all the principles of being; and these are the objects of search in metaphysics. Concrete objects are infinite; but follow the concept gained by studying any one to its utmost limits, and it will be found at every step to tend toward these principles. We find that this is also the law for æsthetics and ethics. The endless variety is unified in the principles. Thus every object termed æsthetical must contain all that is required to constitute æsthetic quality; and it is this element, and the system founded on it, which constitute æsthetics. Neither can any moral act be traced to its ultimate principle without attaining the primary thought of ethics. By thus taking any concept, and tracing it back far enough, we arrive at the principles of that division of philosophy to which it belongs. This shows how any thought pursued far enough must lead to philosophy. Indeed, we shall not go astray if we view philosophy as an exhaustive elaboration of concepts; the aim being to discover principles which cannot be exhausted any more, but which embrace, principiantly, the universe of thought, of being, of feeling, and of conduct.

Since the rational laws, like reason itself, are unvarying, the method pursued in philosophy must always be the same in principle; but there is abundant room for variety in details. There may be various processes in elaborating the concepts, but their ultimate results must harmonize. The details in the method may be left to each one who has the qualification for philosophical studies; they may be largely determined by the peculiarity of the subject under consideration, and by the specific aim. While numerous avenues may be chosen,

they must all lead to principiant truth. After the right beginning, the intellect is probably in greatest danger of taking as exhausted what is not exhausted, and in accepting as certain what has not been demonstrated. Not that the demonstrable is the limit of the true, nor philosophy the only sphere of human interest and human confidence; but we must distinguish between knowledge and faith, between hypothesis and theory on the one hand, and demonstration on the other. The true method in philosophy is that in which reason beholds itself.

For training the mind into this harmony with the truth, or to be true to itself, which is one of the principal aims of this Introduction, the following summary may be helpful:—

1. Exert the mind to the utmost limit of its powers. In order to get the full length of a cable, it must be stretched as far as possible without breaking. Constant mental strain tends to weakness and final destruction; but frequently to tax the healthy mind severely, but without overstraining, is a condition for promoting vigorous health. For this discipline the deepest problems should be selected. Continuous exercise of the mind on them will train it for the most successful philosophical effort. Only in dealing profoundly with deep problems can the mind itself become profound.

2. Learn by practice to rivet the attention on a subject until you are through with it, or voluntarily abandon it. Nothing is more destructive of philosophical thinking than to skip from subject to subject, touching each one tenderly. In such a course it is a lawless fancy, not reason, which holds the reins. The object chosen for reflection should be held up in every light, and viewed from every standpoint, by itself and in its

relations, and all pertinent questions respecting it should be asked. A twofold power of abstraction is necessary; namely, the subject must be abstracted (distinguished) from all others, and the mind must abstract its attention from every thing else. This twofold power of abstraction is the condition for greatness of mind. Mental superiority consists largely in power of concentration. The mind must be its own lord; it must be master of its thoughts, and must rigorously resist the inclinations and whims which make them wander. Distraction is the deadly foe of profundity.

3. The most important subjects should be chosen, — subjects whose interest is such as to enlist all the energies. Among profound themes, the mind should choose the most valuable, so that it may become supremely strong, and supremely fruitful in its strength.

4. Get clear and distinct ideas, — clear, because what they are in themselves is apprehended; and distinct, because they stand out boldly, sharply marked off from all their surroundings. Explain the compound by its simple elements, and relations by defining the related. Distinguish the word from the thought, the thought from the object for which it stands. Whatever severity it may require, the mind must give a strict account of itself. It will attain philosophic clearness in proportion as it heeds the ancient maxim: Know thyself.

5. Fathom what is given, and, by fathoming, develop it. Then classify and systematize. Avoid heterogeneity by discovering the unity in multiplicity. Philosophizing consists in unravelling the thought involved in thoughts. Not in the exclusivism of scepticism or dogmatism or criticism or eclecticism or intuitionism or empiricism, but in the rational element in all of them, is the true method of philosophy formed.

6. Many of the problems of philosophy are thrust upon it by science. In the co-operation of philosophy and science, not in their antagonism, is there hope for depth, comprehensiveness, exactness, and completeness. Between the facts of nature and of psychology, and the speculations of philosophy, there must be the relation of foundation and superstructure. Phenomena are materials from which concepts are formed, but phenomena are not the law of philosophy. It speculates, in the etymological sense of looking about, beholding and investigating; but the speculation of philosophy is the work of reason, not the play of fancy. Owing to the objects of philosophic contemplation, it may be misleading to speak of scientific exactness in philosophic thought; but the method which leads to the philosophical investigation of what is, as in metaphysics, and of what ought to be, as in noetics, æsthetics, and ethics, is as rigid as in science. The reason, and the general laws of thinking, with which the scientist operates, are also those of the philosopher. Not its method, but its principiant aim, namely to unify all thought in the ultimate principle or principles, and to form of all thought a system which, like an organism, consists of articulated members, — a system as rich in variety as it is perfect in unity, — constitutes the difficulty of philosophic inquiry.

REFLECTIONS.

Importance of the right Spirit in a study. Why study Philosophy? Theoretical value. Practical value. Intellectual craving. Love of Truth. Enthusiasm in its pursuit. Power of prejudice. Mental power and energy. Penetrative, exhaustive thought. Abstraction. How does Philosophy begin? Why do all thoughts

ultimately lead to Philosophy? How does Philosophy unify Knowledge? Principiant Knowledge. How do Psychology, Science, and History furnish the problems of Philosophy? Order in the study of the divisions of Philosophy. How study the History of Philosophy? Philosophical works and systems worthy of special attention. Relation of the student to teachers and systems. Original thought. Independent thinking. Relation of the Philosopher to his age and nation. What is necessary thought, and why is it final? Truth and error in eclecticism. Define Speculation. Healthy Philosophy and baseless speculation. The learner, the scholar, and the thinker. Continuity of philosophical thought. Division of labor in Philosophy. Fruitful and empty concepts. Depth and narrowness, breadth and shallowness. Union of breadth and depth in philosophy. Concentration of thought. Scientific and philosophic definiteness and exactness. Summary of requirements necessary for attaining the right Spirit and proper Method in the study of Philosophy.

APPENDIX.

1. IN an article on Philosophy at Cambridge, in *Mind*, 1876, Mr. Sedgwick says, "The use of the general term 'philosophy' to mean physics, which Continental writers have noticed as an English peculiarity, has been especially at home in Cambridge since the time of Newton. . . . Philosophy without qualification was generally understood to mean 'natural philosophy.' That which is now usually understood by philosophy was, therefore, not at all included. In 1779 Dr. Jebb speaks of the transition (in the examination in the university) 'from the elements of mathematics to the four branches of philosophy, viz., mechanics, hydrostatics, apparent astronomy, and optics. . . . The moderator, having closed the philosophical examination, sometimes asks questions in Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Butler's *Analogy*, or Clarke's *Attributes*.' "

In the introduction to the *History of the Inductive Sciences*, Whewell frequently uses "philosophical" for "scientific." He also speaks of the "experimental philosophy of the Arabians." Yet the title of his work on the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* implies that he wants to distinguish between the two terms. Other writers also desire to make a distinction; but in spite of their efforts, the old habit of confounding the terms gets the better of them. Thus Sir Alexander Grant, in the article "Aristotle," in the *Ency. Brit.* (ninth edition), refers to the different elements of Greek thought, and pronounces "the one purely

philosophical, the other scientific." Other expressions also indicate that he recognizes the difference. But, in the same article, he takes "natural philosophy" in the usual English sense, and speaks of "a modern physical philosopher." The English literature of the day abounds in similar examples.

Hegel ridiculed the looseness with which the English employ the words "philosophy" and "philosophical." He says that they term thermometers, barometers, and similar instruments philosophical, whereas nothing but thinking should be regarded as the instrument of philosophy. He also quotes the title of a pamphlet, "The Art of Preserving the Hair on Philosophical Principles." That confusion of the terms which Hegel regarded as a peculiarity of the English was, however, formerly common on the Continent as well as in England.

2. The prevalent view of philosophy in the leading systems of Germany emphasizes the rational in distinction from the empirical. As purely rational, philosophy is theoretical as distinct from the practical, and speculative (the reason beholding all objects in its own light) as distinct from observation. As transcending experience, it is transcendental. It consequently deals with concepts (ideas, notions), not with percepts. Kant defines philosophy as rational knowledge by means of concepts (*Vernunftbegriffe*), and regards the following as its primary problems: What can I know? What ought I to do? What dare I hope? What is man? Hegel pronounces philosophy the science of reason comprehending itself (*die Wissenschaft der sich selbst begreifenden Vernunft*). Herbart views it as an elaboration of the concepts (*die Bearbeitung der Begriffe*). Struempell: *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 19-22. Fichte wanted the whole of philosophy to be a rational development of a single idea, and Schelling claimed that philosophy must construct even the real world according to concepts or ideas of reason. In a recent work on *Philosophie als Be-*

griffswissenschaft, G. Biedermann says, "Philosophy is, and always was, a science of concepts."

3. However much we may dissent from the contents of this book, we must admit that in it Kant gives valuable hints respecting the province of reason in religion. The purely rational elements are, of course, legitimate subjects for philosophical inquiry. If the elements are only partly rational, then they belong to philosophy only so far as rational. If a philosophical system claims that all the contents of religion must be rational, it fails to distinguish between knowledge and faith, between speculation and history, and between the facts of experience and rational inferences. Much of the confusion of philosophical speculation respecting religion arises from the failure to distinguish between the exact sphere of each. I cannot believe what is in direct conflict with reason; but I can, and may even be obliged to, believe much which I cannot raise from faith into knowledge, and which, consequently, I cannot subject to purely philosophical or rational tests. In religion the emotions have a right to be heard; and it is important for philosophy, as well as for religion, to determine the significance of their voice. Emerson truly says, "The affections are the wings by which the intellect launches on the void and is borne across it. Great love is the inventor and expander of the frozen powers, the feathers frozen to our sides. It was the conviction of Plato, of Van Helmont, of Pascal, of Swedenborg, that piety is an essential condition of science, that great thoughts come from the heart."

4. Those who treat religion with levity are justly chargeable with a crime against human nature itself, to say nothing of a higher Being. A system which ignores what has affected humanity most deeply, and involves man's highest interests, cannot even be regarded as a serious inquiry into man's nature, and is surely neither a deep nor a broad philosophy. To treat God, the soul, sin, and immortality, as if they were

trifles and unworthy of regard, proves a man wholly unfit for philosophic thought. We must not, however, confound with the trifler the man who has thought profoundly on these subjects, and come to conclusions different from ours. Earnest thought is always worthy of respect, regardless of its consequences, and may demand the deepest research to confirm or refute its conclusions. But the frivolous spirit should be as mercilessly expelled from the fraternity of philosophers, as a traitor from the assembly of patriots.

5. "The hypothesis that there is a Creator, at once all-powerful and all-benevolent, is pressed, as it must seem to every candid investigator, with difficulties verging closely upon logical contradiction. The existence of the smallest amount of sin and evil would seem to show that he is either not perfectly benevolent, or not all-powerful. No one can have lived long without experiencing sorrowful events of which the significance is inexplicable. But if we cannot succeed in avoiding contradiction in our notions of elementary geometry, can we expect that the ultimate purposes of existence shall present themselves to us with perfect clearness? I can see nothing to forbid the notion that in a higher state of intelligence much that is now obscure may become clear. We perpetually find ourselves in the position of finite minds attempting infinite problems; and can we be sure that where we see contradiction, an infinite intelligence might not discover perfect logical harmony?" — JEVONS, *Principles of Science*, 3d ed. 736.

6. With his merciless criticism, Kant, just because so rigid, denied the ability of philosophy to determine *a priori* that revelation and miracles are impossible. If any one claimed that they were impossible, he himself offered to show the fallacy of his reasoning. He wanted the rational, therefore he opposed the narrow dogmatism of philosophy as well as of religion. See his book on *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*. The dogmatic spirit is gener-

ally found to rest on assumptions which are the very points in dispute. If we despise bigotry in religion, let us not deem it less despicable when it is dubbed "philosophical" or "scientific." Jevons (*Principles of Science*, 736) says, "There are scientific men who assert that the interposition of Providence is impossible, and prayer an absurdity, because the laws of nature are proved to be invariable. Inferences are drawn, not so much from particular sciences as from the logical nature of science itself, to negative the impulses and hopes of men. Now, I may state that my own studies in logic lead me to call in question such negative inferences. Laws of nature are uniformities observed to exist in the action of certain material agents; but it is logically impossible to show that all other agents must behave as they do." Men are apt to take their prepossessions for demonstrations. In speaking of God as acting on nature, W. B. Carpenter (*Contemp. Rev.*, vol. 27, 281) says, "I deem it presumptuous to deny that there might be occasions which in His wisdom may require such departure. I am not conscious of any such scientific 'prepossession' against miracles as would prevent me from accepting them as facts if trustworthy evidence of their reality could be adduced." See also Lotze, *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*, 60-63.

7. At the close of his volume on the *Principles of Science*, Jevons says, "Now, among the most unquestionable rules of scientific method is that first law that *whatever phenomenon is, is*. We must ignore no existence whatever; we may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin, but, if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of explanation. If, then, there is to be competition for scientific recognition, the world without us must yield to the undoubted existence of the spirit within. Our own hopes and wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phenomena within the sphere of consciousness. If men do act, feel, and live as if they were not merely the brief products of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the instruments of a

far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phenomena and pass over these? We investigate the instincts of the ant and the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are led by an inscrutable agency to work towards a distant purpose. Let us be faithful to our scientific method, and investigate also those instincts of the human mind by which man is led to work as if the approval of a higher Being were the aim of life."

8. That Bacon was far from giving a specific and complete scientific method, is admitted in England as well as in Germany. Thus we read in Jevons's *Principles of Science*, 506, "Bacon's method, so far as we can gather the meaning of the main portions of his writings, would correspond to the process of empirically collecting facts, and exhaustively classifying them. . . . The value of this method may be estimated historically by the fact that it has not been followed by any of the great masters of science. Whether we look at Galileo who preceded Bacon, to Gilbert his contemporary, or to Newton and Descartes, Leibnitz and Huyghens, his successors, we find that discovery was achieved by the opposite method to that advocated by Bacon. Throughout Newton's works, as I shall show, we find deductive reasoning wholly predominant; and experiments are employed, as they should be, to confirm or refute hypothetical anticipations of nature."

The right beginning is so important to students, that the principles here advocated cannot be too strongly emphasized, particularly at a time when so many expect success by ignoring them. The mere collector and classifier of facts must be content with the position of a journeyman to the thinker, instead of attaining the heights of science. The leaders in science are, and ever must be, the thinkers,—those who esteem facts sufficiently to regard them worthy of profoundest thought. I add another quotation from Whewell: "Invention, acuteness, and connection of thought are necessary, on the one hand, for the progress of philosophic

knowledge ; on the other hand, the precise and steady application of these faculties to facts well known and clearly conceived. . . . The facts, the impressions on the senses on which the first successful attempts at physical knowledge proceeded, were as well known long before the time when they were thus turned to account, as at that period. The motions of the stars, and the effects of weights, were familiar to man before the rise of the Greek astronomy and mechanics : but the 'divine mind' was still absent ; the act of thought had not been exerted, by which these facts were bound together under the form of laws and principles. And even at this day, the tribes of uncivilized and half-civilized man over the whole face of the earth, have before their eyes a vast body of facts, of exactly the same nature as those with which Europe has built the stately fabric of her physical philosophy ; but, in almost every other part of the earth, the process of the intellect by which these facts become science, is unknown. The scientific faculty does not work. The scattered stones are there, but the builder's hand is wanting."

9. Those who imagine that reason is liable to err, but that knowledge obtained through sensation is absolutely reliable, agree neither with philosophers nor with the leading scientists. The history of science shows that observation is very apt to make mistakes ; and what is termed the scientific method is intended to prevent these mistakes, as well as to make the observation as full as possible. Reason and sense must co-operate, but the supremacy of the former is unquestioned ; "reason acting as interpreter as well as judge, while the senses are merely the witnesses, who may be more or less untrustworthy and incompetent, but are nevertheless of inconceivable value to us, because they are our only available ones." — TAIT, 347.

10. Whewell says, "Man is not a practical creature merely ; he has within him a *speculative* tendency, a pleasure in the contemplation of ideal relations, a love of knowledge

as knowledge. It is the speculative tendency which brings to light the difference of common notions and scientific ideas.

. . . The mind analyzes such notions, reasons upon them, combines and connects them; for it feels assured that intellectual things ought to be able to bear such handling. Even practical knowledge, we see clearly, is not possible without the use of reason; and the speculative reason is only the reason satisfying itself of its own consistency."

Zoellner, in the strange volume *Ueber die Natur des Cometen*, 51, says, "In the present state of natural science, the need of speculation is so deeply felt that the English, a people now almost exclusively devoted to induction, cannot resist the temptation to speculate even on mathematico-physical hypotheses." Sometimes in reading certain scientific works we wonder whether the fancy is not aroused to assert itself by the very rigors of science, so luxuriantly does it flourish in those works. There is no end to interesting illustrations of this, but they are too evident to the thoughtful reader to require special notice.

11. Helmholtz, 363, says, "During the first half of the present century we had an Alexander von Humboldt, who was able to scan the scientific knowledge of his time in its details, and to bring it within one vast generalization. At the present juncture, it is obviously very doubtful whether this task could be accomplished in a similar way, even by a mind with gifts so peculiarly suited for the purpose as Humboldt's was, and if all his time and work were devoted to the purpose."

Professor Roscoe (address before the British Association, 1884) pronounces the progress of organic chemistry in the last twenty years "so vast, that it is already impossible for one individual, even though he devote his whole time and energies to the task, to master all the details, or make himself at home with the increasing mass of new facts which the busy workers in this field are daily bringing forth." The president, Lord Rayleigh, at the same meeting referred

to mechanics, electricity, heat, optics, acoustics, astronomy, and meteorology, and said, "Any one of these may well occupy the lifelong attention of a man of science; and to be thoroughly conversant with all of them is more than can be expected of any one individual, and is probably incompatible with the devotion of much time and energy to the actual advancement of knowledge."

12. Professor Zoellner (p. ix.) declares that he has come to the conclusion "that the majority of the representatives of the exact sciences in our day lack a clear knowledge of the first principles of the theory of knowledge." It became the habit to gather mere facts, and those who gathered them were unable to use them in drawing conclusions from them. "Yes, it even came to this, that the most modest effort to raise a part of the gathered facts, by means of inductive generalization, to a law or a principle, was branded by specialists as savoring of philosophical speculation." He holds, that, with all the mass of materials gathered by observation, our age is behind that of Newton in the conscious application of logical inductive principles. These facts have been so keenly felt by eminent scientists, that they have found it incumbent on them to connect with their scientific lectures, instruction on the laws of reasoning, and hints on the theory of knowledge. In 1874 Wundt said, "How one would have been astonished twenty years ago, to have discovered, in a work purely physical, an excursus on the problem of knowledge! Or how would it have been thought possible for a teacher of physics to have felt the need of giving his pupils a special lecture on the logical principles of his science?" (WUNDT, *Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Gegenwart*, 5.) The fact that attention is now paid to these problems is regarded by Wundt as evidence that scientists are beginning to appreciate the need of a nearer approach to philosophy.

13. Wundt, *Aufgabe*, 19, says, "The science of our day strives to obtain an harmonious view of the world, and has

already gathered many stones for the structure. But the requirements of the special sciences are not met by any of the existing systems, for they lack that circumspect use of scientific experience which the special sciences, and particularly the natural sciences, have a right to demand according to their present degree of development." That which the special sciences demand but cannot do, he regards as lying within the province of philosophy. Everywhere in the natural sciences he sees philosophical problems proposed, which accounts for the revival of interest in philosophy on the part of scientists. "The interest in philosophy has again been revived in the more general spheres of the scientific world, in which for a considerable time it was almost wholly neglected." Paulsen says, "The impulse to seek ultimate knowledge is the soul of all inquiry, even in the special sciences."

14. My study of Comte left the impression of breadth without depth and thoroughness and earnestness. There is a lack of sharp distinctions, of critical acumen, and of penetration to the ultimate consequences of the processes of thought. The most essential points are often treated superficially, and the disposition made of them shows that the real problems involved are not appreciated. Instead of regarding Comte as one of the main pillars of science, he has more properly been classed with the ancient sophists. All this can be admitted without depreciating his merits, especially in sociology; his works have been valuable as a ferment. I find my view of Comte confirmed by Huxley (*Lay Sermons*, "The Scientific Aspect of Positivism"). Comte's works had been recommended to him as a mine of wisdom; but he says, "I found the veins of ore few and far between, and the rock so apt to run to mud, that one incurred the risk of being intellectually smothered in the working. . . . That part of M. Comte's writings which deals with the philosophy of physical science appeared to me to possess singularly little value, and to show that he had but the most superficial

and merely second-hand knowledge of most branches of what is usually understood by science."

15. Reuschle, *Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft*, 28, gives some interesting illustrations how the extremes of speculation fifty years ago promoted the opposite extreme of empiricism. The journals on natural science, as a rule, published only empirical articles. Thus J. R. Mayer's article on *The Powers of Inanimate Nature* was rejected by one of the most prominent of these journals, because of its speculation. Yet that paper, which afterwards appeared in Liebig's *Annals of Chemistry*, contained the first published information of the mechanical theory of heat, one of the greatest discoveries of the nineteenth century. "Mayer was led to his discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat, by means of speculative considerations." Reuschle mentions as particularly prominent in connecting philosophy with natural science, the names of Helmholtz, Zoellner, Du Bois-Reymond, Hering, Darwin, Wallace, Faraday, Fechner, Liebig, and Haeckel. The list might be greatly increased by eminent names from America, England, France, and Germany.

16. The quotation is from *Mind*, 1876, 5. How little agreement there is among scientists, is evident, among other things, from the controversies occasioned by the address of Du Bois-Reymond on *The Limits of Natural Science*. The disputes connected with evolution and Darwinism are so well known that they need no special mention. When we come to questions pertaining to experience and necessary truth, there is any thing but agreement among scientists. The fact is, few of them are at home in philosophical questions. Some agree with Wundt, who says (*Aufgabe*), "However high the natural science of the day places experience, not a few physicists agree that in our knowledge of nature certain *a priori* elements are actively concerned, among which is found especially the principle of causality."

Others agree with Jevons (738): "I demur to the assumption that there is any necessary truth even in such fundamental laws of nature as the indestructibility of matter, the conservation of energy, or the laws of motion." Can agreement be expected among scientists so long as there is no agreement on the principles? And if scientists cannot agree respecting the philosophical principles on which all their investigations depend, can they blame philosophers for their disagreement?

17. The fundamental problems in Hume's philosophy were discussed by the author in an address on *Grundprobleme in Hume*, before the Philosophical Society of Berlin, and published by that society (*Philosophische vortraege*: R. Stricker, Halle).

Professor Adamson, in *Ency. Brit.*, article "Hume," referring to the influence of Locke and Hume in determining the course of English philosophy, says, "It was left for Hume to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final consequences of that view, so far as cognition is concerned. The terms which he employs are not those which we should now employ; but the declaration, in the introduction to the *Treatise*, that the science of human nature must be treated according to the experimental method, is, in fact, equivalent to the statement of the principle implied in Locke's *Essay*, that the problems of psychology and of the theory of knowledge are identical. And this view is the characteristic of what we may call the English school of philosophy." Mr. Sedgwick (*Mind*, 1876, 228) also holds that English thinkers, with few exceptions (Berkeley and Coleridge), are psychologists, not philosophers. They take it for granted that there is a world external to the mind, hence they do not enter into a critical examination of the existence of an external world. "All our philosophical writers are dominated by the notion of a separation between consciousness and its objects, and approach philosophical

questions with the notion of settling what we can know of objects, with what certainty we can know it, and what our wisest course of action is in consequence. But this is to adopt the distinction between the mind and its organism, and the world external to the mind, as an ultimate one. Our English writers are thus psychologists in the above-explained sense of the term, and not philosophers in the strict sense."

18. Although there is no agreement among thinkers respecting the exact nature of psychology, it is generally admitted that it should be taken wholly out of metaphysics. Mansel holds that psychology inquires, "what are the actual phenomena of the several acts and states of the human mind, and the actual laws or conditions on which they depend." Sedgwick (*Mind*, 1876, 223) claims that "the main purpose of psychology is to investigate the laws by which different states of consciousness either co-exist or follow one another." A clear distinction between consciousness and its contents is made by Hodgson (*Mind*, 1884, 70): "Psychology has nothing to do with consciousness *quâ* content, or with the relations of its parts as content, in which aspect it is the mirror or subjective side of the universe of things. That is the domain of philosophy. The business of psychology is with sentient beings, with the classification and examination of their faculties, the genesis of the various modes of their sentience and intelligence, and generally the real actions and relations between them and their environment." Similar views prevail to some extent in Germany. Steinthal declares, "Psychology is altogether an experimental science, and its aim cannot extend further than to determine the conditions under which by experience a certain result may be expected. Further than this natural science also does not extend, and every step farther in the direction of causation or teleology belongs to metaphysics and the philosophy of religion." Benno Erdmann says, "The general, formal science of mind, that is, the science of the laws of the psychical processes of development, is psychology."

Other views of psychology also prevail. Thus Ueberweg defines it as "the science of the nature and natural laws of the human mind." Spencer makes his psychology in part what others have termed a theory of knowledge; that is, a theory of the relation existing between sensation and the object producing it, or between thought and its external object. (*Psychology*, I. 132, 133.) Volkmann (*Grundriss der Psychologie*, 3) defines psychology as "aiming to describe the several activities of the soul, to interpret their laws, and to throw light on the nature of the soul." Without making psychology itself metaphysical, it is but natural that its results should be used for a better understanding of the soul itself. Höffding, the Danish psychologist, pronounces psychology the doctrine of the soul, or the doctrine of that which thinks, feels, and wills, in distinction from physics, which treats of what moves in and fills space. Just as in physics the beginning is not made with determining the essence of matter, so in psychology the nature of the soul is not the starting-point. He treats the subject as purely empirical, and wants facts to be carefully distinguished from theories. Bain declares that "the only account of mind strictly admissible in scientific psychology consists in specifying three properties or functions, — feeling, will or volition, and thought or intellect, — through which all our experience, as well objective as subjective, is built up. This positive enumeration is what must stand for a definition." (*Mental and Moral Science*, 2.) Sully (*Outlines of Psychology*, 1) says, "What mind is in itself as a substance, is a question that lies outside psychology, and belongs to philosophy. As a science, psychology is concerned only with the phenomena of mind, with mental states, psychical facts, or whatever else we choose to call them. Bowne (*Introduction to Psychological Theory*, 1) says, "Psychology deals with mental facts and processes. It aims to describe and classify those facts and processes, to discover and state their laws, and to form some theory concerning their origin and cause."

19. Utterances similar to those given in the text might be quoted from numerous scientific authorities. In his address before the British Association, the president, Professor Allmann, said, "Between thought and the physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but no conceivable analogy. . . . The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by which, as a bridge, we may span it over." I shall add a quotation from Romanes, a Darwinist: "And here I may as well at once give it as my opinion that, of however much service the theory of materialism may be made up to a certain point, it can never be accepted by any competent mind as a final explanation of the facts with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as its use may be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine, it is wholly inadequate as an hypothesis in philosophy." In an address on Descartes, Professor Huxley also admits the inadequacy of materialism to account for mental phenomena. In Germany, popular scientists like Buechner have popularized materialism; but among the deeper scientists they have no standing, and they cannot claim to speak in the name of science. The leading physiologists admit that matter does not explain the facts of mind.

20. T. M. Lindsay (*Mind*, 1877, 481) says that the philosopher loses much if "he attempts to confine his philosophical observations either to the working of his own mind, or to an examination of the writings of previous or contemporary thinkers. It is his duty to measure the pulse of human thought, to note its movements, its expressions, to understand its nature, and to describe it. His task is to reduce thought and its movements to scientific formulæ. But if he isolates the problem, if he examines mind only by the introspective method, if he measures its movements in some narrow technical fashion, if he overlooks the upheavals of mind in art, poetry, and science, or its crystallization in political and ecclesiastical institutions, he has wantonly

and arbitrarily limited the sphere of his observation, and his attempt must be abortive. . . . The professional metaphysician who keeps within merely technical limits is liable to make a caricature, not the living reproduction of thought." This applies especially to the psychologist, whose views should be broad as well as deep, comprehensive as well as thorough. He must aim to give an account of the operations of *mind*, not merely of *a mind*.

21. "Even if it explains the form of thought, logic leaves unanswered another fundamental question of rational self-criticism, namely, whether and how far the content of consciousness corresponds with reality; that is, the question respecting the possibility and validity of knowledge. For this another subject is necessary, namely, the *Theory of Knowledge*. . . . It is the first task of this theory to explain how we happen to refer the content of our consciousness, which is produced by us, and which we therefore recognize as ours, to something which we are not, so as to be able to speak of knowing and comprehending a reality different from ourselves." (SCHAAERSCHMIDT in *Philos. Monatsh.*, 1878, 7.) Benno Erdmann holds that it is the aim of this theory to determine the relation of the object to our knowledge of it; "to give the laws of the relation of knowledge to things." Ulrici held that the theory is to determine whether by correct thinking we attain a knowledge of reality. There might be correct thinking, even if there were no external world.

22. Intuitionism has been used in various senses; but the disputes respecting it are on the ground and validity rather than on the fact of intuitions. On the use of the word, H. Calderwood (*Mind*, 1876, 201) says, "Intuition is a direct beholding of an object or a truth. It is immediate knowledge of the thing itself. It stands in contrast with knowledge of one thing through means of another, as in reasoning; and also in contrast with admission of real

existence without personal observation of the thing, as in belief. It is direct vision. . . . Intuition, then, is perception in contrast with comparison or judgment, though the term has been applied to the notion obtained by simple comparison. It is a single and direct act in contrast with a mental process." Applying the doctrine of intuitions to morals, he says, "Let me begin with a concise statement of the intuitional theory of moral distinctions. Self-evident laws of conduct afford the only rational basis for distinguishing the moral qualities of actions; and self-evident moral laws are intuitively known by men, that is, directly recognized by the reason. Or, to throw it into another form, moral laws are applied by all men, and are recognized as essentially true and authoritative, though their validity has not been determined by personal induction, nor established by experience of past ages, nor by the *consensus* of opinion among the more intelligent and civilized nations, but is self-evident to the reason." Dr. M'Cosh (*Princeton Review*, November, 1878, 895) says of the "marks and tests of our intuitions:" "Their primary and essential character is not necessity, as Leibnitz held, nor necessity and universality, as Kant maintained; but self-evidence. They look immediately on things, and contain their evidence within themselves. Being so, they become necessary, that is, have a necessity of conviction, which is the secondary test; and universal, that is, entertained by all men, which is their tertiary corroboration." The essential points are the reality, the reason, and consequent authority, of their "self-evidence." One man may reject what another pronounces "self-evident to the reason." How, then, shall the dispute be decided?

23. Whately says, "Logic is entirely conversant about language," which is true so far as language is the instrument used in reasoning. De Morgan says, "Formal logic deals with *names*, and not with either the *ideas* or *things* to which these names belong." "Names are exclusively the objects of formal logic." Mill claims that logic has to do with

facts or things themselves, rather than with our ideas about them. Jevons says, "We may therefore say that logic treats ultimately of thoughts and things, and immediately of the signs which stand for them." Venn says, "Every one, it is to be presumed, will admit that a proposition is a statement in words of a judgment about things." I should say, *no* proposition; thus making the sense the very opposite. A proposition is always a statement in words of a judgment about concepts. Herbert Spencer's peculiar view of logic, as distinct from the process of reasoning, is found in his *Psychology*, II. 87. These conflicting views respecting the very nature of logic and its subject-matter will show the student how much is yet required to bring harmony and unity into this study. In spite of the great attention devoted to the subject, its sphere and fundamental principles are not even agreed upon.

24. In *Mind*, 1883, 18, the editor states that the sense of metaphysics best justified historically is "ontology or theory of being." While physics is concerned with "the being of things as they appear," "metaphysic, as going beyond physic, has then to do with the being of things as they are, or with their being as the ground of their appearing." Speaking of transcendental metaphysics, J. S. Mill (*Logic*, first edit. I. 9) says, "To this science appertain the great and much-debated questions of the existence of matter; of the existence of spirit, and the distinction between it and matter; of the reality of time and space, as things without the mind, and distinguishable from the objects which are said to exist *in* them." Unfortunately, later English writers have used the term so vaguely, or have made it so general, that it can hardly be claimed to represent a definite sphere of inquiry. There are definitions in which scarce a trace of the historic use of the word is found. Professor Bain (*Cont. Rev.*, 29, 928) says, "By metaphysical study, or metaphysics, I mean — what seems intended by the designation in its current employment at present — the circle of

the mental or subjective sciences. The central department of the field is *PSYCHOLOGY*; and the adjunct to psychology is logic, which has its foundation partly in psychology, but still more in the sciences altogether, whose procedure it gathers up and formulates. The outlying and dependent branches are, the narrow metaphysics or ontology, ethics, sociology, together with art or æsthetics. There are other applied sciences of the department, as education and philology." Another writer (C. E. Appleton, *Cont. Rev.*, vol. 28, 925) makes the "collective ego" the subject of metaphysics. "This collective ego, this best self, this element of common consciousness in man as a member of society, standing behind and operating through the ordinary individual consciousness, is precisely, and from first to last, and nothing else than, the subject-matter of metaphysic as it has been understood since Kant. Metaphysic is the science conversant with the collective consciousness of man as a member of society."

25. This view, particularly prominent in Vischer's *Ästhetik*, is by no means confined to the Germans, but is generally accepted by those who make beauty more than the agreeable and mere sentience. Thus Cousin in his *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good* (Wight's translation, 149), says, "Form cannot be simply a form: it must be the form of something. Physical beauty is, then, the sign of an internal beauty, which is spiritual and moral beauty; and this is the foundation, the principle, the unity of the beautiful." He quotes Reid's *Essay on Taste*, in which the Scotch philosopher also argues "that sensible beauty is only the image of moral beauty." Cousin repeatedly states the same thought. Thus he says, "The foundation of the beautiful is the idea; what makes art is before all the realization of the idea, and not the imitation of such or such a particular form" (158). "Every work of art that does not express an idea, signifies nothing; in addressing itself to such or such a sense, it must penetrate to the mind, to the

soul, and bear thither a thought, a sentiment, capable of touching or elevating it" (171). "Genius is a ready and sure perception of the right proportion in which the ideal and the natural form and thought ought to be united. This union is the perfection of art." He also says, "that all arts are such only so far as they express the idea concealed under the form, and are addressed to the soul through the senses" (178). The idea or ideal, as the essential element in beauty, dates back to the philosophy of Plato.

26. Ideals, as we have seen, are purely mental products, though in their formation the mind receives important help from existing objects. They do not inhere in things, nor can they be produced by any energy in things. Of much that is, I declare that it ought not to be; and of much which is not, that it ought to be. Experience is necessary to form these ideals, but they are not given by the experience of what is. We meet real, not ideal men; from the past and present we learn what governments have been and are, not what they should be. We place the ideal against the real, and condemn the latter in the interest of the former. Nor are these ideals a composition, a conglomeration formed by choosing the most perfect elements from what exists. The perfections in ideals are not scattered about in that way, they do not at all exist externally. But even if they existed, how could the mind discover and select them, and form them into unity, unless it had in itself a standard of perfection? All such eclecticism implies a principle of selection and unification. How could a compound be recognized as the ideal unless the mind had a standard with which to compare it? Pushing our inquiries back into matter itself, we cannot find in that the explanation of morality. Combine the chemical elements as we please, we can never get any thing from them except what is really (though perhaps only in embryo) in them. By multiplying these elements, or by subjecting them to any known laws of physics, we never rise above what is to what ought to be. Nor is the ideal even an inference

drawn from things. If a certain thing is, I may infer that something else must be ; but, that something else *ought* to be, is not a logical deduction from things, simply because it is not in things. We may call it the logic of the entire personality, but not merely of the intellect. If so absurd a notion as this were advocated, that the ideal is inherited, it would not meet the case at all. It is not merely the transmission of the ideal which is to be accounted for, but also its first origin. If only an inheritance, I may reject it ; only if it is rational, am I bound by it. Does inheritance make it rational ? Does environment, or history, or training ? These things become clear as soon as the question is answered : What ultimately determines the ideal of morality ?

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